Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates

Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



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Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction: (\$ in thousands)

Defense	FY 2007	Price	Program	FY 2008	Price	Program	FY 2009
Threat	<u>Actuals</u>	Change	Change	<u>Estimate</u>	Change	Change	<u>Estimate</u>
Reduction							
Agency	370,615	7,042	48,267	425,924	8,518	-20,307	414,135

- I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: The mission of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise from Former Soviet Union (FSU) states through the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DoD) has:
 - Expanded the strategic focus of the CTR Program to support the Global War on Terrorism;
 - Increased Biological Threat Reduction activities to consolidate and secure pathogens and to build threat agent detection and response systems to provide early warning of a bio-attack; and
 - Established a program in coordination with other Federal agencies to enable non-Russian FSU states to detect and capture WMD crossing their borders. Other agencies include:
 - o the Department of Energy (DOE),
 - o the Department of State, and
 - o the Department of Homeland Security including the U.S. Coast Guard.

The CTR Program directly supports the U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat WMD and strengthens national security by reducing the WMD threat to the U.S. and its allies; denying roque states and terrorists access to WMD and related

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

materials, technologies, and expertise; jointly exploiting pathogens, data, and expertise to enhance preparedness against biological threats; and contributing to stability and cooperation in the FSU. The CTR Program continues to dismantle strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure at their source; enhance the security of WMD and weapons material; prevent proliferation of weapons technology, materials, and expertise; and facilitate defense and military contacts to encourage military reductions and reform. The Administration also developed interagency guidelines that enhance interagency planning and coordination.

To achieve maximum effectiveness and greatest efficiency, the CTR Program requires cooperation on common objectives from partner countries receiving assistance. Program's flexibility in program management and acquisition strategy enables it to target its efforts on the most cooperative partner countries. If a country is not cooperative in developing or implementing a CTR threat reduction project, the law permits the CTR Program to shift its resources to another country or CTR Program area after notification to Congress. Also, the Implementing Agreements with partner countries, required before a project can begin or enter a new stage, are written with an "up to" cost limit so that the CTR Program's resources are not irrevocably committed if a recipient state is not cooperating fully. Each phase of a project has exit criteria, many of which are tied to the recipient state's cooperation. If the exit criteria are not met, DoD can terminate a project. Similarly, all projects' acquisition strategies take into account the possibility that the recipient state's objectives or level of cooperation may change. The flexibility permitted by this approach means that, while the CTR Program's near-term projects may change, the long-term goal and outcome of keeping the U.S. safe from WMD is not affected if resources must be directed to another country or project.

The CTR Program objectives and related assistance activities are:

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

A. Dismantle Former Soviet Union WMD and associated infrastructure:

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The DoD, through the CTR Program, seeks to reduce this threat by providing assistance to FSU states to dismantle WMD and associated delivery systems and infrastructure.

The DoD, through the CTR Program, assists Russia in dismantling Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); ICBM silo launchers and road- and rail- mobile ICBM launchers; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and the associated strategic nuclear submarine; and WMD infrastructure. The DoD also assists Ukraine by supporting storage and elimination of 160 SS-24 ICBM rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine.

Biological weapons capabilities in FSU states also pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. The DoD estimates that approximately 40 former biological weapons facilities are located in FSU states. Through the CTR Program, DoD has funded a project to dismantle infrastructure associated with biological weapons production or research at Soviet legacy facilities. This project eliminates infrastructure, equipment, and facilities previously used to perform biological weapons-related research and/or produce biological weapons.

As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons. The CTR Program assistance will continue to fund jointly with the other Group of Eight (G8) countries construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. The DoD is constructing the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility near the Planovy chemical weapons storage facility which contains approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

filled artillery munitions (estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles).

B. Consolidate and secure Former Soviet Union WMD and related technology and materials:

The CTR Program supports the President's Bratislava Initiative by encouraging nuclear warhead dismantlement and providing enhanced security for strategic and tactical nuclear warheads stored in Russia. The CTR Program assists in the secure transport of an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear warheads per year to dismantlement or secure storage facilities. Limited site access and other means of transparency through the Ministry of Defense (MOD) enables DoD to enhance security at 24 nuclear weapons storage areas throughout Russia. The CTR Program assistance is coordinated with the DOE Materials Protection, Control and Accounting assistance program.

The CTR Program consolidates dangerous virus and bacteria pathogens into safe and secure central reference laboratories and bolsters threat agent detection and response systems to provide early warning of bio-attacks. This assistance helps prevent the theft, diversion, or accidental release of dangerous biological pathogens and strengthens DoD's ability to detect and diagnose outbreaks; attribute them to natural or terrorist causes; access real-time, unfiltered medical information; consolidate pathogen collections into central labs; modernize diagnostic capabilities to eliminate the need for pathogen retention at vulnerable field stations; and develop a network of trained, ethical partner scientists equipped to prevent, deter, respond to, and contain a bio-attack.

C. Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct:

Cooperative biological research projects enhance the U.S. capability to prevent proliferation of the former Soviet biological weapons' expertise to rogue states and terrorist groups, while increasing transparency at FSU biological research facilities

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

formerly closed to Westerners. The research projects enhance epidemiological and diagnostic capacity and advance DoD's understanding of endemic especially dangerous pathogens. The CTR Program provides the opportunity to transfer dangerous pathogens to the U.S. to improve diagnostics and therapeutics and for force health protection and forensics reference. The DoD uses this program to encourage higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct by scientists and to gain transparency into research at laboratories that work on especially dangerous pathogens. Due to the Russian government's unwillingness to cooperate on biological threat reduction and absent a bilateral agreement for such cooperation, DoD has reduced its engagement of scientists in Russia and expanded activities with other countries in the region.

D. Support defense and military cooperation to prevent proliferation:

The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across their borders. The DoD provides assessments, equipment, infrastructure, logistics support, and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and related materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. The DoD is pursuing proliferation prevention projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The WMD-PPI program is coordinated with the DoD International Counter-Proliferation Program and other U.S. Government border security programs in non-Russian FSU states.

The CTR Program also supports expanded contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization, and democratic reforms in FSU states. DoD has negotiated a series of implementing arrangements with FSU states that govern the Defense and Military Contacts program. The DoD has provided support to 32 separate major commands, service headquarters, and subordinate commands for approximately 260 events per

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

year between the U.S. and FSU states. Events include exchange visits between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their FSU counterparts; visits between naval, air, and ground units; bilateral exercises and ship visits; and visits of the nations' senior officials. Participating states currently include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Russia, and Ukraine.

The CTR Program also secured and eliminated a stockpile of chemical weapons agents in Albania. Albania is now the first nation to have completed destruction of its declared chemical weapons stockpile under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Two new programs (WMD Proliferation Prevention - Non-FSU and Chemical Weapons Destruction - Libya) were established based upon the additional funding in the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations Act for the CTR Program.

E. Other Program Support:

Other Assessments/Administrative Support funds the Audits and Examination (A&E) program provided for in the CTR agreements with Program recipient states and overall program management and administration costs. The A&E program ensures that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Additionally, CTR Program funding is required to support CTR Program travel expenses, translator/interpreter support, agency support services, and administrative and advisory support. The CTR Program personnel at Embassy offices in six FSU countries also are supported with these funds.

Program management and support costs are funded by the individual CTR Program areas and include contract logistic support, contract transportation support, administrative and advisory support, and travel.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) - Russia:

The DoD assists Russia by providing equipment and services and overseeing destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems in accordance with the SOAE Implementing Agreement and relevant Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) provisions and agreements, including the START Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. The DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), ICBM silo launchers, road and rail-mobile launchers, and WMD infrastructure. For strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), the launcher section is eliminated, the reactor section removed, and the spent naval fuel placed in dry storage.

Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination

This project eliminates SS-24/25 and SS-N-20 solid propellant missile systems. Activities include operation and maintenance of Russian missile disassembly and elimination facilities and mobile launcher elimination facilities, destruction of treaty-limited components, and transportation of SS-24/SS-25 missiles and solid rocket motors into and out of a temporary storage facility. The CTR Program-provided equipment, used to recover missiles in case of an accident, is also maintained.

<u>Liquid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)/Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Silo Elimination</u>

This project deactivates, dismantles and eliminates SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated launch control center (LCC) silos, and destroys SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and SS-N-18 SLBMs.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement
This project eliminates SLBM launchers from Delta class and Typhoon class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at START-designated elimination facilities. In addition, this project provides the infrastructure required to defuel the SSBNs at the Zvezdochka and Zvezda naval facilities. The spent naval reactor fuel is placed into casks for long-term storage.

B. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Implementing Agreement.

Site Security Enhancements

This project improves security and safety at Russia's nuclear weapons storage sites. Russian MOD nuclear weapons storage sites include both national stockpile sites and operational storage sites of the Russian Air Force and Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as well as temporary storage locations at road-to-rail transfer points. The DOE, in coordination with DoD, also is providing comprehensive security enhancements at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. Permanent storage locations receiving security enhancements may contain either or both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

Far East Training Center

This project will establish a Far East Training Center (FETC) to complement the existing Security Assessment and Training Center at Sergiev Posad and the Kola Technical Center. The FETC will serve as a training facility for all branches of MOD involved with providing security for WMD, specifically supporting the operators, maintainers, and system administrators of the approved "objective suite" of physical security equipment.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Additionally, the FETC will serve as a regional depot-level maintenance facility for that equipment.

Automated Inventory Control and Management System II

This project will enhance and expand the previously established automated inventory system for the tracking and cataloging of nuclear weapons to be eliminated. It will construct new AICMS facilities at additional sites and provide a technological refresh of the hardware and software for the existing automated inventory sites, a one-year warranty for hardware and software, and new system training.

C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Implementing Agreement. This program supports U.S. proliferation prevention objectives by enhancing the security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons during shipment and provides railcar maintenance and procurement.

Nuclear Weapons Transportation

This project assists Russia to transport deployed nuclear warheads safely and securely to secure storage and dismantlement facilities.

Railcar Maintenance and Procurement

This project supports the certification of a required set of MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars through preventive and depot maintenance and production of up to 100 safe and secure weapons transport cars. Russia will eliminate two weapons transport cars for each new one provided.

D. <u>Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia</u>:

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

This program supports the Agreement for the Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons and prevents the proliferation of chemical weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

This project provides for the creation of a Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for organophosphorous (nerve) agent-filled, man-portable munitions. The project assists with the design; equipment acquisition; and installation, construction, systems integration, training, and start-up of the facility (near Shchuch'ye, Kurgan Oblast); as well as the associated destruction process and development of equipment.

E. Biological Threat Reduction Program - Former Soviet Union:

The CTR Program assistance consolidates and secures dangerous pathogen collections into central reference laboratories; improves the safety and security of biological facilities; enhances recipient states' ability to detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics; engages scientists with biological weapons-related expertise in research that supports peaceful pursuits; and destroys former biological weapons facilities and related infrastructure. The DoD has cooperative projects in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, and intends to expand its activities into Armenia. The DoD's effort in Russia is limited due to Russia's reluctance to cooperate on biological threat reduction.

Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination

This project eliminated dual-use technologies and infrastructure at the Biokombinat Production Facility in Tbilisi, Georgia.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Biosecurity and Biosafety and Threat Agent Detection and Response

This project consolidates and secures recipient states' dangerous pathogen collections into safe centralized facilities to prevent terrorists' acquisition of biological weapon seed materials; improves biosafety and biosecurity; enhances these countries' abilities to detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics; and ensures the safe and secure storage and handling of especially dangerous pathogens used for peaceful research to prevent accidental release, theft, and exposure. partner government executive agents are developing a network of disease monitoring and diagnostic centers with trained staff throughout each country linked to a safe, secure centralized reference laboratory and pathogen/data repository. The DoD envisions that these individual country networks will be linked with their regional partners to enhance disease monitoring, reporting, and containment and ensure early warning of potential The DoD created training modules to elevate the diagnostic and bioattacks. epidemiological capabilities of the scientific and technical staff and to promote bioethics, nonproliferation, biosafety, and biosecurity to ensure effectiveness of program investment, and strategic relevance. This project promotes sustained transparency and the formation of strategic health partnerships in the war on bioterrorism. In Russia, efforts are limited to providing safety and security upgrades to select former weapons facilities still involved in dangerous pathogen work.

Cooperative Biological Research

This project increases transparency, improves scientists' standards of conduct, and leverages the extensive expertise of former Soviet biological weapons scientists and those with experience with endemic threat agents to address DoD's bio-defense needs in force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism, and disease surveillance. U.S. researchers are currently collaborating with former Soviet biological weapons research institutes, working side-by-side with counterparts on DoD/interagency projects.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

F. Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative:

This project enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU countries to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD or related materials. Individual and unit equipment, infrastructure, and operations and maintenance training will be provided to border guards, customs officials, and MOD military for defined roles in WMD proliferation prevention. The DoD assistance will complement ongoing counterproliferation assistance provided by DOE's Second Line of Defense, the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security programs and the DoD International Counter-Proliferation Program.

Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Ukraine)

This project is designed to help Ukraine develop a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD-related materials, technology, and components transiting Ukraine's border with Moldova, along Ukraine's maritime border, on adjacent coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, and at key seaports. Ukraine will achieve these capabilities by improving WMD detection, surveillance, comprehensive interdiction, communications/data storage, training, maintenance, and sustainment.

Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan)

This project is designed to help Kazakhstan secure and develop a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD-related materials, technology, and components. The objective is to provide surveillance equipment and procedures; repair and upgrade of existing vessels, where economical; new patrol craft if necessary; equipment for boarding crews, including WMD detection devices; construction, repair, and upgrade of command and control, maintenance, and logistics facilities at operating locations along the Caspian

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Sea coast and select land borders to improve the on-station time and expand the patrol areas of Kazakhstan Maritime Services.

Portal Monitoring (Uzbekistan)

This project provided radiation portal monitors and other surveillance and interdiction equipment, communication systems, installation, training, and other support at key ports of entry (POEs) to increase Uzbekistan's ability to monitor its borders for the illegal transport of fissile and radioactive material. This project is near completion with minimal assistance in the areas of maintenance, sustainment, logistics, transportation, and administrative support. The Department of Energy will provide longer term sustainment.

Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Azerbaijan)

This project is designed to help Azerbaijan develop a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD-related materials, technology, and components on its maritime border and on adjacent waters of the Caspian Sea. It provides maritime surveillance equipment and procedures; repair and upgrade of existing vessels, where economical; equipment for boarding crews, including devices to detect WMD; the construction, repair, and upgrade of command and control, maintenance, and logistics facilities; and the construction of a operating location along the Azerbaijan southern coast to improve the on-station time and expand the patrol areas of the MBG craft.

Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan) This project will secure radiological materials.

G. Defense and Military Contacts:

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

This project develops improved cooperation between the U.S. and FSU military establishments through increased bilateral contacts such as high-level visits and specialists' exchanges between DoD and the respective MOD. These bilateral activities are designed to engage FSU military and defense officials in activities that promote demilitarization of excess infrastructure and defense reform or further counterproliferation efforts.

H. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Audits and Examinations

This project allows the U.S. Government to account for CTR assistance; examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment; and evaluate whether the provided equipment, services, and training are being used for the intended purposes of the CTR Program.

Program Management/Administration

This project provides for general program administrative and overall support costs, project development costs, contracted advisory assistance and administrative support, Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support, and travel.

This project also funds six permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Embassy offices (DTROs) in Moscow, Russia; Kiev, Ukraine; Baku, Azerbaijan; Astana/Almaty, Kazakhstan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; and Tbilisi, Georgia. In some instances, the DTROs will ensure compliance with Section 1305 of Public Law 106-136, FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act that requires DoD to appoint an on-site manager from among employees of the Federal Government for any CTR project in the FSU involving dismantlement, destruction, storage facilities, or construction of a facility where the total DoD contribution is expected to exceed \$50M. Also included is overall in-country management

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

and translation support not unique to specific projects or established implementing agreements.

I. Chemical Weapons Elimination - Albania:

This project secured and eliminated a stockpile of chemical weapons agent that consists of bulk-agent mustard, lewisite, and minimal quantities of arsenical compounds.

J. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination - Ukraine:

This project will assist Ukraine to store and eliminate 160 SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRMs) from dismantled ICBMs.

K. WMD Proliferation Prevention - Non-FSU:

Funding was included in the FY 2008 DoD appropriations bill. The DoD will use these funds to expand the WMD proliferation prevention outside of the FSU.

L. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Libya:

The FY 2008 DoD appropriations bill included funding for a chemical weapons incinerator in Libya.

III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)

		Project	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
A.	Strategic	Offensive Arms Elimination - Russia	\$63,735	\$90,652	\$79,985
		Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination	\$45,380	\$33,550	\$37,149
		Liquid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Silo Elimination	\$12,400	\$27,842	\$30,750
		SLBM Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement	\$5,955	\$29,260	\$12,086
B.	Nuclear W	/eapons Storage Security - Russia	\$92,850	\$45,516	\$24,101
		Site Security Enhancements	\$60,911	\$16,662	\$24,101
		Far East Training Center	\$9,461	\$2,856	
		Automated Inventory Control Management System	\$22,478	\$25,998	
C.	Nuclear W	leapons Transportation Security - Russia	\$32,750	\$37,700	\$40,800
		Nuclear Weapons Transportation	\$10,718	\$16,417	\$13,990
		Railcar Maintenance and Procurement	\$22,032	\$21,283	\$26,810
D.	Chemical	Weapons Destruction - Russia	\$42,700	\$1,000	
		Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility	\$42,700	\$1,000	
E.	Biologica	Threat Reduction - FSU	\$72,357	\$158,489	\$184,463
		BW Infrastructure Elimination	\$541		
		Biosecurity, Biosafety, Threat Agent Detection and Response	\$66,064	\$139,249	\$160,049
		Cooperative Biological Research	\$5,752	\$19,240	\$24,414
F.	WMD Pro	iferation Prevention - FSU	\$32,223	\$47,986	\$50,286
		Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Ukraine)	\$7,231	\$25,382	\$17,766
		Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan)	\$603	\$153	
		Portal Monitoring (Uzbekistan)	\$1,892	\$92	
		Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Azerbaijan)	\$11,519	\$9,526	\$9,733
		Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan)	\$10,978	\$12,833	\$22,787
G.		nd Military Contacts - FSU	\$7,750	\$8,000	\$8,000
		Defense and Military Contacts	\$7,750	\$8,000	\$8,000
Н.	Other Ass	essments/Administrative Costs	\$18,250	\$19,348	\$20,100
		Audits and Examinations	\$500	\$500	\$500
		Program Management/Administration	\$17,750	\$18,848	\$19,600
I.	Chemical	Weapons Elimination - Albania	\$5,000		
		Chemical Weapons Elimination	\$5,000		
J.	Strategic	Nuclear Arms Elimination - Ukraine	\$3,000	\$2,233	\$6,400
		SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination	\$3,000	\$2,233	\$6,400
K.		iferation Prevention - Non-FSU		\$10,000	
		New Initiatives		\$10,000	
L.	Chemical	Weapons Elimination - Libya		\$5,000	
		Chemical Weapons Elimination		\$5,000	
	Total		\$370,615	\$425,924	\$414,135

III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)

		FY 2008					
	_		Cong	gressional	Action	<u> </u>	
a and the state of the state of	FY 2007	Budget			Appro-	Current	FY 2009
A. BA Subactivities	<u>Actuals</u>	Request	Amount	Percent	priated	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>
1. Strategic Offensive Arms							
Elimination-Russia	63,735	77,885	15,000	19	92,885	90,652	79,985
2. Nuclear Weapons Storage							
Security-Russia	92,850	22,988	22,528	98	45,516	45,516	24,101
3. Nuclear Weapons Transportation							
Security-Russia	32,750	37,700			37,700	37,700	40,800
4. Chemical Weapons Destruction-							
Russia	42,700		1,000		1,0000	1,0000	
5. Biological Threat Reduction							
Program	72,357	144,489	14,000	10	158,489	158,489	184,463
6. WMD Proliferation Prevention							
Initiative	32,223	37,986	10,000	26	47,986	47,986	50,286
7. Defense and Military Contacts	7,750	8,000			8,000	8,000	8,000
8. Other Assessments/							
Administrative Support	18,250	19,000	348	2	19,348	19,348	20,100
9. Chemical Weapons Destruction-							
Albania	5,000	0			0	0	0
10. Strategic Nuclear Arms							
Elimination - Ukraine	3,000	0				2,233	6,400
11. WMD Proliferation Prevention -						,	,
Non-FSU			10,000		10,000	10,000	
12. Chemical Weapons Destruction-			,,		, , , , ,	,,	
Libya			5,000		5,000	5,000	
			3,000		3,000	3,000	
Total	370,615	348,048	77,876		425,924	425,924	414,135

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

B. Reconciliation Summary:

	Change	Change
	FY 2008/FY 2008	FY 2008/FY 2009
Baseline Funding	348,048	425,924
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	80,000	N/A
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	-	-
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent	_	-
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	-2,124	-
Subtotal Appropriated Amount		-
Fact-of-Life Changes	_	-
Subtotal Baseline Funding	-	_
Anticipated Supplemental	-	_
Reprogrammings	-	-
Price Changes		8,518
Functional Transfers		
Program Changes		-20,307
Current Estimate	425,924	414,135
Less: Wartime Supplemental	-	-
Normalized Current Estimate	425,924	414,135

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases:

		Amount	Totals
FY	2008 President's Budget Request		348,048
1.	Congressional Adjustments a. Distributed Adjustments b. Undistributed Adjustments c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent d. General Provisions 1) Sec 8097 - Contractor Efficiencies 2) Sec 8104 - Economic Assumptions e. Congressional Earmarks - Indian Lands Environmental Impact	80,000 -688 -1,436	
FY	2008 Appropriated Amount		425,924
	War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations Fact-of-Life Changes		
FY	2008 Baseline Funding		425,924
4.	Reprogrammings (requiring 1415 Actions)		
Re	vised FY 2008 Estimate		425,924
5.	Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
FY	2008 Normalized Current Estimate		425,924
6.	Price Change		8,518

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

		Amount	<u>Totals</u>
7.	Functional Transfers		
8.	Program Increases		30,658
	a. Annualization of New FY 2008 Program		
	b. One-Time FY 2009 Increases		
	c. Program Growth in FY 2009		
	1) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security-Russia (FY 2008		
	Base: \$37,700) Procures up to two additional cargo railed	ars	
	used to transport nuclear weapons to secure storage or		
	dismantlement facilities.	2,346	
	2) Biological Threat Reduction Program-FSU (FY 2008 Base:		
	\$158,489) Accelerates pace of work in Uzbekistan on Zona	1	
	Diagnostic Laboratories, and in Kazakhstan and Ukraine for	r	
	Central Reference Laboratories.	22,485	
	3) WMD Proliferation Prevention (non-Russian FSU) (FY 2008		
	Base: \$47,986) Increased funding to prevent proliferation	า	
	of weapons-grade fissile material within the FSU.	1,340	
	4) Other Assessments/Administrative Support (FY 2008 Base:		
	\$19,348) Funds additional support costs associated with	the	
	CTR Integrated Support Contract (Logistics).	365	
	5) Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination-Ukraine (FY 2008 Base:		
	\$2,233) Funding is provided for storage and to initiate		
	elimination of 160 SS-24 SRMs.	4,122	
۵	Drogram Dograagog		-50,965
Э.	Program Decreases		-30,905
	a. Annualization of New FY 2008 Program Decreases		

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

	Amount	<u>Totals</u>
b. One-Time FY 2008 Increases		
c. Program Decreases in FY 2009		
1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination - Russia (FY 2008 Bas	se: -	
\$90,652) Typhoon 724 completed.	12,480	
2) Nuclear Weapons Storage Security-Russia (FY 2008 Base:		
\$45,516) AICMS II and Far East Training Center projects	_	
completed.	22,325	
3) Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia (FY 2008 Base: \$1,00	00)	
Contract closeout complete.	-1,000	
4) Defense and Military Contacts (FY 2008 Base: \$8,000) Up t	0	
five fewer defense and military exchanges.	-160	
5) WMDPPI-Non-FSU FY 2008 Base: \$10,000) No additional fundi	ing -	
until projects defined.	10,000	
6) Chemical Weapons Destruction - Libya (FY 2008 Base: \$5,000	<u>)</u>	
No planned additional work.	-5,000	
FY 2009 Budget Request		414,135

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

The CTR Program was identified in 2006 as one of DoD's programs to participate in the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), a diagnostic tool used to assess the performance of Federal programs. The Office of Management and Budget concurred with DoD's Assessment Rating of "Effective" for the CTR Program, the highest rating achievable under PART. To achieve maximum effectiveness and greatest efficiency, the CTR Program requires cooperation on common objectives from partner countries receiving assistance. The CTR Program's flexibility in program management and acquisition strategy enables it to target its efforts on the most cooperative partner countries. The full PART review can be viewed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/.

The CTR Program's annual targets as performance measures are presented in the table below. The table represents many of the programs and activities but is not all inclusive. Summary accomplishments/targets for the prior years and the full FYDP period can be found in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to the Congress FY 2009.

CTR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES ANNUAL TARGETS						
Calendar Year	2007	2008	2009			
WMD Means of Delivery Elimination	157	165	181			
Cumulative Eliminations	3,534	3,699	3,880			
Railcar Procurements to Transport Nuclear Weapons	10	18	18			
Cumulative Procurements	10	28	46			
Nuclear Weapons Site Security Upgrades	4	8				
Cumulative Upgrades	16	24				
Biological Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories Built and						
Equipped	4	10	15			
Cumulative Built and Equipped	13	23	38			

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

63,735 90,652 79,985

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)-Russia:

FY 2007 funds:

Eliminate 12 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 20 and eliminate 10 SS-19 ICBM silos, eliminate 1 SS-19 Launch Control Center (LCC), defuel and transport 20 SS-19 ICBMs to storage or the Missile Elimination Destruction Facility (MEDF);

Disassemble and eliminate components of 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Eliminate 44 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 23 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 104 support vehicles;

Decommission and remove infrastructure from 2 SS-25 regiments and transport ICBMs, road-mobile launchers, and support vehicles to storage or elimination facilities; Support SS-24/25 ICBM/SRM handling operations;

Initiate lease activity to repair, maintain, and convert railcars to support the SS-25 ICBM Project;

Initiate *Typhoon* 724 dismantlement, prepare, and tow submarine to Zvezdochka shipyard, and place in dry-dock;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2008 funds will:

Eliminate 13 SS-18 ICBMs and 22 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 10 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers;

Decommission 1 SS-18 LCC;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Decommission 30 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers;

Eliminate 20 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers;

Decommission 1 SS-19 LCC;

Eliminate 2 SS-19 LCCs;

Eliminate 10 SS-N-18 and 7 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Disassemble and eliminate 40 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 30 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 122 support vehicles;

Continue lease activity to repair, maintain, and convert railcars to support the SS-25 ICBM Project;

Complete Typhoon 724 dismantlement, including elimination of 20 SLBM launchers, sectioning the reactor unit, scrapping salvageable material from the launcher section, handling radioactive hazardous materials, and transporting the six-compartment reactor unit to Murmansk;

Initiate work to dismantle 2 Delta III class SSBNs;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Eliminate 9 SS-18 ICBMs and 28 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 6 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers;

Decommission 1 SS-18 LCC;

Decommission 20 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers;

Eliminate 20 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers;

Eliminate 2 SS-19 LCCs;

Continue lease activity to repair, maintain, and convert railcars to support the SS-25 ICBM Project;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Eliminate 6 SS-N-18 and 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Disassemble and eliminate 36 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 31 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 110 support vehicles;

Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;

Complete the dismantlement of 2 *Delta* III SSBNs including the elimination of 32 SLBM launchers;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 92,850 <u>45,516</u> <u>24,101</u>

B. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia:

FY 2007 funds:

Continue construction and installation of equipment for comprehensive security upgrades at the last 8 sites identified by MOD;

Complete construction, training, turnover, and limited follow-on support for a MOD Far East Training Center (FETC);

Complete AICMS II system architecture development, construction of 11 new AICMS field facilities, and procurement and installation of hardware and software at the new facilities, two central control points, and the prototype facility;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

FY 2008 funds will:

Continue construction and installation of equipment for comprehensive security upgrades at the last 8 sites identified by MOD;

Initiate sustainment to include training, maintenance, spares, and depot support for site security enhancements;

Provide electrical and heating infrastructure upgrades for the FETC;

Provide a hardware and software technological refresh for the existing AICMS central, regional, and field facilities, training on the AICMS II system, and one year of warranty support for AICMS II;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Continue sustainment for site security enhancements; Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

> (\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 32,750 37,700 40,800

C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia

FY 2007 funds:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Continue procurement of 19 additional cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

FY 2008 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Continue procurement of 23 additional cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

FY 2009 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Continue procurement of 25 additional cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

D. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia:

42,700 1,000

0

FY 2007 funds:

Complete equipment installation assistance;

Complete systemization of installed CWDF equipment;

Complete training program for CWDF operating personnel;

Facilitate Transfer of Custody of facility to Russia; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2008 funds will:

Complete contract closeout activities and maintain Chemical Weapons Elimination (CWE) core capability.

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 72,357 158,489 184,463

E. Biological Threat Reduction Program:

FY 2007 funds:

Non-Russian FSU:

Initiate 4 new Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) projects and related biosecurity and biosafety upgrades and continue implementing 9 projects; Complete the Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination project in Georgia;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Start implementation of a computerized disease surveillance system, Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System version 1.0 (EIDSS v1.0), in Azerbaijan and continue implementation in Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation and additional training as required;

Continue construction of 1 Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Georgia, commence renovation of 1 interim CRL in Ukraine, initiate design adaptation of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, and establish 5 Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories (ZDLs) (2 ZDL in Uzbekistan, 1 ZDL in Ukraine, 1 ZDL in Azerbaijan and 1 ZDL in Georgia);

Complete development and training of 1 mobile response team in Uzbekistan, 2 mobile response teams in Georgia, and 2 mobile response teams in Azerbaijan;

Support, test, and maintain previously installed communication and information technology system (CIT) at 11 ZDLs;

Train scientists located at 12 ZDLs; and

Provide for technical, administrative, and advisory contractor support services. Russia:

Provide for training, workshops, travel, technical support, administrative support, and advisory contractor support services.

FY 2008 funds will:

Non-Russian FSU:

Start 9 new CBR projects and continue implementing 10 CBR projects;

Fund Armenian scientist attendance to the BTRP Science Review in Garmish, Germany and additional travel support for the development of the Collaborative Biological Research Program in Armenia;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation training and other training as required;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Complete development of EIDSS v2.0

Start implementation of EIDSS v2.0 in Ukraine and continue implementation in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan;

Start implementation of a computerized disease surveillance system in Ukraine and continue implementing the disease surveillance system in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan;

Continue construction and outfitting of 1 CRL in Georgia, complete design and permitting for 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, complete design adaptation and initiate construction of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, and establish 3 ZDLs in Kazakhstan, 1 ZDL in Azerbaijan, 3 ZDLs in Ukraine and 1 ZDL in Georgia;

Complete development and training of 3 mobile response teams (2 in Kazakhstan, 1 in Ukraine);

Sustain 8 mobile response teams (2 in Kazakhstan, 1 in Ukraine, 1 in Uzbekistan, 2 in Georgia, and 2 in Azerbaijan);

Support testing and maintenance of installed CIT for 1 CRL;

Sustain 20 ZDLs and train scientists located at 20 ZDLs; and

Provide for technical, contractor administrative, and advisory contractor support services.

Russia:

Restart 3 CBR smallpox projects at Vector;

Complete 5 Biosafety & Biosecurity projects; and

Provide for training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for Biological Threat Reduction Program projects.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

FY 2009 funds will:

Non-Russian FSU:

Start 15 new CBR projects and continue implementing 13 existing CBR projects;

Initiate assessment of Armenian BTRP requirements and implement initial biosecurity fixes; provide additional travel support for the development of the Collaborative Biological Research Program and implementation of projects in Armenia;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation training and additional training as required;

Continue implementation of EIDSS v2.0 in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;

Complete construction of 1 CRL in Georgia, continue construction of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, commence construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, and begin design adaptation of 1 permanent CRL in Ukraine;

Establish 12 ZDLs (1 in Georgia, 5 in Ukraine, and 6 in Azerbaijan);

Complete development and training of 1 mobile response team in Ukraine and 1 in Uzbekistan;

Maintain 10 mobile response teams (2 in Kazakhstan, 2 in Ukraine, 2 in Uzbekistan, 2 in Georgia and 2 in Azerbaijan);

Support testing and maintenance of installed CIT for 1 CRL;

Sustain 32 ZDLs;

Train scientists located at 32 ZDLs; and

Provide for technical, administrative, and advisory contractor support services. Russia:

Continue implementing 3 CBR smallpox projects at Vector; and

Provide the International Science and Technology Center with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 32,223 <u>47,986</u> 50,286

F. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative - (non-Russian Former Soviet Union):

FY 2007 funds:

Continue the efforts to provide equipment and training to improve WMD proliferation prevention border control capabilities and logistics support and maintenance training of CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and respond to new proliferation threats. This program uses a spiral development and incremental acquisition approach to provide for upgrade of in-country capabilities. As such, specific assistance will be based on prior year assessment of needs and the effectiveness of previous assistance. This assistance could include:

Ukraine: continue efforts to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border. Continue project assessments and upgrade of additional international and state land POEs.

Enhance maritime proliferation prevention capability along the maritime border on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

Azerbaijan:

Continue efforts to enhance the capability to detect and interdict WMD at the maritime borders on the Caspian Sea and continue project assessments. Expand Coast Guard coastal surveillance and provide upgrades to the joint command and control center.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Kazakhstan:

Install additional security measures at former Semipalatinsk test site.

Uzbekistan:

Provide maintenance and sustainment of radiation portal monitors, supporting communications equipment, and video surveillance cameras. Transition maintenance and sustainment to the Department of Energy.

Provide for logistical and technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2008 funds will:

Continue to provide equipment and training to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities and logistics support and maintenance training for CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD-PPI projects and respond to new proliferation threats. This program will define end states and implement through an incremental approach. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of previous assistance and could include:

Ukraine: support continuing efforts to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border and other borders, continue project assessments, and upgrade additional international and state land POEs.

Continue to increase WMD interdiction capability on the maritime border in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Azerbaijan:

Support efforts to upgrade WMD detection and interdiction capabilities for the maritime borders on the Caspian Sea and expand Coast Guard surveillance network.

Kazakhstan:

Install additional security measures at former Semipalatinsk test site.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

Uzbekistan:

Provide for logistical and technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Continue to provide equipment and training to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities and consolidated logistics support and maintenance training of CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD-PPI projects and respond to new proliferation threats. This program will define end states and implement through an incremental approach. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of previous assistance and could include:

Ukraine: support continuing efforts to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border and other land borders, continue project assessments, and upgrade additional international and state ports of entry.

Conduct threat and vulnerability assessments at additional maritime POEs and increase WMD interdiction capability on the maritime border in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Azerbaijan:

Support efforts focusing on upgrading WMD detection and interdiction capabilities for the maritime borders on the Caspian Sea and other borders.

Kazakhstan:

Install additional security measures at former Semipalatinsk test site.

Provide for logistical and technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

(\$ in Thousands)

<u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 8,000

G. Defense and Military Contacts - Former Soviet Union:

FY 2007 funds approximately 253 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2008 will fund approximately 253 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2009 will fund approximately 248 defense and military exchanges.

(\$ in Thousands)

H. Other Assessments/Administrative Cost:

FY 2007 through FY 2009 funds will support approximately 12 Audits and Examinations per year and provide for agency support services as well as contractor administrative and advisory support. Funds will also provide Embassy support for six DTRA/CTR offices within the FSU.

(\$ in Thousands)
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

0

5,000

I. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Albania

FY 2007 funds completed the disposal of chemical agents.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued)

(\$ in Thousands)

<u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 6,400

J. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination - Ukraine:

FY 2007 funds:

Support the storage of 160 SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRMs); and Support repair and maintenance of SRM storage buildings.

FY 2008 funds will:

Support the storage of 160 SS-24 solid rocket motors; Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility; and Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage buildings.

FY 2009 funds will:

Support the storage of 160 SS-24 solid rocket motors; Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility; Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases; and Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage buildings.

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 0

K. WMD Proliferation Prevention - Non-FSU

FY 2008 funds expand the CTR Program outside the FSU.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 0 5,000 0

L. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Libya

FY 2008 funds support chemical weapons elimination in Libya.

V. Personnel Summary: N/A

VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (\$ in Thousands):

			FY 20	e From 07 to 2008		FY 20	e From 08 to 2009	
Line <u>Item</u>	DESCRIPTION	FY 2007 PROGRAM	PRICE GROWTH	PROGRAM GROWTH	FY 2008 PROGRAM	PRICE GROWTH	PROGRAM GROWTH	FY 2009 Estimate
0308 0399	Travel of Persons Total Travel	2,826 2,826	54 54	734 734	3,614 3,614	72 72	192 192	3,878 3,878
0671 0699	Communications Services (DISA) (Reimbursable) Total Purchases	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
0920	Supplies & Materials (Non-centrally managed)	80	2	-82	0	0	0	0
0925	Equipment Purchases (Non-centrally managed)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0932	Management & Professional Support Services	8,645	164	-1,609	7,200	144	56	7,400
0934	Engineering Technical Services	15,388	292	2,120	17,800	356	-56	18,100
0987	Other Intra-governmental Purchases	81,887	1,556	-46,630	36,813	736	-186	37,363
0998	Other Costs	261,789	4,974	93,734	360,497	7,210	-20,313	347,394
0999	Total Other Purchases	367,789	6,988	47,533	422,310	8,446	-20,499	410,257
9999	TOTAL	370,615	7,042	48,267	425,924	8,518	-20,307	414,135