Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

February 2015
Cooperative Threat Reduction: ($ in Thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
<th>FY 2016 Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTR Actual</td>
<td>581,480</td>
<td>10,433</td>
<td>-226,805</td>
<td>365,108</td>
<td>5,936</td>
<td>-12,548</td>
<td>358,496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Description of Operations Financed:

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program’s overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, facilities, and expertise. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, and consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The CTR Program also focuses on building partner capacity to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials in transit across international borders. The CTR Program contributes to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts by:

- Supporting a layered defense approach to countering weapons of mass destruction;
- Building strategic relationships with key international partners that enhance threat reduction on a global scale; and,
- Supporting the resilience of the global nonproliferation framework by building partner capacities to enforce the tenets of that framework.

The CTR Program’s objectives are:

- Objective 1: Dismantle and destroy stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery that partner countries own, possess, or control.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

- Objective 2: Account for, secure, and safeguard nuclear, chemical and biological materials, equipment or expertise, which, if vulnerable to theft or diversion, could result in WMD threats.
- Objective 3: Prevent and detect acquisition, proliferation, and use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery and knowledge.

The CTR Program is currently authorized to operate in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Afghanistan, Africa, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Southeast Asia, Libya, and the Middle East. The CTR program is also authorized to operate worldwide for the transport of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and nuclear and high-threat radiological material, and for the disposition of interdicted WMD and WMD-related materials.

The CTR Program areas and related assistance are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in thousands</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program eliminates WMD delivery systems and associated infrastructure. The program has experience providing equipment and services to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM silo launchers, road-mobile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, nuclear reactor cores of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and WMD infrastructure. In Russia, this
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

work is conducted under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, DoD assists with the storage and elimination of solid rocket motors (SRMs) from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs. This includes the provision of selected maintenance, consumables, and technical assistance to ensure the proper operation of the elimination facility which Ukraine intends to use to remove solid propellant through water washout and subsequently incinerate the SRM cases. The program maintains readiness to respond to emerging requirements for WMD delivery systems elimination in other countries.

Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Elimination – Russia
The project provides the defueling and elimination of a Russian SSBN Delta III Hull 393 and its associated SLBM launchers.

SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination – Ukraine
The project provides secure, safe, ecologically sound incineration of residual propellant and SRM empty motor cases. It also supports a controlled environment for storage of the remaining SRMs and their movement within and between storage areas.
## Defense Threat Reduction Agency
### Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
#### Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Estimates

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Chemical Weapons Destruction</strong></td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction program works with partner nations to reduce the threat from chemical weapons by securing and destroying CW stockpiles and eliminating chemical agent research capabilities and production facilities.

The CTR program is providing significant contributions to the international effort to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons. The program provided the majority of the materials used to package and transport the Syrian chemicals out of Syria and funded the modification and operations of the Motor Vehicle Cape Ray to destroy Syria’s highest priority chemicals. Contingency planning continues in order to be prepared to support CW nonproliferation and elimination activities elsewhere.

**Chemical Weapons Destruction Technical Support – Russia**
This project provided Russia with technical advice, repair parts, and other assistance to support chemical agent destruction at the Shchuch’ye and Kizner Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities. A final repair parts shipment was delivered to the Kizner facility in July 2014.

**Chemical Weapons Destruction – Libya**
The project provided safety and security improvements at the Ruwagha Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction Facility, to include safety and physical security, Concept of
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

Operations planning advice, equipment upgrades, equipment operation and maintenance training, and other enhancements to improve existing capabilities. The United States assisted Libya in destroying its entire Category 1 CW stockpile, which included munitions filled with sulfur mustard (HD), bulk HD, and polymerized HD. This project was completed in June 2014.

Chemical Weapons Destruction – Syria

This project supports a request from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – United Nations Joint Mission for technical and resource support to destroy chemical agents declared by Syria in late 2013. Specifically, this project provided material handling and other equipment to the United Nations to support the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, including finished sulfur mustard agent and difluoro, a key binary precursor for the nerve agent sarin. Additionally, this project supported the mobilization and modification of the Motor Vessel CAPE RAY to accept the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System which was used to neutralize the highest priority Syrian chemicals at sea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Global Nuclear Security</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>20,703</td>
<td>20,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Global Nuclear Security program consolidates its ongoing efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials in the FSU and new initiatives to secure nuclear materials across the globe. This program is expanding nuclear security cooperation to new countries and regions consistent with legislation and nuclear threat reduction guidance, and in
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

coordination with the efforts of other U.S. Government (USG) entities and international partners.
The DOD Strategic Policy Guidance for Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Memo dated May 1, 2014 objectives are to:

- Dismantle and destroy nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and related weapons-delivery systems;
- Securely transport and store nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and related weapons-delivery vehicles in order to prevent theft or proliferation; and,
- Enhance a partner country's capability to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and nuclear weapons-related technology and expertise.

This program supports the President’s Nuclear Security Summit agenda by assisting the development of Centers of Excellence and conducting technical exchanges with partner countries to enhance training capabilities. Training enhancements are consistent with international best practices related to nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transportation security, emergency response capabilities, and other activities important to improving nuclear security.

The program intended to work with Russia to improve nuclear security through technical exchanges with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) under a DoD Joint Staff – MOD General Staff Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) until military to military cooperation with the Russian Federation was suspended. Work on nuclear materials security with Rosatom, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, is conducted under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

This program works with Kazakhstan to help develop its Nuclear Security Training Center and corresponding curricula related to guard force training, emergency response, and inventory management. Work on nuclear security with Kazakhstan is conducted under the Agreement on the Elimination of Infrastructure for Weapons of Mass Destruction (as amended). This Agreement was signed by the United States Department of Defense and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan on October 3, 1995.

The program works closely with Department of Energy and partner countries under various agreements and MOUs in accordance with existing authorities and determinations.

Global Nuclear Security – Russia This project provides assistance to securely transport spent naval fuel that is potentially vulnerable and meets the International Atomic Energy Association definition for weapons-usable material.

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence
This project helps to support Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and other activities important to improving nuclear material security. The project will facilitate training course development and delivery, and will provide equipment to enhance nuclear security, material control, and inventory management both bilaterally and through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>256,762</td>
<td>264,618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Cooperative Biological Engagement program (CBEP) seeks to prevent terrorists or non-state actors from accessing biological material of security concern or expertise that could contribute to a biological weapons capability. The program builds regional and bilateral partnerships to mitigate biological risks and initiate timely and effective measures to contain biological threats. The program trains partner country experts in current best practices across clinical, epidemiology, laboratory, veterinary, and environmental vector surveillance disciplines. The training’s intent is to detect, diagnose, report, and predict new and emerging disease threats rapidly and effectively. The program supports training and exercises for National response teams; thereby enhancing response to and identification of the cause of outbreaks and reporting the findings to appropriate international bodies such as the World Health Organization.

Strategic policy objectives of CBEP are to:

- Dismantle, destroy, and prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or use of stockpiles of biological weapons, means of delivery, and biological weapons related equipment, technology, and infrastructure;
- Enhance partner country/region's capability to identify, consolidate, and secure collections of pathogens and diseases of security concern in order to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of such pathogens and diseases; and,
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

- Enhance partner country/region's capability to rapidly and accurately survey, detect, diagnose, and report biological terrorism and outbreaks of pathogens and diseases of security concern in accordance with international reporting requirements.

The effective implementation of the CBEP strategic objectives contributes to the White House Global Health Security Agenda announced in February 2014.

This program builds upon the indigenous capacities of regions and partner countries to safely and accurately diagnose and rapidly report diseases of security concern and establishes and enhances international research partnerships. The program is regionally organized and implemented in cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Agency for International Development, and partner countries. Projects are ongoing in the FSU, Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. The program is initiating work with additional high priority countries to fill gaps in many countries’ International Health Regulations diagnostic and reporting as well as biorisk management capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in thousands</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>152,446</td>
<td>40,704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38,945</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

E. Proliferation Prevention:

The Proliferation Prevention program builds partner countries’ capacity to interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related components and technologies. The program develops self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials,
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

components, and technologies across country borders. The program develops our partners' capacities in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, border security and interdiction, disposition, and other areas related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear identification, security, and consequence incident response. The projects provide for equipment, training, and related assistance. Projects are executed incrementally and do not proceed until successful implementation of a previous stage to provide flexibility and management control while minimizing program risk. Projects are also designed and executed with the long-term sustainment of U.S. provided equipment in mind to ensure that each partner country has the capability and resources to sustain project equipment upon project completion. This program complements ongoing USG and international counter-proliferation assistance provided by the DoE Second Line of Defense Program, the Department of State (DOS) Export Control and Related Border Security Program, and the DoD’s International Counterproliferation Program. The Program also complements the assistance provided by other USG and international partners that enhance counter-smuggling capacities, enhance border security, and increase maritime domain awareness and interoperability. Projects are leveraged with other U.S. and international programs to avoid duplication of effort.

Green Border Project - Armenia

The project is continuing with a new increment that focuses on delivering equipment and training to the Armenian Border Guard to enhance capabilities in communications, surveillance, WMD detection and to ensure that the ABG can sustain and maintain these capabilities in the long term. It also will provide co-sponsorship of cross-border detection and interdiction exercises with Georgia.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

Green Border Project - Moldova
The project is improving the capability of the Moldovan Border Police and the Moldovan Customs Services to prevent border-crossing of WMD and related materials. Special emphasis will be put on ensuring the government of Moldova can sustain and build upon these capabilities over the long-term.

Georgia
The project includes construction of small boat facilities, allowing decreased response time to maritime interdiction, in addition to organic boat haul-out capability, and several maintenance and training enhancements at key Georgian Coast Guard (GCG) sites. The project improves the GCG's response time, interdiction capability, and reduces the operating and maintenance costs of the GCG fleet. These efforts are coordinated with the other USG ongoing efforts in country.

Southeast Asia
The project will enhance the capabilities of partner countries within the Southeast Asia region to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, and other regional waters by enhancing port security and conducting assessments for future maritime and land border efforts. Initial efforts are focused on providing maritime domain awareness support to the nascent Philippines Coast Watch Center/System; providing maritime-focused command and control, and providing surveillance and WMD-related training and equipment to Vietnam. In Cambodia, the Proliferation Prevention Program will partner with the DOE Second Line of Defense Program to provide a radiological detection capability at the main river port in Phnom Penh. The program is also supporting other maritime domain awareness and interoperability efforts.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
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I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)
and is in project design discussions for additional bilateral maritime border security projects with other Southeast Asia partners.

Middle East
The project enhances the WMD proliferation prevention capabilities of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders. This effort enhances the Jordanian Armed Forces’ capabilities to detect, identify, track, and interdict potential illicit traffickers, and supports WMD interdiction efforts with government forces of Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F. Threat Reduction Engagement</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td>2,827</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Threat Reduction Engagement program (TREP) supports activities that strategically advance the CTR Program’s mission and provides opportunities for new partner country engagements. The TREP provides the CTR program the ability to work closely with Combatant Commands on bio-engagement, proliferation prevention, and nuclear security to identify relationship-building opportunities in their respective Areas of Responsibility, to include Regional Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-2, Symposium on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, and the United Arab Emirates Bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Low-Yield Explosive Defense Initiative.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
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<tr>
<td>G. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Other Assessments/Administrative Costs account provides general program administrative support and project development costs for the CTR program in areas not unique to other program elements. It includes funds for internal and external stakeholder travel, executive language services, operating costs of the Defense Threat Reduction Offices and Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices at embassy locations overseas, program management for CTR logistics support, and advisory and assistance services. This program also supports required audits and examinations of CTR mission efforts and overall program management and administration.

**Audits and Examinations**

The goal of this project is to ensure that the CTR Program’s assistance is accounted for and used efficiently and effectively for its intended purpose. In accordance with umbrella and implementing agreements, and other political frameworks, the United States has the right to examine the use of any material, training, or other services provided under these agreements and frameworks during implementation and for a follow-on period.

**Program Management/Administration**

The project provides program administrative and general support, project development cost estimates, advisory and assistance services, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support to the CTR program, and travel. The project funds permanent full-
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)
time Defense Threat Reduction Offices and Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices in the
FSU, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. CTR plans to close some Defense Threat Reduction
Offices in the FSU and establish a new Regional Cooperative Engagement Office in the
Middle East to better align the overseas office structure with the CTR Program’s new
geographic areas of emphasis.

II. Force Structure Summary:
N/A
Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Estimates

III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>A. BA Subactivities</th>
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<th>Budget Request</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
<th>Current Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2016 Estimate</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination</td>
<td>5,700</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chemical Weapons Destruction</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>942</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Global Nuclear Security</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>20,703</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>20,703</td>
<td>20,703</td>
<td>20,555</td>
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<td>4. Cooperative Biological Engagement</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>256,762</td>
<td>256,762</td>
<td>264,618</td>
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<td>5. Proliferation Prevention</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>40,704</td>
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<td><strong>365,108</strong></td>
<td><strong>358,496</strong></td>
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### III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

#### B. Reconciliation Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY 2015/FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2015/FY 2016</th>
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<td>365,108</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)</td>
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<td>Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal Appropriated Amount</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fact-of-Life Changes (2015 to 2015 Only)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal Baseline Funding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplemental</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reprogrammings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price Changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional Transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Changes</td>
<td></td>
<td>-12,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Estimate</td>
<td>365,108</td>
<td>358,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: Wartime Supplemental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Normalized Current Estimate</td>
<td>365,108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

#### C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2015 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)</td>
<td>365,108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Congressional Adjustments
   a. Distributed Adjustments
      1) Program Decrease
   b. Undistributed Adjustments
   c. Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent
   d. General Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2015 Appropriated Amount</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations

3. Fact-of-Life Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2015 Baseline Funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revised FY 2015 Estimate</td>
</tr>
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5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2015 Normalized Current Estimate</td>
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</table>

6. Price Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Functional Transfers
   a. Transfers In
      1) Enter Description
   b. Transfers Out
      1) Enter Description

8. Program Increases
   a. Annualization of New FY 2015 Program
   b. One-Time FY 2016 Increases
   c. Program Growth in FY 2016
      1) Cooperative Biological Engagement

   The increase is to fund biological safety and security enhancements, disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements. (FY 2015 Baseline:
III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$256,762 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Other assessments/Administrative Costs  
   The funding increase in FY 2016 reflects the impacts of transitioning to a new overseas office structure that better aligns with the CTR Program's new geographic areas of emphasis (which at completion is projected to cost less than the current structure) and added travel expenses due to the increasing number of countries covered by the CTR program. (FY 2015 Baseline: $27,844 thousand)

3) Threat Reduction Engagement  
   The funding increase in FY 2016 will allow the opportunity to increase engagements with partners in new geographical areas and the Unified Combatant Commands. (FY 2015 Baseline: $2,375 thousand)

4) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination  
   The increase funds the continuation of elimination and program activities in Ukraine and maintains the ability to address WMD delivery system threats in other countries. (FY 2015 Baseline: $1,000 thousand)

9. Program Decreases  

   a. Annualization of FY 2015 Program Decreases  
   b. One-Time FY 2015 Increases  
   c. Program Decreases in FY 2016

   1) Chemical Weapons Destruction  
      The funding decrease in FY 2016 is due to the completion of the assistance efforts in eliminating Syria's chemical weapons and dangerous precursors. (FY 2015 Baseline: $15,720 thousand)
III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Proliferation Prevention</td>
<td>-2,451</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The funding decrease in FY 2016 represents the anticipated completion of improvements to Armenia and Moldovan Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, and WMD detection and interdiction capabilities. (FY 2015 Baseline: $40,704 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Global Nuclear Security</td>
<td>-500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The funding decrease in FY 2016 is due to cost savings associated with the Russian Spent Nuclear Fuel project. (FY 2015 Baseline: $20,703 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FY 2016 Budget Request 358,496
IV. **Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:**

A. **Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:**

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Assist Ukraine by financing elimination of 45 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine’s remaining Solid Rocket Motors (SRM) awaiting destruction;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Support elimination and program activities in the Russian Federation;
- Assist Ukraine by financing elimination of 20 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine’s remaining SRMs and continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue elimination and program activities in Ukraine;
- Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide physical security and safety improvements for chemical weapons storage and guard force training;
- Assist with Libyan and Syrian chemical weapons elimination operations;
- Prepare U.S. Maritime Administration ship for destroying Syria’s highest priority chemicals;
- Provide packaging and removal equipment for Syrian chemical weapons and dangerous precursors;
- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support in other regions to eliminate and improve safety and security of chemical weapons; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Complete assistance with eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons; including destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and dangerous precursors, support the external security of the destruction operation, and support demobilization;
- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support in other regions to eliminate chemical weapons and to improve safety and security of chemical weapons until they can be safely eliminated; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical and contracted advice and support in other regions to eliminate chemical weapons and to improve safety and security of chemical weapons until they can be safely eliminated; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

C. Global Nuclear Security:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable weapons and useable material or special nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel and other nuclear material that meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria as “weapons-usable” to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue support and expanding efforts for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel and other nuclear material that meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria as “weapons-usable” to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel and other nuclear material that meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria as “weapons-usable” to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund biological safety and security (BS&S) enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Armenia;
- Continue construction of the Central Reference Laboratory in Kazakhstan;
- Continue oversight of Azerbaijan Central Reference Laboratory construction and installation of BS&S systems and equipment;
- Continue standup, operationalization, and sustainment of the Lugar Center in Tbilisi, Georgia under the agreed upon terms of the joint transition agreement;
- Initiate construction of two regional diagnostic labs in western Uzbekistan;
- Continue the programmatic development and country-specific implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures and training in the fields of biosafety and security, laboratory operations/management and conduct of epidemiological investigations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; and,
- Continue the provision of biorisk management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

**Africa**

- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya and Uganda;
- Install Pathogen Asset Control System at key laboratories and conduct PACS training in South Africa;
- Conduct biorisk management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa; and,
- Address the ongoing Ebola virus outbreak in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, and build capacity in those countries and throughout Africa to reduce the risk of biological threats in the future.

**Middle East/South Asia (MESA)**

- Initiate laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Conduct biorisk management training for scientists from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan; and,
- Demonstrate an electronic reporting system in Iraq.

**Southeast Asia (SEA)**

- Conduct biorisk management workshops in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia;
- Conduct laboratory design technical consultation workshops in Vietnam;
- Install Pathogen Asset Control System in Vietnam;
- Install BS&S equipment and conduct associated operation and maintenance training in Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Cambodia, and Vietnam; and,
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate dialog with the Philippines.

2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis, and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

FSU
- Continue human and veterinary training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan;
- Continue cooperative biological research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan;
- Continue transition of sustainment of diagnostic laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan; and,
- Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

Africa
- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda;
- Install laboratory diagnostic equipment in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as well as conduct associated operation and maintenance training;
- Initiate cooperative biological research activities in Kenya; and,
- Continue cooperative biological research activities in West Africa.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

MESA
- Install the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System and conduct associated training at multiple locations in Iraq;
- Install laboratory diagnostic equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan and conduct associated operation and maintenance training;
- Conduct epidemiology training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan; and,
- Provide goods and services for classified project.

SEA
- Install laboratory diagnostic equipment in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam as well as conduct associated operation and maintenance training;
- Conduct laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Continue partnership with The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to enhance diagnostic capacity of Global Disease Detection element in India; and,
- Conduct epidemiology training in Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
IV. **Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:**

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

Fund BS&S enhancements as detailed below:

**FSU**

- Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Armenia and Ukraine;
- Continue construction of the Central Reference Laboratory in Kazakhstan;
- Continue oversight on construction of the Central Reference Laboratory in Azerbaijan and installation of BS&S systems and equipment;
- Continue standup, operationalization and sustainment of the Lugar Center in Tbilisi, Georgia under the agreed upon terms of the joint transition agreement;
- Complete regional diagnostic labs and seek to reinitiate research activities in Uzbekistan;
- Continue the programmatic development and country-specific implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region; and,
- Continue the provision of biorisk management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

**Africa**

- Continue implementing BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Uganda and Tanzania;
- Conduct biorisk management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa, Cameroon;
- Continue gap analysis with Ethiopia; and,
- Initiate gap analysis in Gabon, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Mali.

**MESA**

- Continue laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue biorisk management training for scientists from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan; and,
- Support Epidemiology and multisectoral workshops in Turkey.

**SEA**

- Conduct Tabletop Exercise and plan for regional outreach workshop with Malaysia on multi-sectorial biorisk management;
- Initiate biorisk management workshops in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Vietnam;
- Install BS&S equipment in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Assist with integrated BS&S design in a Vietnam-built diagnostic lab;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Initiate gap analysis in Indonesia; and,
- Conduct Tabletop Exercise in India.

Fund disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

**FSU**

- Continue human and veterinary training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue transition of sustainment of laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan; and,
- Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System implementation, training and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

**Africa**

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sierra Leon, and Uganda;
- Continue laboratory equipment and facility upgrades in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda;
- Initiate research activities in Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa; and,
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue research activities in Kenya and West Africa.

**MESA**
- Continue installation of Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System and conduct training in Iraq;
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan and assess needs in Jordan;
- Conduct laboratory diagnostic training in Iraq; and,
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan.

**SEA**
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Initiate electronic disease surveillance workshops and Pathogen Asset Control System demonstration in Vietnam;
- Initiate gap analysis in the Philippines;
- Continue partnership with The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to enhance diagnostic capacity of Global Disease Detection element in India; and,
- Initiate research activity in Thailand and Vietnam.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

Fund BS&S enhancements as detailed below:

**FSU**
- Complete BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Armenia;
- Continue BS&S upgrades to veterinary laboratories in Ukraine;
- Continue the construction of the Central Reference Laboratory in Kazakhstan;
- Complete oversight on construction of the Central Reference Laboratory in Azerbaijan and installation of BS&S systems and equipment;
- Continue standup, operationalization, and sustainment of the Lugar Center in Tbilisi, Georgia under the agreed upon terms of the joint transition agreement;
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region; and,
- Continue the provision of biorisk management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

**Africa**
- Complete BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Ethiopia, Cameroon, Senegal, Gabon, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; and,
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:


MESA
- Continue laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue biorisk management training in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Jordan;
- Continue multisectoral workshops and Tabletop Exercise in Turkey; and,
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SEA
- Conduct biorisk management workshops in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia and fill identified gaps;
- Conduct gap analysis in Timor-Leste;
- Continue biorisk management workshops in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and,
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Fund disease detection, diagnosis, and reporting enhancements as detailed below:
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

**FSU**

- Continue human and veterinary training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine;
- Continue transition of sustainment of laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; and,
- Complete Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

**Africa**

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Senegal; and,
- Continue research activities in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, and West Africa.

**MESA**

- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Fill gaps in diagnostics and reporting in Jordan;
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System and Pathogen Asset control System installation and operator training; and,
- Continue diagnostic training in Iraq.

SEA
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Install laboratory equipment in the Philippines and Indonesia;
- Initiate lab management training in the Philippines and Indonesia;
- Introduce Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System and Pathogen Asset Control System to human and veterinary ministries in the Philippines;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Complete laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Continue partnership with The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to enhance diagnostic capacity of Global Disease Detection element in India; and,
- Continue research activity in Thailand and Vietnam.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

E. Proliferation Prevention:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FSU
- Continue improvements to Armenian and Moldovan Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities;
- Complete improvements to Georgian Coast Guard supply chain management, logistics planning, vessel maintenance capabilities, and tactical infrastructure to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea maritime; and,
- Support Ukraine’s effort to perform and sustain counter-WMD missions in and around conflict zones on the board with Russia.

Southeast Asia
- Work with Department of Energy to strengthen WMD detection and interdiction capabilities at key points of entry through equipment, training, and exercises;
- Continue to increase WMD Proliferation Prevention command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Sustainment in the Philippines and Vietnam, the South China Sea, and in other regional waters; and,
  - Continue project assessments.

Middle East
- Continue engagement in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident; and,
  - Pursue limited engagements in Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon to prevent illicit flow and use of WMD.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and,
  - Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

Former Soviet Union
- Build upon previous efforts to improve the ability of the Government of Ukraine to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials along Ukraine’s borders, particularly focusing on threats originating from Russia;
  - Complete improvements to Armenia and Moldovan Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities; and,
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate efforts in George to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along its green border with Armenia.

Philippines
- Continue to increase WMD and maritime security communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment through the implementation of the National Coast Watch System and development of a concept of operations to aid in command and control and interagency coordination.

Vietnam
- Continue engagement to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment with training and infrastructure support capabilities.

Southeast Asia Regional
- Begin engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities as well as bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

Middle East
- Continue engagement in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident; and,
- Provide equipment and training to those agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD.
IV. **Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:**

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

**Former Soviet Union**

- Continue to build upon previous efforts to improve the ability of the Government of Ukraine to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials along Ukraine’s borders, particularly focusing on threats originating from Russia; and,
- Continue to develop modest but longer-term WMD threat reduction activities with CTR partners sharing borders with Russia.

**Philippines**

- Sustain existing efforts and complete planned improvements of the National Coast Watch System (NCWS). The NCWS will increase WMD and maritime security command, control communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities. Support development of a concept of operations to better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain.

**Vietnam**

- Complete improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Southeast Asia Region
• Continue engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities as well as bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

Middle East
• Complete detection and interdiction upgrades in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement:
• FY 2014 through FY 2016 funds will continue to support specific relationship-building opportunities with existing FSU countries while shifting towards engagements and expansion of CTR Program areas with partners in new geographical areas including cooperation and coordination with cognizant Unified Combatant Commands to advance CTR Program goals.

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

FY 2014 through FY 2016 funds support advisory and assistance services to all CTR programs, U.S. Embassy support, and operating costs for the overseas Defense Threat Reduction Offices and Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices. Also funds administrative and contracted support services to the CTR program, program management for worldwide CTR contract logistics support, approximately 6-10 Audits and Examinations per year, and travel by DTRA and stakeholder personnel not in support of a single CTR program.
### V. Personnel Summary

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor FTEs (Total)</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>-398</td>
<td>-46</td>
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The decrease in contractor FTEs for FY 2016 represents the end of the U.S. assistance for land-based strategic launcher and missile elimination in Russia, and the anticipated completion of program assistance to destroy Syrian chemical weapons. This effort is in coordination with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other foreign governmental entities. Decreases also attributed to downsizing of cooperative Biological Engagement Integrated contracts in Former Soviet Union designated countries as research and development grants and Cooperative agreements in those countries are funded at a higher rate. Decreases also result from anticipated completion of work supporting the deterrence, detection and interdiction of WMD and related material within Georgia’s borders.
# Defense Threat Reduction Agency

## Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

### Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Estimates

## VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>308 Travel of Persons</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>-4,430</td>
<td>3,357</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>6,599</td>
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<tr>
<td>399 Total Travel</td>
<td>7,649</td>
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<td>3,357</td>
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<td>914 Purchased Communications (Non-Fund)</td>
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<td>925 Equipment Purchases (Non-Fund)</td>
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<td>932 Mgt Prof Support Svcs</td>
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<td>934 Engineering &amp; Tech Svcs</td>
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<td>957 Other Costs (Land and Structures)</td>
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<td>985 Research &amp; Development, Contracts</td>
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<td>989 Other Services</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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