Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/FY 2009 Budget Estimates

Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



February 2007

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Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction: (\$ in thousands)

Defense	FY 2006*	Price	Program	FY 2007	Price	Program	FY 2008	Price	Program	FY 2009
Threat	<u> Actuals</u>	Change	Change	Estimate	Change	Change	<u>Estimate</u>	Change	Change	Estimate
Reduction										
Agency	454,937	10,918	-95,240	370,615	8,523	-31,090	348,048	7,658	3,078	358,784

^{*} Amounts include \$44.5 million appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234).

I. Description of Operations Financed:

The mission of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise from Former Soviet Union (FSU) states through the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DoD) has expanded the strategic focus of the CTR Program to support the Global War on Terrorism. It has increased Biological Threat Reduction activities to consolidate and secure pathogens and established a program in coordination with other Federal Agencies to permit non-Russian FSU states to detect and capture WMD crossing their borders. Other agencies include the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of State, and the Department of Homeland Security including the U.S. Coast Guard.

The CTR Program directly supports the U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and strengthens national security by reducing the WMD threat to the U.S. and its allies; denying rogue states and terrorists access to WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise; jointly exploiting pathogens, data, and expertise to enhance preparedness against biological

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

threats; and contributing to stability and cooperation in the FSU. The CTR Program continues, at their source, to dismantle strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure; enhance the security of WMD and weapons material; prevent proliferation of weapons technology, materials, and expertise; and facilitate defense and military contacts to encourage military reductions and reform. The Administration also developed interagency guidelines that enhance interagency planning and coordination.

The CTR Program was identified in 2006 as one of DoD's programs to participate in the Program Assessment Rating Tool(PART), a diagnostic tool used to assess the The Office of Management and Budget concurred with performance of Federal programs. DoD's Assessment Rating of "Effective" for the CTR Program, the highest rating achievable To achieve maximum effectiveness and greatest efficiency, the CTR Program requires cooperation on common objectives from partner countries receiving assistance. The CTR Program's flexibility in program management and acquisition strategy enables it to target its efforts on the most cooperative partner countries. Thus, if a country is not cooperative in developing or implementing a CTR threat reduction project, the law permits the CTR Program to shift its resources to another country or to another CTR Program area after notification to Congress. Also, the Implementing Agreements with partner countries, required before a project can begin or enter a new stage, are written with an "up to" cost limit so that the CTR Program's resources are not irrevocably committed if a recipient state is not cooperating fully. Each phase of a project has exit criteria, many of which are tied to the recipient state's cooperation. If the exit criteria are not met, DoD can terminate a project. Similarly, all projects' acquisition strategies take into account the possibility that the recipient state's objectives or level of cooperation may change. The flexibility permitted by this approach means that, while the CTR Program's near-term projects may change, the long-term goal and outcome of keeping

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

the U.S. safe from WMD is not affected if resources must be directed to another country or project.

CTR Program objectives and related assistance activities are:

A. Dismantle Former Soviet Union (FSU) WMD and associated infrastructure:

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The DoD, through the CTR Program, seeks to reduce this threat by providing assistance to FSU states to dismantle WMD and associated delivery systems and infrastructure.

The DoD, through the CTR Program, assists Russia in dismantling Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); ICBM silo launchers, and road and rail mobile ICBM launchers; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and the associated strategic nuclear submarine; and WMD infrastructure. The DoD also supports storage of 163 SS-24 ICBM rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine.

Biological weapons capabilities in FSU states also pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. The DoD estimates that approximately 40 former biological weapons facilities are located in FSU states. Through the CTR Program, the DoD has funded a project to dismantle infrastructure associated with biological weapons production or research at Soviet legacy facilities. This project eliminates infrastructure, equipment, and facilities previously used to perform biological weapon related research and/or produce biological weapons.

As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons and demilitarize its former chemical weapon

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

production facilities. Contingent on Russia's certification for conditions specified by Congress or a presidential waiver being authorized and exercised, CTR Program assistance will continue to fund jointly with other Group of eight (G8) countries construction of a chemical weapon destruction facility for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. The DoD is constructing the Chemical Weapon Destruction Facility near the Planovy chemical weapon storage facility which contains approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions (estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles).

B. Consolidate and secure Former Soviet Union WMD and related technology and materials:

The CTR Program supports the President's Bratislava Initiative by encouraging nuclear warhead dismantlement and providing enhanced security for strategic and tactical nuclear warheads stored in Russia. The CTR Program assists in the secure transport of an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear warheads per year to dismantlement or secure storage facilities. Limited site access and other means of transparency through the Ministry of Defense (MOD) enables the DoD to enhance security at 24 nuclear weapons storage areas throughout Russia. The CTR Program assistance is coordinated with the DOE Materials Protection, Control and Accounting assistance program.

The CTR Program consolidates dangerous virus and bacteria pathogens into safe and secure central reference laboratories and bolsters threat agent detection and response systems to provide early warning of bio-attacks. This assistance helps prevent the theft, diversion, or accidental release of dangerous biological pathogens and strengthens DoD's ability to detect and diagnose outbreaks; attribute them to natural or terrorist causes; access real-time, unfiltered medical information; consolidate pathogen collections into central labs; modernize diagnostic capabilities to eliminate the need

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

for pathogen retention at vulnerable field stations; and develop a network of trained, ethical partner scientists equipped to prevent, deter, respond to, and contain a bioattack.

C. Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct:

Cooperative biological research projects enhance the U.S. capability to prevent proliferation of the former Soviet biological weapons' expertise to rogue states and terrorist groups, while increasing transparency at FSU biological research facilities formerly closed to Westerners. The research projects enhance epidemiological and diagnostic capacity and advance the DoD's understanding of endemic especially dangerous pathogens. The CTR Program provides the opportunity to transfer dangerous pathogens to the U.S. to improve diagnostics and therapeutics and for force health protection and The DoD uses this program to encourage higher standards of forensics reference. openness, ethics, and conduct by scientists, and to gain transparency into research at laboratories that work on especially dangerous pathogens. Due to the Russian Government's unwillingness to cooperate on biological threat reduction and absent a bilateral agreement for such cooperation, the DoD has reduced its engagement of scientists in Russia and expanded activities with other countries in the region.

D. Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation:

The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across their borders. The DoD provides assessments, equipment, infrastructure, logistics support, and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and related materials to

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. DoD is pursuing proliferation prevention projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The WMD-PPI program is coordinated with the International Counter-Proliferation Program and other U.S. Government border security programs in non-Russian FSU States.

The CTR Program also supports expanded contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization, and democratic reforms in FSU states. DoD has negotiated a series of implementing arrangements with FSU states that govern the Defense and Military Contacts program. DoD has provided support to 32 separate major commands, service headquarters, and subordinate commands for approximately 260 events per year between the U.S. and FSU states. Events include exchange visits between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with their FSU counterparts; visits between naval, air, and ground units; bilateral exercises and ship visits; and visits of the nations' senior officials. Participating states currently include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Russia, and Ukraine.

The CTR Program also is securing and eliminating a stockpile of chemical weapons agents in Albania. This activity is authorized under Section 1308 of the FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act that permits the U.S. to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals.

E. Other Program Support:

Other Assessments/Administrative Support funds the Audits and Examination (A&E) program provided for in the CTR agreements with Program recipient states and overall program management and administration costs. The A&E program ensures that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Additionally, CTR Program funding is

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

required to support CTR Program travel expenses, translator/interpreter support, and administrative and advisory support. CTR Program personnel presence at Embassy offices in six FSU countries also are supported with these funds.

Program management and support costs are funded by the individual CTR Program areas and include contract logistic support, contract transportation support, administrative and advisory support, and travel.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) - Russia:

The DoD assists Russia by providing equipment and services, and overseeing destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems in accordance with the SOAE Implementing Agreement and relevant Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) provisions and agreements, including the START Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. The DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), ICBM silo launchers, road and rail mobile launchers, and WMD infrastructure. For strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), the launcher section is eliminated, the reactor section removed, and the spent naval fuel placed in dry storage.

Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination

This project eliminates SS-24/25 and SS-N-20 solid propellant missile systems. Activities include operation and maintenance of Russian missile disassembly and elimination facilities and mobile launcher elimination facilities, destruction of treaty-

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

limited components, and transportation of SS-24/SS-25 missiles and solid rocket motors into and out of a temporary storage facility. CTR Program-provided equipment, used to recover missiles in case of an accident, is also maintained.

<u>Liquid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)/Submarine Launched</u> Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Silo Elimination

This project deactivates and eliminates SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated launch control center (LCC) silos. SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and SS-N-18 SLBMs are also destroyed.

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement

This project eliminates SLBM launchers from Delta class and Typhoon class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at START-designated elimination facilities. In addition, this project provides the infrastructure required to defuel the SSBNs at the Zvezdochka and Zvezda naval facilities. The spent naval reactor fuel is placed into casks for long-term storage.

B. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Implementing Agreement.

Site Security Enhancements

This project improves security and safety at Russia's nuclear weapons storage sites. Russian MOD nuclear weapons storage sites include both national stockpile sites and operational storage sites of the Russian Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as well as some temporary storage locations, such as road to rail transfer points.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

The DOE, in close coordination with DoD, also is providing comprehensive security enhancements at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. Permanent storage locations receiving security enhancements may contain either or both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

Far East Training Center

This project will establish a Far East Training Center (FETC) to complement the existing Security Assessment and Training Center at Sergiev Posad and the Kola Technical Center. The FETC will serve as a training facility for all branches of the MOD involved with providing security for WMD, specifically supporting the operators, maintainers, and system administrators of the approved "objective suite" of physical security equipment. Additionally, the FETC will serve as a regional depot-level maintenance facility for that equipment.

C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Implementing Agreement. This program supports U.S. proliferation prevention objectives by enhancing the security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons during shipment and provides railcar maintenance and procurement.

Nuclear Weapons Transportation

This project assists Russia to transport deployed nuclear warheads safely and securely to secure storage and dismantlement facilities.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Railcar Maintenance and Procurement

This project supports the certification of a required set of MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars through preventive and depot maintenance and production of up to 100 safe and secure weapons transport cars. Russia will eliminate two weapons transport cars for each new one provided.

D. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia:

This program supports the Agreement for the Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons and prevents the proliferation of chemical weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

This project provides for the creation of a Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for organophosphorous (nerve) agent filled, man-portable munitions. The project assists with the design; equipment acquisition; and installation, construction, systems integration, training, and start-up of the facility (near Shchuch'ye, Kurgan Oblast); as well as the associated destruction process and development of equipment.

E. Biological Threat Reduction Program - Former Soviet Union:

The CTR Program assistance consolidates and secures dangerous pathogen collections into central reference laboratories; improves the safety and security of biological facilities involved in threat agent detection and response; enhances recipient states' ability to detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks, whether they be natural outbreaks that could be exploited by bioterrorists or outbreaks caused by bioterrorists; engages scientists with biological weapons-related expertise in research that supports peaceful pursuits; and destroys former biological weapons facilities and related

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

infrastructure. DoD has cooperative projects in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. DoD's effort in Russia is very limited due to Russian aversion to cooperate on biological threat reduction with DoD.

Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination

This project eliminates former Soviet biological weapons infrastructure and technologies at Tbilisi, Georgia. DoD is eliminating dual-use technologies at the Biokombinat Production Facility.

Biosecurity and Biosafety and Threat Agent Detection and Response

This project consolidates and secures recipient states' dangerous pathogen collections into safe centralized facilities to prevent terrorists' acquisition of biological weapon seed materials; improves biosafety and biosecurity; enhances these countries' abilities to detect, diagnose, and respond to disease outbreaks; and ensures the safe and secure storage and handling of especially dangerous pathogens used for peaceful research to prevent accidental release, theft, and exposure. The DoD and its partner government executive agents are developing a network of disease monitoring and diagnostic centers with trained staff throughout each country linked to a safe, secure centralized reference laboratory and pathogen/data repository. The DoD envisions that these individual country networks will be linked with their regional partners to enhance disease monitoring, reporting, and containment and ensure early warning of potential The DoD created training modules to elevate the diagnostic and bioattacks. epidemiological capabilities of the scientific and technical staff and to promote bioethics, nonproliferation, biosafety, and biosecurity to ensure effectiveness of program investment, and strategic relevance. This project promotes sustained transparency and the formation of strategic health partnerships in the war on

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

bioterrorism. In Russia, efforts are limited to providing safety and security upgrades to select former weapons facilities still involved in dangerous pathogen work.

Cooperative Biological Research

This project increases transparency, improves scientists' standards of conduct, and leverages the extensive expertise of former Soviet biological weapons scientists and those with experience with endemic threat agents to address DoD's bio-defense needs in force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism, and disease surveillance. U.S. researchers are currently collaborating with former Soviet biological weapons research institutes, working side-by-side with counterparts on DoD/Interagency approved projects.

F. Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative:

This project enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU countries to prevent, deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD or related materials. Individual and unit equipment, infrastructure, and operations and maintenance training will be provided to, border guards, customs officials, and MOD military for defined roles in WMD proliferation prevention. DoD assistance will complement ongoing Counter-Proliferation assistance provided by the DOE's Second Line of Defense and the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security programs.

Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Ukraine)

This project is designed to help Ukraine develop a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD-related materials, technology and components transiting Ukraine's border with Moldova, along Ukraine's maritime border, on adjacent coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, and at key seaports. Ukraine will achieve these

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

capabilities by improving WMD detection and interdiction, surveillance, comprehensive interdiction, communications/data storage, training, maintenance, and sustainment.

Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan)

This project is designed to help Kazakhstan to secure and to develop a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD-related materials, technology, and components. It will provide surveillance equipment and procedures; repair and upgrade of existing vessels, where economical; the possibility of new patrol craft if necessary; equipment for boarding crews, including WMD detection devices; the construction, repair, and upgrade of command and control, maintenance, and logistics facilities at coastal operating locations along the Caspian Sea coast to improve the on-station time and expand the patrol areas of Kazakhstan Maritime Services and select land borders.

Land Border Proliferation Prevention (Uzbekistan)

This project will provide radiation portal monitors and other surveillance and interdiction equipment, communication systems, installation, training, and other support at key ports of entry to increase Uzbekistan's ability to monitor its borders for the illegal transport of fissile and radioactive material.

Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Azerbaijan)

This project is designed to help Azerbaijan develop a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD-related materials, technology and components on its maritime border and on adjacent waters of the Caspian Sea. It provides maritime surveillance equipment and procedures; repair and upgrade of existing vessels, where economical; equipment for boarding crews, including devices to detect WMD; the construction, repair, and upgrade of command and control, maintenance, and logistics facilities; and the

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

construction of a coastal operating location along the Azerbaijan southern coast to improve the on-station time and expand the patrol areas of the MBG craft.

Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan)

This project will secure radiological sources.

G. <u>Defense and Military Contacts</u>:

This project develops improved cooperation between the U.S. and FSU military establishments through increased bilateral contacts such as high level visits and specialists' exchanges between DoD and the respective MOD. These bilateral activities are designed to engage FSU military and defense officials in activities that promote demilitarization of excess infrastructure and defense reform or further counterproliferation efforts.

H. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Audits and Examinations

This project allows the U.S. Government to account for CTR assistance that is delivered; examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment; and evaluate whether or not the provided equipment, services, and training are being used for intended purposes of the CTR Program.

Program Management/Administration

This project provides for general program administrative and overall support costs, project development costs, contracted advisory assistance and administrative support, Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support, and travel.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

This project also funds six permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Embassy offices (DTROs) in Moscow, Russia; Kiev, Ukraine; Baku, Azerbaijan; Astana/Almaty, Kazakhstan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; and Tbilisi, Georgia. In some instances, the DTROs will ensure compliance with Section 1305 of Public Law 106-136, FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act that requires DoD to appoint an On-site Manager from among employees of the Federal Government for any CTR project in the FSU involving dismantlement, destruction, or storage facilities or construction of a facility where the total DoD contribution is expected to exceed \$50M. Also included is overall in-country management and translation support as long as such expenses are not unique to specific projects or established implementing agreements.

I. Chemical Weapons Elimination - Albania:

This project will secure and eliminate a stockpile of chemical weapons agent that consists of bulk-agent mustard, lewisite, and minimal quantities of arsenical compounds. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) elimination effort will dispose of the chemical agents in accordance with the Albanian government requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The project is being implemented using the authority provided by Section 1308 of the FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, which allows CTR Program funds to be used for nonproliferation projects outside the FSU.

J. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination - Ukraine:

This project will assist Ukraine to store 163 SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRMs) pending their elimination.

	Program Project	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
Α.	Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination - Russia	\$49,688	\$75,735	\$77,885	
	Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination	\$45,404	\$53,601	\$46,664	
	Liquid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Silo Elimination	\$971	\$16,347	\$16,133	\$16,503
	SLBM Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement	\$3,313	\$5,787	\$15,088	
В.	Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia	\$128,600	\$86,850	\$22,988	
	Site Security Enhancements	\$119,855	\$79,063	\$22,988	\$24,750
	Far East Training Center	\$8,745	\$7,787		
C.	Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia	\$30,000	\$32,750	\$37,700	\$40,800
	Nuclear Weapons Transportation	\$8,946	\$11,898	\$12,908	\$13,990
	Railcar Maintenance and Procurement	\$21,054	\$20,852	\$24,792	\$26,810
D.	Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia	\$108,500	\$42,700		
	Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility	\$108,500	\$42,700		
E.	Biological Threat Reduction - FSU	\$69,849	\$68,357	\$144,489	\$144,463
	BW Infrastructure Elimination	\$2,216	\$1,574		
	Biosecurity & Biosafety and Threat Agent Detection and Response	\$66,283	\$47,001	\$125,749	\$130,263
	Cooperative Biological Research	\$1,350	\$19,782	\$18,740	\$14,200
F.	WMD Proliferation Prevention - FSU	\$40,600	\$37,223	\$37,986	\$38,286
	Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Ukraine)	\$17,590	\$12,849	\$15,800	\$15,800
	Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan)	\$5,346	\$6,688	\$8,300	\$8,453
	Land Border Proliferation Prevention (Uzbekistan)	\$3,284	\$6,984	\$5,450	\$5,476
	Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Azerbaijan)	\$13,740	\$9,401	\$8,436	\$8,557
	Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstar		\$1,301		
G.	Defense and Military Contacts - FSU	\$8,000	\$7,750	\$8,000	\$8,000
	Defense and Military Contacts	\$8,000	\$7,750	\$8,000	
Н.	Other Assessments/Administrative Costs	\$14,600	\$18,250	\$19,000	
	Audits and Examinations	\$500	\$500	\$500	\$500
	Program Management/Administration	\$14,100	\$17,750	\$18,500	\$19,600
I.	Chemical Weapons Elimination - Albania	\$4,000		<u>-</u>	
	Chemical Weapons Elimination	\$4,000			
J.	Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination - Ukraine	\$1,100	\$1,000		
	SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination	\$1,100	\$1,000		
	Total	\$454,937	\$370,615	\$348,048	\$358,784

III. Financial Summary (\$'s in Thousands):

		FY 2007						
	_		Congi	ressional	Action			
A. Sub-Activity Group	FY 2006* Actuals	Budget Request	Amount	Percent	Appro- priation	Current Estimate	FY 2008 Estimate	FY 2009 Estimate
 Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination- 								
Russia 2. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security-	49,688	76,985	-250	.325	76,735	75,735	77,885	82,385
Russia 3. Nuclear Weapons	128,600	87,100	-250	.287	86,850	86,850	22,988	24,750
Transportation Security-Russia 4. Chemical Weapons	30,000	33,000	-250	.758	32,750	32,750	37,700	40,800
Destruction-Russia 5. Biological Threat	108,500	42,700			42,700	42,700	0	0
Reduction Program 6. WMD Proliferation	69,849	68,357			68,357	68,357	144,489	144,463
Prevention Initiative 7. Defense and Military	40,600	37,486	-263	.702	37,223	37,223	37,986	38,286
Contacts 8. Other Assessments/Administra	8,000	8,000	-250	3.125	7,750	7,750	8,000	8,000
tive Support 9. Chemical Weapons	14,600	18,500	-250	1.351	18,250	18,250	19,000	20,100
Destruction-Albania 10. Strategic Nuclear Arms	4,000	0	0		0	0	0	0
Elimination - Ukraine	1,100	0	0		0	1,000	0	0
Total	454,937	372,128	-1,513	.407	370,615	370,615	348,048	358,784

^{*} Amounts include \$44.5 million appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234).

III. Financial Summary (\$'s in Thousands): (Continued)

B. Reconciliation Summary:

	Change	Change	Change
	FY 2007/FY 2007	FY 2007/FY 2008	FY 2008/FY 2009
Baseline Funding	372,128	370,615	348,048
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	-	N/A	N/A
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	-	-	-
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent	-	-	-
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	-1,513	-	
Subtotal Appropriated Amount		-	-
Fact-of-Life Changes	-	-	-
Subtotal Baseline Funding	-	-	-
Anticipated Supplemental	-	-	-
Reprogrammings	-	-	-
Price Changes	-	8,523	7,658
Functional Transfers			
Program Changes	-	-31,090	3,078
Current Estimate	370,615	348,048	358,784
Less: Wartime Supplemental	-	-	-
Normalized Current Estimate	370,615	348,048	358,784

III. Financial Summary (\$'s in Thousands): (Continued)

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases:

	Amount	Totals
FY 2007 President's Budget Request		372,128
1. Congressional Adjustments		-1,513
a. Distributed Adjustments		
b. Undistributed Adjustments		
c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent		
d. General Provisions		
1) Sec 8097 - Excessive Growth in Travel and Transportation	-264	
2) Sec 8106 - Economic Assumptions	-1,249	
FY 2007 Appropriated Amount		370,615
 War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations Fact-of-Life Changes 		
FY 2007 Baseline Funding		370,615
4. Reprogrammings (requiring 1415 Actions)		
Revised FY 2007 Estimate		370,615
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental		
Appropriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings, Iraq Freedom Fund Transfers		
FY 2007 Normalized Current Estimate		370,615
6. Price Change		8,523
7. Functional Transfers		
8. Program Increases		78,563
a. Annualization of New FY 2007 Program		
b. One-Time FY 2008 Increases		
c. Program Growth in FY 2008		

III. Financial Summary (\$'s in Thousands): (Continued)

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1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination-Russia (FY 2007	Amount 409	<u>Totals</u>
Base: \$75,735) Increased elimination of ICBMs.	100	
2) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security-Russia	4,197	
(FY 2007 Base: \$32,750) Procures up to 4 additional	1,10,	
cargo railcars used to transport nuclear weapons to		
secure storage or dismantlement facilities.		
3) Biological Threat Reduction Program-FSU (FY 2007	73,555	
Base: \$68,357) Continues the phased expansion of		
Biosecurity & Biosafety/Threat Agent Detection and		
Response and Cooperative Biological Research		
activities in the non-Russian states. Continues		
construction and outfitting of one central reference		
laboratory in Georgia. Completes staff training,		
outfitting and sustains 17 Epidemiological		
Monitoring Stations in the non-Russian states.		
4) Defense and Military Contacts (FY 2007 Base: \$7,750)	72	
Funds up to two additional defense and military		
exchanges.		
5) Other Assessments/Administrative Support (FY 2007	330	
Base: \$18,250) Additional support costs associated		
with the Defense Threat Reduction Offices within the		
FSU are anticipated		
Decreases		-109,653
a. Annualization of FY 2007 Program Decreases		
b. One-Time FY 2007 Decreases		
c. Program Decreases in FY 2008		
1) Nuclear Weapons Storage Security-Russia (FY 2007	-65,860	
Base: \$86,850) Site Security Enhancements completed.		

III. Financial Summary (\$'s in Thousands): (Continued)

	Amount	<u>Totals</u>
2) Chemical Weapons Destruction (FY 2007 Base:	-42,700	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
\$42,700) FY 2007 funding will complete DoD's		
assistance for the Chemical Weapons Destruction		
Facility.		
3) WMD Proliferation Prevention (non-Russian FSU)	-93	
(FY 2007 Base: \$37,223) Minor adjustment for		
decrease in travel requirements.		
4) Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination-Ukraine (FY 2007	-1,000	
Base: \$1,000) No additional funding is provided for		
storage of 163 SS-24 SRMs.		
FY 2008 Budget Request		348,048
10. Price Change		7,658
11. Functional Transfers		
12. Program Increases		6,995
a. Annualization of New FY 2008 Program		
b. One-Time FY 2009 Increases		
c. Program Growth in FY 2009		
1) <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination - Russia</u>	2,787	
(FY 2008 Base: \$77,885) Eliminates Delta III SSBN.		
2) Nuclear Weapons Storage Security-Russia (FY 2008	1,256	
Base: \$22,988) Sustainment of site security		
enhancement increased.		
3) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security-	2,27	
Russia(FY 2008 Base: \$37,700) Procures up to	1	
2 additional cargo railcars used to transport		
nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement		
facilities.		

III. Financial Summary (\$'s in Thousands): (Continued)

	Amount	<u>Totals</u>
4) Other Assessments/Administrative Support (FY 2008	681	
Base: \$19,000) Funds additional support costs		
associated with the CTR Integrated Support Contract		
(Logistics) and contract support for the Defense		
Threat Reduction Offices.		
13. Program Decreases		-3,917
1) Biological Threat Reduction Program-FSU (FY 2008		
Base: \$144,489) Reduced scope of work in Uzbekistan	-3,205	
for epidemiological monitoring stations.		
2) WMD Proliferation Prevention (non-Russian FSU)		
(FY 2008 Base: \$37,986) Minor scope change for	-536	
WMDPPI (Ukraine).		
3) Defense and Military Contacts (FY 2008 Base:		
\$8,000) Up to five fewer defense and military	-176	
exchanges.		
FY 2009 Budget Request		358,784

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

(\$'s in Thousands)

A. <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)-Russia:</u> FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 82,385

FY 2006 funds:

Eliminate and Dismantle 2 SS-18 ICBMs and 4 SS-19 ICBMs;

Disassemble and eliminate components of 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Eliminate 44 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 25 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 72 support vehicles;

Decommission and remove infrastructure from 3 SS-25 regiments and transport ICBMs, road-mobile launchers, and support vehicles to storage or elimination facilities;

Support SS-24/SS-25 ICBM/SRM handling operations at the Perm Storage Facility;

Eliminate fixed structure foundations for 3 SS-25 regiments decommissioned in FY06;

Restore sites at 3 regiments decommissioned in FY05;

Typhoon 724 Base Contract - Program Management Plan, Safety Plan, and prepare for towing;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2007 funds will:

Eliminate 14 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 20 and eliminate 10 SS-19 ICBM silos, eliminate 1 SS-19 Launch Control Center (LCC), defuel and transport 20 SS-19 ICBMs to storage or the MEDF;

Disassemble and eliminate components of 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Eliminate 44 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 122 support vehicles;

Decommission and remove infrastructure from 2 SS-25 regiments and transport ICBMs, road-mobile launchers, and support vehicles to storage or elimination facilities;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Support SS-24/25 ICBM/SRM handling operations;

Design, procure equipment and convert the Perm Disassembly Facility for SS-24s to SS-25s;

Typhoon 724 Contract Option 1 - tow to shipyard, fabricate Radioactive Hazardous Materials Containers, Defuel Prep Report, and Complete defueling, Low Level Radioactive Waste Processing Report;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2008 funds will:

Eliminate 6 SS-18 ICBMs and 15 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission and eliminate 14 SS-18 ICBM silos;

Decommission 20 and eliminate 10 SS-19 ICBM silos, eliminate 1 SS-19 LCC, defuel and transport 20 SS-19 ICBMs to storage or the MEDF;

Eliminate 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Disassemble and eliminate 44 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 33 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 149 support vehicles;

Decommission and remove infrastructure from 3 SS-25 regiments and transport ICBMs, road-mobile launchers, and support vehicles to storage or elimination facilities;

Purchase 4 new modified isothermal railcars for loaded motor case transportation;

Typhoon Contract Option 2 - eliminate 20 SLBM launchers, launcher compartment dismantled, 6-Compartment unit sealed, and 6-compartment unit towed to pier;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Eliminate 12 SS-18 ICBMs and 15 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 20 and eliminate 10 SS-19 ICBM silos, eliminate 1 SS-19 LCC, defuel and transport 20 SS-19 ICBMs to storage or the MEDF;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Eliminate 12 SS-N-18 and 7 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Disassemble and eliminate 44 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 122 support vehicles;

Decommission and remove infrastructure from 3 SS-25 regiments and transport ICBMs, road-mobile launchers, and support vehicles to storage or elimination facilities; Dismantlement 1 Delta III SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2006*</u> <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 128,600 86,850 22,988 24,750

B. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia:

FY 2006 funds:

Initiate and complete vulnerability analyses, site security designs, site upgrades, equipping, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at final 8 sites identified by MOD;

Procure 40 armored transport vehicles to support site security enhancement;

Provide for survey, designing, equipment procurement, site preparation and initiate construction for a MOD Far East Training Center (FETC);

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2007 funds will:

Complete construction and installation of equipment for comprehensive security upgrades at the last 8 sites identified by MOD;

^{*}Amounts include \$44.5 million appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234)

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Initiate sustainment to include training, maintenance, and depot support at 12 nuclear weapons storage sites;

Complete construction, training, turnover, and limited follow-on support for a MOD Far East Training Center (FETC);

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2008 funds will:

Continue sustainment to include training, maintenance, and depot support at 12 nuclear weapon storage sites;

Initiate sustainment at 12 additional nuclear weapons storage sites;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Continue sustainment to include training, maintenance, and depot support at 24 nuclear weapon storage sites;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

(\$'s in Thousands)

C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia

<u>FY 2006</u>	<u>FY 2007</u>	FY 2008	FY 2009
30,000	32,750	37,700	40,800

FY 2006 funds:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Initiate procurement (for 15 of up to 100) cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

FY 2007 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Continue procurement of 15 additional cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

FY 2008 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Continue procurement of 20 additional cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

FY 2009 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Continue procurement of 22 additional cargo railcars to support transportation of nuclear weapons to secure storage or dismantlement facilities;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

(\$'s in Thousands)

<u>FY 2006</u> <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u>

108,500 42,700 0 0

D. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia:

FY 2006 funds:

Continue Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) equipment installation to include distributed control system, catalytic reactors, pumps, furnaces, laboratory testing and monitoring equipment, low voltage motor control centers, and chemical monitors;

Continue systemization of installed CWDF equipment and systems;

Continue training program for CWDF operating personnel; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2007 funds will:

Complete equipment installation assistance;

Complete systemization of installed CWDF equipment;

Complete training program for CWDF operating personnel;

Facilitate Transfer of Custody of facility to Russia; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$'s in Thousands)

 $\frac{\text{FY } 2006}{69,849} \quad \frac{\text{FY } 2007}{68,357} \quad \frac{\text{FY } 2008}{144,489} \quad \frac{\text{FY } 2009}{144,463}$

E. Biological Threat Reduction Program:

FY 2006 funds:

Non-Russian FSU:

Continue 7 ongoing projects including 2 project development grants;

Continue 2 biosecurity and biosafety projects in Azerbaijan and commence three biosecurity and biosafety projects in Ukraine;

Continue 1 Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination (BWIE) project in Georgia and complete 1 BWIE project in Kazakhstan;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation training and other additional training as required; Complete facility design and pre-construction permitting for 2 Central Reference Laboratories (CRL) (1 in Uzbekistan, 1 in Georgia);

Commence construction of 1 CRL in Georgia;

Initiate development of 3 mobile response teams;

Provide Computer and Information Technology (CIT) to support 10 Epidemiological Monitoring Stations (EMS);

Maintain and sustain 9 EMS; renovate and equip 2 EMS; train scientists at 11 EMS; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

Russia:

Continue implementing 4 ongoing Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) projects including 3 smallpox projects at Vector;

Continue 4 ongoing biosecurity and biosafety projects and start 1 additional project;

Provide training, workshops, travel, and funding to strengthen oversight and management of Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) projects; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide technical oversight for all biosecurity and biosafety projects in Russia.

FY 2007 funds will:

Non-Russian Former Soviet Union:

Initiate 5 new CBR projects, and related biosecurity and biosafety upgrades, and continue implementing 6 projects;

Complete 2 biosecurity and biosafety projects in Azerbaijan and continue 3 biosecurity and biosafety projects in Ukraine;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation training and other additional training as required;

Continue construction of 1 Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Georgia;

Complete development and training of 3 mobile response teams;

Support test and maintenance of previously installed CIT at 11 EMS;

Maintain and sustain 11 previously upgraded EMS; renovate and equip 7 additional EMS;

Train scientists located at 18 EMS; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

Russia:

Continue implementing 3 CBR smallpox projects at Vector;

Complete 1 biosafety and biosecurity project; and

Provide training, workshops, travel, and funding to strengthen oversight and management of BTR projects.

FY 2008 funds will:

Non-Russian FSU:

Start 1 new CBR project and continue implementing 10 CBR projects;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation training and other additional training as required;

Continue construction and outfitting of 1 CRL in Georgia; Complete design and permitting for 1 CRL in Kazakhstan;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Maintain and sustain 3 mobile response teams;

Support testing and maintenance of installed CIT for one CRL and 18 EMS;

Maintain and sustain 18 EMS and commence equipping and renovation of 11 additional EMS;

Train scientists located at 29 EMS; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

Russia:

Continue implementing 2 CBR smallpox projects at Vector; and

Provide training, workshops, travel, and funding to strengthen oversight and management of BTR projects.

FY 2009 funds will:

Non-Russian FSU:

Start 10 new CBR projects and continue implementing 6 ongoing CBR projects;

Fund bioethics/nonproliferation training and other additional training as required;

Continue construction and outfitting of 1 CRL in Georgia, and commence construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan;

Maintain and sustain 3 mobile response teams;

Support testing and maintenance of installed CIT for one CRL and 29 EMS;

Maintain and sustain 29 EMS; and commence equipping and renovation of 10 additional EMS;

Train scientists located at 39 EMS; and

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

Russia:

Continue implementing 1 CBR smallpox project at Vector; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide the International Science and Technology Center with staff support, training, workshops, and travel funding to support oversight and management of Biological Threat Reduction projects.

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2006</u> <u>FY 2007</u> <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> 37,223 37,986 38,286

F. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative - (non-Russian Former Soviet Union):

FY 2006 funds:

Continue the efforts to provide equipment and related training to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities and logistics support and maintenance training of CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and respond to new proliferation threats. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of initial assistance that could include:

Ukraine: upgrade international Ports of Entry (POE), enhance capabilities of mobile response teams, continue project assessments, enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities, and enhance maritime proliferation prevention capability along the maritime border and coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: enhance maritime WMD surveillance, interdiction, and patrol capabilities in the Caspian Sea, to include radars, command control, project assessments, vessel upgrades, boarding equipment and training, and WMD detection equipment. Enhance southern Caspian Sea patrol capabilities through infrastructure upgrades.

Uzbekistan: install radiation portal monitors at the POE's. Analyze communications requirements to connect POEs with higher commands of the State Customs Committee and the Border Guards and begin communications installation.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Analyze related training requirements to support radiation portal monitor operations and begin training program. Initiate assessments to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capability along the land borders. Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2007 funds will:

- Continue the efforts to provide equipment and training to improve WMD prevention border control capabilities and logistics support and maintenance training of CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and respond to new proliferation threats. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of previous assistance and could include:
- Ukraine: continue efforts to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border. Continue project assessments and upgrade of additional international and state land POE's.
- Conduct threat and vulnerability assessments at additional maritime POEs and enhance maritime proliferation prevention capability along the maritime border in the Black Sea.
- Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: continue efforts to enhance the capability of the two countries to detect and interdict WMD at their maritime borders in the Caspian Sea and other WMD proliferation prevention activities. Continue project assessments, expand Border Guard coastal radar net, and establish a joint command and control center.
- Uzbekistan: conduct operational assessments to validate improved Uzbekistan capabilities. Continue to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the land borders. Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2008 funds will:

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Continue to provide equipment and training to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities and logistics support and maintenance training of CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and respond to new proliferation threats. This program uses a spiral development and incremental acquisition approach to provide for upgrade of incountry capabilities. As such, specific assistance will be based on prior year assessment of needs and the effectiveness of previous assistance. This assistance could include:

Ukraine: support continuing efforts to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border and other borders, continue project assessments, upgrade additional international and state land POEs, conduct threat and vulnerability assessments at additional maritime POEs, and increase WMD interdiction capability on the maritime border in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: support efforts focusing on upgrading WMD detection and interdiction capabilities for the maritime borders in the Caspian Sea and other WMD proliferation prevention activities, fund continual project assessments, expand Border Guard coastal radar net, and enhance coastal patrol fleet.

Uzbekistan: conduct additional operational assessments as required. Transition maintenance and sustainment to non-CTR Program organizations. Continue to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the land borders. Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Continue to provide equipment and training to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities and consolidated logistics support and maintenance training of CTR Program-provided equipment. Support additional WMD proliferation prevention projects and respond to new proliferation threats. This program uses

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

a spiral development and incremental acquisition approach to provide for upgrade of in-country capabilities. As such, specific assistance will be based on prior year assessment of needs and the effectiveness of previous assistance. This assistance could include:

Ukraine: support continuing efforts to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border and other land borders, continue project assessments, upgrade additional international and state ports of entry, conduct threat and vulnerability assessments at additional maritime POEs, and increase WMD interdiction capability on the maritime border in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: support efforts focusing on upgrading WMD detection and interdiction capabilities for the maritime borders in the Caspian Sea and other borders, fund continual project assessments, expand Border Guard coastal radar net, and enhance coastal patrol fleet.

Uzbekistan: conduct additional operational assessments as required. Transition maintenance and sustainment to non-CTR Program organizations. Continue to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the land borders.

Provide for technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

G. Defense and Military Contacts - Former Soviet Union: $\frac{\text{FY 2006}}{8,000} = \frac{\text{FY 2007}}{7,750} = \frac{\text{FY 2008}}{8,000} = \frac{\text{FY 2009}}{8,000}$

FY 2006 funds approximately 263 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2007 will fund approximately 253 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2008 will fund approximately 253 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2009 will fund approximately 248 defense and military exchanges.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2006 through FY 2009 funds approximately 12 Audits and Examinations per year and provide for agency support services as well as contractor administrative and advisory support. Funds will also provide Embassy Support for 6 DTRA/CTR offices within the FSU.

FY 2006 funds will complete the disposal of chemical agents.

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

J. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination - Ukraine: 1,100 1,000 0

FY 2006 and FY 2007 funds will support the storage of 163 SS-24 solid rocket motors.

V. Personnel Summary: N/A

VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

		Change FY 2006	e from /FY 2007		Change FY 2007	e from /FY 2008		_	e from /FY 2009	
	FY 2006	Price	Program	FY 2007	Price	Program	FY 2008	Price	Program	FY 2009
OP 32 Line	Actuals *	Growth	Growth	<u>Estimate</u>	Growth	Growth	Estimate	Growth	Growth	Estimate
308 Travel of Persons	3,926	94	-940	3,080	71	463	3,614	80	184	3,878
399 Total Travel	3,926	94	-940	3,080	71	463	3,614	80	184	3,878
671 Communication Services	152	4	-156	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(DISA)										
671 TOTAL	152	4	-156	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
920 Supplies & Materials (Non-	50	1	49	100	2	-102	0	0	0	0
centrally managed)										
925 Equipment Purchases (Non-	3,969	95	-4,064	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
centrally managed)										
932 Management and Professional	6,441	155	3,024	9,620	221	-2,641	7,200	158	42	7,400
Support Services										
934 Engineering and Technical	20,392	489	-6,081	14,800	340	2,660	17,800	392	-92	18,100
Services										
987 Other Intra-governmental	146,807	3,523	-95,192	55,138	1,268	-19,593	36,813	810	-260	37,363
Purchases										
998 Other Costs	273,200	6,557	8,120	287,877	6,621	-11,877	282,621	6,218	3,204	292,043
999 Total Other Purchases	450,859	10,820	-94,144	367,535	8,452	-31,553	344,434	7,578	2,894	354,906
Total	454,937	10,918	-95,240	370,615	8,523	-31,090	348,048	7,658	3,078	358,784

^{*} Amounts include \$44.5 million appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234).

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