Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Estimates
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

April 2022
### Cooperative Threat Reduction Program ($ in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
<th>Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>360,190</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>-26,068</td>
<td>344,849</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>-10,467</td>
<td>341,598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FY 2021 includes Division C, Title IX and Division J, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).

*The total amount of the FY 2023 request reflects $0.0 thousand for Overseas Operations Costs*

### I. Description of Operations Financed:

Features of today’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat environment include State and Non-State actors acquiring, developing, or using WMD through readily available knowledge, technologies, and materials. The Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program’s primary mission is to reduce WMD threats against U.S. interests, and it works cooperatively with allies and partners to enhance their capabilities to address WMD proliferation threats. The DoD CTR Program is a significant tool for implementing the priorities of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and coordinates throughout DoD (including with U.S. Combatant Command CWMD activities) and with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to ensure alignment across all U.S. threat reduction efforts. The program also pursues collaboration and burden sharing with close allies, e.g. the UK and Canada. The DoD CTR Program addresses WMD-related threats as close to the source as possible by focusing on DoD’s unique CTR mission and authorities to eliminate, secure, detect, and interdict WMD and related systems and materials as follows:

- **Eliminate:** When possible, eliminate WMD and related systems or materials.
- **Secure:** If cooperative elimination is not possible, then consolidate, secure, and account for WMD and related systems or materials at their source.
- **Detect and Interdict:** If unable to fully address the threat at the source, work with partner countries to detect and prevent trafficking, enhance disease detection and surveillance, and disrupt proliferation pathways.

The DoD CTR Program consists of the following six program areas: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination; Chemical Security and Elimination; Global Nuclear Security; Biological Threat Reduction Program; WMD Proliferation Prevention Program and Other Assessments and Administrative Costs.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates

I. **Description of Operations Financed:** (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021 Actuals</th>
<th>FY 2022 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2023 Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)</strong></td>
<td>6,703</td>
<td>2,997</td>
<td>6,859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SOAE program supports cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, related materials, and infrastructure, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities; and builds partner capacity to secure related components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.

Contingency Planning and Global Engagement
Increase U.S. preparedness and partner capacity to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems, critical missile commodities, and associated capabilities, in order to reduce potential emerging threats and proliferation concerns in an efficient and expeditious manner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021 Actuals</th>
<th>FY 2022 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2023 Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE)</strong></td>
<td>11,806</td>
<td>13,250</td>
<td>14,998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CSE program supports the cooperative elimination of chemical weapons, related materials, and infrastructure; and enhances capabilities of international partners to secure chemical weapon precursors and toxic industrial chemicals that can be used as improvised chemical weapons.

Global Preparedness
Increase preparedness to support a potential future chemical weapons (CW) elimination effort to safely and quickly destroy any declared CW; and support appropriate international and interagency partners to identify and implement chemical security best practices in partner countries.
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Asia
Ensure that the Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. armed forces are ready to respond to the threat of CW use; and assist regional partners with mitigating chemical security gaps and vulnerabilities in legislation and regulations, transportation and facility security, and inventory management.

Middle East and North Africa
Enhance the capability of regional partner countries to secure toxic industrial chemicals and chemical weapons precursors that may be vulnerable to theft, diversion, or misuse by violent extremist organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$ in thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2021</td>
<td>FY 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>Enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS)</td>
<td>32,073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The GNS program supports the cooperative dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs, as well as the transportation and disposition of associated materials; and enhances the capabilities of international partners to counter nuclear smuggling and secure nuclear weapons, high-threat radiological material, and related components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.

Global Preparedness
Continue to exercise and maintain capabilities to cooperate with interagency and global partners to facilitate the safe and secure transportation, storage, and disposition of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, nuclear weapons useable or high-threat radiological material to prevent proliferation.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia
Support partner nation efforts to enhance nuclear material security, sensitive nuclear site security, and nuclear and high-threat radiological material inventory control; and improve regional capabilities to detect, interdict, and safely secure radiological/nuclear materials and return them to regulatory control.
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Asia
Strengthen nuclear and high-threat radiological material security through subject matter expert exchanges and the institutionalization of international best practices; prepare partners to secure, characterize, and eliminate WMD sites and material, and prevent, detect, and respond to WMD smuggling activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)</td>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>Enacted</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>225,396</td>
<td>229,022</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BTRP reduces the proliferation of biological weapons (BW), BW components, and BW-related technologies and expertise. The program seeks to facilitate security, detection, and reporting of diseases caused by especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs), including diseases such as COVID-19, which could affect the armed forces of the United States or its allies and partners. BTRP’s activities include enhancement of partner country and regional biosafety and biosecurity (BS&S) and biosurveillance (BSV) capabilities. These capabilities counter the threat of theft or diversion of dangerous biological materials, prevent accidental or intentional pathogen release, and establish an early detection capability for biological threats to contain outbreaks at their source before they become destabilizing regional events or pose a threat to U.S. forces, the U.S. homeland, or partners abroad.

Eurasia
Strengthen regional linkages and facilitate sharing BS&S and BSV best practices; and partner with relevant regional and international organizations to identify emerging disease risks, monitor sustainability of investments, and improve regional reporting of disease outbreaks.

Armenia
Ensure self-sustainability of BS&S and BSV capabilities; implement and operationalize a One Health BSV system that includes multi-sectoral ministerial involvement; and strengthen relationships with regional and international partners through biothreat reduction network engagement, collaborative scientific engagement, and data sharing.

Azerbaijan
Reduce the likelihood of and improve the ability to respond to the accidental or intentional release of dangerous biological materials; link national epidemiological institutions to regional and international partners to sustain BSV capabilities, collaborative engagement, and data sharing; and bolster regional cooperation to integrate and sustain technical expertise.
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Bulgaria
Ensure the effective use of BS&S capability and Biorisk Management (BRM) processes to prevent the theft, loss, and/or release of dangerous biological materials, technology, and expertise; strengthen laboratory network capabilities to facilitate safe, secure, and reliable laboratory diagnostics; and improve capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological events and disease outbreaks.

Georgia
Support the Richard G. Lugar Center’s role as a national and regional center of excellence for biological threat reduction; and facilitate BSV studies to share expertise and reinforce training programs.

Romania
Ensure the effective use of BS&S capability and BRM processes to prevent the theft, loss, and/or release of dangerous biological materials, technology, and expertise; strengthen laboratory network capabilities to facilitate safe, secure, and reliable laboratory diagnostics; and improve capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological events and disease outbreaks.

Turkey
Improve the multi-sectoral, One Health approach to BSV; build a BRM program aligned to international biosafety regulations and guidelines to deny Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) acquisition of EDPs; ensure compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) to detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks especially along the border with Syria; and instill international best practices in epidemiological control.

Ukraine
Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.

Middle East and Western and Central Asia
Mitigate the risk of VEO acquisition of biological materials, equipment, and/or expertise; prepare partners to address the full spectrum of biological threats across the region, whether naturally occurring or deliberate, existing or emerging; and reduce biological threats compounded by transboundary human and animal movement as well as mass social gatherings.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States (Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates)
Develop partnerships to facilitate cross-border interactions related to BRM; strengthen multilateral information sharing; and promote BS&S and BSV best practices.
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Iraq
Provide BS&S equipment, processes, and regulations for entities that oversee, handle, store, or transport dangerous biological materials in compliance with international guidelines; and ensure an effective disease surveillance and reporting system that reduces the risk of natural and intentional proliferation of dangerous biological materials.

Jordan
Improve the ability to detect and report human and animal diseases caused by EDPs; and build capacity to lead an effective regional BSV and BRM network.

Kazakhstan
Ensure the sustained ability to manage, maintain, and adhere to international BS&S best practices; ensure sustained capacity to conduct effective BSV; and leverage role as a regional leader to promote adherence to international norms and best practices throughout the region.

Uzbekistan
Ensure that BSV capacities and capabilities remain functional and sustainable; instill sustainable BS&S practices and BRM programs in accordance with international best practices; strengthen relationships with regional and international partners; and establish a multi-sectoral regulatory framework for a functional One Health network.

Africa
Establish and strengthen biological threat reduction networks; strengthen BRM standards; and ensure sustainability of technical capability and infrastructure investments.

Cameroon
Secure collections of EDPs into a minimum number of facilities to prevent VEO access while also reducing the risk of inadvertent and intentional exposures; increase capacity to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks of highly pathogenic diseases; and strengthen linkages between the human, animal, and defense sectors to facilitate sharing of BSV best practices.

Ethiopia
Due to the on-going civil unrest in Ethiopia, DTRA issued a Stop Work Order per DoD-wide guidance to pause all engagements with the Government of Ethiopia. Pending a more stable environment and revised DoD guidance, DTRA remains prepared to re-engage with Ethiopia.
I. **Description of Operations Financed**: (Cont.)

**Gabon**
Address BS&S gaps and reduce vulnerabilities at the International Center for Medical Research of Franceville (CIRMF) by supporting implementation of an effective BRM program and capacities needed to protect pathogen collections from diversion or misuse; and establish ability to maintain and sustain investment in high containment laboratories.

**Kenya**
Enhance the capability to identify, consolidate, and secure collections of EDPs that may be vulnerable to VEOs; and increase the capability to survey, detect, diagnose, and report on outbreaks caused by EDPs in a safe and timely manner.

**Liberia**
Improve laboratory diagnostic capabilities through the provision of training, equipment, and facility construction; and enable improved laboratory diagnostic and EDP security capabilities in alignment with international standards.

**Nigeria**
Strengthen biosecurity at the select facilities that handle EDPs through improved physical security, material control and accountability, transportation security, and implementation of sustainable BRM practices; establish a national select agent list; and establish a sustainable biosurveillance network that is capable of accurately and effectively detecting, diagnosing, and reporting disease outbreak events.

**North Africa**
Strengthen BRM partner capacity in the region; and establish regional linkages between BTRP partner institutes to ensure sustainability.

**Senegal**
Improve the capability to detect, diagnose, and report EDPs safely, securely, and in a timely manner by delivering training, developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), and renovating select national-level laboratory facilities.

**South Africa**
Solidify position as a regional leader in southern Africa (and on the African continent) to promote best practices in BS&S and BSV; demonstrate BSV capabilities in alignment with international standards; and ensure sustainability of appropriate BS&S capacities.

**Uganda**
Secure EDPs by reducing the risk of inadvertent and intentional exposure at laboratory facilities; and increase capacity to surveil, detect, and report outbreaks, including those of endemic pathogens like anthrax and Marburg virus.
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Southeast Asia
Enhance BS&S capabilities to reduce the risk of accidental or intentional release of dangerous biological materials; and enhance sustainable capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological threats.

Cambodia
Strengthen the National Laboratory System workforce; improve diagnostic capacity; increase zoonotic disease surveillance and outbreak preparedness capabilities; improve epidemiology and clinical training programs, including in-service and post-service education; and improve BS&S conditions at public health and veterinary laboratories.

India
Enhance the ability to rapidly detect, diagnose, and report biological events, in accordance with international guidelines; identify, inventory, and consolidate EDP collections into a minimum number of facilities; and instill investigative epidemiological skills among the human and animal health workforce.

Indonesia
Enhance abilities of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) to prevent, detect, and report outbreak events and to work collaboratively with the civilian health sector; and strengthen BS&S culture by enhancing TNI capability to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of biological materials, technology, and expertise.

Laos
Establish and strengthen policy and legislation for BS&S and BSV; strengthen laboratory capacity to conduct diagnostics safely and securely; strengthen disease detection, reporting, analysis, outbreak investigation, and preparedness for outbreaks caused by EDPs; and strengthen scientific capability to enable detection of disease risk and provide evidence-based data to decision makers in order to inform surveillance strategies.

Malaysia
Develop a national-level program that enhances BS&S capacities to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of biological materials, technology, and expertise; develop regional leadership capabilities in BS&S culture, multi-sectoral coordination, and Public Health Emergency Operating Centers (PH EOCs); and facilitate multi-sectorial BS&S and BSV collaboration toward a One Health-compliant system to enhance capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological events.

Philippines
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Enhance BSV capabilities to detect and report outbreaks caused by EDPs quickly, consistent with international reporting requirements; and enhance BS&S capabilities to secure and maintain control of pathogen collections.

Republic of Korea
Enhance the ability to counter WMD threats emanating from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); and improve the capacity to detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks caused by EDPs.

Thailand
Integrate BSV activities to maximize ability to detect and report outbreaks caused by EDPs; enhance BS&S capabilities, including EDP inventory control and BRM standards; and support Thailand’s role as a regional BS&S and BSV leader.

Vietnam
Consolidate host nation public and animal health pathogen collections into a minimum number of secure facilities; strengthen BS&S culture; and enhance capability to detect, diagnose, and report biological threat events.

E. WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP)

The PPP strengthens partner nations’ WMD proliferation prevention capabilities by providing detection, interdiction, and domain awareness capabilities related to WMD trafficking across borders or through maritime jurisdictions.

Eurasia
Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials across their borders. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure and associated human capital development to improve, and then maintain, core proliferation prevention, detection, and characterization capabilities.

Middle East
I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials by VEOs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure and associated human capital development to improve, and then maintain, core proliferation prevention, detection, and characterization capabilities.

North Africa
Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials by VEOs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure and associated training to improve, and then maintain, core proliferation prevention, detection, and characterization capabilities.

Southeast Asia
Improve partner nation capabilities to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD-related materials, and enforce WMD-related United Nations Security Council Regulations (UNSCR) and other international regulatory frameworks through their ports or near their territorial waters by providing equipment and human capital development to enhance maritime domain awareness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enacted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. Other Assessments / Administration Costs

The OAAC program provides general program and administrative support for the DoD CTR Program. OAAC funds DTRA’s U.S. Embassy and overseas office support; Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS); program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program activities; contract logistics support (i.e. shipping, travel, and language translation services); travel support for DTRA’s senior leadership, Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel, and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program; and execution of assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners. In addition, these funds will be used for DoD CTR Program Operational Evaluations, which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose and that such assistance is being used efficiently and effectively.
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Overseas Operations Costs funding accounted for in the Base budget include:

- Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) [$0 thousand].
- Operation European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) [$0 thousand].
- Other theater requirements and related missions [$0 thousand].

II. Force Structure Summary:
N/A
III. Financial Summary ($ in Thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. BA Subactivities</th>
<th>FY 2021 Actuals</th>
<th>Budget Request</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
<th>Current Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2023 Request</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination</td>
<td>$6,703</td>
<td>$2,997</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>$2,997</td>
<td>$2,997</td>
<td>$6,859</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Chemical Security and Elimination</td>
<td>$11,806</td>
<td>$13,250</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>$13,250</td>
<td>$13,250</td>
<td>$14,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Global Nuclear Security</td>
<td>$32,073</td>
<td>$17,767</td>
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<td>$17,767</td>
<td>$17,767</td>
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<td>4. Biological Threat Reduction Program</td>
<td>$225,396</td>
<td>$124,022</td>
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<td>84.66%</td>
<td>$229,022</td>
<td>$229,022</td>
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<td>5. Proliferation Prevention</td>
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<td>6. Other Assessments / Administrative Costs</td>
<td>$24,148</td>
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<td>$23,059</td>
<td>$23,059</td>
<td>$30,763</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$360,190</strong></td>
<td><strong>$239,849</strong></td>
<td><strong>$105,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.78%</strong></td>
<td><strong>$344,849</strong></td>
<td><strong>$344,849</strong></td>
<td><strong>$341,598</strong></td>
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</table>

*FY 2021 includes Division C, Title IX and Division J, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).

*Overseas Operations costs accounted for in the base budget: $0.0 thousand.
### III. Financial Summary ($ in Thousands): (Cont.)

#### B. Reconciliation Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASELINE FUNDING</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)</td>
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<td>Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL APPROPRIATED AMOUNT</td>
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<td>Fact-of-Life Changes (2022 to 2022 Only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL BASELINE FUNDING</td>
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<td>Supplemental</td>
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<td>Reprogrammings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price Changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional Transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CURRENT ESTIMATE</td>
<td>344,849</td>
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<td>Less: Supplemental</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORMALIZED CURRENT ESTIMATE</td>
<td>$344,849</td>
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</table>
III. Financial Summary ($ in Thousands): (Cont.)

FY 2022 President’s Budget Request (Amended, if applicable) ................................................................. $239,849

1. Congressional Adjustments ................................................................................................................................. $105,000
   a) Distributed Adjustments ................................................................................................................................. $105,000
      1) Biological Threat Reduction Program ........................................................................................................ $105,000
   b) Undistributed Adjustments ............................................................................................................................ $0
   c) Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent ..................................................................................................... $0
   d) General Provisions ......................................................................................................................................... $0

FY 2022 Appropriated Amount .................................................................................................................................. $344,849

2. Supplemental Appropriations ................................................................................................................................. $0
   a) Supplemental Funding ....................................................................................................................................... $0

3. Fact-of-Life Changes ............................................................................................................................................. $0
   a) Functional Transfers ....................................................................................................................................... $0
   b) Technical Adjustments ..................................................................................................................................... $0
   c) Emergent Requirements .................................................................................................................................. $0

FY 2022 Baseline Funding .......................................................................................................................................... $344,849

4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions) ........................................................................................................ $0
III. Financial Summary ($ in Thousands): (Cont.)

a) Increases ............................................................................................................................................................................................. $0
b) Decreases ........................................................................................................................................................................................... $0

Revised FY 2022 Estimate .............................................................................................................................................................................. $344,849

5. Less: Item 2, Supplemental Appropriation and Item 4, Reprogrammings ............................................................................................................... $0
   a) Less: Supplemental Funding ............................................................................................................................................................... $0

FY 2022 Normalized Current Estimate .......................................................................................................................................................... $344,849

6. Price Change .................................................................................................................................................................................................... $7,216

7. Functional Transfers ................................................................................................................................................................................................ $0
   a) Transfers In ......................................................................................................................................................................................... $0
   b) Transfers Out ....................................................................................................................................................................................... $0

8. Program Increases ........................................................................................................................................................................................ $108,684
   a) Annualization of New FY 2022 Program ............................................................................................................................................. $0
   b) One-Time FY 2023 Increases ............................................................................................................................................................. $0
   c) Program Growth in FY 2023 .................................................................................................................................................... $108,684

1) Biological Threat Reduction Program.................................................................................................................................................. $96,195
   The funding increase will enable completion of the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) in Liberia; support biosafety and biosecurity remediation efforts in Gabon; reduce the risk of countries transitioning to sustainment and ownership of BTRP-provided training, facilities, and equipment; strengthen regional biothreat surveillance networks in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa; and conduct
capability gap assessments in Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Gabon, Ghana, Latvia, Lithuania, and Morocco. Additionally, the increase provides funding for BTRP to strengthen the Department's capacity to prevent, detect and respond to global disease outbreaks especially for countries within Africa Command (AFRICOM) and European Command (EUCOM).
(FY 2022 Baseline: $124,022 thousand)

2) Other Assessments/Administrative Costs ................................................................. $7,220
The funding increase is due to the addition of eight planned Operational Evaluations and establishment of DTRA personnel at U.S. Embassy Bucharest, Romania and U.S. Embassy Sofia, Bulgaria.
(FY 2022 Baseline: $23,059 thousand)

3) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ................................................................. $3,799
The funding increase addresses maturing requirements for disposition of interdicted Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) delivery system commodities.
(FY 2022 Baseline: $2,997 thousand)

4) Chemical Security and Elimination ................................................................. $1,470
The funding increase addresses maturing requirements for chemical security capacity building in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and global elimination preparedness efforts.
(FY 2022 Baseline: $13,250 thousand)

9. Program Decreases ......................................................................................................................... $-119,151
a) Annualization of FY 2022 Program Decreases ................................................................. $0
b) One-Time FY 2022 Increases ................................................................................................. $-105,000
   1) Biological Threat Reduction Program ................................................................................. $-105,000
   The funding decrease is due to a $105 million Congressional add in FY 2022.

   c) Program Decreases in FY 2023 ......................................................................................... $-14,151
      1) Global Nuclear Security ................................................................................................. $-53
      The funding decrease is due to refined costs in transportation security and disposition project.
III. Financial Summary ($ in Thousands): (Cont.)

(FY 2022 Baseline: $17,767 thousand)

2) Proliferation Prevention .......................................................... $-14,098
   The funding decrease is due to the projected completion of efforts in Iraq, Tunisia, and Armenia as well as the delay to start new efforts in Bulgaria and Romania.
   (FY 2022 Baseline: $58,754 thousand)

FY 2023 Budget Request ................................................................. $341,598
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Global
Continue to enhance partner capabilities to secure and eliminate WMD delivery system commodities, technologies, and expertise; and initiate activities that support disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities as well as improve partner capabilities to secure technology and expertise; and develop a post-interdiction WMD delivery system commodities recognition/disposition course for delivery to partner nations.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

Global
• Continue to advance preparedness for cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, infrastructure, and related materials, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

Global
• Continue to advance preparedness for cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, infrastructure, and related materials, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities and partner capability to secure technology and expertise.

B. Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE):

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Global
• Continue to increase preparedness for chemical weapon contingency elimination operations, including demonstration of material solutions needed to close critical gaps in destruction technology.

Asia
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to enhance the capability of the ROK to respond to chemical unexploded ordinance (UXO) munitions; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy chemical weapons (CW) on the Korean peninsula;
- Implement chemical security framework and national chemical inventory tracking systems and associated training in the Philippines; and
- Identify chemical security vulnerabilities in Indonesia and initiate priority capacity building projects, as applicable.

Middle East and North Africa
- Continue training in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting; and
- Support the Iraq CBRN conference to gain stakeholder buy-in and refine follow-on requirements for a chemical security standards project.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

Global
- Continue to increase U.S. preparedness for CW contingency elimination operations including demonstration of material solutions and operational logistics.

Asia
- Continue to enhance the capability of the ROK to respond to chemical UXO munitions; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula;
- Assess capabilities to manage chemicals of security concern across the life-cycle, and commence workshops, training, and table-top exercises based on outcomes of assessments in the Philippines; and
- Complete the chemical security capabilities assessment in Indonesia in order to initiate a project, as applicable.

Middle East and North Africa
- Complete training in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting to reduce threats of VEOs obtaining or using improvised chemical weapons.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

Global
- Continue to increase U.S. preparedness for chemical weapon contingency elimination operations including development of plans and demonstration of material solutions and operational logistics.

Asia
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to enhance the capability solutions for chemical UXO response in coordination with United States Forces Korea initiatives for overall ROK explosive ordnance disposal interoperability; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula;
- Establish a train-the-trainer capability for the Philippines Strategic Trade Management Office strategic goods tracking system and related equipment; continue to assist with implementation of a national level chemical security framework; and
- Implement training programs in Indonesia and the Philippines in order to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to independently develop and implement effective chemical countermeasures strategies.

Middle East and North Africa

- Continue to assist Iraq with building and institutionalizing chemical security standards and best practices;
- Continue to support Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in strengthening chemical security by institutionalizing best practices delivered through previous prior training; and
- Continue to provide training and expert exchanges to the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie to increase mobile laboratory capabilities.

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Global

- Continue to increase preparedness and capabilities to support global transportation and disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear or high-threat radiological materials; and
- Complete support of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear security training efforts, initiatives, and other international nuclear security exchange; develop and implement an IAEA sustainment plan.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue efforts to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites in Kazakhstan, provide training to Kazakh forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and transition sustainment of Kazakhstan’s National Nuclear Material Inventory Management System to the host nation;
- Initiate counter nuclear smuggling capacity building efforts in Moldova and Georgia in collaboration with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute; and
- Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Asia
- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Continue to enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through equipping, training, and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

Global
- Continue to increase preparedness and capabilities to rapidly and agilely respond globally to support nuclear weapons and fissile material removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commands and U.S. interagency partners; and
- Continue to enhance the quality of and expand access to training on nuclear and high-threat radiological material security best practices for IAEA Member States by completing translation and upgrades of existing e-Learning nuclear security modules and supporting other international nuclear security exchanges.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia
- Continue efforts with Kazakhstan to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites and provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear materials;
- Continue counter nuclear smuggling projects in Bulgaria and Romania based on previous assessments, if applicable; and
- Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.

Asia
- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Continue to enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through small-scale equipping, and training and exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

Global
- Continue to increase preparedness and capabilities to rapidly and agilely respond globally to support nuclear weapons and fissile material
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commands and U.S. interagency partners.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia
- Continue final efforts with Kazakhstan to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites and provide training to Kazakh forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear materials, planning for transition to host nation sustainment beyond 2025;
- Continue delivery of counter nuclear smuggling train the trainer courses in Moldova and Georgia; and
- Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.

Asia
- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Continue enhancing the capability of ROK Nuclear Characterization Teams (NCT) through implementation of the Combined Requirements Implementation Plan and follow on cycles of advanced NCT training.

D. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP):

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Eurasia
- Continue regional technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread via a deliberate biological threat event;
- Continue to strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Continue to leverage the Lugar Center in Georgia as a regional center of excellence for training and certification;
- Continue mentorship to ensure safe and effective use of Azerbaijan’s Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) for outbreak detection and diagnostics;
- Continue engagement with regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue assessment efforts in the Balkan and the Black Sea regions, with priority for engagements with Bulgaria and Romania;
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Continue to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Complete remediation and commissioning of the CRL in Azerbaijan;
- Complete Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia;
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; and
- Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.

Middle East and Southwest Asia
- Continue assessments of current BS&S and BSV capabilities within the GCC States;
- Continue technical support to enhance the GCC’s leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen abilities to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Jordan and Kazakhstan;
- Continue activities to ensure sustainable transition of operations of the Kazakhstan CRL;
- Continue activities and biosurveillance study opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and support for electronic disease reporting, to support sustainment of capabilities in Iraq;
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula; and
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats.

Africa
- Initiate implementation of a transition training plan in Uganda;
- Initiate BRM training and BS&S improvements in Nigeria;
- Continue BRM and SOP implementation in Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Complete national BRM strategic planning in Tanzania and Uganda;
- Continue to provide epidemiology training and laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania;
- Continue to enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate BRM training for laboratory staff, conduct laboratory assessments, and begin designs for limited upgrades at laboratory facilities in Gabon;
- Continue construction of the Laboratoire National de l'Elevage et de Recherches Vétérinaires (LNERV) in Senegal;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue collaboration with African Union Center for Disease Control (AUCDC) to develop biosecurity guidelines;
- Continue to strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;
- Complete repair and certification of biosafety cabinets (BSCs) as well as critical infrastructure repairs and upgrades at the mobile diagnostic laboratory (MDL) in Guinea;
- Continue construction of the NRL in Liberia;
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Guinea and Tanzania; and
- Remain prepared to re-engage with Ethiopia, pending stabilization of the security environment and Departmental guidance.

Asia

- Initiate efforts to train regional partner nations to plan, organize and execute workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional experts within Asia to enhance collaboration on early detection of biological threat events;
- Continue to equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Continue to conduct BSV and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue to develop and implement epidemiology training and exercises in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam;
- Continue to enhance integrated, real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Initiate development of the Malaysian One Health network as a regional leader in emergency operation center (EOC) development and sustainment within Asia;
- Initiate establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats; and
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

**Eurasia**
- Initiate biosafety and biosecurity engagement activities with Bulgaria and Romania based on threat reduction opportunities as identified in assessments;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread, throughout the region;
- Continue to strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Continue to leverage the Lugar Center as a regional center of excellence for training and certification;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue assessment efforts in the Balkan and the Black Sea regions;
- Continue to integrate Bulgaria and Romania into regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Continue to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Complete mentorship to ensure safe and effective use of Azerbaijan’s CRL for outbreak detection and diagnostics; and
- Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.

**Middle East and Southwest Asia**
- Initiate workshops on BS&S and BSV topics with GCC States, and continue to identify local capabilities to leverage in future engagements;
- Continue technical support to enhance the GCC’s leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread, throughout the region;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue activities and biosurveillance study opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and continued support for electronic disease reporting, to support sustainment of capabilities in Iraq;
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Jordan and Kazakhstan;
- Complete activities to ensure sustainable transition of operations of the Kazakhstan CRL; and
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Jordan and Uzbekistan.

Africa
- Continue BS&S improvements in Nigeria;
- Continue BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the government of Cameroon;
- Continue to enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue establishment and operationalization of a Regional Collaborating Center for the AUCDC;
- Continue to strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;
- Continue implementation of a transition training plan in Uganda;
- Complete laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Complete collaboration with AUCDC to develop biosecurity guidelines;
- Complete designs for limited upgrades at laboratory facilities, as well as advanced phases of laboratory BS&S training in Gabon; and
- Remain prepared to re-engage in Ethiopia, pending Departmental guidance.

Asia
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate laboratory and hospital facility and equipment upgrades in Indonesia;
- Continue efforts to train regional partner nations to plan, organize, and execute a series of workshops and tabletop exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional biological experts within Asia that can enhance collaboration for detection of biological threat agents;
- Continue to equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Continue to conduct BSV and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue development of the Malaysian One Health network as a regional leader in emergency operation center development and sustainment within Asia;
- Continue establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue to enhance integrated, real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; and
- Reduce program footprint to prepare for host-country sustainment in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

Eurasia

- Initiate comprehensive national capability gap assessments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania;
- Continue BS&S engagement activities with Bulgaria and Romania based on threat reduction opportunities as identified in assessments;
- Continue training efforts to ensure sustainability of investments in Armenia;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Complete strengthening BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to leverage the Lugar Center in Georgia as a regional center of excellence for training and certification;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue assessment efforts in the Balkan and the Black Sea regions;
- Continue to integrate Bulgaria and Romania into regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Continue to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak; and
- Due to the conflict in Ukraine, all activities planned for Ukraine in FY 2022 and FY 2023 are suspended; funds for Ukraine will shift to support efforts in other European countries.

Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Initiate veterinary twinning programs to promote sustainment of BTRP investments;
- Initiate support for development of recurring Biological Threat Reduction Forum meetings among GCC member states to promote information sharing and best practices;
- Complete workshops on BS&S and BSV topics with the GCC States and continue to identify local capabilities to leverage in future engagements;
- Continue technical support to enhance the GCC’s leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue activities and biosurveillance study opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and continued support for electronic disease reporting, to support sustainment of capabilities in Iraq;
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats; and
- Continue to reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Jordan and Uzbekistan.

Africa

- Initiate comprehensive national capability gap assessments in Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Gabon, Ghana, and Morocco;
- Initiate construction oversight for African Union (AU) Pan African Veterinary Vaccine (PANVAC) facility;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades at CIRMF in Gabon;
- Initiate BSV exercises to integrate refurbished laboratories into laboratory networks and emergency operations centers in Nigeria;
- Continue BS&S improvements in Nigeria;
- Continue BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Continue to enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue to strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;
- Continue establishment of the LNERV in Senegal to include construction/renovation, equipage, training, and operations support;
- Continue establishment of the NRL in Liberia to include construction/renovation, equipage, training, and operations support;
- Complete implementation of a transition training plan in Uganda; and
- Initiate regional workshops with international health organizations to strengthen human and veterinary disease surveillance policy and disease preparedness.

Asia
- Continue laboratory and hospital facility and equipment upgrades in Indonesia;
- Continue efforts to train regional partner nations to plan, organize, and execute a series of workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional biological experts within Asia that can enhance collaboration for detection of biological threat agents;
- Continue to equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Continue to conduct BSV and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue development of the Malaysian One Health network as a regional leader in development and sustainment within Asia;
- Continue establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue to enhance integrated, real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak; and
- Continue to reduce program footprint to prepare for host-country sustainment in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

E. WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP):

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Southeast Asia
- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Complete improvements to enhance maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam; and
- Continue engagements to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

Eurasia
- Continue long-term WMD threat reduction activities with DoD CTR Program partners who share borders with Russia;
- Support sustainment and transition of DoD CTR-provided WMD proliferation prevention capacities to Armenia;
- Complete efforts to improve WMD detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along Georgia’s green borders; and
- Continue assessment efforts in Bulgaria and Romania and begin capability development as warranted.

Middle East and North Africa
- Complete engagement in Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, focusing on sustainment of capabilities to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and WMD-related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Complete WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Continue efforts training Iraqi Border guards in Jordan and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, to counter the spread of WMD from state-based actors and VEO threat networks.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

- Complete efforts to improve WMD detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along Georgia’s green borders; and
- Continue efforts training Iraqi Border guards in Jordan and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, to counter the spread of WMD from state-based actors and VEO threat networks.

Southeast Asia
- Sustain existing efforts, and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Continue improvements to enhance maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam; and
- Continue engagements to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

FY 2023 funds executed over three years will:

Eurasia
- Support sustainment and transition of DoD CTR-provided WMD proliferation prevention capacities to Armenia;
- Complete efforts to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along Georgia’s green borders; and
- Continue capacity building efforts in Bulgaria and Romania based off of completed assessments.

Middle East and North Africa
- Continue to transition all capabilities to Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, focusing on sustainment of capabilities to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and WMD-related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Complete WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Continue efforts training Iraqi Border guards in Jordan and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, to counter the spread of WMD from state-based actors and VEO threat networks.

Southeast Asia
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Continue improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam; and
- Continue engagements to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

F. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs (OAAC):
FY 2021, FY 2022, and FY 2023 OAAC funds over three years will:

- Fund U.S. Embassy and overseas office support, Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS), and program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program contract logistics support (i.e. shipping, travel, and language translations services);
- Fund travel for DTRA senior leadership and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program;
- Fund assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners;
- Facilitate collaboration and synchronization in order to integrate CTR Program activities to enable the DoD, U.S. Government, and international partners to counter and deter WMD; and
- Fund DoD CTR Program Operational Evaluations, which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose and that such assistance is being used efficiently and effectively.
### V. Personnel Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
<th>Change FY 2021/2022</th>
<th>Change FY 2022/2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor FTEs (Total)</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>-104</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel Summary Explanations:**
The contractor full-time equivalent (FTE) totals include OP-32 codes associated with Advisory & Assistance Services and performance contractors who implement CTR capabilities in foreign countries. The increase from FY 2022 to FY 2023 is due to Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) expansion to support capability gap assessments and initial bilateral engagement activities that necessitate dedicated subject matter experts. Program expansion for BTRP includes activities in Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Gabon, Ghana, Latvia, Lithuania, and Morocco.
### VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021 Program</th>
<th>Price Growth</th>
<th>Program Growth</th>
<th>Price Growth</th>
<th>Program Growth</th>
<th>FY 2023 Program</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>308 TRAVEL OF PERSONS</strong></td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>3,199</td>
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<td><strong>0399 TOTAL TRAVEL</strong></td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>526</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>920 SUPPLIES &amp; MATERIALS (NON-FUND)</strong></td>
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<td>457</td>
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<td>20,141</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>923 FACILITIES SUST, REST, &amp; MOD BY CONTRACT</strong></td>
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<td><strong>925 EQUIPMENT PURCHASES (NON-FUND)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>932 MGT PROF SUPPORT SVCS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>933 STUDIES, ANALYSIS &amp; EVAL</strong></td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td><strong>934 ENGINEERING &amp; TECH SVCS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>957 OTHER COSTS (LAND AND STRUCTURES)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>985 RESEARCH &amp; DEVELOPMENT, CONTRACTS</strong></td>
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<td>-7,948</td>
<td>6,314</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>-2,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0999 TOTAL OTHER PURCHASES</strong></td>
<td>357,595</td>
<td>10,649</td>
<td>-26,594</td>
<td>341,650</td>
<td>7,149</td>
<td>-10,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9999 GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>360,190</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>-26,068</td>
<td>344,849</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>-10,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FY 2021 includes Division C, Title IX and Division J, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).