
DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEFENSE FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request



COUNTERNARCOTICS

Global War On Terror (GWOT)/Regional War on Terror (RWOT)

Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Budget Activity 04, Administrative and Service-Wide Activities

Detail by Subactivity Group

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>:

The production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan is a devastating threat to the stability of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Afghanistan cannot develop into a properly functioning democracy, with a stable government operating under the rule of law, if the drug trade dominates its economy. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government (USG), working with allied governments, developed a five-pillared counternarcotics strategy that addresses: (1) alternative livelihoods; (2) elimination and eradication; (3) interdiction; (4) law enforcement and justice reform; and (5) public information.

The Department of Defense (DoD) provides military assistance under the interdiction, law enforcement and justice reform, and public information counternarcotics pillars with a focus on building the Afghan government's capacity to combat the drug trade and to coordinate those efforts with the United Kingdom, as lead nation.

- <u>Military Actions</u>: In Afghanistan, U.S. troops are authorized to conduct military operations against drug trafficking targets when those military operations support the stability mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, U.S. military forces support Afghan interdiction operations focused on building government or Afghan counternarcotics capabilities. U.S. military support includes air mobility (Apache, Blackhawk, and MI-8 helicopters).
- <u>Public Information Support</u>: Reliable public information supportive of President Karzai's anti-drug policy is a critical element of the interagency drug plan. As part of the United States' integrated interagency counternarcotics strategy, DoD is helping the Afghans establish a public affairs capacity that reaches out to the Afghan citizens and seeks to coordinate and integrate the Government of Afghan officials' messages on counterdrug targets.

• Support to Law Enforcement Capacity Building:

- DoD is also assisting in the development of Afghan law enforcement capacity, including border security forces and the highway police. Working closely with the Department of State (DOS), the DoD assists in providing the Afghan border police with specialized training, equipment and facilities. Because Border Police operate in a hostile environment where heavily armed traffickers or militants are found, they often need equipment beyond the requirements of normal policemen (equipment such as vests and cold/wet weather gear). DoD's efforts focus on the border of Pakistan, which is also the general area of DoD counterterrorism and counterinsurgent operations, as a significant amount of the narcotics cross that border. DoD is also improving the borders with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where narcotics flow.
- DoD is providing a communications system for the Border Police that will link them with the existing National Police communications system—funded by DOS—that will extend from the command to the tactical level. Training on the use of the radios and some instruction on minor repair will also be included with the delivery of the equipment. Finally, small unit and tactical training will enable the Border Police forces to operate as an effective team against potential foes.

• Support to Interdiction Efforts:

- Expansion of Afghan interdiction capabilities so that its operations can result in criminal prosecutions is vital to a successful program. In support of law enforcement, DoD funds the ongoing training and equipping of a specialized National Interdiction Unit (NIU), an element of the Afghan Counternarcotics Policy. This unit currently consists of approximately 100 trained officers who work closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and their Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) in Afghanistan. The Department trains the FAST teams and provides them with transportation in country. DoD also provides the DEA FAST with extensive support, including bases of operation in the U.S. and Afghanistan.
- DoD offers some support to the United Kingdom (UK) trained Afghan interdiction force, the Afghan Special Narcotics
 Police (ASNF) by providing close air security support and some equipment, including night vision goggles. In addition,
 DoD is financing the refurbishment of an additional MI-8 helicopter to complement the UK refurbished MI-8s used by
 this force.
- To improve the flow of information between intelligence and law enforcement organizations, the DoD is establishing counter-narcoterrorism Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs) within Combined Forces Coalition—Afghanistan (CFC–A)

and the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Intelligence packages developed, at least in part, by the CFC–A cell have been used in several successful Afghan interdiction operations, including those of the ASNF. The cell works closely with other USG agencies, such as DOS and DEA, and the UK partners. The Afghan Intelligence Fusion Center will not only house counternarcotics information in support of interdictions and prosecutions, but will support police operations against insurgent and other illicit activities. This database will be the first step in reconstructing Afghanistan's criminal justice records, which were destroyed by the last two decades of war. DoD will continue to support this effort and expand its capability in fiscal year (FY) 2007.

Resources are required for training, equipment, intelligence, infrastructure, and information operations related to the campaign against narcotics trafficking and narcotics-related terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the Central Asia area.

- Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU); Counternarcotics Police (Training/Equipment/Facilities)
- Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU); Counternarcotics Police (Air Mobility)
- Intelligence Fusion Centers
- Afghan CN Border Police (Training/Equipment/Facilities)
- Intelligence and Technology (Classified Program)
- Other Nation Support

FY 2006	**		
Actuals	Title IX	Supplemental	Total
168,626	100,000	259,115	359,115

Note: The table does not reflect an additional \$19,692 in baseline FY2007 Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities funding.

II. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands):

- A. <u>Subactivity Group</u> Afghan National Interdiction Unit Counternarcotics Police (Training/Equipment/Facilities)
 - 1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

24,109

20,685

108,515

129,200

Narrative Justification: Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) Expansion Plan – Establish a CNP-A force that is a self-sustaining law enforcement agency comprised of a 2,900 man force that strengthens the Afghanistan law enforcement capacity by providing intelligence, interdiction, eradication, and investigative capabilities in order to support long-term stability in Afghanistan and disrupt production and trafficking of illicit drugs across international borders.

Execution of this plan will occur in two phases:

- Phase I is to build the capacity of the CNPA by constructing facilities; train, equip, and mentor additional Afghan personnel for the National Interdiction Unit, Mobile Detection Teams, Special Investigative Unit, CNPA officers (investigative/intelligence/support), Counternarcotics Police Special Forces, and the aviation squadron; develop a train the trainer program; and increase CNPA intelligence capacity.
- Phase II is the transition the program to the Afghans.

Impact if not funded: Maintaining stability in Afghanistan is a critical responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater security cooperation strategy and is a key component of the USCENTCOM war on terror efforts in Central Asia. There is also great risk to all USG progress in Afghanistan if the narcotics problem is not addressed effectively, and this includes regional efforts to stop narcotics trafficking. For nations outside of

USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, growth of the drug trade will further inhibit the government's ability in these GWOT countries to gain control of ungoverned spaces and their borders and will enable terrorist groups to increase a major funding source.

B. <u>Subactivity Group</u> – Afghan National Interdiction Unit Counternarcotics Police (Air Mobility)

1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

28,466

34,075

12,000

46,075

Narrative Justification: Provide contract MI-8 helicopter transportation. Provide 10 MI-17 refurbished helicopters with associated training. Provide contract pilot/maintenance support followed by pilot/maintenance training for Afghan personnel. Construct a Joint Aviation Facility for helicopter operations and maintenance.

Impact if not funded: Providing an airlift capability is a critical step for the GOA to be an equal partner in the combating the drug trade. Without airlift, the GOA will not have the ability move in quickly to prosecute labs and traffickers identified by highly perishable information provided by intelligence sources. Helicopters are a must in this very mountainous range, which also makes it very challenging to pilot this region and requires very specialized training to avoid mishaps that will endanger lives and loss of the aircraft. This aspect of the program supports the US/UK CNPA plan drafted primarily by DEA.

C. Subactivity Group – Intelligence Fusion Centers

1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

8,314

1,800

500

2,300

Narrative Justification: Establish the CFC-A (CN) Intel Fusion Element and the Ministry of Interior CN Intel Fusion Center to share information on narcotics trafficking and insurgent operations. Train Afghan fusion center analysts. Support the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center in London. Provide imagery and signals intelligence support.

Impact if not funded: The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) will not be able to archive and share narcotics related intelligence for investigation. This in turn will not allow the Afghans to conduct nation wide investigations and to identify narcotics trafficking organizations. The CNPA will not benefit

from the use of the system if the necessary changes are not made. The GOA will never be able to conduct investigations properly and effectively or share the information with the international community. Overall, the current minor headway on CN will stagnate and result in failure, which in turn will play a negative key role in undermining GOA in projecting rule of law outside of Kabul and endangering stability throughout the country.

D. <u>Subactivity Group</u> – Afghan Counternarcotics Border Police (Training/Equipment/Facilities)

1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

24,683

14,800

15,500

30,300

Narrative Justification: Provide counternarcotics tactical training at the unit level for the Afghan Border Police. Establish a communications system for the entire border police. Provide scanners, training, and warehouse costs for border police and Mobile Detection Teams.

Impact if not funded: The DOS requested border crossing and communications equipment to outfit the Afghan border crossings. This equipment will complement the Border Management Initiative mentoring to make Afghanistan more secure, but more importantly to collect much needed revenue. Some crossings collect up to \$1 million per day. The equipment, as well as weapons for Border Police, is essential to conduct inspections to apprehend smugglers and collect revenue.

E. Subactivity Group – Intelligence and Technology

1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

13,280

25,540

45,700

71,240

Narrative Justification: Reflects a number of classified and unclassified programs providing intelligence, technology and imagery support to US forces performing CN efforts.

Impact if not funded: Classified – Details provided through separate submission.

F. Subactivity Group - Other Program Support

1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

9,202

600

5,000

5,600

Narrative Justification: Provides for programs, such as one that will use financial intelligence to trace and track terrorists and drug traffickers. Exploiting information from known terrorists or drug traffickers will assist in finding Medium and High Value Individuals.

Impact if not funded: The DOS/INL requested these programs to support and augment the information collection and analysis to interdict traffickers. This information can also provide information related to CT. Without this capability in the CN Cell and at the MOI, packages cannot be developed to interdict and forces like the NIU are ineffective. Without the planner and program manager pulling the details together it is virtually impossible for this program to succeed.

G. Subactivity Group - Other Nation Support

1. 3.3 Other Supplies and Equipment

60.572

2.500

71.900

74.400

Narrative Justification: Conduct training, support intelligence efforts, purchase equipment, and construct facilities in Central Asia in support of DoD CN efforts.

Pakistan – Construct or refurbish facilities to include Coast Guard facilities, boathouse, and bases of operations for Pakistan Security and Narcotics forces along the border. Purchase of aircraft Forward Looking Infrared Radars, equipment for patrol boats, and safe boats. Provide training for Pakistani CN forces.

Tajikistan – Construct new border crossing facilities and sustainment of communications systems.

Turkmenistan – Construct an additional border crossing point, and establish a C2 network between border crossings points.

Yemen – Refurbish floating docks/piers to accommodate the Yemen Coast Guard boats which are involved in patrolling the coast for drug trafficking.

Kyrgyzstan – Complete construction of the Scorpion compound. This compound is used to recruit and retain soldiers for a Special Forces unit. Construct three small compounds for the Mobile Interdiction Team (MIT).

Kazakhstan – Purchase safe boats and provide boat training.

Turkey – Construct information fusion centers.

Horn of Africa – Provide DEA training with police in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Construct observation towers along the Kenyan coast.

Impact if not funded: DoD has made major inroads in gaining cooperation between counter narcotics agencies within these nations. Not providing funding seriously jeopardizes these relationships that are just in their infancy. Furthermore, these programs are a critical component of the U.S. Central Command Commander's theater security cooperation strategy as well as key components of the Commander's war on terror efforts in Central Asia.

Funding Totals 168,626 100,000 259,115 359,115