OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2016



March 2015

FY 2016 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)

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SECTION I

Budget Summary	FY 2015	FY 2016
Budget Activity – Defense Forces		
A. Government of Iraq Forces	\$1,239,997,825	
B. Kurdish Forces	\$353,871,161	
C. Tribal Security Forces	\$24,131,014	
D. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) / Local Security Forces (Iraq National Guard (ING))		\$715,000,000
TOTAL	\$1,618,000,000	\$715,000,000

SECTION II

Overview of Operations:

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a clear threat to our National Interests, the people of Iraq and Syria, and ultimately, if unchecked, a growing threat to the region and U.S. homeland. Currently, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), affiliated Kurdish Security Forces (KSF), and tribal security forces have stemmed the ISIL advance, stopped or reversed encroachment on Baghdad and are taking the fight to ISIL. Iraqi and Kurdish forces and tribal elements have begun to liberate territory threatened or captured by the ISIL with the aid of U.S. and Coalition air strikes and Advise and Assist (A&A) teams. U.S. and Coalition forces are helping Government of Iraq build (GOI) new Iraqi units to provide the additional combat power necessary to go on the counter-offensive against ISIL. To continue that effort, Iraq requires assistance in building its military capacity to counter the ISIL threat.

The initial setbacks and subsequent losses absorbed by the ISF resulted in a critical requirement to rebuild ISF capabilities through training and equipping forces to conduct offensive operations to liberate ISIL-held territory. The FY 2015 budget, coupled with Coalition contributions and Iraqi national funding, focused on rapidly rebuilding GoI, Kurdish and Tribal Security Forces for immediate employment in the counter attack and offensive operations. Based on the U.S. assessment to support the GoI counter-ISIL plan, the requirement to support

ISF offensive operations in FY 2016 will continue. The future force structure of Iraqi forces continues to evolve, and will be dependent upon a number of variables, such as whether Iraq passes legislation to create an Iraq National Guard (ING). Those unknowns make it impossible to predict with precision the type and exact number of Iraqi units that will need training and equipment in FY16, or the capability shortfalls they will have. In general, though, our FY 2016 request is designed to build on our FY 2015 efforts by by requesting funds that would be used to develop critical ground forces acceptable to local and provincial tribes, who are needed to hold terrain liberated from ISIL and integrate Sunni Tribal elements and other actors into the GoI security sector. This will facilitate enabling the ISF to secure Iraq's national borders, and prevent ISIL from developing safe havens where they can threaten and destabilize the region. Our preference is to channel this support through the Iraqi National Guard (ING) concept currently under consideration by the GoI, and this our submission is built on this assumption but, we are prepared to execute other efforts, such as our support to the Sunni tribal elements in FY 2015, or other support to the ISF, should the GoI prove unable to pass required ING legislation.

U.S. and Coalition efforts are focused on building the necessary Iraqi military capability and capacity to counter ISIL that is nested in our broader desired end states for Iraq, Syria, and the Levant. It is critical to concurrently pursue these efforts while supporting the New Syrian Force to effectively diminish, degrade and ultimately destroy the ISIL threat.

Summary: Our forces in an Advise and Assist role, together with Coalition airstrikes, training and material, have demonstrated our commitment to countering ISIL and are on track to meet campaign objectives. This support and the coalition air campaign has helped shape the willingness and capability of the Iraq Security Forces to go on the offensive against ISIL and expand security and stability. However, they continue to need training and equipment to be successful in combined operations, securing liberated areas and developing a non-sectarian and integrated force.

Section III: Defense Forces/Iraq National Guard (ING)

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) will assist the ISF in creating a strategic plan to transform the Iraqi Army into a sustainable, non-sectarian, eight division-sized force with enablers.

Once major combat operations are complete, current plans involve the Iraq Army reorganizing from 13 Divisions to eight Divisions as part of a broader Security Sector Reform effort. This shift in planned force structure recognizes that the size of the force required to oppose and eject

ISIL from Iraq is significantly larger than the force required to guarantee the security of Iraq's borders in the long-term. As a result, once the threat from ISIL is defeated, the GoI current plan is to reduce the size of the Iraqi Army by 5 Divisions (15 Brigades), leaving the country with a smaller, more capable, representative and cost-effective force to guarantee National Defense. At the same time, to prepare for other future significant security challenges, the GoI has proposed to establish an Iraqi National Guard (ING). Current constructs under discussion with the GoI would create a provincially based National Guard that could reinforce and support the Police in situations beyond their capacity, but would also be available to the central government to support the Iraqi Army in time of National crisis.

Current discussions in the GoI have suggested that the ING may consist of as many as 23 Brigades, with one per province (18) and additional brigades in major population centers. Draft legislation to create the ING is currently with Iraq's Council of Ministers. Supporting the creation of an inclusive National Guard is a major point of engagement between U.S. officials and the GoI, and the Abadi government has indicated its support for such a concept. However, it must be noted that such legislation has not been passed and remain politically contentious, so we do not know what form the future Iraqi force structure will ultimately take.

USCENTCOM, Commander Joint Task Force and OSC-I will advise and assist in the GoI's planned reorganization, including appropriate inventory and redistribution of equipment from the IA. In an effort to be prepared to support the development of Iraqi units needed for the future Iraqi force, we anticipate a shortfall of equipment for up to eight brigades. It is worth noting that this total could prove to be higher, but the estimate incorporates the possibility of substantial cross-leveling of equipment from Iraqi Army units. Our planning assumption represents a prudent estimate of eight brigades given current Iraqi plans and equipment provided previously. Equipping these forces is critical to generate sufficiently armed, equipped and trained forces to secure liberated areas to deny ISIL future safe haven and foster a multi-ethnic Iraq.

Equiping the eight brigades is projected to cost \$715M. This request is separate from and additive to any scheduled or routine FMF or FMS cases pending on behalf of the Government of Iraq and is limited to the immediate needs for establishment of the future Iraqi brigades planned either as part of a National Guard or other future force structure.

Program Summary:

The focus of DoD efforts is to work by, with and through the GoI to build the necessary military capability to counter ISIL. To build the required capacity, U.S. assistance is focused on securing liberated terrain and integrating the force. This program includes three lines of effort:

- Equip units appropriately for their assigned missions.
- Increase ISF readiness by redistributing (cross leveling) current on-hand equipment to units most in need.
- Assess and repair existing equipment to reduce the need for new equipment.

Equipping the ING is dependent on Iraq's ability to resource forces at the local, provincial, and national level. Equally important in avoiding past challenges is the need for adequate logistical and maintenance support and overall improvement in supply chain management.

This program facilitates the counter-ISIL efforts by the Iraqi Security Forces and builds the foundation for the restructured Iraq Army and the framework for the creation of the ING or equivalent force by ensuring interoperability of equipment between elements of the Iraqi Security Forces.

SECTION IV:

Requirement Summary					
Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Total Cost		
M4	38,400	\$647	\$24,844,800		
Sniper Rifle	176	\$8,500	\$1,496,000		
M240	1,560	\$12,000	\$18,720,000		
M2 .50 Caliber	232	\$8,493	\$1,970,376		
M249	1,296	\$3,830	\$4,963,680		
M3 Carl Gustaf	1,136	\$20,000	\$22,720,000		
Truck Utility TOW Carrier	96	\$49,521	\$4,754,016		
120 mm Mortar	96	\$99,813	\$9,582,048		
81mm Mortar	144	\$121,855	\$17,547,120		
60mm Mortar	344	\$55,879	\$19,222,376		
12 Guage Riot Shotgun	304	\$235	\$71,440		
M9	1,920	\$636	\$1,221,120		
4 Litter Front Line Ambulance	112	\$113,998	\$12,767,776		
Medical Equipment Set Ground Ambulance	112	\$22,961	\$2,571,632		
Medical Equipment Set Combat Medic	528	\$2,059	\$1,087,152		
M978 HEMTT Fuel Tanker	80	\$384,000	\$30,720,000		
Armt Carrier UP-ARMORED HMMWV	1,048	\$47,455	\$49,732,840		
Radio Set AN/VRC 90F	1,048	\$7,415	\$7,770,920		
Truck Cargo Light Military Tactial Vehicle	1,600	\$176,428	\$282,284,800		
Truck Tractor	32	\$142,132	\$4,548,224		
Semitrailer Low Bed 40 Ton	32	\$51,900	\$1,660,800		
Truck Cargo, Mediun Tactical Vehicle	80	\$128,076	\$10,246,080		
Gennerator Set 3 KW	112	\$11,693	\$1,309,616		
³ ⁄ ₄ Ton Trailer	872	\$8,954	\$7,807,888		
Trailer Tank 400 Gallon	248	\$6,921	\$1,716,408		

FY 2016 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OCO) REQUEST IRAQ TRAIN and EQUIP FUND

Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Containerized Kitchen	80	\$100,532	\$8,042,560
ATLAS Rough Terrain Forklift	56	\$180,000	\$10,080,000
M1089 Medium Tactical Vehicle Wrecker	80	\$331,680	\$26,534,400
Tool Kit: General Mechanics	928	\$1,805	\$1,675,040
Small Arms Repair Tool Kit	160	\$892	\$142,720
Body Armor	40,000	\$2,000	\$80,000,000
Helmet	40,000	\$250	\$10,000,000
M50 Mask	40,000	\$272	\$10,880,000
Improved First Aid Kit	40,000	\$90	\$3,600,000
Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology	40,000	\$250	\$10,000,000
Glove Set, Chemical	40,000	\$23.11	\$924,400
Chemical Detector	192	\$6,000	\$1,152,000
Binoculars: Modular	4,000	\$354	\$1,416,000
AN/PSN-13	1,504	\$2,666	\$4,009,664
Contingency			\$345,704
Total			\$715,000,000

(Dollars in Thousands)

Project Description/Justification:

The request outlines requirements to equip eight trained Iraqi Brigade using U.S. weapons systems and other related equipment. After the IA restructures, the estimated cost to stand-up, train and equip the minimum eight brigades that will require \$715,000,000. For planning purposes, a brigade force structure of 5000 personnel was used; however as the GoI finalizes its force structure, equipment procurement will be adapted to match final requirements.

The continued and evolving nature of the ISIL threat underscores the importance of equipping Iraq to liberate and secure territory lost to ISIL, secure borders, protect the population, integrate with the ISF and support the Police, and provide for enhancement of both provincial and national defense. Equipping these forces is critical to generate sufficiently armed, equipped and trained forces to secure liberated areas, deny ISIL safe haven, and facilite integration of the ISF. Support for equipping these forces is also a relatively modest, feasible and tangible way to demonstrate our commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity of a multi-ethnic Iraq and a unity of effort in countering ISIL. It will also help counter past GoI broken promises and lack of support for tribal forces to actively arm, train and sustain them, and assist in their eventual assimilation into the ISF.

Impact if not provided:

The FY 2015 ITEF appropriation, and this FY 2016 budget request, are key components of the counter-ISIL strategy and the necessary, nearterm U.S. resourcing support to accomplish desired end states for countering ISIL. If the Iraq Security Force components – Army, Kurdish, Tribal and Guard forces - do not receive the necessary training and equipment, they will not be as successful in securing liberated areas, denying ISIL safe havens and producing an integrated force crucial to ensuring the stability and unity of Iraq as a single nation. Failure to resource these efforts could further degrade tribal and sectarian divisions, facilitate the establishment of a de facto ISIL state, fuel ISIL extremism, and make worse the growing humanitarian crisis that is the result of the continuing conflict in Iraq. Failure of the Iraqi forces to secure terrain and integrate ISF could spread the conflict in the region and further the Sunni/Shia divide. Additionally, if support is not provided, American interests in the region would be undermined. This would result in ongoing destabilization of Iraq, Syria and the region, and likely would result in an expansion of involvement by other nations in providing lethal aid to Shia-dominated elements in the Iraqi Army and increasing their support to Shia militias in the region.

This assistance to the GoI and support to the ISF will provide a counterweight to Iranian influence, reassure Iraqi Sunnis, and help provide solutions so the GoI can address the Sunni grievances that facilitated ISIL expansion. If we do not provide this crucial, timely support to bolster the ISF, we may also deter those ethnic/tribal forces already engaged or contemplating engagement in opposing ISIL from either directly supporting ISF operations or initiating independent actions to clear their local areas of ISIL presence.