# Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



May 2021

#### **Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (\$ in thousands)**

	FY 2020	Price	Program	FY 2021	Price	Program	FY 2022
	<u>Actuals</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	<b>Enacted</b>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	<b>Request</b>
CTR	373,700	7,474	-20,984	360,190	6,821	-127,162	239,849

\*FY 2020 includes Division A, Title IX and X of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93), Division F, Title IV and V from the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (P.L. 116-136).

\*FY 2021 includes Division C, Title IX and Division J, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).

#### I. Description of Operations Financed:

Today's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat environment includes State and Non-State actors acquiring, developing, or using WMD through readily available knowledge, technologies, and materials. The Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's primary mission is to reduce WMD threats against U.S. interests, and it works cooperatively with allies and partners to enhance their capabilities to address WMD proliferation threats. The DoD CTR Program strongly supports the priorities of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy (including Strengthening Alliances and Attracting New Partners) and coordinates throughout DoD (including with U.S. Combatant Command CWMD activities) and with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to ensure alignment across all U.S. threat reduction efforts. The DoD CTR Program addresses WMD-related threats as close to the source as possible by focusing on DoD's unique CTR mission and authorities to eliminate, secure, detect, and interdict WMD and related systems and materials as follows:

- Eliminate: When possible, eliminate WMD and related systems or materials.
- Secure: If cooperative elimination is not possible, then consolidate, secure, and account for WMD and related systems or materials at their source.
- Detect and Interdict: If unable to fully address the threat at the source, work with partner countries to detect and prevent trafficking, enhance disease detection and surveillance, and cut off proliferation pathways.

The DoD CTR Program consists of the following six program areas: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination; Chemical Security and Elimination; Global Nuclear Security; the Biological Threat Reduction Program; the WMD Proliferation Prevention Program, and Other Assessments and Administrative Costs.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

			<u>\$ in thousands</u>	
		FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
		Actuals	Enacted	<b>Estimate</b>
Α.	Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)	492	2,924	2,997

The SOAE program supports cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, related materials, and infrastructure, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities; and builds partner capacity to secure related components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.

#### Contingency Planning and Global Engagement

Increase U.S. preparedness and partner capacity to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems, critical missile commodities, and associated capabilities, in order to reduce potential emerging threats and proliferation concerns in an efficient and expeditious manner.

			<u>\$ in thousan</u>	ds
		FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
		<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
В.	Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE)	12,858	11,806	13,250

CSE supports the cooperative elimination of chemical weapons, related materials, and infrastructure; and builds the capacity of international partners to secure chemical weapon precursors and toxic industrial chemicals that can be used as improvised chemical weapons, as well as associated components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.

#### <u>Algeria</u>

Complete the Chemical Risk Identification and Mitigation Program (CRIMP) effort and identify any remaining capability gaps.

#### Morocco

Complete the CRIMP effort and identify any remaining capability gaps.

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#### I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

#### Tunisia

Complete the CRIMP effort and identify any remaining capability gaps.

# Iraq

Complete the project with the Ministry of Defense and begin implementation of the Chemical Security Standards Project with Iraqi ministries as applicable.

#### <u>Jordan</u>

Complete efforts to enhance Jordan's chemical security oversight and protection measures to mitigate potential exploitation by VEOs; begin transition of bilateral cooperation to sustainment phase.

#### Indonesia

Support efforts with Indonesia to address critical gaps in capability to conduct chemical security management, mitigate chemical vulnerabilities, and institutionalize best practices to prevent VEO acquisition and use of improvised chemical weapons.

### **Philippines**

Continue to improve the Philippines' capability to prevent VEO acquisition and use of improvised chemical weapons; continue strengthening chemical security by enhancing chemical security framework and identifying and mapping the chemical industry landscape; develop a national chemical inventory database and tracking system; and develop and implement transportation and site security training and standard operating procedures.

# Republic of Korea (ROK)

Continue to enhance capabilities to secure and eliminate chemical unexploded ordinance in crisis through training and exercises, and increase ROK preparedness for the potential large scale elimination of chemical weapons and materials on the Korean peninsula.

#### **Global Cooperative Security**

Reduce VEO access to chemicals of security concern by supporting the efforts of multilateral institutions to establish common security standards, share chemical security best practices, develop low cost/high impact tools to address emerging chemical threats, and strengthen international security standards and regulatory regimes.

#### **Global Contingency Preparedness**

#### I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Increase preparedness for global contingencies by improving capabilities to rapidly support and agilely respond to chemical weapons and chemical weapon program elimination requirements by advancing technical preparedness, plans, and procedures.

			<u>s in thousan</u>	as
		FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
		<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
C.	<u>Global Nuclear Security (GNS)</u>	48,918	35,852	17,767

The GNS program supports the cooperative dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs, as well as the transportation and disposition of associated materials; and builds the capacity of international partners to secure nuclear weapons, high-threat radiological material, and related components, materials, equipment, technology, and expertise, and to counter nuclear smuggling.

#### Global Contingency Preparedness, Transportation Security, and Disposition

Continue to improve preparedness and capabilities for global contingencies by rapidly and agilely responding to requests for support of nuclear weapons and fissile material removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commanders and U.S. interagency partners.

#### International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Enhance the quality of and expand access to training on nuclear and high-threat radiological material security best practices for IAEA Member States by completing translation and upgrades of existing e-Learning nuclear security modules in the official languages of the United Nations.

#### <u>Jordan</u>

Complete enhancement of Jordan's capabilities to secure nuclear and high threat radiological material and counter nuclear smuggling throughout Jordan and the region; complete transition of bilateral cooperation to partner sustainment.

#### Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS)

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#### I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

Increase capacity of MESIS activities to sustain nuclear security training capabilities in Jordan and to conduct regional nuclear security training with and for partners in the Middle East and North Africa.

#### <u>Kazakhstan</u>

Increase Kazakhstan's capacity to protect vulnerable fissile material in place and in-transit by improving physical security at sensitive nuclear sites, providing training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and renovating and equipping training centers.

#### <u>Ukraine</u>

Enhance Ukraine's capability to secure fissile and high threat radiological material in Ukraine and to counter nuclear smuggling throughout the country and the region.

#### Republic of Korea (ROK)

Assess and enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through training and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

#### <u>India</u>

Conduct best-practice exchanges and nuclear security dialogs in coordination with the Republic of India on mutual nuclear security concerns.

#### <u>Romania</u>

Assess potential requirements and, as applicable, begin development of capacity of Romania to counter nuclear smuggling.

#### <u>Bulgaria</u>

Assess potential requirements and, as applicable, begin development of capacity of Bulgaria to counter nuclear smuggling.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

		<u>\$ in thousands</u>		
		FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
		Actuals	Enacted	<b>Estimate</b>
D.	Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)	203,642	225,396	124,022

BTRP activities reduce the proliferation of biological weapons (BW), BW components, and BW-related technologies and expertise. The program seeks to facilitate security, detection, and reporting of diseases caused by especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs), including zoonotic diseases such as COVID-19, which could affect the armed forces of the United States or its allies and partners. BTRP's activities include enhancement of partner country and regional biosafety and biosecurity (BS&S) and biosurveillance (BSV) capabilities. These capabilities counter the threat of theft or diversion of dangerous materials, counter the threat of accidental or intentional pathogen release, and establish an early detection capability for biological threats to contain outbreaks at their source before they can become destabilizing regional events or pose a threat to forces, the U.S. homeland, or partners abroad.

#### <u>Eurasia</u>

Support Eurasian partner nation efforts to build self-sustaining regional biological threat reduction networks: improve communication and threat information sharing between partners; share BS&S and BSV best practices; ensure tailored but consistent approaches to training, diagnostic processes, and reporting; enhance regional organizations' biological threat reduction capabilities and infrastructure sustainment through regional and international scientific engagements and partnerships; and be the partner of choice for biological threat reduction work in the region.

#### Middle East and Southwest Asia

Mitigate the risk of VEOs from acquiring biological materials, equipment, and expertise; strengthen linkages and facilitate the adoption of internationally recognized BS&S best practices among BTRP partner nations in the region; sustainably enhance biological threat reduction capabilities with regional organizations; and be the partner of choice for biological threat reduction work in the region.

#### <u>Africa</u>

Expand on BS&S and BSV investments particularly to decrease the risk of VEOs acquiring biological materials, equipment, and expertise; provide tools and guidance for sustainment in sub-regions (i.e., East Africa, West Africa); strengthen linkages and facilitate the adoption of internationally recognized BS&S and BSV best practices among BTRP partner nations on a regional and sub-regional basis; enhance biological threat reduction capabilities with regional organizations; and be the partner of choice for biological threat reduction work in the region.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed: (Cont.)

#### <u>Asia</u>

Secure dangerous pathogens in an area with VEO activity and illicit proliferation; enhance partner nations' individual and regional capability to detect, diagnose, and report human and animal EDPs; enhance the region's BS&S capabilities to reduce the risk of accidental or intentional release of EDPs; and be the partner of choice for biological threat reduction work in the region.

		<u>\$ in thousan</u>	d <u>s</u>
	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
	<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
E. WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP)	79,868	60,064	58,754

PPP strengthens partner nations' WMD proliferation prevention capabilities by providing detection, interdiction, and domain awareness capabilities related to WMD trafficking across borders or through maritime jurisdictions.

#### <u>Eurasia</u>

Support Eurasian partner nation efforts as the partner of choice to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials across their borders. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure and associated human capital development to improve and then maintain core proliferation prevention, detection, and characterization capabilities.

#### Middle East

Support partner nation efforts as the partner of choice to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials by VEOs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure and associated human capital development to improve and then maintain core proliferation prevention, detection, and characterization capabilities.

#### North Africa

Support partner nation efforts to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials by VEOs. Provide relevant military and civilian agencies equipment, infrastructure and associated human capital development to improve and then maintain core proliferation prevention, detection, and characterization capabilities.

#### Southeast Asia

#### I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: (Cont.)

Improve the partners' capability to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD-related materials and enforce WMD-related United Nations Security Council Regulations and other International Regulatory framework through or near their territorial waters by providing equipment and training to enhance their maritime domain awareness.

		<u>\$ in thousands</u>	
	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
	<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
F. Other Assessments / Administration Costs	27,922	24,148	23,059

The Other Assessments / Administrative Costs (OAAC) Program provides general program and administrative support for the CTR Program.

OAAC centrally funds DTRA's U.S. Embassy and overseas office support; Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS); program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program; contract logistics support (shipping, travel, and language translation services); travel support for DTRA's senior leadership, Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel, and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program; and execution of assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners. In addition, these funds will be used for DoD CTR Program Operational Evaluations (formerly known as Audits & Examinations), which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose.

The FY 2022 Direct War and Enduring Costs accounted for in the base budget are as follows:

• Direct War costs accounted for in the Base Budget: \$0.0 thousand: Direct War costs are those combat or direct combat support costs that will not continue to be expended once combat operations end at major contingency locations.

• Enduring costs accounted for in the Base Budget: \$0.0 thousand: Enduring Requirements are enduring in theater and in CONUS costs that will likely remain after combat operations cease.

#### II. Force Structure Summary:

N/A

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands):

			FY 2021				
			Congressional Action				
	FY 2020	Budget				Current	FY 2022
A. BA Subactivities	<u>Actuals</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>Amount</u>	Percent	Appropriated	<b>Enacted</b>	<u>Request</u>
1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	\$492	\$2,924	\$0	0.00%	\$2,924	\$2,924	\$2,997
2. Chemical Security and Elimination	\$12,858	\$11,806	\$0	0.00%	\$11,806	\$11,806	\$13,250
3. Global Nuclear Security	\$48,918	\$20,152	\$15,700	77.91%	\$35,852	\$35,852	\$17,767
4. Biological Threat Reduction Program	\$203,642	\$127,396	\$98,000	76.93%	\$225,396	\$225,396	\$124,022
5. Proliferation Prevention	\$79,868	\$52,064	\$8,000	15.37%	\$60,064	\$60,064	\$58,754
6. Other Assessments / Administrative							
Costs	<u>\$27,922</u>	<u>\$24,148</u>	<u>\$0</u>	<u>0.00%</u>	<u>\$24,148</u>	<u>\$24,148</u>	<u>\$23,059</u>
Total	\$373,700	\$238,490	\$121,700	51.03%	\$360,190	\$360,190	\$239,849

\*FY 2020 includes Division A, Title IX and X of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93), Division F, Title IV and V from the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (P.L. 116-136).

\*FY 2021 includes Division C, Title IX and Division J, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).

	Change	Change
B. Reconciliation Summary	<u>FY 2021/FY 2021</u>	FY 2021/FY 2022
BASELINE FUNDING	\$238,490	\$360,190
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	121,700	
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	0	
Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent	0	
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	0	
SUBTOTAL APPROPRIATED AMOUNT	360,190	
Fact-of-Life Changes (2021 to 2021 Only)	0	
SUBTOTAL BASELINE FUNDING	360,190	
Supplemental	0	
Reprogrammings	0	
Price Changes		6,821
Functional Transfers		0
Program Changes		-127,162
CURRENT ESTIMATE	360,190	239,849
Less: Wartime Supplemental	0	
NORMALIZED CURRENT ESTIMATE	\$360,190	\$239,849

FY 2021 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)	\$238,490
1. Congressional Adjustments	\$121,700
a) Distributed Adjustments	\$121,700
1) Biological Threat Reduction Program	\$98,000
2) Global Nuclear Security	\$15,700
3) Proliferation Prevention	\$8,000
b) Undistributed Adjustments	\$0
c) Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent	\$0
d) General Provisions	\$0
FY 2021 Appropriated Amount	\$360,190
2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations	\$0
a) OCO Supplemental Funding	\$0
3. Fact-of-Life Changes	\$0
a) Functional Transfers	\$0
b) Technical Adjustments	\$0
c) Emergent Requirements	\$0

FY 2021 Baseline Funding	\$360,190
4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)	\$0
a) Increases	\$0
b) Decreases	\$0
Revised FY 2021 Estimate	\$360,190
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriation and Item 4, Reprogrammings	\$0
a) Less: OCO Supplemental Funding	\$0
FY 2021 Normalized Current Estimate	\$360,190
6. Price Change	\$6,821
7. Functional Transfers	\$0
a) Transfers In	\$0
b) Transfers Out	\$0
8. Program Increases	\$6,786
a) Annualization of New FY 2021 Program	\$0
b) One-Time FY 2022 Increases	\$0
c) Program Growth in FY 2022	\$6,786
1) Chemical Security and Elimination	\$1,220

The funding increase in FY 2022 addresses maturing requirements for chemical security and capacity building activities in Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, as well as efforts to conduct assessments and develop e-learning, tools and frameworks to enhance global chemical security. (FY 2021 Baseline: \$11,806 thousand)	
2) Proliferation Prevention The funding increase in FY 2022 addresses new requirements for capacity building activities in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as efforts to ensure a sustainable capability is turned over to partners in Armenia and Georgia. (FY 2021 Baseline: \$60,064 thousand)	\$5,549
3) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination The slight funding increase in FY 2022 reflects advancement of program activities and defined requirements to initiate new activities to address disposition of WMD missile components and securing technology and expertise. (FY 2021 Baseline: \$2,924 thousand)	\$17
9. Program Decreases	\$-133,948
a) Annualization of FY 2021 Program Decreases	\$0
b) One-Time FY 2021 Increases	\$-121,700
1) Biological Threat Reduction Program\$ The funding decrease is due to a \$98 million Congressional add in FY 2021.	98,000
2) Global Nuclear Security\$ The funding decrease is due to a \$15.7 million Congressional add in FY 2021.	15,700
The funding decrease is due to a \$15.7 million Congressional add in FY 2021. 3) Proliferation Prevention	\$-8,000

Funding decrease in FY 2022 is due to OSD reprioritization and accelerated completion of activities in Armenia, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Tanzania. (FY 2021 Baseline: \$225,396 thousand)	
2) Global Nuclear Security The funding decrease in FY 2022 is due to OSD reprioritization and economic adjustments affecting Ukraine, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Republic of Korea (ROK). (FY 2021 Baseline: \$35,852 thousand)	\$-3,066
<ul> <li>3) Other Assessments/Administrative Costs</li> <li>The funding decrease in FY 2022 is due to a decrease in overhead costs and support associated with program management and administration, as well as a minor decrease due to streamlined and consolidated embassy costs.</li> <li>(FY 2021 Baseline: \$24,148 thousand)</li> </ul>	\$-1,548
FY 2022 Budget Request	\$239,849

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Asia

• Complete efforts to enhance U.S. preparedness to secure and eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) delivery systems and associated capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

#### Global

• Continue to advance preparedness for cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, related materials, and infrastructure, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities.

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Global

• Continue to build partner capacity to secure and eliminate WMD delivery system commodities, technologies, and expertise.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

Global

• Continue to advance preparedness for cooperative elimination of WMD delivery systems, related materials, and infrastructure, including disposition of interdicted delivery systems and related commodities.

#### B. Chemical Security and Elimination (CSE):

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Global

• Continue to increase preparedness for chemical weapon contingency elimination operations, including demonstration of material solutions needed to close critical destruction technology gaps.

#### IV. <u>Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary</u>:

Middle East and North Africa

- Continue training in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting to reduce threats of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) obtaining or using improvised chemical weapons; and
- Deliver the final series of planned chemical security trainings in Jordan and begin transition to sustainment by monitoring partner ability to institutionalize and deliver trainings independently.

Asia

- Continue to build Republic of Korea (ROK) capacity to address chemical unexploded ordinance in crisis and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula;
- Facilitate chemical security framework implementation and associated training in the Philippines; and
- Assess chemical security requirements in Indonesia.

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Global

• Continue to increase preparedness for chemical weapon contingency elimination operations, including demonstration of material solutions needed to close critical destruction technology gaps.

Asia

- Continue to enhance the capability of the ROK to respond to chemical unexploded ordinance (UXO) munitions; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy chemical weapons (CW) on the Korean peninsula;
- Implement chemical security framework and national chemical inventory tracking systems and associated training in the Philippines; and
- Identify new priority chemical security vulnerabilities in Indonesia and initiate a project as applicable.

Middle East and North Africa

• Continue training in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting; and

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

• Continue to build capacity of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense chemical forensics laboratory to facilitate attribution and prevent future CW attacks.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will: Global

• Continue to increase U.S. preparedness for chemical weapon contingency elimination operations including demonstration of material solutions and operational logistics.

Asia

- Continue to enhance the capability of the ROK to respond to chemical unexploded ordinance munitions; and secure, account for, transport, and/or destroy chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula;
- Assess capabilities to manage chemicals of security concern across the life-cycle, and commence workshops, training, and table-top exercises based on the outcomes of the assessments in the Philippines; and
- Complete the chemical security capabilities assessment in Indonesia and initiate a project as applicable.

#### Middle East and North Africa

Complete current Chemical Risk Identification and Management Program in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq on
effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting to reduce threats of
VEOs obtaining or using improvised chemical weapons.

#### C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will: Global

- Increase preparedness and capabilities to rapidly and agilely respond to support nuclear weapons and fissile
  material removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commanders and U.S. interagency partners;
  and
- Continue to enhance the quality of and expand access to training on nuclear and high-threat radiological material security best practices for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States by completing translation and upgrades of existing e-Learning nuclear security modules and support other international nuclear security exchanges.

#### Middle East

• Transition sustainment of capabilities provided to Jordan to train, exercise, and maintain equipment to secure,

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

handle, and transport interdicted nuclear and high-threat radiological materials and secure nuclear materials and facilities; and

• Complete planned support to Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS) to increase its ability to support sustainment of nuclear security training in Jordan and serve as a regional leader for outreach and training related to national capacity building for safety and security of nuclear and high-threat radiological materials.

#### Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue efforts with Kazakhstan to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites and provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear materials;
- Continue implementation of counter nuclear smuggling efforts in Ukraine and transition sustainment of capabilities for nuclear site security; and
- Complete assessments of Romania and Bulgaria's capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling and, as applicable, implement projects to mitigate vulnerabilities.

Asia

- Continue to conduct nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities in India; and
- Continue to enhance ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through small-scale equipping, training, and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Global

- Continue to increase preparedness and capabilities to support global transportation and disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear or high-threat radiological materials; and
- Continue support to the IAEA's nuclear security training efforts, initiatives, and other international nuclear security exchanges.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

• Continue efforts to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites, provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and transition sustainment of Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Material Inventory Management System;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue implementation of counter nuclear smuggling efforts in Ukraine and transition sustainment of nuclear security capabilities; and
- Initiate counter nuclear smuggling projects in Bulgaria and Romania, if applicable based on previous assessments.

Asia

- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Continue to enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through equipping, training, and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Global

- Continue to increase preparedness and capabilities to rapidly and agilely respond globally to support nuclear weapons and fissile material removal missions in coordination with the Combatant Commands and U.S. interagency partners; and
- Continue to enhance the quality of and expand access to training on nuclear and high-threat radiological material security best practices for IAEA Member States by completing translation and upgrades of existing e-Learning nuclear security modules and support other international nuclear security exchanges.

#### Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue efforts with Kazakhstan to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites and provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear materials;
- Continue implementation of counter nuclear smuggling efforts in Ukraine and transition sustainment of nuclear security capabilities; and
- Continue counter nuclear smuggling projects in Bulgaria and Romania, if applicable based on previous assessments.

Asia

- Continue cooperation with India on nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities; and
- Continue to enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through small-scale equipping, training,

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#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

#### D. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP):

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Provide COVID-19 technical and material assistance including biosafety equipment, diagnostic supplies, and subject matter expertise to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Ukraine;
- Initiate engagements with Bulgaria and Romania, including capability gap and threat prioritization assessments;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue to support laboratory surveillance network optimization, especially dangerous pathogens (EDP) consolidation, biosafety and biosecurity (BS&S) regulatory reform, and epidemiology training in Ukraine;
- Continue to strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Continue to leverage the Lugar Center as a regional center of excellence for training and certification;
- Continue remediation and commissioning of the Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Azerbaijan;
- Continue mentorship to ensure safe and effective use of Azerbaijan's CRL for outbreak detection and diagnostics;
- Continue training to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Continue to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak; and

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

• Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine.

#### Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Provide COVID-19 technical and material assistance including biosafety equipment, diagnostic supplies, and subject matter expertise to Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan;
- Initiate EIDSS implementation and training in Jordan;
- Continue assessments of current BS&S and BSV capabilities within the Gulf Cooperation Council States;
- Continue technical support to enhance the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen abilities to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue activities to ensure sustainable transition of operations of the Kazakhstan CRL;
- Continue EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Kazakhstan;
- Continue BRM training and biosurveillance (BSV) capacity building activities and support for electronic disease reporting in Iraq;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats; and
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula.

#### Africa

- Provide COVID-19 technical and material assistance including biosafety equipment, diagnostic supplies, and subject matter expertise to the African Union Centers for Disease Control, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia;
- Initiate repair and certification of biosafety cabinets (BSC) and provide critical infrastructure repairs and upgrades at the Mobile Diagnostic Laboratory (MDL) in Guinea;
- Initiate establishment and operationalization of a Regional Collaborating Center for the African Union Center for Disease Control;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in Ethiopia, Gabon, and Kenya;
- Continue to strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities sub-regionally in North Africa;
- Continue BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in South Africa;
- Continue BRM national strategic planning in Tanzania and Uganda;
- Continue to provide epidemiology training in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania;
- Continue sample repository BS&S upgrades in Uganda;
- Continue construction of the National Laboratory for Livestock and Veterinary Research (LNERV) in Senegal;
- Continue laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue collaboration with African Union Center for Disease Control to develop biosecurity guidelines;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue construction of the National Reference Laboratory in Liberia;
- Continue to enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Complete designs for campus and facility BS&S upgrades in Ethiopia; and
- Complete construction of a Biological Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) Diagnostic Training Center, BS&S mentorship, and research activities in South Africa.

Asia

- Provide COVID-19 technical and material assistance including biosafety equipment, diagnostic supplies, and subject matter expertise to Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam;
- Continue to provide BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in Philippines;
- Complete provision of BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in Malaysia;
- Continue to provide BS&S and BSV training in Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, and the Philippines;
- Continue to develop and implement field epidemiology training and exercises in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam;
- Continue to enhance integrated real-time disease reporting in Thailand;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue to equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the Republic of Korea (ROK);
- Continue building a network of regional experts within Asia on biological issues that can enhance collaboration on detection of biological agents;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak; and
- Complete laboratory designs and upgrades, pathogen tracking systems implementation, and BS&S training in human and animal health laboratories in Vietnam.

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will: Eurasia

- Continue regional technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue to strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Continue to leverage the Lugar Center as a regional center of excellence for training and certification;
- Continue mentorship to ensure safe and effective use of Azerbaijan's CRL for outbreak detection and diagnostics;
- Continue to support laboratory surveillance network optimization, EDP consolidation, BS&S regulatory reform, and epidemiology training in Ukraine;
- Continue engagement with regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue assessment efforts in the Balkan and the Black Sea regions, consistent with new CTR authorities,

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

prioritizing engagements with Bulgaria and Romania;

- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Continue to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Complete remediation and commissioning of the CRL in Azerbaijan;
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine; and
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

#### Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Continue assessments of current BS&S and BSV capabilities within the Gulf Cooperation Council States;
- Continue technical support to enhance the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen abilities to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Jordan and Kazakhstan;
- Continue activities to ensure sustainable transition of operations of the Kazakhstan CRL;
- Continue activities and research opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and support for electronic disease reporting, to support sustainment of capabilities in Iraq;
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula; and
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats.

#### Africa

- Initiate implementation of a transition training plan in Uganda;
- Initiate BRM training and BS&S improvements in Nigeria;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue BRM and standard operating procedures implementation in Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Complete BRM national strategic planning in Tanzania and Uganda;
- Initiate physical upgrades at regional laboratories and complete renovations at a national level laboratory in Ethiopia;
- Continue to provide epidemiology training and laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania;
- Continue to enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Initiate BRM training for laboratory staff, conduct laboratory assessments, and begin designs for limited upgrades at laboratory facilities in Gabon;
- Complete construction of the LNERV in Senegal;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue establishment and operationalization of a Regional Collaborating Center for the African Union Center for Disease Control;
- Continue collaboration with African Union Center for Disease Control to develop biosecurity guidelines;
- Continue to strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;
- Complete repair and certification of BSCs as well as critical infrastructure repairs and upgrades at the MDL in Guinea;
- Complete construction of the National Reference Laboratory in Liberia; and
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Tanzania.

Asia

- Initiate efforts to train regional partner nations in the requirements to plan, organize and execute a series of workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional experts within Asia to enhance collaboration on early

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

detection of biological threat events;

- Continue to equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Continue to conduct BSV and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue to develop and implement field epidemiology training and exercises in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam;
- Continue to enhance integrated real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Initiate development of the Malaysian One Health network as a regional leader in Emergency Operation Center development and sustainment within Asia;
- Initiate establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats; and
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak.

FY 2022 funds executed over three years will: Eurasia

- Initiate biosafety and biosecurity engagement activities with Bulgaria and Romania based on threat reduction opportunities identified in assessments;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue to strengthen BS&S capacity through targeted mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Continue to leverage the Lugar Center as a regional center of excellence for training and certification;
- Continue to support laboratory surveillance network optimization, EDP consolidation, BS&S

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

regulatory reform, and epidemiology training in Ukraine;

- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue assessment efforts in the Balkan and the Black Sea regions, consistent with new CTR authorities;
- Continue to integrate Bulgaria and Romania with regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to prevent the proliferation of research practices of security concern;
- Continue to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak; and
- Complete mentorship to ensure safe and effective use of Azerbaijan's CRL for outbreak detection and diagnostics.

Middle East and Southwest Asia

- Initiate workshops on BS&S and BSV topics with the Gulf Cooperation Council States and continue to identify local capabilities to leverage in future engagements;
- Continue technical support to enhance the Gulf Cooperation Council's leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue activities and research opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and continued support for electronic disease reporting, to support sustainment of capabilities in Iraq;
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, table-top and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Jordan and Kazakhstan;
- Complete activities to ensure sustainable transition of operations of the Kazakhstan CRL; and
- Reduce program activities to prepare for host-country sustainment in Jordan and Uzbekistan.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Africa

- Initiate operations, management, and sustainment training for laboratories in Ethiopia;
- Continue BS&S improvements in Nigeria;
- Continue BRM training and standard operating procedures implementation in Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, and South Africa;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the government of Cameroon;
- Continue to enhance pathogen diagnostics and reporting in South Africa and Kenya;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue establishment and operationalization of a Regional Collaborating Center for the African Union Center for Disease Control;
- Continue to strengthen cross-border BS&S capabilities in North Africa;
- Continue implementation of a transition training plan in Uganda;
- Complete physical upgrades at regional laboratories and complete renovations at a national level laboratory in Ethiopia;
- Complete laboratory BS&S upgrades in Cameroon;
- Complete collaboration with African Union Center for Disease Control to develop biosecurity guidelines; and
- Complete designs for limited upgrades at laboratory facilities as well as advanced phases of laboratory biosafety/biosecurity training in Gabon.

Asia

- Initiate laboratory and hospital facility and equipment upgrades in Indonesia;
- Continue efforts to train regional partner nations in the requirements to plan, organize, and execute a series of workshops and table-top exercises;
- Continue building a network of regional experts within Asia on biological issues that can enhance

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

collaboration on detection of biological agents;

- Continue to equip, train, and conduct multi-sectoral exercises to prepare for countering emergent biological threats in the ROK;
- Continue to conduct BSV and BS&S facility and equipment upgrades in the Philippines;
- Continue fostering biosecurity dialogues in India;
- Continue development of the Malaysian One Health network as a regional leader in Emergency Operation Center development and sustainment within Asia;
- Continue establishment of national laboratory BS&S regulatory standards in India;
- Continue to strengthen regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue to enhance integrated real time disease reporting in Thailand;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between health and security entities during an EDP outbreak;
- Complete provision of epidemiology training and mentorship workshops and transfer ownership to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; and
- Reduce program footprint to prepare for host-country sustainment in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

#### E. WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP):

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

#### Southeast Asia

- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Complete improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

support capabilities in Vietnam; and

• Continue engagements to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

FY 2021 funds executed over three years will:

Eurasia

- Continue long-term WMD threat reduction activities with CTR partners sharing borders with Russia;
- Support sustainment and transition of provided WMD proliferation prevention capacities to Armenia;
- Complete efforts to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along Georgia's green borders; and
- Continue assessment efforts in Bulgaria and Romania, consistent with new CTR authorities, and begin capability development as warranted.

Middle East and North Africa

- Complete engagement in Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, focusing on sustainment of capabilities to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Complete WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Continue efforts in Iraq and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula to counter the spread of WMD from statebased actors and VEO threat networks.

#### Southeast Asia

- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Continue improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam; and
- Continue engagements to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. FY 2022 funds executed over three years will:

#### Eurasia

- Continue long-term WMD threat reduction activities with DoD CTR Program partners sharing borders with Russia;
- Complete efforts to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along Georgia's green borders; and
- Continue assessment efforts in Bulgaria and Romania, consistent with new CTR authorities, and begin capability development as warranted.

#### Middle East and North Africa

- Transition all capabilities to Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, focusing on sustainment of capabilities to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to relevant agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Complete WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border;
- Continue efforts in Iraq and assess requirements on the Arabian Peninsula to counter the spread of WMD from statebased actors and VEO threat networks; and,
- Initiate new engagements, consistent with new authorities and completed assessments, in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to counter the spread of WMD from state-based actors and VEO threat networks.

#### Southeast Asia

- Sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain in the Philippines;
- Continue improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities in Vietnam; and
- Continue engagements to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

#### F. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs (OAAC):

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2020, FY 2021, and FY 2022 OAAC funds over three years will:

- Fund U.S. Embassy and overseas office support, Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS), program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program contract logistics support (shipping, travel, and language translations services);
- Fund travel for DTRA senior leadership and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program;
- Fund assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners;
- Facilitate collaboration and synchronization in order to integrate CTR Program activities to enable the DoD, United States Government and international partners to counter and deter WMD, and to advance CTR's ability to build friendly networks by enhancing partner nations' capabilities and capacity to maintain and sustain Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction programs;
- Fund DoD CTR Program Operational Evaluations (formerly known as Audits and Examinations), which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose.

#### V. Personnel Summary:

<u>.</u>	<u>FY 2020</u>	<u>FY 2021</u>	<u>FY 2022</u>	Change FY 2020/ <u>FY 2021</u>	Change FY 2021/ <u>FY 2022</u>
Contractor FTEs (Total)	480	481	286	1	-195

Personnel Summary Explanations: Contractor FTE totals include OP32 codes associated with Advisory Assistance & Support and performance contractors who implement CTR capabilities in foreign countries.

#### VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

			Change from FY 2020 to FY 2021		Change from FY 2021 to FY 2022			
		FY 2020	Price	Program	FY 2021	Price	Program	FY 2022
		Program	Growth	<u>Growth</u>	Program Program	Growth	Growth	Program
308	TRAVEL OF PERSONS	3,299	66	609	3,974	76	-1,251	2,799
0399	TOTAL TRAVEL	3,299	66	609	3,974	76	-1,251	2,799
914	PURCHASED COMMUNICATIONS (NON-FUND)	0	0	50	50	1	-1	50
920	SUPPLIES & MATERIALS (NON-FUND)	42,082	842	-20,738	22,186	422	-2,467	20,141
923	FACILITIES SUST, REST, & MOD BY CONTRACT	8,737	175	12,232	21,144	402	-15,472	6,074
925	EQUIPMENT PURCHASES (NON-FUND)	11,851	237	-5,778	6,310	120	-4,213	2,217
932	MGT PROF SUPPORT SVCS	2,810	56	7,443	10,309	196	293	10,798
934	ENGINEERING & TECH SVCS	142,890	2,858	-6,044	139,704	2,654	-61,638	80,720
957	OTHER COSTS (LAND AND STRUCTURES)	11,968	239	10,599	22,806	433	-10,874	12,365
985	RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, CONTRACTS	17	0	1,257	1,274	0	-9	1,265
987	OTHER INTRA-GOVT PURCH	30,160	603	47,002	77,765	1,478	-23,811	55,432
988	GRANTS	59,461	1,189	-52,912	7,738	147	6,185	14,070
989	OTHER SERVICES	48,991	980	-11,874	38,097	724	-11,217	27,604
990	IT CONTRACT SUPPORT SERVICES	11,434	229	-2,830	8,833	168	-2,687	6,314
0999	TOTAL OTHER PURCHASES	370,401	7,408	-21,593	356,216	6,745	-125,911	237,050
9999	GRAND TOTAL	373,700	7,474	-20,984	360,190	6,821	-127,162	239,849

\*FY 2020 includes Division A, Title IX and X of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93), Division F, Title IV and V from the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (P.L. 116-136).

\*FY 2021 includes Division C, Title IX and Division J, Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).