# Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



**March 2023** 

# **Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (\$ in thousands)**

	FY 2022	Price Program FY 2023	Price	Program	FY 2024		
	<u>Actuals</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	<b>Estimate</b>
CTR	344,849	7,187	-438	351,598	7,727	-8,326	350,999

# I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>:

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) enables the Department of Defense (DoD) to work cooperatively with international and interagency partners to reduce or eliminate the threat of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or WMD-related materials and to facilitate the detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases that could be used as an early warning mechanism for disease outbreaks that could affect the Armed Forces of the United States or its allies, regardless of whether such diseases are caused by biological weapons. DoD derives authority to carry out the CTR Program through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (Public Law 113-291), and has used this authority to reduce chemical, biological, and nuclear threats to the United States and its interests worldwide. To accomplish this, the CTR Program includes several lines of effort: the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), the Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP), Global Nuclear Security (GNS), Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE), and Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE). These efforts facilitate the elimination and safe and secure transportation of WMD, weapon components, weapon-related material, and associated delivery vehicles. They also prevent the proliferation of WMD and WMD-related materials, technology, and expertise.

	\$ in thousands	
FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024
<u>Actuals</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
2 996	6.859	6.815

# A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

The SOAE program supports cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, related materials, and infrastructure, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities; it builds partner capacity to secure related components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.

#### Contingency Planning and Global Engagement

Increase U.S. preparedness and partner capacity to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems, critical missile commodities, and associated capabilities, in order to reduce potential emerging threats and proliferation concerns in an efficient and expeditious manner.

		\$ in thousan	<u>ds</u>
	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024
	<u>Actuals</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE)	13,249	14,998	16,400

The CSE program supports the cooperative elimination of chemical weapons, related materials, and infrastructure; and builds the capacity of international partners to secure chemical weapon precursors and toxic industrial chemicals, as well as associated components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.

#### Global

В.

Increase preparedness to support a potential future chemical weapons (CW) elimination effort and support international and interagency partners' ability to identify and implement chemical security best practices.

# Indo-Pacific

Reduce the threat of non-state actors acquiring or using improvised CW or toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) by addressing gaps in legislation and regulation, training, transportation security, facility security, inventory management, materials management, and disposal; enable partners to effectively collaborate to secure chemicals across the supply chain.

#### Eurasia

Enable partners to address or mitigate chemical security gaps and vulnerabilities in legislation and regulations, transportation security, facility security, and inventory management.

#### Middle East and North Africa

Increase partner capabilities to reduce threats of violent extremist organizations obtaining or using CW, toxic industrial chemicals, and CW precursors while monitoring for emerging CW proliferation risks.

	<u>\$ in thousands</u>			
FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024		
<u>Actuals</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>		
17.768	18.088	19.406		

#### C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS)

The GNS program supports the cooperative dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs, as well as the transportation and disposition of related systems and associated materials; and builds international partner capacity and expertise to counter nuclear smuggling and secure nuclear weapons, and related components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise, as well as high-threat radiological material.

#### Global

Maintain the capability to safely and securely transport, store, and dispose of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons material, nuclear weapons components, and high-threat radiological material by identifying and implementing security best practices.

#### Eurasia

Support partner nation efforts to enhance nuclear material security, nuclear site security, and nuclear and high-threat radiological material inventory control. Improve partner nation capabilities to detect, interdict, and safety secure and return nuclear and high-threat radiological materials to regulatory control.

#### Central Asia

Support partner nation efforts to enhance nuclear material security, nuclear site security, and nuclear and high-threat radiological material inventory control. Improve partner nation capabilities to detect, interdict, and safely secure and return nuclear and radiological materials to regulatory control.

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#### <u>Asia</u>

Strengthen nuclear and high-threat radiological material security through subject matter expert exchanges and the promotion of international best practices; prepare partners to secure, characterize, and eliminate nuclear and high-threat radiological materials; and prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radiological smuggling activity.

	\$ in thousands	i
FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024
<u>Actuals</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
229 022	235 000	228 030

# D. <u>Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)</u>

The BTRP reduces the proliferation of biological weapons (BW), BW components, and BW-related technologies and expertise. The program seeks to facilitate security, detection, and reporting of diseases that could affect the armed forces of the United States or its allies and partners. BTRP's activities include One Health multi-sectoral approaches to improve coordination and enhancement of partner country and regional biosafety and biosecurity (BS&S) and biosurveillance (BSV) capabilities. These capabilities counter the threat of pathogen release, prevent theft or diversion of biological materials, and establish an early detection capability for biological threats to contain outbreaks at their source before they become destabilizing regional events or pose a threat to U.S. forces, the U.S. homeland, or partners abroad.

#### Eurasia

Strengthen regional linkages and facilitate sharing BS&S and BSV best practices; and partner with relevant regional and international organizations to identify emerging disease risks, monitor sustainability of investments, and improve regional reporting of disease outbreaks.

#### Armenia

Ensure self-sustainability of BS&S and BSV capabilities; implement and operationalize a One Health BSV system that includes multi-sectoral ministerial involvement; and strengthen relationships with regional and international partners through biothreat reduction network engagement, and data sharing.

#### Azerbaijan

Reduce the likelihood of and improve the ability to respond to the release of dangerous biological materials; link national epidemiological institutions to regional and international partners to sustain BSV capabilities, and data sharing; and bolster regional cooperation to integrate and sustain technical expertise.

#### Georgia

Support the Richard G. Lugar Center's role as a national and regional center of excellence for biological threat reduction; and facilitate BSV studies to share expertise and reinforce training programs.

#### Romania

Ensure the effective use of BS&S capability and biorisk management (BRM) processes to prevent the theft, loss, and/or release of dangerous biological materials, technology, and expertise; strengthen laboratory network capabilities to facilitate safe, secure, and reliable laboratory diagnostics; and improve capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological events and disease outbreaks while helping Georgia characterize local and regional threats.

#### Turkey

Improve the multi-sectoral, One Health approach to BSV; build a BRM program aligned to international biosafety regulations and guidelines to deny Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) acquisition of pathogens; ensure compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) to detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks especially along the border with Syria; and instill international best practices in epidemiological control.

#### Ukraine

Due to the conflict in Ukraine, many activities planned for Ukraine through FY 2024 are suspended; BTRP will execute program efforts where possible with Ukraine including training, equipment and consumable delivery and BSV studies to help Ukraine characterize local and regional disease threats.

#### Middle East and Western and Central Asia

Mitigate the risk of VEO acquisition of biological materials, equipment, and/or expertise; prepare partners to address the full spectrum of biological threats across the region, whether naturally occurring or deliberate, existing or emerging; and reduce biological threats compounded by transboundary human and animal movement as well as mass social gatherings.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States (Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates)

Develop partnerships to strengthen regional biological prevention, detection, and reporting capabilities; strengthen multilateral information sharing; enhance One Health integration; and promote BS&S and BSV best practices.

#### Iraq

Provide BS&S equipment, processes, and regulations for entities that oversee, handle, store, or transport dangerous biological materials in compliance with international guidelines; and ensure an effective disease surveillance and reporting system that reduces the risk of proliferation of dangerous biological materials.

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#### Jordan

Improve the ability to detect, diagnose, investigate, and report human and animal diseases; strengthen national capabilities relating to biosafety and biosecurity practices and workforce development; and build capacity to lead an effective regional BSV and BRM network.

#### Kazakhstan

Ensure the sustained ability to manage, maintain, and adhere to international BS&S best practices; ensure sustained capacity to conduct effective BSV; and leverage Kazakhstan as a regional leader to promote adherence to international norms and best practices throughout the region.

#### Uzbekistan

Complete the framework for a functional One Health network and transition from a bilateral to multilateral engagement.

#### Africa

Establish and strengthen biological threat reduction networks; strengthen BRM standards; and ensure sustainability of technical capability and infrastructure investments.

#### Cameroon

Secure collections of pathogens into a minimum number of facilities to prevent VEO access while also reducing the risk of inadvertent and intentional exposures; increase capacity to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks of highly pathogenic diseases; and strengthen linkages between the human and animal, and defense sectors to facilitate sharing of BSV best practices.

# Ethiopia

Due to the on-going civil unrest in Ethiopia, DTRA issued a Stop Work Order per DoD-wide guidance to pause all engagements with the Government of Ethiopia. Pending a more stable environment and revised DoD guidance, DTRA remains prepared to re-engage with Ethiopia.

#### Gabon

Address BS&S gaps and reduce vulnerabilities at the International Center for Medical Research of Franceville (CIRMF) by supporting implementation of an effective BRM program and capacities needed to protect pathogen collections from diversion or misuse; and establish ability to maintain and sustain investment in high containment laboratories.

# Kenya

Enhance the capability to identify, consolidate, and secure collections of pathogens that may be vulnerable to VEOs; and increase the capability to survey, detect, diagnose, and report on outbreaks in a safe and timely manner.

#### Liberia

Improve laboratory diagnostic capabilities through the provision of training, equipment, and facility construction; and enable improved laboratory diagnostic and pathogen security capabilities in alignment with international standards.

#### Nigeria

Strengthen biosecurity at the select Nigerian facilities that handle pathogens through improved physical security, material control and accountability, transportation security, and implementation of sustainable BRM practices; establish a national select agent list; and establish a sustainable BSV network that is capable of accurately and effectively detecting, diagnosing, and reporting disease outbreak events.

### North Africa

Strengthen BRM partner capacity in the region; and establish regional linkages between BTRP partner institutes to ensure sustainability.

# Senegal

Improve the capability to detect, diagnose, and report infectious diseases safely, securely, and in a timely manner by delivering training, developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), and renovating select national-level laboratory facilities.

#### South Africa

Solidify South Africa's position as a regional leader in southern Africa (and on the African continent) to promote best practices in BS&S and BSV; demonstrate BSV capabilities in alignment with international standards; and ensure sustainability of appropriate BS&S capacities.

# Uganda

Secure Uganda's pathogens by reducing the risk of exposure at laboratory facilities; and increase the capability to survey, detect, diagnose, and report on outbreaks in a safe and timely manner.

#### Southeast Asia

Enhance BS&S capabilities to reduce the release of dangerous biological materials and pathogens; and enhance sustainable capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological threats.

#### Cambodia

Strengthen Cambodia's National Laboratory System workforce and diagnostic capacity; increase zoonotic disease surveillance and outbreak preparedness capabilities; improve epidemiology and clinical training programs, including in-service and post-service education; and improve BS&S conditions at public health and veterinary laboratories.

#### India

Enhance India's ability to rapidly detect, diagnose, and report biological events, in accordance with international guidelines; identify, inventory, and consolidate pathogen collections into a minimum number of facilities; and instill investigative and analytic epidemiological skills among the public health and veterinary workforce.

#### Indonesia

Enhance Indonesia's abilities to prevent, detect, and report outbreak events and to work collaboratively to strengthen BS&S by enhancing Indonesia's capability to prevent the proliferation of biological materials, technology, and expertise.

#### Laos

Establish and strengthen Laos' policy and legislation for BS&S and BSV; strengthen laboratory capacity to conduct diagnostics safely and securely; strengthen disease detection, reporting, analysis, outbreak investigation, and preparedness for outbreaks; and strengthen scientific capability to enable detection of disease risk and provide evidence-based data to decision makers in order to inform BSV strategies.

#### Malaysia

Develop a national-level program that enhances BS&S capacities to prevent the proliferation of biological materials, technology, and expertise; develop regional leadership capabilities in BS&S culture, multi-sectoral coordination, and Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs); and facilitate multi-sectorial BS&S and BSV collaboration toward a One Health-compliant system to enhance capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological events.

# **Philippines**

Enhance Philippines' BSV capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks quickly, consistent with international reporting requirements; and enhance BS&S capabilities to secure and maintain control of pathogen collections through equipment and facility upgrades and BRM trainings.

# Republic of Korea

Enhance the Republic of Korea's ability to counter WMD threats emanating from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); and improve the capacity to detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks.

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#### Thailand

Integrate BSV activities to maximize Thailand's ability to detect and report outbreaks; enhance BS&S capabilities, including pathogen inventory control and BRM standards; and support Thailand's role as a regional BS&S and BSV leader.

#### Vietnam

Consolidate Vietnam's public health and veterinary pathogen collections into a minimum number of secure facilities; strengthen BS&S capabilities; implement a multi-sectoral One Health laboratory network to enhance the capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological incidents; and strengthen scientific capability to generate evidence-based data for improved national BSV strategies.

		\$ in thousan	<u>ds</u>
	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024
	<u>Actuals</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
. Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP)	58,754	45,890	46,324

The PPP strengthens partner nations' WMD proliferation prevention capabilities by providing detection, interdiction, and domain awareness capabilities related to WMD trafficking across borders or through maritime jurisdictions.

#### Eurasia

Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD as well as WMD-related materials, technologies, and delivery systems across their borders, through their ports, or near their territorial waters and enforce WMD-related United Nations Security Council Regulations (UNSCR) and other international regulatory frameworks. Work with allies and partners to constrain and delay the development or advancement of adversary WMD and delivery system programs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure, and associated training to improve, and then maintain, core proliferation prevention, interdiction, detection, characterization, attribution, and denial of benefit capabilities.

#### Middle East

Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD as well as WMD-related materials, technologies, and delivery systems by VEOs or other state or non-state actors. Work with allies and partners to constrain and delay the development or advancement of adversary WMD and delivery system programs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure, and associated training to improve, and then maintain, core proliferation prevention, interdiction, detection, characterization, attribution, and denial of benefit capabilities.

#### North Africa

Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD as well as WMD-related materials, technologies, and delivery systems by VEOs or other state or non-state actors. Work with allies and partners to constrain and delay the development or advancement of adversary WMD and delivery system programs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure, and associated training to improve, and then maintain, core proliferation prevention, interdiction, detection, characterization, attribution, and denial of benefit capabilities.

#### Southeast Asia

Improve partner nation capabilities to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD-related materials, technologies, and delivery systems through their ports or near their territorial waters, and enforce WMD-related UNSCR and other international regulatory frameworks by providing equipment, infrastructure, and training to enhance maritime domain awareness and export control measures. Work with allies and partners to constrain and delay the development or advancement of adversary WMD and delivery system programs.

		<u>\$ in thousan</u>	<u>ds</u>
	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024
	<u>Actuals</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
F. Other Assessments / Administration Costs	23,060	30,763	34,024

The OAAC program provides general program and administrative support for the DoD CTR Program. OAAC funds DTRA's U.S. Embassy and overseas office support; Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS); program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program activities contract logistics support (e.g.. shipping, travel, and language translation services); travel support for DTRA's senior leadership, Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel, and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program; and execution of assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners. In addition, these funds will be used for DoD CTR Program Operational Evaluations, which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose and that such assistance is being used efficiently and effectively. In 2024, there will be an expansion from eight to ten planned operational evaluations, and additional DTRA personnel within U.S. Embassies in the Baltics, the Middle East, and Northern Africa.

# II. Force Structure Summary:

N/A

		FY 2023					
	•	Congressional Action					
	FY 2022	Budget				Current	FY 2024
A. BA Subactivities	<u>Actuals</u>	Request	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<b>Appropriated</b>	<b>Enacted</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	\$2,996	\$6,859	\$0	0.00%	\$6,859	\$6,859	\$6,815
Chemical Security and Elimination	\$13,249	\$14,998	\$0	0.00%	\$14,998	\$14,998	\$16,400
Global Nuclear Security	\$17,768	\$18,088	\$0	0.00%	\$18,088	\$18,088	\$19,406
Biological Threat Reduction Program	\$229,022	\$225,000	\$10,000	4.44%	\$235,000	\$235,000	\$228,030
5. Proliferation Prevention	\$58,754	\$45,890	\$0	0.00%	\$45,890	\$45,890	\$46,324
6. Other Assessments / Administrative Costs	<u>\$23,060</u>	\$30,763	<u>\$0</u>	0.00%	<u>\$30,763</u>	\$30,763	\$34,024
Total	\$344,849	\$341,598	\$10,000	2.93%	\$351,598	\$351,598	\$350,999

	Change	Change
B. Reconciliation Summary	FY 2023/FY 2023	FY 2023/FY 2024
BASELINE FUNDING	\$341,598	\$351,598
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	10,000	
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	0	
Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent	0	
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	0	
SUBTOTAL APPROPRIATED AMOUNT	351,598	
Fact-of-Life Changes (2023 to 2023 Only)	0	
SUBTOTAL BASELINE FUNDING	351,598	
Supplemental	0	
Reprogrammings	0	
Price Changes		7,727
Functional Transfers		0
Program Changes		-8,326
CURRENT ESTIMATE	351,598	350,999
Less: Supplemental	0	
NORMALIZED CURRENT ESTIMATE	\$351,598	\$350,999

FY 2023 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)	\$341,598
1. Congressional Adjustments	\$10,000
a) Distributed Adjustments	\$10,000
Biological Threat Reduction Program  Congressional increase to the Biological Threat Reduction Program  (FY 2023 Baseline: \$225,000 thousand)	\$10,000
b) Undistributed Adjustments	\$0
c) Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent	\$0
d) General Provisions	\$0
FY 2023 Appropriated Amount	\$351,598
2. Supplemental Appropriations	\$0
a) Supplemental Funding	\$0
3. Fact-of-Life Changes	\$0
a) Functional Transfers	\$0
b) Technical Adjustments	\$0
c) Emergent Requirements	\$0

FY 2023 Baseline Funding	\$351,598
4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)	\$0
a) Increases	\$0
b) Decreases	\$0
Revised FY 2023 Estimate	\$351,598
5. Less: Item 2, Supplemental Appropriation and Item 4, Reprogrammings	\$0
a) Less: Supplemental Funding	\$0
FY 2023 Normalized Current Estimate	\$351,598
6. Price Change	\$7,727
7. Functional Transfers	\$0
a) Transfers In	\$0
b) Transfers Out	\$0
8. Program Increases	\$4,576
a) Annualization of New FY 2023 Program	\$0
b) One-Time FY 2024 Increases	\$0
c) Program Growth in FY 2024	\$4,576

1) Other Assessments/Administrative Costs	
<ol> <li>Chemical Security and Elimination</li></ol>	\$1,072
3) Global Nuclear Security  The funding increase in FY 2024 addresses increasing requirements including work in the Black Sea region and urgent assistance in Ukraine.  (FY 2023 Baseline: \$18,088 thousand)	\$920
9. Program Decreases	\$-12,902
a) Annualization of FY 2023 Program Decreases	\$0
b) One-Time FY 2023 Increases	\$0
c) Program Decreases in FY 2024	\$-12,902
1) Biological Threat Reduction Program - 1	S-10,000
2) Biological Threat Reduction Program - 2	\$-2,133

# III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands): (Cont.)

# IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

• Enhance partner capabilities to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems and corresponding commodities, technologies, and expertise; and initiate activities that support disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities as well as improve partner capabilities to secure technology and expertise; and develop a post-interdiction WMD delivery system commodities recognition/disposition course for delivery to partner nations.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

 Advance preparedness for cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, infrastructure, and related materials, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities and partner capability to secure technology and expertise.

FY 2024 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

• Advance preparedness for cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, infrastructure, and related materials, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities and partner capability to secure technology and expertise, especially in Southeast Asia.

# B. Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE):

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

Continue to increase U.S. preparedness for chemical weapons (CW) contingency elimination operations including operational logistics and demonstration
of material solutions needed to close critical gaps in destruction technology; and continue identifying and developing chemical security best practices for
implementation in partner countries.

#### Indo-Pacific

• Enhance the capability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to respond to chemical unexploded ordinance (UXO) munitions; and secure, account for, transport,

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CTR

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

and/or destroy CW on the Korean peninsula; and

Implement chemical security framework and national chemical inventory tracking systems and associated training in the Philippines.

#### Middle East and North Africa

- Train and equip responsible organizations in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting;
- Initiate efforts to equip Moroccan partners with mobile identification and characterization suite (MICS) capabilities and associated training; and
- Support the Iraq CBRN conference to gain stakeholder buy-in and refine follow-on requirements for a chemical security standards project.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

• Increase U.S. preparedness for chemical weapons (CW) contingency elimination operations including operational logistics and demonstration of material solutions needed to close critical gaps in destruction technology.

#### Indo-Pacific

- Enhance the capability of the ROK to respond to chemical UXO munitions; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy CW on the Korean peninsula;
- Assess capabilities to manage chemicals of security concern across the life-cycle, and commence workshops, training, and table-top exercises based on outcomes of assessments in the Philippines; and
- Complete the chemical security capabilities assessment in Indonesia in order to initiate a project, as applicable.

#### Middle East and North Africa

- Complete training in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting to reduce threats of violent extremist organizations obtaining or using improvised CW; and
- Complete MICS procurement and delivery to Moroccan partners and continue associated training.

FY 2024 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

• Increase U.S. preparedness for chemical weapons (CW) contingency elimination operations including improvements to existing elimination systems,

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

operational logistics, and demonstration of processes and material solutions.

#### Indo-Pacific

- Enhance the chemical UXO response capability solutions in coordination with United States Forces Korea initiatives for overall ROK explosive ordnance disposal interoperability; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy CW on the Korean peninsula;
- Establish a train-the-trainer capability for the Philippines Strategic Trade Management Office strategic goods tracking system and related equipment; continue to assist with implementation of a national level chemical security framework; and
- Implement training programs in Indonesia and the Philippines in order to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to independently develop and implement effective chemical countermeasures strategies.

#### Middle East and North Africa

- Assist Iraq with building and institutionalizing chemical security standards and best practices; and
- Provide training and expert exchanges to the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie to increase mobile laboratory capabilities.

# C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

- Increase preparedness and capabilities to support global transportation and disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear or high-threat radiological materials; and
- Complete support of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear security training efforts, initiatives, and other international nuclear security exchange; develop and implement an IAEA sustainment plan.

# Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites in Kazakhstan, provide training to Kazakh forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and transition sustainment of Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Material Inventory Management System to the host nation;
- Initiate counter nuclear smuggling capacity building efforts in Moldova and Georgia in collaboration with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute; and
- Assist nuclear security partner, the Ukraine National Guard, to enable CTR's nonproliferation mission during the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### Asia

- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through equipping, training, and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

- Increase preparedness and capabilities to rapidly and agilely respond globally to support nuclear weapons and fissile material removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commands and U.S. interagency partners; and
- Enhance the quality of and expand access to training on nuclear and high-threat radiological material security best practices for IAEA Member States by completing translation and upgrades of existing e-Learning nuclear security modules and supporting other international nuclear security exchanges.

#### Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites and provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear materials in Kazakhstan;
- Conduct counter nuclear smuggling projects in Georgia and Romania based on previous assessments, if applicable; and
- Provide assistance to nuclear security partner, the Ukraine National Guard, to enable CTR's nonproliferation mission during the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine.

#### Asia

- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through small-scale equipping, and training and exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

FY 2024 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

 Conduct logistics support for fissile material removal missions and increase preparedness and capabilities to rapidly and agilely respond globally to support nuclear weapons and fissile material removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commands and U.S. interagency partners.

OP-5 Exhibit

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Prepare Kazakhstan for transition of training support to host nation sustainment beyond 2025, increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites, and provide training to Kazakh forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear materials;
- Deliver counter nuclear smuggling train the trainer courses in Moldova and Georgia; and
- Provide assistance to nuclear security partner, the Ukraine National Guard, to enable CTR's nonproliferation mission during the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine.

#### Asia

- Cooperate with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Enhance the capability of ROK Nuclear Characterization Teams (NCT) through implementation of the Combined Requirements Implementation Plan and follow on cycles of advanced NCT training.

#### D. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP):

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Conduct gap assessments in the Balkan, Baltic, and Black Sea region;
- Initiate BRM training for laboratory staff in Romania;
- Conduct regional technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable partner nation laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events.
- Strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Leverage Georgian threat-reduction capabilities as a regional leader for BS&S and BSV;
- Mentor and support sustainment to ensure Azerbaijan's safe and effective use of their Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) for outbreak detection and diagnostics;
- Improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during a pathogen outbreak;
- Implement, train, and upgrade Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS)in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia;
- Complete gap assessments in the Balkan, Baltic, and Black Sea region;

# IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Complete remediation and validation of the Biosafety Level 3 suite at the CRL in Azerbaijan;
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey; and
- Where possible with Ukraine, train, equip and deliver consumables, regulatory subject matter expertise, and BSV studies to help characterize and mitigate local and regional disease threats.

#### Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Assess current BS&S and BSV capabilities within the GCC States;
- Initiate workshops on BS&S and BSV topics with GCC States, and continue to identify local capabilities to leverage for future sustainment efforts;
- Conduct bioscience fellowships to improve BSV and BS&S lab capacity and build regional scientific networks;
- implement, train staff, and upgrade EIDSS in Jordan and Kazakhstan;
- Conduct BSV studies and BS&S and BSV training in Iraq;
- Conduct laboratory diagnostics and BS&S trainings as well as One Health tabletop and field training exercises in Jordan;
- Conduct laboratory suite renovations, equipment procurement, diagnostic training, field epidemiology support, and training on disease detection in Iraq;
- Conduct multilateral engagement with partner country researchers to improve coordination as well as understanding of endemic and early warning of emergent biological threats;
- Complete remediation activities to ensure sustainable operations of the Kazakhstan CRL and Research Institute for Biological Safety Problems (RIBSP)
  laboratory; and
- Complete biological incident prevention and mitigation training for civil defense personnel in the GCC.

#### Africa

- Implement the training transition plan in Uganda;
- Conduct BRM training and BS&S improvements in Nigeria;
- Conduct BRM and SOP implementation in Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Complete national BRM strategic planning in Tanzania and Uganda;
- Provide epidemiology training and laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Initiate BRM training for laboratory staff, conduct laboratory assessments, and begin designs for limited upgrades at laboratory facilities in Gabon;
- Initiate construction of the Laboratoire National de l'Elevage et de Recherches Vétérinaires (LNERV) in Senegal;
- Strengthen regional BSV coordination;
- Continue multilateral engagement with partner country researchers to improve coordination as well as understanding of endemic and early warning of emergent biological threats;
- Engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an infectious disease outbreak;
- Continue collaboration with African Union Center for Disease Control (AUCDC) to develop biosecurity guidelines;
- Strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;
- Complete repair and certification of biosafety cabinets (BSCs) as well as critical infrastructure repairs and upgrades at the mobile diagnostic laboratory (MDL) in Guinea;
- Continue construction of the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) in Liberia;
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Guinea and Tanzania; and
- Remain prepared to re-engage with Ethiopia, pending Departmental guidance.

#### Asia

- Train regional partner nations to plan, organize and execute workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional experts within Asia to enhance collaboration on early detection of biological threat events;
- Conduct BSV studies and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Foster biosecurity dialogues in Southeast Asia and India;
- Develop and implement epidemiology training and exercises in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam;
- Enhance integrated, real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Continue development of the Malaysian One Health University Network (MyOHUN) as a regional leader in PHEOC development and sustainment within Asia;
- Conduct train-the-trainer events with MyOHUN in BRM curriculum development and self-auditing capabilities for the Science & Technology Research

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Institute for Defence (STRIDE);

- Initiate establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue multilateral engagement with partner country researchers to improve coordination as well as understanding of endemic and early warning of emergent biological threats;
- Engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an infectious disease outbreak;
- Establish Vietnam-led BRM train-the-trainer activities and posture Vietnam as a regional leader for BRM; and
- Establish a BRM trainer cadre in Indonesia to strengthen sustainable BRM capacities.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Initiate biosafety and biosecurity engagement activities with Bulgaria and Romania based on threat reduction opportunities as identified in assessments; Bulgaria engagement will likely be deferred due to limitations in cooperation;
- Conduct technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable partner nation laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Leverage Georgian threat-reduction capabilities as a regional leader for BS&S and BSV;
- Mentor and support sustainment to ensure their safe and effective use of Azerbaijan's CRL for outbreak detection and diagnostics;
- Strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Conduct gap assessments efforts in the Baltic, Balkan and Black Sea regions;
- Integrate Bulgaria and Romania into regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an infectious disease outbreak;
- Implement, train staff, and upgrade Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia;
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; and

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Execute program efforts where possible with Ukraine including training, equipment and consumable delivery, and BSV studies.

#### Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Complete assessments of current BS&S and BSV capabilities within the GCC States;
- Conduct workshops on BS&S and BSV topics with GCC States, and continue to identify local capabilities to leverage in future engagements;
- Conduct bioscience fellowships to improve BSV and BS&S lab capacity and build regional scientific networks;
- Provide BSV study opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and continued support for electronic disease reporting, to support sustainment of capabilities in Iraq;
- Conduct scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top
  and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula;
- Engage with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Jordan and Kazakhstan;
- Complete activities to ensure sustainable transition of operations of the Kazakhstan CRL; and RIBSP laboratory; and
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Jordan and Uzbekistan.

#### Africa

- Initiate laboratory and training facility construction for the CIRMF (PANVAC);
- Conduct BS&S improvements in Nigeria;
- Conduct BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Provide epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the government of Cameroon;
- Enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Engage with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security elements during an infectious disease outbreak;
- · Strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;

OP-5 Exhibit

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Implement transition training plan in Uganda;
- Complete laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Complete collaboration with AUCDC to develop biosecurity guidelines;
- Continue establishment of the LNERV in Senegal to include construction/renovation, equipping, training, and operations support;
- Continue establishment of the NRL in Liberia to include construction/renovation, equipping, training, and operations support;
- Complete designs for limited upgrades at laboratory facilities, as well as advanced phases of laboratory BS&S training in Gabon; and
- Remain prepared to re-engage in Ethiopia, pending Departmental guidance.

#### Asia

- Initiate laboratory and hospital facility and equipment upgrades in Indonesia;
- Train regional partner nations to plan, organize, and execute a series of workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional biological experts within Asia that can enhance collaboration for detection of pathogens;
- Equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Conduct BS&S facility and equipment upgrades and facilitate BSV studies in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue development of the Malaysian One Health network as a regional leader in Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) development and sustainment within Asia;
- Continue establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Engage with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Enhance integrated, real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an infectious disease outbreak;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam;
- Reduce program footprint to prepare for host-country sustainment in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand; and

OP-5 Exhibit

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Support Vietnam-led Biorisk Management train-the-trainer and regional training center of excellence for laboratory BS&S.

FY 2024 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Initiate BS&S and BSV engagement activities with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania based on threat reduction opportunities as identified in assessments;
- Continue training efforts to ensure sustainability of health security capabilities provided to Armenia;
- Conduct technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Leverage Georgian threat-reduction capabilities as a regional leader for BS&S and BSV;
- Mentor and support sustainment to ensure Azerbaijan's safe and effective use of their CRL for outbreak detection and diagnostics;
- Strengthen regional BSV coordination, including implementation of multilateral BSV studies;
- Conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an infectious disease outbreak; and
- Conduct program efforts where possible with Ukraine including training, equipment and consumable delivery, regulatory subject matter expertise, and BSV studies.

#### Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Conduct veterinary twinning programs to promote sustainment of BTRP provided animal health security capabilities;
- Initiate multilateral Biological Threat Reduction Forum meetings among GCC member states to promote epidemiological, disease reporting, and best-practices information sharing;
- Complete workshops BS&S and BSV with the GCC States and begin leveraging local capabilities to sustain future GCC Forum;
- Conduct bioscience fellowships to improve BSV and BS&S lab capacity and build regional scientific networks;
- Conduct BSV studies and BS&S and BSV training in Iraq;
- Continue establishing unified electronic disease reporting capacity for public health and veterinary sectors in Iraq;
- Complete laboratory suite renovations and equipment procurement in Iraq;
- Conduct laboratory diagnostics and BS&S trainings as well as One Health tabletop and field training exercises in Jordan;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Provide regulatory subject matter expertise to strengthen veterinary regulatory frameworks in Jordan;
- Continue multilateral engagement with partner country researchers to improve coordination as well as understanding of endemic and early warning of emergent biological threats; and
- Sustain bilateral engagements in Jordan and transition to leveraging capabilities at the regional level.

#### Africa

- Initiate biosafety, biosecurity, and BSV engagement activities with Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Morocco based on threat reduction opportunities as identified in assessments;
- Continue laboratory and training facility construction for the AU PANVAC facility;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades at CIRMF in Gabon;
- Initiate BSV exercises to integrate refurbished laboratories into laboratory networks and emergency operations centers in Nigeria;
- Continue BS&S improvements and laboratory renovations in Nigeria;
- Complete laboratory BS&S upgrades and BRM training in Cameroon;
- Conduct BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Strengthen regional BSV coordination;
- Continue multilateral engagement with partner country researchers to improve coordination as well as understanding of endemic and early warning of emergent biological threats;
- Engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security elements during an infectious disease outbreak;
- Continue establishment of the LNERV in Senegal to include construction/renovation, equipment, training, and operations support;
- Continue establishment of the NRL in Liberia to include construction/renovation, equipment, training, and operations support;
- Complete implementation of a transition training plan in Uganda;
- Initiate regional workshops with international health organizations to strengthen human and veterinary disease surveillance policy and disease preparedness; and
- Remain prepared to re-engage in Ethiopia, pending Department guidance.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### Asia

- Continue laboratory and hospital facility and equipment upgrades in Indonesia;
- Train regional partner nations to plan, organize, and execute a series of workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional biological experts within Asia that can enhance collaboration for detection of endemic and emergent pathogens;
- Equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Conduct BSV and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue development of the MyOHUN as a regional leader in PHEOC development and sustainment within Asia;
- Conduct train-the-trainer efforts with MyOHUN in BRM curriculum development and self-auditing capabilities for STRIDE;
- Strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue multilateral engagement with partner country researchers to improve coordination as well as understanding of endemic and early warning of emergent biological threats;
- Enhance integrated, real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an infectious disease outbreak;
- Reduce program footprint to prepare for host-country sustainment in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand;
- Support Vietnam-led BRM train-the-trainer program and posture Vietnam as a regional leader for BRM;
- Initiate the development of a long-term, sustainable train-the-trainer program in Indonesia to establish a cadre of professional trainers in topics such as BS&S, BRM, and epidemiology; and
- Initiate Biosafety Cabinet certification program for BRM professionals in the Philippines.

# E. WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP):

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

Build Allies and partners ability to detect, attribute, and counter Russia WMD programs, thereby denying potential benefits of employing WMDs;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Sustain DoD CTR-provided WMD proliferation prevention capacities in Armenia and Georgia; and
- Assess requirements in Bulgaria and Romania and begin capability development as warranted.

#### Middle East and North Africa

- Sustain capabilities along the Syrian and Iraqi borders in Jordan, focusing on preventing the illicit flow of WMD and WMD-related components and ensure
  resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Sustain WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Train Iraqi Border guards in Jordan and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, to counter the spread of WMD from state-based actors and VEO threat networks.

#### Southeast Asia

- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Enhance maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam;
- Enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia; and
- Initiate activities with partners willing to build capacity to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technology, commodities, and knowledge.

# FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Build Allies and partners ability to detect, attribute, and counter Russia WMD programs, thereby denying potential benefits of employing WMDs;
- Sustain DoD CTR-provided WMD proliferation prevention capacities in Armenia and Georgia; and
- Conduct engagement efforts in Bulgaria and Romania and expand capability development as warranted.

#### Middle East and North Africa

Sustain capabilities along the Syrian and Iraqi borders in Jordan, focusing on preventing the illicit flow of WMD and WMD-related components and ensure
resilience in the event of a WMD incident;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Sustain WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Train Iraqi Border guards in Jordan and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, to counter the spread of WMD for state-based actors and VEO threat networks.

#### Southeast Asia

- Sustain existing efforts, and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Enhance maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam;
- Enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia; and
- Initiate activities with partners willing to build capacity to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technology, commodities, and knowledge.

#### FY 2024 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Build Allies and partners ability to detect, attribute, and counter Russia WMD programs, thereby denying potential benefits of employing WMDs;
- Support sustainment of DoD CTR-provided WMD proliferation prevention capacities in Armenia and Georgia;
- Build capacity in Bulgaria and Romania based on completed assessments; and
- Initiate activities with partners willing to build capacity to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technology, commodities, and knowledge.

#### Middle East and North Africa

- Sustain capabilities along the Syrian and Iraqi borders in Jordan, focusing on preventing the illicit flow of WMD and WMD-related components and ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Sustain WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border;
- Train Iraqi Border guards in Jordan and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, to counter the spread of WMD from state-based actors and VEO threat networks; and
- Initiate activities with partners willing to build capacity to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technology, commodities, and knowledge.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### Southeast Asia

- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam;
- Enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia; and
- Initiate activities with partners willing to build capacity to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technology, commodities, and knowledge.

#### F. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs (OAAC):

FY 2022, FY 2023, and FY 2024 OAAC funds over three years will:

- Provide U.S. Embassy and overseas office support, Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS), and program management for worldwide DoD CTR
  Program contract logistics support (i.e. shipping, travel, and language translations services);
- Facilitate travel for DTRA senior leadership and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program;
- Conduct assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners;
- Facilitate collaboration and synchronization in order to integrate CTR Program activities to enable the DoD, U.S. Government, and international partners to counter and deter WMD; and
- Conduct DoD CTR Program Operational Evaluations, which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose and that such assistance is being used efficiently and effectively.

# V. <u>Personnel Summary</u>:

				Change	Change
				FY 2022/	FY 2023/
	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2023	FY 2024
Contractor FTEs (Total)	353	476	392	123	-84

# **Personnel Summary Explanations:**

The contractor full-time equivalent (FTE) totals include OP-32 codes associated with Advisory & Assistance Services and performance contractors who implement CTR capabilities in foreign countries. The decrease from FY 2023 to FY 2024 is due to the reduction of Biological Threat Reduction Program activities in Uganda and Armenia for the planned transition to sustainment in FY 2025 and a shift of funds into non-contract services expenditure types for planned mission requirements.

# VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

			Change from FY 20	022 to FY 2023	Change from FY 2023 to FY 2024			
		FY 2022	Price	Program	FY 2023	Price	Program	FY 2024
		<u>Program</u>	<u>Growth</u>	<u>Growth</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Growth</u>	<u>Growth</u>	<u>Program</u>
308	TRAVEL OF PERSONS	2,991	63	-199	2,855	63	1,359	4,277
0399	TOTAL TRAVEL	2,991	63	-199	2,855	63	1,359	4,277
920	SUPPLIES & MATERIALS (NON-FUND)	33,757	709	-15,224	19,242	423	-218	19,447
923	FACILITIES SUST, REST, & MOD BY CONTRACT	11,405	240	-8,184	3,461	76	-2,867	670
925	EQUIPMENT PURCHASES (NON-FUND)	2,834	60	-1,388	1,506	33	-1,389	150
932	MGT PROF SUPPORT SVCS	9,873	207	432	10,512	231	-1,844	8,899
934	ENGINEERING & TECH SVCS	60,336	1,267	124,429	186,032	4,093	-87,029	103,096
957	OTHER COSTS (LAND AND STRUCTURES)	82,034	1,723	-61,784	21,973	483	14,357	36,813
985	RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, CONTRACTS	2,650	0	-2,321	329	0	-329	0
987	OTHER INTRA-GOVT PURCH	54,887	1,153	12,928	68,968	1,517	-70	70,415
988	GRANTS	12,962	272	-1,028	12,206	269	19,518	31,993
989	OTHER SERVICES	63,499	1,333	-43,793	21,039	463	52,755	74,257
990	IT CONTRACT SUPPORT SERVICES	7,621	160	-4,306	3,475	76	-2,569	982
0999	TOTAL OTHER PURCHASES	341,858	7,124	-239	348,743	7,664	-9,685	346,722
9999	GRAND TOTAL	344,849	7,187	-438	351,598	7,727	-8,326	350,999

Figures above are based on the annual program budget.