Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 President's Budget

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



March 2019



Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

	FY 2018	Price	Program	FY 2019	Price	Program	FY 2020
	<u>Actuals</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	Enacted	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Estimate</u>
CTR	350 , 000	6,285	-6,045	350,240	6,641	-18,181	338,700

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>:

Today's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat environment includes State and Non-State actors acquiring, developing, or using WMD through readily available knowledge, technologies, and materials. During Congressional testimony in 2017, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis described the Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program as DoD's most comprehensive and effective tool for working cooperatively with international and interagency partners to mitigate WMD-related threats. Moreover, the program has strong linkages to the National Defense Strategy (Strengthening Alliances and Attracting New Partners) and DoD Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) priorities - namely, building partner capacity to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. To address these transnational threats and to meet national and DoD/GCC priorities, the CTR Program works with partner nations to build their capacity to prevent the proliferation or use of WMD. With a focus on eliminating, securing, detecting, and interdicting WMD and related systems and materials, the CTR program takes a layered approach to help its partners address WMD-related threats as close to the source as possible:

- Eliminate. When possible CTR eliminates WMD and related systems or materials.
- Secure. If cooperative elimination is not possible, CTR consolidates, secures, and accounts for WMD and related systems or materials at their source.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

• Detect and Interdict. Where the Program cannot fully address the threat at the source, it works with partner countries to detect and prevent trafficking, enhance disease detection and surveillance, and cut off proliferation pathways.

The DoD CTR Program consists of the following efforts: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination, Chemical Weapons Destruction, Global Nuclear Security, the Biological Threat Reduction Program (formerly the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, an administrative name change to accurately reflect the mission of this effort), the WMD Proliferation Prevention Program, and Other Assessments and Administrative Costs.

DTRA's CTR portfolio continues to reflect Services Requirements Review Board reductions previously implemented across the FYDP.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

		FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
		<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	Estimate
Α.	Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)	12,188	2,823	492

The SOAE program supports the elimination of WMD delivery systems including missiles and missile launch systems such as silos and submarines.

Ukraine

Facilitate the safe and secure disassembly, storage, and destruction of propellant from first stage SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile solid rocket motors in Eastern Ukraine. Project activities were completed on December 31, 2018.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Increase preparedness to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems and associated capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

Global Contingency Preparedness

Increase U.S. preparedness to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems and associated capabilities, in order to reduce potential emerging threats and proliferation concerns in an efficient and expeditious manner.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

		<u>\$</u>	in thousand	<u>ds</u>
		FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
		<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
<u>B.</u>	Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)	8,500	5,446	12,856

The CWD Program facilitates the destruction of chemical weapons (CW), CW-related materials, and CW production facilities as well as the security of industrial chemicals that could be used to create an improvised CW.

Algeria

Leverage the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to detect, deter, and disrupt non-state actor threats to the highest risk weaponizable chemicals; collaborate with Algeria to reinforce its commitment to chemical security and strengthen its ability to monitor security and compliance with various international treaties and conventions.

Morocco

Leverage INTERPOL to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to detect, deter, and disrupt non-state actor threats to the highest risk weaponizable chemicals; enhance Morocco's ability to prevent Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) access to chemicals that could be used to create an improvised CW by strengthening Morocco's regulations, tightening inventory tracking systems, and developing an advanced chemical security train-the-trainer program.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

Tunisia

Leverage INTERPOL to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to detect, deter, and disrupt non-state actor threats to prevent VEO access to the highest risk chemicals that could be used to create an improvised CW.

Lebanon

Leverage INTERPOL to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to detect, deter, and disrupt non-state actor threats to prevent VEO access to the highest risk chemicals that could be used to create an improvised CW.

<u> Iraq</u>

Collaborate with the Government of Iraq to improve the security of chemicals that could be used to create an improvised CW by developing Iraq's strategy and action plans and its ability to improve facility security; prevent the proliferation of expertise; destroy any potential CW; and improve the capability to detect, analyze, and characterize chemical materials for proper disposition.

<u>Jordan</u>

Improve Jordan's ability to counter chemical threats through development and delivery of targeted and increasingly advanced chemical security training.

Philippines

Strengthen chemical security by identifying and mapping the chemical industry landscape; implement a chemical security regulatory framework; develop a web-based chemical

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

inventory and tracking management system; and develop and implement transportation and site security training.

Contingency Preparedness

In cooperation with the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD), the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC), and other key stakeholders, increase preparedness to secure and eliminate chemical weapons and associated capabilities focused on the Korean peninsula.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

		<u>\$</u>	in thousand	<u>ds</u>
		FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
		<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
<u>C.</u>	Global Nuclear Security (GNS)	43,287	44,001	33,919

The GNS Program prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related materials and expertise.

Global Contingency Preparedness, Transportation Security, and Disposition

Increase preparedness and capabilities to support global transportation and disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear or high-threat radiological materials.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Enhance the IAEA's capabilities to expand quality and access to training on nuclear and high-threat radiological material security best practices for IAEA Member States.

Jordan

Continue to expand Jordan's capabilities to secure, handle, and transport interdicted nuclear and high-threat radiological materials and secure nuclear materials and facilities to prevent potential proliferation.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS)

Support efforts of MESIS to serve as a regional leader and training provider for outreach and national capacity building for safety and security of nuclear and high-threat radiological materials.

<u>Kazakhstan</u>

Increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites, provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and enhance Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Material Inventory Management System to track weapons useable nuclear materials at various sites throughout the country.

Ukraine

Enhance Ukraine's capability to detect the loss, theft, or diversion of nuclear and high-threat radiological materials, and return interdicted materials to regulatory control.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Assess and enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through equipping, training, and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

<u>China Nuclear Security Center of Excellence (COE)</u>

Project activities were completed at the end of FY 2018.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

India

Conduct best-practice exchanges in coordination with U.S. Government and Indian partners to improve nuclear site and transportation security.

Morocco

Identify potential gaps associated with detecting and responding to incidents of nuclear and high-threat radiological material smuggling and address as applicable.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

		\$	in thousand	<u>ds</u>
		FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
		<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
D.	Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)	172,752	197,585	183,642

BTRP (formerly Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP)) facilitates elimination, safety, and security of especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs) as well as rapid detection and reporting of diseases caused by EDPs. This reduces the risk of EDP holdings, accidental release, or EDP's being used for nefarious purposes. It also reduces the risk of localized outbreaks becoming regional destabilizing events and increases the safety of U.S. forces. The program name change is an administrative name-change to accurately reflect the mission of this effort.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

Build partner capacity in the region by strengthening linkages and facilitate sharing of biosecurity and safety (BS&S) and biosurveillance (BSV) best practices between BTRP partner nations in Eastern Europe and Eurasia; ensure tailored but consistent approaches to training, diagnostic processes, and reporting; enhance regional organizations' biological threat reduction capabilities and infrastructure investment sustainment through regional and international scientific engagements and partnerships; and be the partner of choice in a region competing against Russian influence.

<u>Middle East</u>

Mitigate the risk of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other non-state terrorist groups, especially those sponsored by Iran, from acquiring biological

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

materials, equipment, and expertise; strengthen linkages and facilitate the adoption of internationally recognized BS&S best practices among BTRP partner nations in the region; and sustainably enhance biological threat reduction capabilities with regional organizations.

<u>Africa</u>

Expand on BS&S and BSV investments particularly to decrease the risk of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) acquiring biological materials, equipment, and expertise; provide tools and guidance for sustainment in sub-regions (i.e., East Africa, West Africa); strengthen linkages and facilitate the adoption of internationally recognized BS&S and BSV best practices among BTRP partner nations on a regional and sub-regional basis; and enhance biological threat reduction capabilities with regional organizations.

Asia

Secure dangerous pathogens in an area dominated with VEO activity and illicit proliferation; enhance partner nation's individual and regional capability to detect, diagnose, and report human and animal EDPs; enhance the region's BS&S capabilities to reduce the risk of accidental or intentional release of EDPs; and be the partner of choice in a region competing against Chinese influence.

BTRP is currently partnering with the following countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Cambodia, India, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. If the political situation presents

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

opportunities for engagement, additional activities will occur with Pakistan and Indonesia.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

						<pre>\$ in thousand:</pre>	<u>s</u>
					FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
					<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
<u>E.</u>	Proliferation	Prevention	Program	(PPP)	86,292	74,937	79,869

PPP strengthens border security through detection, interdiction, and domain awareness of WMD related trafficking across borders or through maritime jurisdictions.

Armenia

Improve Armenia's capability to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and WMD-related materials across its borders by providing equipment and associated training to the Armenian Border Guard (ABG) to enhance capabilities in communications, surveillance, WMD detection and identification, mobility, tactical infrastructure, and post and patrol operations, and to ensure that the ABG can sustain and build upon these capabilities over the long term.

Georgia

Provide comprehensive WMD detection and interdiction capabilities to the Georgia Border Police to deter, detect, and interdict WMD and related materials along Georgia's land borders by installing border surveillance cameras and integrated communications systems, constructing or renovating existing border patrol headquarters, and providing training on tactics and procedures for green-border surveillance and interdiction operations.

Jordan

Improve Jordan's capability to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and related materials across its borders with Syria and Iraq and maintain operational capability in the event of a WMD event. Supply training and equipment that improves core proliferation prevention capabilities of the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF), including

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

provision of command and control, communications, surveillance, interdiction, and handheld equipment in order to facilitate the interdiction of WMD on Jordan's borders. Provide relevant military and civilian responders with equipment and training to detect, characterize, isolate, and secure WMD, as well as training to mitigate the effects of WMD materials. Focus on delivering sustainment activities such as train-the-trainer and preventive and corrective maintenance to the JAF and civilian agencies in order to sustain and build upon these capabilities for the long term.

Lebanon

Improve the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces Land Border Regiments to deter, detect, and interdict WMD and WMD-related materials in transit across Lebanon's 375-kilometer border with Syria by providing surveillance equipment at border outposts, providing integrated United Kingdom-provided surveillance equipment, delivering border security and WMD detection training and equipment, and conducting Concept of Operations (CONOPS) workshops.

<u>Tunisia</u>

Improve Tunisia's capability to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and related materials across its border with Libya by working collaboratively with Tunisia's Army and National Guard to design, develop, produce, deploy, and sustain an integrated border surveillance system. Deliver training to develop sustainable human capital and equipment to detect, characterize, isolate, and secure WMD and WMD-related materials and to prevent their proliferation. Support CONOPS workshops for Tunisian border security agencies to develop and refine standard operating procedures that better utilize the border security system in a whole-of-government approach to combatting WMD-terrorism and proliferation.

Cambodia

Through FY 2019, minimally sustain Cambodia's capability to deter, detect, and interdict WMD and related materials transiting through maritime ports and national waters by

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

enhancing radiological detection capabilities at the main river port, the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port New Container Terminal. No funding requested in FY 2020 as Cambodia transitions to sustain the full effort.

<u>Philippines</u>

Improve the Philippine's capability to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and related materials through or near its territorial waters by providing equipment and training to enhance the Philippine's maritime domain awareness.

Vietnam

Improve Vietnam's capability to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and related materials through Vietnamese national waters, including the territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone by providing patrol vessel sustainment facilities and WMD-interdiction training.

Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia New Projects

Pursue critical emerging WMD proliferation threats with cooperative partners in the Middle East (Iraq) and Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia).

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

	<u>\$</u>	in thousand	<u>ds</u>
	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
	<u>Actuals</u>	Enacted	<u>Estimate</u>
F. Other Assessments / Administration Costs	26,981	25,448	27,922

The Other Assessments / Administrative Costs (OAAC) Program provides general program administrative support and strategic development costs for the CTR Program.

OAAC centrally funds U.S. Embassy and overseas office support, Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS), program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program contract logistics support (shipping, travel, and language), and execution of assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and inter-organizational partners. In addition, these funds will be used for DoD CTR Program Audits and Examinations, which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose in an efficient and effective manner, and travel for Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) senior leadership, Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel, and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program.

II. Force Structure Summary:

N/A

				FY 201	9		_
		_	Cong	ressional	Action		
A. BA Subactivities	FY 2018 <u>Actuals</u>	Budget <u>Request</u>	Amount	Percent	Appropriated	Current <u>Enacted</u>	FY 2020 Estimate
1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	12,188	2,823	0	0.0	2,823	2,823	492
2. Chemical Weapons Destruction	8,500	5,446	0	0.0	5,446	5,446	12,856
3. Global Nuclear Security	43,287	29,001	15,000	51.7	44,001	44,001	33,919
4. Biological Threat Reduction Program	172 , 752	197,585	0	0.0	197 , 585	197 , 585	183,642
5. Proliferation Prevention	86,292	74,937	0	0.0	74,937	74 , 937	79,869
6. Other Assessments / Administrative Costs	26,981	25,448	0	0.0	25,448	25 , 448	27,922
Total	350,000	335,240	15,000	4.5	350,240	350,240	338,700

		Change	Change
В.	Reconciliation Summary	FY 2019/FY 2019	FY 2019/FY 2020
	Baseline Funding	335,240	350,240
	Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	15,000	
	Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)		
	Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent		
	Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)		
	Subtotal Appropriated Amount	350,240	
	Fact-of-Life Changes (2019 to 2019 Only)		
	Subtotal Baseline Funding	350,240	
	Supplemental		
	Reprogrammings		
	Price Changes		6,641
	Functional Transfers		
	Program Changes		-18,181
	Current Estimate	350,240	338,700
	Less: Wartime Supplemental		
	Normalized Current Estimate	350,240	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Totals</u>
FY 2019 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)		335,240
1. Congressional Adjustments		15 , 000
a. Distributed Adjustments		
1) Global Nuclear Security	15 , 000	
b. Undistributed Adjustments		
c. Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent		
d. General Provisions		
FY 2019 Appropriated Amount		350,240
2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		•
3. Fact-of-Life Changes		
FY 2019 Baseline Funding		350,240
4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)		•
Revised FY 2019 Estimate		350,240
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental		·
Appropriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings		
FY 2019 Normalized Current Estimate		350,240
6. Price Change		6,641
7. Functional Transfers		·
8. Program Increases		17,007
a. Annualization of New FY 2019 Program		·
b. One-Time FY 2020 Increases		
c. Program Growth in FY 2020		
1) Chemical Weapons Destruction	7,301	
The funding increase in FY 2020 reflects ongoing	,	
maturation of the program in Middle East/North Africa		
(MENA) partner nations as well as expansion into		
Asia. The program will build upon initial MENA		
baseline data and refine requirements that focus on		
national-level chemical security regulations,		
<u> </u>		

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

C. Re	econciliation of Increases and Decreases	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Totals</u>
	inventory and tracking systems, and train-the-trainer		
	programs. In Asia, the program plans to conduct		
	capacity-building activities in the Republic of Korea		
	and the Philippines. (FY 2019 Baseline: \$5,446		
	thousand)		
	2) Global Nuclear Security	4,308	
	The funding increase in FY 2020 will provide		
	equipment, training, and exercises for partner		
	countries and nuclear guard and response forces to		
	enhance their capabilities to secure vulnerable and		
	interdicted nuclear material; support shipments of		
	nuclear material to consolidate and facilitate		
	disposition; and provide continued support for		
	Nuclear Security Support Centers. The funding		
	increase provides additional training requirements for the ROK Nuclear Characterization Teams and		
	anticipated project expansion to emerging ROK partners. In the Republic of India (ROI), the		
	increase provides for additional nuclear security		
	engagements with ROI stakeholders, including best		
	practice exchanges, strategic dialogues, and tabletop		
	exercises. Funds also support Kazahstan Physical		
	Protection Security (PPS) upgrades at key sites		
	containing vulnerable nuclear and high-threat		
	radiological material, and increased response force		
	capability for the Kazakhstani National Guard.		
	Additionally, funding will also support the creation		
	of a maintenance and sustainment facility for		

continued security of the former Semipalatinsk Test

C.	Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Totals</u>
	Site in Kazakhstan. The funding will also provide		
	for the procurement of equipment and logistics		
	support to conduct large scale, multi-modal		
	contingency preparedness exercises in coordination		
	with interagency partners, and provides funds for		
	recurring annual requirements to remove nuclear		
	material in a contingency environment. (FY 2019		
	Baseline: \$44,001 thousand)		
	3) Proliferation Prevention Program	3 , 433	
	The funding increase in FY 2020 continues to reduce		
	the threats posed by Violent Extremist Organization		
	(VEO) acquisition and use of chemical weapons in the		
	Middle East and North Africa; addresses trafficking		
	of dual-use items in Southeast Asia particularly in		
	Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam; and impacts		
	trafficking networks by both state and non-state		
	networks in regions known for proliferating WMD. (FY		
	2019 Baseline: \$74,937 thousand)	1 0 0 5	
	4) Other Assessments Administrative Costs	1,965	
	The funding increase in FY 2020 reflects costs		
	associated with new requirements in new countries		
	such as the Republic of Korea and a strategic		
	development program with GCC sponsorship and		
0	participation. (FY 2019 Baseline: \$25,448 thousand)		25 100
9.	Program Decreases		-35,188
	a. Annualization of FY 2019 Program Decreases		
	b. One-Time FY 2019 Increases	15 270	
	1) Global Nuclear Security The funding degrees in EV 2020 is due to a \$15M	-15 , 270	
	The funding decrease in FY 2020 is due to a \$15M		

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	<u>Totals</u>
congressional addition of FY 2019 funds. (FY 2019		
Baseline: \$44,001 thousand)		
c. Program Decreases in FY 2020		
1) Biological Threat Reduction Program	-17 , 531	
The funding decrease in FY 2020 is due to many		
Eurasia efforts transitioning to sustainment.		
Decrease also accounts for reduction in efforts for		
some countries in Africa that are lower priority		
efforts. *Service Requirements Review Board: 932		
Management Professional Support Services (\$-15		
thousand) (FY 2019 Baseline: \$197,585 thousand)		
2) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	-2 , 387	
The funding decrease in FY 2020 is due to the		
December 31, 2018 completion of efforts to safely		
store and eliminate SS-24 solid rocket motor		
propellant in Ukraine. (FY 2019 Baseline: \$2,823		
thousand)		
FY 2020 Budget Request		338,700

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2018 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Assist Ukraine by financing the elimination of the remaining SS-24 solid rocket propellant and first-stage motor cases through December 31, 2018; and
- Store Ukraine's remaining SS-24 first stage solid rocket motors and continue maintenance and repair of storage facilities.

Asia

• Increase U.S. preparedness to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems and associated capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

FY 2019 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Complete and demobilized the project to eliminate SS-24 solid rocket propellant in Ukraine by December 31, 2018; and
- ullet Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Asia

- Continue to build the capacity of the ROK to secure, account for, transport, consolidate, dismantle and destroy WMD delivery systems and related infrastructure in compliance with U.S. and international law; and
- Continue to assess a post-conflict or collapse scenario on the Korean Peninsula.

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Asia

• Continue to increase U.S. preparedness to secure and eliminate WMD delivery systems and associated capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

B. <u>Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)</u>:

FY 2018 funds executed over three years will:

Middle East and North Africa

- Leverage INTERPOL to strengthen the ability of Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, and Lebanese law enforcement to detect, deter, and disrupt non-state actor threats to the highest risk weaponizable chemicals; and
- Expand training in Morocco, Jordan, and Iraq on effective chemical

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting.

Asia

- Build ROK capacity to perform chemical security and elimination;
- In cooperation with the JPEO-CBD, ECBC, and other key stakeholders, increase preparedness to secure and eliminate chemical weapons and associated capabilities on the Korean peninsula; and
- Strengthen chemical security in the Philippines by identifying and mapping the chemical industry against known VEO areas of activity and assisting with the development of chemical security regulations.

FY 2019 funds executed over three years will:

Global Planning

- Continue and expand chemical security enhancements to partner nations facilities housing toxic industrial chemicals and materials; and
- Provide technical advice and support for contingency planning to eliminate chemical weapons and to improve safety and security of chemical weapons until they can be safely eliminated.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Asia

- Continue to build the capacity of the ROK to secure, characterize, account for, handle, transport, consolidate, store, and destroy CW materials and associated infrastructure while meeting U.S. laws and international treaty obligations; and
- Continue to assess a post-conflict or collapse scenario on the Korean Peninsula.

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Middle East and North Africa

• Expand training in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Iraq on effective chemical security, chemical characterization, supply chain management, and reporting.

Asia

- Continue to build ROK capacity to perform chemical security and elimination;
- Continue to increase preparedness to secure and eliminate chemical weapons and associated capabilities on the Korean peninsula; and
- Facilitate chemical security framework implementation and associated training in the Philippines.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2018 funds executed over three years will:

Middle East and North Africa

- Conduct workshops and training events and begin transitioning to a train-the-trainer approach that will result in a Jordanian-led training process to secure nuclear material and ensure the security of interdicted nuclear and high-threat radiological material in Jordan; and
- Support nuclear security workshops, training courses, exercises, and related activities.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue efforts to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites, provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and enhance Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Material Inventory Management System;
- Assume management and funding of the project to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials by working collaboratively with the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan(previously funded by PPP); and
- Complete training, tabletop and field exercises, emergency response and sustainment/maintenance equipment, and training center equipment to enhance nuclear security in Ukraine and begin activities to enhance Ukraine's counter nuclear smuggling capability to secure, handle, and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

transport interdicted material.

Asia

- Complete DoD CTR Nuclear Security COE efforts with China;
- Support nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, and related activities in India; and
- Initiate training activities with key partners from Republic of Korea.

Global

- Support shipments of weapons-usable nuclear material to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and
- Increase preparedness and capabilities to support global transportation and disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear or highthreat radiological materials and continue support to the IAEA's nuclear security training efforts and other international nuclear security exchanges.

FY 2019 funds executed over three years will:

Middle East and North Africa

• Continue to provide training, tabletop exercises, and equipment to build Jordan's capabilities to secure, handle, and transport interdicted radiological material, and secure nuclear materials and facilities to prevent potential proliferation;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Work to transition training courses through a train-the-trainer approach; and
- Support nuclear security workshops, training courses, exercises, and related activities focused on enhancing counter nuclear smuggling capabilities and begin assessing post interdiction capabilities to compliment assistance provided through other CTR Programs in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and other key emerging partner countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue support for Nuclear Security COEs in countries including Kazakhstan;
- Enhance nuclear security in Kazakhstan by completing physical security upgrades at nuclear sites, providing guard and response force equipment, building nuclear security capabilities through training, and continuing development of an enhanced inventory management system for nuclear materials; and
- Continue training, tabletop, and field exercises and begin transitioning to a train-the-trainer approach to enhance nuclear security in Ukraine and initiate opportunities to provide support to enhance counter nuclear smuggling efforts in Ukraine.

Asia

- Support anticipated new requirements to assist the Republic of Korea with nuclear security activities; and
- Continue support for Nuclear Security COEs in Asia.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Sub-Saharan Africa

• Support potential requirements in the Republic of South Africa if specific gaps are identified through the DOE/ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs assessment.

Global

- Support shipments of weapons-usable nuclear material to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and
- Ensure the capability to work with United States Government partners to securely transport weapons useable nuclear material and high-threat radiological material by participating in transportation exercises; and, Continue support to the IAEA's nuclear security training efforts and other international nuclear security exchanges.

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Middle East and North Africa

- Continue to provide training, tabletop exercises, and equipment to build Jordan's capabilities to secure, handle, and transport interdicted nuclear and high-threat radiological materials and secure nuclear materials and facilities to prevent potential proliferation;
- Continue to support efforts of MESIS to serve as a regional leader and training provider for outreach and national capacity building for safety and security of nuclear and high-threat radiological materials; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

• Identify potential gaps associated with detecting and responding to incidents of nuclear and high-threat radiological material smuggling and address as applicable in Morocco.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue efforts to increase physical security at sensitive nuclear sites, provide training to forces responsible for weapons-useable nuclear material security and response, and transition sustainment of Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Material Inventory Management System;
- Continue efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials by working collaboratively with the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan (previously funded by PPP);
- Equip and develop training curriculum for the Anti-Crisis Training Center in Kazakhstan; and
- Continue implementation of counter nuclear smuggling efforts in Ukraine and transition sustainment of nuclear security capabilities.

Asia

- Continue to conduct nuclear security workshops, best practice exchanges, training courses, table-top exercises, and related activities in India; and
- Continue to enhance the ROK capability to reduce nuclear and radiological threats through equipping, training, and conducting exercises for designated ROK military and civilian units.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Global

- Support shipments of weapons-usable nuclear material to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material;
- Increase preparedness and capabilities to support global transportation and disposition of nuclear weapons and nuclear or high-threat radiological materials;
- Continue to work with the U.S. interagency to increase preparedness for nuclear and radiological security and elimination contingencies; and
- Continue support to the IAEA's nuclear security training efforts, initiatives and other international nuclear security exchanges.

D. Biological Threat Reduction Program (formerly Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP)):

FY 2018 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Initiate modern security upgrades at two confirmatory diagnostic laboratories in Ukraine;
- Initiate a Field Epidemiology Training Program in Ukraine (jointly funded with Ukraine);
- Continue regional technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to strengthen BS&S capacity through mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals in Turkey;
- Continue Pathogen Access Control System (PACS) support at all known EDP repository sites in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia;
- Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine;
- Continue deployment of online tools for improved clinical diagnostics of EDP outbreaks in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine;
- Continue development of regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats:
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to improve safety, ethicality, and transparency among researchers;
- Complete deployment of PACS to all known EDP repository sites in Ukraine;
- Complete deployment of a Laboratory Information Management System in Georgia; and
- Complete commissioning of the Central Reference Laboratory in Azerbaijan.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Middle East Southwest Asia

- Initiate modern security upgrades at up to 14 diagnostic laboratories in Iraq;
- Initiate regional Mass Gathering Workshops to improve threat readiness:
- Initiate support for country-wide implementation of EIDSS in Iraq, to improve the timeliness and accuracy of the detection and reporting of potential outbreaks of EDPs;
- Continue regional technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Kazakhstan;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue EDP detection and reporting table top exercises to enhance disease surveillance capabilities in Uzbekistan;
- Complete commissioning and certification of the Central Reference Laboratory in Kazakhstan; and
- Complete transition of the Bio-risk Management training series to Jordan.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Africa

- Initiate construction of Bong County Regional Laboratory in Liberia;
- Initiate development and implementation of an EDP consolidation plan in Tanzania;
- Continue security upgrades and renovation at the Kenya Medical Research Institute in Kenya and National Reference Laboratory in Liberia;
- Continue PACS support at all known EDP repository sites in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Complete construction of the Virus Institute Plague Station in Uganda to provide enhanced diagnostics and surveillance capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report on outbreaks caused by EDPs securely and in a timely manner; and
- Complete direct engagement drawdown in Guinea and Sierra Leone and transition to a sustainment posture in each country.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Asia

- Initiate exploratory efforts, requirements gathering, and award projects in India to address critical biosecurity and biosafety gaps;
- Continue laboratory equipment and upgrades to the Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) laboratory in Thailand to bolster its ability to diagnose, study, and contain FMD throughout the region;
- Continue development of regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats; and
- Complete construction of the Regional Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratories in the Philippines.

FY 2019 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Engage regional partners and organizations to highlight the importance of multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Conduct a regional scientific mentorship seminar for junior and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

developing researchers, providing opportunities to present and receive feedback from senior leaders and scientists;

- Strengthen Turkey's BS&S capacity through mentorship and training opportunities for emerging biosafety professionals;
- Develop scientific research capacity through program development grants and micro-grants for BTRP supported laboratories and organizations in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan;
- Continue to establish an independent and sustainable Field Epidemiology Training Program in Ukraine;
- Advise Ukraine on laboratory optimization, EDP consolidation, and BS&S regulatory reform;
- Conduct a Full Operational Capability demonstration and field exercise with Armenia; and
- Provide support to sustain the Laboratory Information Management system in Georgia.

Middle East Southwest Asia

- Support Jordan to develop Bio Risk Management (BRM) competency in laboratory and healthcare workforce and serve as a regional resource for BRM training;
- Assist Jordan to develop and implement BRM laws, regulations, and/or policies to standardize requirements for facilities and organizations that handle or store EDPs:
- Continue to support Jordan to develop the physical infrastructure

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

needed to detect and diagnose diseases caused by EDPs;

- As the political situation unfolds between the U.S. and Pakistan, improve Pakistan's capacity to prevent, detect, diagnose, respond to, and report a full range of biological agents, support One-Health initiatives, and identify new collaborative projects;
- Promote Turkey's multi-sectoral, interagency communication and coordination to strengthen public health response and BSV capacities throughout the country;
- Complete laboratory renovations, equipment provision, and training activities in Iraq. BTRP will also focus on sustainment activities and research opportunities, including BRM training and BSV capacity building activities and continued support for electronic disease reporting; and
- Complete Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) sustainment efforts, begin new biological research and threat agent detection and response activity projects, organize and execute One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, continue training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, tabletop and field training exercises, and continue to promote sustainable training using the train-the-trainer method in Kazakhstan.

Africa

• Complete construction of the National Public Health Institute of the Liberia National Reference Laboratory and the Bong County Regional Laboratory in Phebe, Liberia to ensure diagnostic capabilities for

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

diseases caused by EDPs are available to prevent future outbreaks;

- Complete subject matter expertise and consumable procurement support in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Transition to sustainment efforts, research sponsorship, and laboratory twinning efforts;
- Continue Field Epidemiology Training Program through CDC in Kenya and Tanzania;
- Implement Biorisk Management (BRM) national strategic planning in Tanzania;
- Implement sample repository BS&S upgrades at the Ugandan Central Public Health Institute and National Livestock Resources Research Institute, develop and promote a national Biosecurity Bill, and conduct additional BS&S laboratory upgrades at new district/regional human and animal health laboratories:
- Engage regional partners and organizations on disease tracking, facilitate annual preparedness exercises, and conduct trainings and outbreak investigations;
- Train approximately 100 students from the animal health sector through the Field Epidemiology Training Program, assess the improvement of animal health laboratories, and develop the Ministry of Public Health CONOPs for the public health emergency response and Health Emergency Operations Center (HEOC) sustainment plan in Cameroon. Complete installation of PACS at human and animal health facilities across the country;
- Complete BS&S laboratory renovations at the National Animal Health Diagnosis and Investigation Center (NAHDIC), begin construction

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

management oversight and commissioning support to the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) National Reference Laboratory in Ethiopia. Conduct BS&S gap assessments at regional human and animal health laboratories and commence subsequent BS&S upgrades;

- Continue genomics and bioinformatics mentorship and training provided to NAHDIC, the Armaeur Hansen Research Institute (AHRI), and EPHI, and begin BRM systems training and standard operating procedure implementation at EPHI and AHRI;
- Transition the HEOC to a fully trained staff capable of independently operating and sustaining the facility, improve BS&S capabilities at National Laboratory for Livestock and Veterinary Research and the National Public Health Laboratory to meet to meet World Health Organization international standards, and develop a list of EDPs that includes Senegalese pathogens from the U.S. Select Agent and Toxins list and identify facilities that work with EDPs in Senegal;
- Begin construction of the Biological Safety Lab (BSL-2) Training Center and continue BS&S mentorship and research activities in South Africa; and
- Begin exploratory efforts and requirements gathering in Nigeria.

Asia

• Provide laboratory capacity through training, workshops on BS&S and epidemiology, and facility upgrades for human and animal health sectors in Cambodia to facilitate the country's ability for sustainment in accurately detecting and characterizing pathogens and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

responding to outbreaks;

- Conduct a series of workshops to train Malaysian officials from the public, animal health, and law enforcement sectors to facilitate investigation and response to a biological incident;
- Conduct BS&S training and assist Laos in developing self-sustaining, institutionalized capacity to train staff in field epidemiology and move them toward receiving financial sustainment for programs through the Government of Laos;
- Provide lab designs/upgrades, pathogen tracking systems inclusion of instruction in curriculum, and training for biosafety equipment in human and animal health laboratories in Vietnam;
- Conduct Field Epidemiology Training exercises in Vietnam to build capability for human and animal health professionals;
- Conduct a series of BS&S trainings targeting facility, laboratory, and management personnel in Indian laboratories to strengthen disease surveillance and diagnostic capacity;
- Enhance Thailand's BS&S and BSV capabilities through integrated real time disease reporting that will lead to a reporting sustainment plan for the country;
- Hold forums through the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Network to leverage the resources of countries in the region to control an outbreak:
- Conduct BS&S training and epidemiology trainings to strengthen the national epidemiological capabilities through the World Health

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Organization;

- Train the Lao Military on vector-borne disease surveillance to leverage both health and military sector capabilities when responding to an outbreak;
- Begin developing requirements in Indonesia, to include potential laboratory renovations, as well as research and training efforts;
- Engage new sites to determine requirements for BS&S facility and equipment upgrades, training, and procedures in Philippines; and
- Conduct regional surveillance activities on zoonotic diseases and strengthen the national biosecurity system through CDC in Lao and Thailand.

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue regional technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue to support laboratory surveillance network optimization, especially dangerous pathogens (EDP) consolidation, and Biosafety and Biosecurity (BS&S) regulatory reform in Ukraine;
- Continue a Field Epidemiology Training Program in Ukraine (jointly

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

funded with Ukraine);

- Continue engagement with regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;
- Continue to conduct regional mentorship seminars to improve safety, ethicality, and transparency among researchers;
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak;
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine; and
- Complete deployment of online tools for improved clinical diagnostics of EDP outbreaks in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine.

Middle East Southwest Asia

- Initiate assessments of current biosecurity, biosafety, and biosurveillance capabilities within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States:
- Initiate technical support to enhance the GCC leadership role in regional networks to prevent the illicit acquisition or use of dangerous biological materials by Iran and ISIS;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to monitor for new or emerging biological threats and engage in capacity-building efforts in Pakistan and Egypt that are focused on preventing the theft, loss, diversion, or misuse of especially dangerous pathogens;
- Continue technical exchanges to improve the security of vulnerable laboratories and strengthen ability to detect unusual biological events, including potential intentional spread;
- Continue EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Iraq and Kazakhstan;
- Continue sustainment activities and research opportunities, including Biorisk management (BRM) training and Biosurveillance (BSV) capacity building activities and continued support for electronic disease reporting in Iraq;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats; and
- Continue scientific engagement projects, One Health and Global Health Security Agenda workshops, training on biosafety and biosecurity topics, tabletop and field training exercises, and incorporating BS&S training in educational curricula.

Africa

• Initiate BS&S engagement and security improvements in Nigeria;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate BRM systems training and standard separating procedures implementation in Ethiopia;
- Continue sample repository BS&S upgrades in Uganda;
- Complete construction of a BSL-2 Diagnostic Training Center, BS&S mentorship, and research activities in South Africa;
- Continue Field Epidemiology Training program in Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, and Cameroon;
- Continue BRM national strategic planning in Tanzania, Senegal, and Uganda;
- Continue engagement with regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding and early warning of endemic and emerging biological threats; and
- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak.

Asia

- Continue to refine requirements for BS&S facility and equipment upgrades, and procedures in Indonesia and Philippines;
- Continue to provide BS&S training in Cambodia, India, Laos, and Philippines;
- Continue to develop and implement field epidemiology trainings and exercises in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam;
- Continue to enhance Thailand's BS&S and BSV capabilities through integrated real time disease reporting;
- Continue engagement with regional biological threat surveillance networks;
- Continue engagement with partner country researchers to improve understanding

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

and early warning of endemic and emergent biological threats;

- Continue to engage regional partners and organizations to improve multi-sectoral partnerships between the Health and Security elements during an EDP outbreak; and
- Complete lab designs/upgrades, pathogen tracking systems, BS&S instruction, and training for biosafety equipment in human and animal health laboratories in Vietnam.

E. <u>Proliferation Prevention</u>:

FY 2018 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue long-term WMD threat reduction activities with CTR partners sharing borders with Russia;
- Provide sustainment transition to Armenia for provided WMD proliferation prevention capacity and continue Moldovan Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, and WMD detection and interdiction capabilities;
- Continue efforts in Georgia to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along its green borders with Armenia and Turkey; and
- Prevent proliferation of nuclear and radiological materials by working collaboratively with the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan.

Middle East and North Africa

• Continue engagement in Jordan along the Syrian and Iragi borders, focusing on

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

sustaining capabilities provided to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;

- Provide equipment and training to those agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD; and
- Continue to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border.

Southeast Asia

- In the Philippines, sustain existing efforts and complete planned improvements of the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) that will increase WMD and maritime security command, control, communications, surveillance, detection, and interdiction capabilities;
- In the Philippines, support development of a CONOPs to better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain;
- Complete improvements in Vietnam to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities; and
- Continue engagements in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

FY 2019 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

• Continue long-term WMD threat reduction activities with CTR partners sharing borders with Russia;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Provide sustainment transition to Armenia and Moldovan Border Guards for provided WMD proliferation prevention capacity;
- Continue efforts in Georgia to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along its green border with Armenia and Turkey; and
- Prevent proliferation of nuclear and radiological materials by working collaboratively with the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan.

Middle East and North Africa

- Continue and complete engagements in Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, focusing on sustainment capabilities to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to those agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Initiate engagements with other Middle East and North Africa countries.

Southeast Asia

- In the Philippines, sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain;
- Complete improvements in Vietnam to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities;
- Continue engagements in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

• Initiate engagements with other countries in the region.

FY 2020 funds executed over three years will:

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

- Continue long-term WMD threat reduction activities with CTR partners sharing borders with Russia;
- Provide sustainment transition to Armenia WMD proliferation prevention capacity; and
- Continue efforts in to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along Georgia's green border with Armenia and Turkey.

Middle East and North Africa

- Complete engagement in Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, focusing on sustainment capabilities to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Provide equipment and training to those agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD;
- Enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in Tunisia along the Libya green border; and
- Initiate engagements with other Middle East and North Africa countries.

Southeast Asia

• In the Philippines, sustain existing efforts and provide training and mentoring that will better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Complete improvements in Vietnam to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities; and
- Continue engagements in Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

F. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs (OAAC):

FY 2018, FY2019, and FY 2020 OAAC funds over three years will:

- Fund U.S. Embassy and overseas office support, Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS), program management for worldwide DoD CTR Program contract logistics support (shipping, travel, and language);
- Fund assessments, site surveys, and seminars with critical foreign partners in collaboration with the Combatant Commands and interorganizational partners; and
- Fund the DoD CTR Program Audits and Examinations, which ensure that DoD CTR Program assistance is used for the intended purpose in an efficient and effective manner, and travel for Defense Threat Reduction Agency senior leadership, Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel, and other stakeholders in support of the DoD CTR Program.

V. <u>Personnel Summary</u>	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	Change FY 2018/ <u>FY 2019</u>	Change FY 2019/ <u>FY 2020</u>
Contractor FTEs (Total)	479	<u>518</u>	<u>567</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>49</u>

The increase to contract services in FY 2020 is primarily due to the program's expansion from 32 to 35 countries starting in FY 2020. These countries are primarily in East Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea.

VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

	Change			Change			
	FY 2018	FY 2018/FY 2019		FY 2019 FY 2019/FY 2020		FY 2020	
OP 32 Line	<u>Actuals</u>	<u>Price</u>	Program	Enacted	<u>Price</u>	Program	<u>Estimate</u>
308 Travel of Persons	2,950	53	3,224	6,227	125	-55	6,297
399 Total Travel	2,950	53	3,224	6,227	125	-55	6,297
914 Purchased Communications (Non-Fund)	40	1	3 , 559	3,600	72	612	4,284
920 Supplies & Materials (Non- Fund)	11,568	208	-9,632	2,144	43	0	2,187
923 Facilities Sust, Rest, & Mod by Contract	6,235	112	-6,347	0	0	0	0
925 Equipment Purchases (Non-Fund)	19,562	352	-19,414	500	10	-510	0
932 Mgt Prof Support Svcs	6,125	110	25,264	31,499	630	-17,475	14,654
934 Engineering & Tech Svcs	141,594	2,549	-62,744	81,399	1,628	30,984	114,011
957 Other Costs (Land and Structures)	16,309	294	-9,643	6,960	139	-4,134	2,965
985 Research & Development, Contracts	800	0	17,399	18,199	0	-9,469	8,730
987 Other Intra-Govt Purch	79 , 263	1,427	-1,570	79,120	1,582	-22,670	58,032
988 Grants	13,472	242	-4,968	8,746	175	1,856	10,777
989 Other Services	42,234	760	64,052	107,046	2,141	-284	108,903
990 IT Contract Support Services	9,848	177	-5,225	4,800	96	2,964	7,860
999 Total Other Purchases	347,050	6,232	-9,269	344,013	6,516	-18,126	332,403
Total	350,000	6,285	-6,045	350,240	6,641	-18,181	338,700

DTRA's CTR portfolio continues to reflect Service Requirements Review Board (SRRB) reductions previously implemented across the FYDP. The FY 2019/FY 2020 change column includes a reduction of \$150 thousand to OP-32 line 932, Management and Professional Support Services, as a result of SRRB reductions.