# FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

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OVERVIEW

The Department requests $189.3 billion to continue operations in the Global War on Terror for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008. In February 2007, the Department requested $141.7 billion primarily to continue operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2008. In July, this request was increased by $5.3 billion to procure additional Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, bringing the total request pending before Congress to $147.0 billion (Figure 1). When the original request was developed, it was always the Department’s intent to refine the estimate once conditions on the ground were better understood. The Department now seeks to amend the $147.0 billion request by adding $42.3 billion, for a total request of $189.3 billion for FY 2008.

This Amendment provides funding necessary to continue ongoing operations; maintain, repair or replace equipment lost, worn out or stressed by use; enhance force protection; and sustain special pays, benefits and medical resources for members of our all-volunteer force.

U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

The goal of U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is to establish stable, democratic, and secure nations that are allies in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with the institutions and resources needed for each nation to provide for its own security.

IRAQ

The United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, are working toward conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as development of more-capable security forces.

Iraq is the central front in the GWOT. Success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against the extremist ideology that breeds international terrorism. Failure would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and for the region, including:

- An emboldened Al Qaeda movement that could gain a new safe haven in parts of Iraq;
- Increased Iranian and Syrian influence;
- A loss of confidence in the U.S. among key allies in the region;
- A severe setback to U.S. credibility, freedom of maneuver, and influence in the region and throughout the world.

Since March 2003, Iraq has made significant progress in overcoming the brutal legacy of Saddam Hussein, reviving Iraqi society, and establishing democratic rule. In December 2005, Iraqis elected a Council of Representatives under a Constitution...
ratified by the people of Iraq. In July 2006, Muthanna became the first province to transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) from Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). As of August 2007, six other provinces have also transitioned. Other provinces will continue to transition to PIC based on the security situation, establishment of local governance, and the assessments of the local Coalition military commander and the national government.

The New Way Forward

Our strategy continues to emphasize the transition of responsibility to the Iraqi government and its security forces. However, an increase in sectarian violence in 2006 inhibited progress toward the political agreements necessary to sustain a government capable of fulfilling its security and administrative responsibilities. In January 2007, the U.S. adopted a New Way Forward that recognized the need to temporarily increase the role of Coalition forces, in conjunction with Iraqi Security Forces, to secure the Iraqi population and provide space for Iraqis to strengthen their institutions and overcome sectarian violence. To achieve this, the U.S. increased the number of forces in Baghdad, increased partnering and mentoring efforts to ensure even-handed Iraqi security operations, and established 30 (of 33 planned) Joint Security Stations across Baghdad to provide a persistent presence in Baghdad’s neighborhoods. In June, the last of the U.S. surge brigades reached operational capacity and Coalition and Iraqi forces were able to conduct an increased tempo of offensive operations against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), insurgents, and militias.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to increase their ability to assume operational lead. Since March 2007, there has been a 14 percent increase in the number of independent Iraqi Army operations, including 20 units operating independently as part of Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon (FAQ) and 10 units assuming the lead role in their areas of responsibility. The current security plan is for Coalition forces to initially lead operations, providing mentorship and serving as an example to the ISF. As ISF units become more capable, Coalition forces will partner with the ISF units, eventually transitioning to an overwatch posture with the ISF in the lead for operational planning and execution. Of the Iraqi Army units conducting operations, 9 divisions, 33 brigades, and 103 battalions have the lead in counterinsurgency operations in their areas of responsibility. Seventy-five percent of all Iraqi Army units are considered able to conduct independent operations or to lead operations with Coalition assistance.

To continue the transition of responsibility to Iraq’s government and security forces, while preserving the security gains made by the surge forces, the U.S. increased efforts to help build Iraqi governmental capacity at the national, provincial, and local levels. Most notably, this required an expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program, with 15 new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). PRT leaders and BCT commanders were also given additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders are charged with supporting moderate elements against extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of terrorists and insurgents.

On September 13, 2007, the President described the next phase of our strategy, which builds on the initial successes of the surge. Based on the recommendations of General Petraeus, the President announced that beginning in December 2007, U.S. forces will gradually transition from surge operations and transfer responsibility for population security to the ISF. This transition depends on sustaining successes that have been made through the combined Coalition-Iraqi efforts to date. Adjustments to the missions of U.S. forces will vary based on local conditions across Iraq. A framework for an enduring security relationship between Iraq and the U.S. will also be developed, based on common principles and the shared goal of reducing the U.S. presence in a manner that sustains the gains accomplished in 2007.
Achievements of the New Way Forward

Security

As General Petraeus reported to Congress on September 10-11, 2007, “the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met.” There has been a decrease in sectarian violence, high profile attacks, murders and executions over the period of the surge. Operation FAQ has limited insurgents’ freedom of maneuver in Baghdad. Iraqi and Coalition operations have prevented insurgents from relocating their infrastructure, which has hampered their ability to operate. Although Baghdad remains the most violent area in Iraq, marketplaces and high-profile places of worship are now more secure thanks to physical protection measures and increased patrols by Iraqi and Coalition forces.

The encouraging progress of Sunni tribal resistance to AQI—especially in Anbar—has led to a considerable improvement in security in those areas. Attacks in Anbar, once an AQI stronghold, have dropped by more than 75 percent since January, and AQI’s sanctuaries have been greatly reduced. This turnaround has occurred partly because AQI’s intimidation tactics have led to resentment among tribal and Sunni resistance groups. Cooperation from local sheikhs and tribal leaders has also dramatically increased the number of new recruits for the ISF and the number of Iraqi citizens providing information to Iraqi forces about insurgent operations. An increase in Coalition engagement with local tribes is intended to capitalize on their increasing unwillingness to tolerate violence and their willingness to take steps to improve their own security.

Coalition forces have worked closely with a number of tribes and Sunni resistance groups to expel AQI, and will continue to build on the successes in Anbar in other provinces, including Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din. These bottom-up initiatives are supported by political and economic efforts to make them sustainable and a catalyst for increased progress on reconciliation from the top-down.

Political

Operating through the PRTs and MNF-I units based throughout the country, Coalition forces have been promoting the strengthening of local and provincial governance and reconciliation between local and tribal groups and the central government. The central government has distributed oil revenues to the provinces in an equitable manner, provincial governments are executing their budgets, and more than 45,000 former Ba’athist members of the old armed services have been granted pensions or even restored to active duty or government service. While further reconciliation is needed before a general amnesty or a national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program can be effective, limited amnesty programs have allowed former insurgents to join the legitimate security institutions and fight against AQI.

At the national level, the main effort of political reconciliation has been on legislation that would shape power and wealth-sharing among Iraq’s various political and ethnic blocs. This includes laws to ensure equitable distribution of wealth, reform the de-
Ba’athification process, hold provincial elections, and establish the powers of the provinces in relation to central government. Passage of these laws depends primarily on agreement across sectarian, ethnic, and other lines. This process was stalled by lack of consensus among the leaders of Iraq’s main political blocs concerning the decision-making processes and power-sharing arrangements within the executive.

To break this impasse, Iraq’s leaders – represented by the Prime Minister, the three-person Presidency Council, and President Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – came together on August 26, 2007. At this meeting, they announced agreement on legislation to reform de-Ba’athification and to define provincial powers. They also agreed to use the “3 plus 1 group” of the Presidency Council and Prime Minister for collective decision-making on sensitive and strategic matters. The Iraqi leaders also announced their intention to work with the U.S. to establish a long-term relationship based on common interests.

**Economic**

Iraq’s current economic situation has been difficult due to the security situation, but progress has been made in strengthening macroeconomic conditions. Given current world oil price projections, the Iraqi economy is projected to grow by 6.3 percent in 2007, including 5.0 percent in non-oil growth.

The Iraqi Government passed a 2007 budget that included $10.1 billion for capital investment and provincial reconstruction. The provinces have now obligated the $2.3 billion in reconstruction funds from 2006, many of which were carried into 2007, and have also obligated 47 percent of their $2.4 billion in 2007 funds. The focus is now on disbursement. Of note, the Governor of Anbar signed 17 contracts worth $5 million in August after the provincial government returned from their period of seclusion in Baghdad due to security concerns in Anbar.

The International Compact with Iraq (ICI), which was designed to provide financial self-sustainability within five years, was signed on May 3 with over 70 countries and involved pledges for over $30 billion in debt relief or other assistance. A mid-year review occurred on July 20 at the United Nations, during which the international community praised Iraq for its progress on reform commitments. Of the 262 items under the compact, 169 have been acted upon. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Iraqi PM Maliki also hosted a meeting on Compact implementation on September 22.

Iraq's IMF program remains on track following a review on August 1, and the IMF Board commended Iraq for undertaking difficult reforms, such as fuel subsidy reduction and monetary tightening in a challenging environment. Iraq’s economic prospects for 2007 and beyond depend on the political and
security conditions that would allow increased investment in the oil sector and continued macroeconomic policies to bring inflation down and to move ahead with priority structural reforms.

**Diplomatic**

Diplomatic efforts to support the Government of Iraq included an Expanded Neighbors ministerial conference in early May 2007, which was followed by Working Group meetings on Energy (June 28-29 in Istanbul), Refugees (July 23-26 in Amman), and Border Security (August 8-9 in Damascus). Preparations are now underway to hold a second Expanded Neighbors ministerial at the end of October in Istanbul.

These multi-lateral initiatives have been complemented by Iraq’s efforts to develop stronger bilateral relations with its neighbors. PM Maliki’s trip to Turkey on August 7-8 produced a memorandum of understanding on economic cooperation and general agreement on the way ahead regarding counter-terrorism, border security, and energy. His trip to Syria on August 20 produced a commitment from the Syrian government to implement border control measures. Two trilateral meetings at the ambassadorial level among the United States, Iraq, and Iran led to the establishment of a Security Subcommittee that met for the first time on August 6. Nonetheless, the actions of Iran and Syria continue to be unhelpful. The Iranian government has shown no sign of curtailing support to Shi’a extremist groups attacking Coalition forces and Iraqis, while Syria continues to provide safe-haven to Ba’athist insurgents and financiers.

**Ministry of Defense Forces**

U.S. funded programs have trained approximately 165,400 Iraqis for the Ministry of Defense (MoD). This includes approximately 22,100 of a planned 32,000 expansion, who have received basic training as part of the 20 percent manning increase for the Iraqi Army. An additional 7,200 of a planned 24,000 military personnel have been trained as part of PM Maliki’s replenishment initiative. The Iraqi Army is capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in both rural and urban environments but currently lacks the ability to conduct large scale operations without access to Coalition enablers.

To assume missions from Coalition forces, the MoD and its forces require continued advice, training, development, and equipping. MoD logistics, from tactical to strategic levels, are fragile and not capable of independent execution. The Government of Iraq is making a substantial effort to address procurement issues by aggressively committing funds to equip and sustain Iraqi forces through U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) with the commitment of $2.15 billion for MoD to date.

Plans are underway to transfer responsibility for ammunition depots and maintenance from contractors to Iraqi logistics units. Progress has been made to establish the skeletal framework of an Iraqi logistics, maintenance, and support capability. A major element of this initiative is the implementation of a Logistics
Management Information Technology Solution to manage more than 11,000 line items of inventory.

Ministry of Interior Forces

U.S. funded programs have trained 194,200 members of the Objective Civil Security Force (OCSF). The provision of tactical leadership and institutional capacity for informed decision-making continue to be a focus for Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNSTC-I has fielded 238 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) that assist in the development of the Iraq Police Service at the field level. PTTs travel to stations to mentor the Iraqi police and conduct joint patrols to promote community policing activities. On a nationwide basis, PTTs are assigned as many as 10 stations each and conduct up to four visits or patrols daily. Current funding levels for the program do not allow for full coverage of the more than 1,100 police provincial and local headquarters and stations in Iraq.

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) inspected all but three of the 47 police stations in Baghdad, based on a Transition Team inspection program, and has initiated its own inspection program focusing on personnel and equipment issues. The MoI is developing policies, plans, and processes for acquisition, distribution, and maintenance of vehicles. The MoI has begun to centrally purchase vehicles and repair parts through FMS contracts.

As the Iraqi Police Service grows, so will the demand for equipment. Due to combat loss, theft, attrition, and heavy use, a significant portion of equipment may no longer be serviceable or in the MoI inventory. These demands as well as growth of police authorization levels will require continual equipment support.

AFGHANISTAN

U.S. and Coalition partners are working in concert with the Government of Afghanistan to establish a stable, democratic, and secure Afghanistan. When Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001, Afghanistan was governed by the brutal Taliban regime, which provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. Afghanistan had endured decades of violence, millions of casualties, and the complete destruction of its economic and physical infrastructures.

Six years later, Afghanistan is no longer an open sanctuary for Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. Afghanistan has a democratically elected and representative government, and significant progress has been made in improving the quality of life of the Afghan people, through improved access to education and health care and completion of infrastructure projects for roads and power. Although security challenges remain, the Taliban’s resurgence in 2006 was countered by unprecedented pressure in 2007 by Allied, Coalition, and Afghan forces. The apprehension or death of several high-level Taliban leaders, including Mullah Dadullah Lang, dealt a further blow to the insurgents.

Increasingly capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are starting to take the lead with support from the international community to provide security, stability, and rule of law for
Afghanistan. International support for the mission remains robust. The UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), comprised of over 40,000 troops from 37 countries under NATO command, is assisting the government of Afghanistan in providing security and stability, enabling the extension of the Government’s authority and facilitating necessary reconstruction and development. The U.S.-led OEF mission continues to target terrorist elements within Afghanistan and is also leading efforts to train and equip the ANSF.

Nonetheless, insurgent operations during the summer of 2007 produced record levels of violence, particularly in the south and east. Unable to successfully engage capable international and Afghan military forces, insurgents are increasingly targeting “softer” targets such as reconstruction projects, lightly armed police, civilians, and those Afghan officials who are most committed to improving the quality of life for their fellow citizens. Narcotics production is at an all-time high and continues to be a significant source of income for the Taliban.

These trends emphasize the need for a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable ANSF, less reliant on international assistance, more capable of providing security and the rule of law, and able to take on the insurgency. Developing the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police ANP to operate independently throughout Afghanistan remains our top priority. The current strength projections, agreed to in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact by the Afghan government and the international community, are 70,000 for the ANA and 62,000 for the ANP. In May, at the request of the Government of Afghanistan, the Joint Control and Monitoring Board (JCMB), comprised of Afghan and international community stakeholders tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, temporarily authorized an increase of ANP manning to 82,000, which is the current U.S. goal for training and equipping the ANSF. Current estimates have the ANA and ANP reaching these projected levels in early FY 2009.

Most important, the ANSF are producing positive results for Afghanistan’s security and its Afghan people. The first significant Afghan-led operation occurred in Ghazni province from May through July 2007. Operation MAIWAND focused on separating the insurgents from the local population in the challenging Andar district. The ANA 203rd Corps led the operation from its planning to execution phases, and the ANP was in the lead in searching and clearing suspected insurgent locations. During this operation, the ANSF, with U.S. Task Force Fury in support, opened 10 schools; trained 28 health care providers; treated 2,302 men, women, and children; and delivered 260 tons of aid.

Military operations are only the precursors to efforts focused on extending the authority of the GoA and strengthening the rule of law, expanding reconstruction programs, delivering humanitarian assistance, and providing economic development. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, for example, are a key element of our comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan. CERP provides local commanders the funds and flexibility required to bring needed assistance and reconstruction to areas that have been affected by conflict and neglect. These resources provide a unique, quick impact tool and bring immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan.

SUMMARY

Significant challenges remain in Iraq and Afghanistan. But through the collaborative efforts of the U.S., Coalition forces, and the Governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Iraqi Security Forces and Afghan National Security Forces are increasingly taking the lead. We must continue to take the fight to our determined enemies by working with and through our allies and partners, employing a comprehensive approach, and arming our men and women in uniform with the best equipment, training, and support. The FY08 GWOT Request, as amended herein, reflects these imperatives. Our continued success depends on timely Congressional support for this amended GWOT request.
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JUSTIFICATION

The Department of Defense requests $189.3 billion for FY 2008 to continue operations in the Global War on Terror. This FY 2008 adjusted request includes $141.7 billion requested in February, a $5.3 billion amendment in July, and a current amendment of $42.3 billion (Figure 2).

This overview identifies the requested funding in the functional categories for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The categories are linked to the appropriations accounts through which the Department typically requests its funding, but they seek to provide a clearer understanding and greater transparency into the overall expenditures on the war effort.

CONTINUING THE FIGHT

Operations

($76.9B: $70.6B February request; +$6.3B Amendment)

The Operations request will fund the incremental costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2008. Operations includes funding for aircraft flying hours, Navy steaming days, and Army vehicle miles used in the conduct of operations on a daily basis. It covers special pays, benefits, medical supplies and subsistence costs – food, water, and ice. This category also pays for transportation inter- and intra-theater, including long-haul supply flights from the United States to Afghanistan and Iraq. Operations also pays for the cost of theater forces not in Iraq or Afghanistan (e.g., those in Qatar and Kuwait), and for pre-deployment costs.

The Amendment requests $6.3 billion for continuing the Iraq surge through December of 2007 and returning to the pre-surge level of 15 BCTs by July 2008.

Force Protection

($30.5B: $11.2B February Request; $5.3B July MRAP Amendment; +$13.9B Amendment)

In the GWOT, military capabilities are not the primary targets for terrorists; rather, people – particularly military personnel – are the primary targets. As a result, terrorists can select their targets at a time and place of their choosing. This, in turn, requires the U.S. to maintain a robust force protection posture at all times.

The Force Protection category includes lightweight body armor, armored vehicles, safe and secure operating bases, identity management for access control, and persistent surveillance capabilities.
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The Amendment requests $13.9 billion for additional force protection equipment in FY 2008. $11.0 billion will procure 7,274 Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, in addition to those already requested, for a total of 15,274. The use of MRAPs, in combination with counter IED jammers and improved tactics, has led to a decrease in the lethal effects of IEDs. This request includes $2.9 billion for a full suite of counter-sniper and capabilities designed to prevent, survive, and react to sniper attacks; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Explosives (CBRNE) protection and detection equipment; and modifications to Army combat vehicles to improve survivability.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat
($4.3B: $4.0B February Request; +$0.3B Amendment)

The counter-IED request will fund action against components of the IED threat: the IED makers, the trainers, and supporting infrastructures. This funding will help counter the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition forces. It includes equipment and materials used in the field for attacking the IED threat.

The Amendment requests $0.3 billion for the infrastructure, personnel, surrogate training vehicles, and training aids to increase counter-IED training at 30 locations.

Military Intelligence
($3.7B: $2.7B February Request; +$1.0B Amendment)

A key enabling priority of the GWOT is to improve traditional and non-traditional military intelligence operations. Continuous enhancement of intelligence capabilities is required to understand the complex and clandestine organizational structure and operating systems of terrorists. With this knowledge, the warfighter can better identify enemy vulnerabilities and take action against terrorist networks.

The Amendment requests $1.0 billion for additional military intelligence capabilities. Specifically, the request would fund 24 additional Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, which can provide nearly continuous coverage of four target areas. Additional human terrain teams would be established to provide the commanders more insight into the local population in the villages and towns in which they operate.

Iraq Security Forces
($3.0B: $2.0B February Request; +$1.0B Amendment)

The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve a stable democratic Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on Terror. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development as well as the development of more capable security forces.
The Amendment requests $1.0 billion for increased Iraq Security Force structure including personnel, equipment, training, and facilities for both Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces as well as funding for related activities. U.S. funding would be combined with additional Government of Iraq contributions to fund expansion requirements.

**Afghan National Security Forces**

($2.7B: $2.7B February Request; No Amendment)

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are steadily growing in strength and capability. Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and an effort that requires consistent support from the American people. Despite the progress made to date, much remains to be done and the U.S. strategy reflects shifts in the strategic environment. This past year’s increase in violence and narcotics production represents one such shift. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the south.

The Department does not seek an increase to the current request, but the Amendment includes a realignment of $182.6 million out of the Afghan National Army to the Afghan National Police ($182.1 million) and detainee operations infrastructure ($0.5 million) to align with the operational environment currently facing the ANSF.

**Coalition Support**

($1.7B: $1.7B February Request; No Amendment)

Wherever possible, the United States works with or through Coalition partners. Training and equipping partner nations institutionalizes the skills and alliances needed for the GWOT and is key to its long-term success. As partner nations enhance their counterterrorism capabilities at home and in their regions, U.S. forces can increasingly disengage, deploying only to critical areas of responsibility or to train partners.

The Department does not request an amendment to the current request at this time.

**Commander’s Emergency Response Program**

($1.2B: $1.0B February request; +$0.2B Amendment)

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) provides ground commanders with funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction in their areas of responsibility. The Program supports the GWOT by helping to win the trust of local populations by improving urgent civil infrastructures.

The Amendment requests $0.2 billion for additional CERP in Afghanistan to help fund short-term, low-cost humanitarian projects on the local level.
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Military Construction

($1.7B: $0.7B February request; +$1.0B Amendment)

This category funds military construction projects in support of OEF and OIF. Included are projects to support military operations, improve force protection, improve waste management, and construct needed medical and supply facilities.

The Amendment of $1.0 billion funds the replacement and/or upgrade of temporary facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also consolidates facilities within Iraq and constructs facilities outside Iraq and Afghanistan that support CENTCOM’s mission in the region.

Factory Restart

($0.1B: No February Request; +$0.1B Amendment)

This funding will support the re-industrialization of Iraq by rebuilding and reopening factories and reenergizing supply chains.

RECONSTITUTING THE FORCE

Reconstitution

($46.4B: $37.6B February request; +$8.8B Amendment)

Reconstitution is central to maintaining U.S. military warfighting capabilities. Reconstituting the force replenishes consumables and replaces, repairs, and maintains all equipment destroyed, damaged, or stressed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As equipment and supplies are used, including aircraft, tanks, helicopters, and assault vehicles, forces are reconstituted.

The Amendment would ensure that additional types and quantities of equipment and supplies are replaced, replenished and repaired. The Amendment would also pay back funds used to cashflow a reprogramming for additional MRAPs in July 2007.

ENHANCING GROUND FORCES

Accelerate Brigade Combat Teams / Establish Regimental Combat Team

($1.6B: $1.6B February Request; No Amendment)

This request continues support to two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the Army and one Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in the Marine Corps that were accelerated in FY 2007. The total funding level for BCTs/RCT for FY 2007 was $3.6 billion. This request would fund recruiting, retention, incremental pay, and relocation; OPTEMPO of the additional BCTs and RCT; and associated military construction.

The Department does not request an amendment to the current request at this time.

Restore the Force

($5.4B: No February Request; +$5.4B Amendment)

This funding will increase equipment for next-to-deploy forces; improve readiness, allowing units to train sooner at battalion and brigade levels prior to deployment; enhance the Army’s ability to provide Commanders with additional ready and relevant forces; and remedy equipment shortfalls including combat vehicles, C3, logistics vehicles, and weapons.
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Strengthening the Army Guard and Reserve
($1.0B: No February Request; +$1.0B Amendment)
This funding will allow for additional training days accomplished in a Reserve training status. This pre-mobilization training for Army Guard and Reserve will increase unit readiness, reduce post-mobilization training, and maximize soldier in-theater time in support of the GWOT.

ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY REQUESTS

Fuel Cost Increases
($0.8B: No February Request; +$0.8B Amendment)
This funding will cover additional outlays for fuel due to increases in world fuel market costs reflected in the mid-session fuel projections from OMB. Crude oil cost increases together with increased refining costs required revision to the internal Department fuel price.

National Capital Region Healthcare Facilities Acceleration
($0.4B: No February Request; +$0.4B Amendment)
This funding will accelerate the closing of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington D.C. and the opening of both the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Maryland, and the new Fort Belvoir Army Community Hospital, Virginia, to provide the best possible medical facilities for the care and recovery of our wounded warriors in the National Capital Region.

Wounded, Ill, and Injured Soldiers
($0.5B: No February Request; +$0.5B Amendment)
This funding will improve care for Wounded, Ill, and Injured soldiers; renovate existing facilities; and construct new facilities in support of WII to create a sustainable medical and vocational rehabilitation system to provide the best treatment and care.

Enhance Soldier and Family Support
($0.8B: No February Request; +$0.8B Amendment)
This funding will support programs for family readiness and Army and Marine Corps community support. The effect of repeated deployments on the All-Volunteer Force heightens the need for these funds.

Non-DoD Classified
($6.8B: $5.9B February request; +$0.8B Amendment)
Details on this section will be provided separately to Congress in a classified annex.

U.S. Air Force photo by 1st Lt. Shannon Collins – August 2007

Maj. Julie Zwies and Capt. Kathy Betts inventory equipment at the new Air Force theater hospital at Balad Air Base, Iraq. Starting at 4 a.m., about 150 base volunteers and 380 332nd EMDG airmen moved patients and equipment to the newly upgraded, pre-engineered facility.
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FY 2008 GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AMENDMENT

This document is a companion and amendment to the FY 2008 GWOT Request justification book that was delivered in February 2007. For each Functional Category, graphs and tables will illustrate the total amended request ($189.3 billion) as shown below in Figure 3, but the text will focus on the Amendment.

Figure 3. FY 2008 GWOT Amended Request ($189.3B)

Dollars in Billions

Source: FY 2008 DoD GWOT Budget Request and Amendments
Numbers may not add due to rounding
**Operations**

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**Policy**

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure that the men and women of the Armed Forces engaged in the Global War on Terror are appropriately compensated and have the funds, supplies, and logistical support they need to conduct military operations.

**February Request: $70.6B**

- Incremental pay, benefits and support for ~320,000 military personnel
- Military operations to include pre-deployment training, transportation inter- and intra-theater of operations, aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, vehicle and ground miles
- Subsistence (food and water) and logistics support
- Operation and restocking of supply depots

**Amendment: +$6.3B**

- Continuing the Iraq surge through December 2007; BCT presence will be reduced from 20 to 15 BCTs between December 2007 and July 2008

* See notes on following page
The Department requests an additional $6.3 billion for military operations in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in FY 2008. Operations in theater remain high: U.S. forces are heavily engaged in fighting the insurgency, maintaining the peace, and training the new military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations costs are directly linked to the operational tempo of frontline combat and support forces in theater.

The Operations category supports the full spectrum of military personnel, operation and maintenance, supply, and fuel requirements for Reserve Component mobilization, deployment and redeployment of all forces, as well as for theater operations and sustainment. This request supports continued deployment of the 20 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and eight Marine Corps Infantry Battalions in Iraq into FY 2008. These force levels represent an increase of five BCTs and two Infantry Battalions.
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over the pending FY 2008 current GWOT request. This force structure will be phased down starting in December 2007, until 15 BCTs and six Infantry Battalions remain in July 2008.

This Amendment also supports synchronous deployment of the combat support forces who are augmenting these combat forces. Additionally, this Amendment sustains throughout FY 2008 the current deployed forces necessary to respond to the resurgent Taliban and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

The pending FY 2008 GWOT request does not reflect the costs associated with the new deployment policy, initiated early in 2007, to extend Army Active Component unit deployments from 12 to 15 months. Since 2004, the Department has paid service members an additional $1,000 per month in a combination of Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) and Hardship Duty Pay (HDP) for each month they are involuntarily deployed beyond 12 months. This Amendment includes these AIP/HDP costs and other increases in Pay and Benefits (continuation of the Plus Up, Reserve Component pay, etc.) which are offset by a $1.5 billion decrease in the Military Personnel Army appropriation for adjusted assumptions based on FY 2007 execution (lower mobilization levels, adjusted overstrength levels, and reduced Permanent Change of Station and subsistence costs).

Also included in this Amendment are the costs to sustain the current FY 2007 force structure to support detainee operations and the Theater Internment Facility Reintegration Centers.
Force Protection

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide U.S. Armed Forces with the best protection and the latest technology against all forms of hostile action.

February Request: $16.6B*
• Body armor and other personal protection items
• Equipment
  – Aircraft survivability components
  – Command and control equipment
  – Radios
  – Night vision equipment
• Armored vehicles and HMMWV Fragmentation Kits

Amendment: +$13.9B
• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles
• Counter-sniper capabilities
• Modification to Army combat vehicles
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRNE) protection and detection equipment

*Includes $5.3B MRAP Amendment
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

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*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

**FORCE PROTECTION**

The safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel is of paramount importance to the Department of Defense. The budget request builds on prior year investment to mitigate the threat to soldiers from improvised explosive devices (IED), snipers, chemical and biological agents, and other asymmetrical attacks from Iraqi and Taliban insurgents. The lethality of improvised weapons and tactics employed by the insurgency, while relatively limited in scope, has inflicted an excessive number of casualties during the past years. The development of new operational tactics, in combination with personnel protection equipment, has reduced the effect of these attacks. However, due to the evolving aspects of the threat, a persistent effort on the part of Department is necessary to ensure that the impact of these attacks is lessened.

**Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle**

A key element of the Department’s force protection strategy is the procurement of additional Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that, in combination with counter IED jammers and improved tactics, have led to a decrease in the lethal effects of IEDs. The MRAP vehicle is currently the Department’s highest priority acquisition program. Secretary Gates formed a senior
level task force to specifically manage its aggressive procurement and integrate all issues with the Services, industry, and commanders on the ground. MRAP funding to date is $5.6 billion; the additional funding request pending before Congress is $16.7 billion (Figure 4).

U.S. operating forces in Iraq and Afghanistan specifically identified a need to increase survivability by expanding the use of vehicles that offer better protection. The MRAP provides operating forces with an effective blast protected platform capable of missions such as transporting soldiers for combat operations in urban environments. The need to operate on the ground makes our troops susceptible to attacks from enemy forces. The MRAP is designed to mitigate some of the risk from improvised explosive devices, rocket propelled grenades, and Explosively Formed Penetrators. The MRAP also supports other critical missions such as patrolling, leading convoys, identifying and clearing mines, and providing ambulatory services.

In July 2007, the Department submitted an amendment to the FY 2008 GWOT budget request to increase its original request by $5.3 billion, based on an MRAP objective to deliver about 8,000 vehicles to troops in theater for all services by May 2008. Subsequently, the Army increased its requirement to 10,000

**Figure 4. MRAP Funding and Requests**

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- **Total Funding to Date:** $5.6 billion
- **Total Quantity to Date:** ~6,480 Qty (Includes $0.2B FY06 Funding)
- **Request Currently before Congress:** $16.7 billion
- **Total Funding, if FY08 Request is Enacted:** $22.3 billion
- **Total Quantity, if FY08 Request is Enacted:** ~15,274 Qty

Source: FY 2008 President’s Budget Request; FY07 Emergency Supplemental Conference Report (4/24/07); FY 2008 GWOT Budget Amendment (7/31/07); and MRAP Program Management Office Spend Plan (7/31/07). Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Source: FY 2008 President’s Budget Request; FY07 Emergency Supplemental Conference Report (4/24/07); FY 2008 GWOT Budget Amendment (7/31/07); and MRAP Program Management Office Spend Plan (7/31/07). Numbers may not add due to rounding.
vehicles. To meet this need, an additional $11.0 billion is requested to procure an additional 7,274 MRAP vehicles. This amended request maintains the production rate of MRAP vehicles through the end of the fiscal year 2008.

Other Force Protection Initiatives

The dangers from enemy sniper attacks are a serious problem.* These attacks have not only caused numerous casualties, but have had an adverse psychological effect on both Coalition forces and the Iraqi civilian populace. Victims in sniper incidents have a fatality rate of over 70 percent. A shift in enemy tactics that increases the number of sniper attacks could potentially inflict even more casualties than IEDs. To guard against such a shift, the Amendment includes $1.4 billion for a full suite of counter-sniper capabilities designed to prevent, survive, and react to sniper attacks. This includes enhanced optics, soldier protection, active sniper defeat systems, sensors, concealment, and development of new tactics.

Protection against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Explosives (CBRNE) threats is still of critical importance in a fight against a cunning and adaptive enemy. While we have not experienced a CBRNE attack in Iraq or Afghanistan, the enduring danger of such an attack requires that the Department be prepared for such situations. Thus, this Amendment request includes $69 million for protection and detection equipment to protect American and Coalition forces from chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.

The request also includes $0.8 billion for modifications to Army combat vehicles (Stryker, M1 Tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, HMMWVs, and logistics and support trucks) to improve their survivability in the event of attack from various threats, including Explosively Formed Projectile and other high explosive devices.

*On October 30, 2007 language was removed that suggested enemy sniper attacks had quadrupled during the past year.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to defeat IEDs as the enemy’s weapon of choice by attacking the IED network, defeating the device, and training our forces to defeat and disarm these weapons.

February Request: $4.0B
- Attack the Network
  - Counter Bomber
  - Counter Infrastructure
- Defeat the Device
  - Jammers
  - Detection Systems
  - Robots, Defusing Systems
- Train the Force
  - Personnel Training

Amendment: +$0.3B
- Infrastructure, personnel, surrogate training vehicles, and training aids to increase Counter IED training at 30 locations
**IED DEFEAT**

Personnel deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan need increased Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) training that will provide a better understanding of the use and tactics for best utilizing IED defeat jammers and related equipment. The training will also give deploying personnel a realistic opportunity to use counter IED equipment, and to practice operational tactics to mitigate the effects of IEDs.

Based on current estimates, the Services require CIED home station training facilities at 30 separate locations:

- The Air Force requires three training facilities at Camp Bullis, Sembach AFB, Germany; and Osan AFB Korea.
- The Navy requires five training facilities at Gulf Port Mississippi; Point Mugu, California; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Eglin, AFB Florida; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
- The Marine Corps requires four training facilities at Camp Pendleton, California; Camp Lejeune, California; Twenty Nine Palms, California; and Okinawa, Japan.
- The Army requires training facilities at Fort Bliss, Texas; and Fort Hood, Texas; and, one each at 16 other locations throughout CONUS.

Training requirements fall into four separate categories:

- Infrastructure ($199 million): Mock villages, jersey barriers, surrogate traffic circles, surrogate over passes, paved and unpaved road trail networks, range instrumentation, and after action review capabilities.
- Personnel ($24 million): Two Red Team members (specialists that play the role of insurgents) at each location.
- Surrogate training vehicles ($21 million): Representative models of MRAP and HMMWV vehicles
- Training aids ($25 million): Various equipment, including deployed jammers, vehicle, robots, and biometric systems.

**FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment**

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<th>IED Defeat</th>
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Numbers may not add due to rounding

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U.S. Army Soldiers hook up a humvee to tow it away after a simulated improvised explosive device detonation during IED recognition training at Ali Air Base, Iraq. 

**U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Robert Valenca – August 2007**
Military Intelligence

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to support warfighting units with timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence.

February Request: $2.7B
- Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
- All-Source Intelligence Analysis
- Counterintelligence (CI)
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence
- Operational Support
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- Training

Amendment: +$1.0B
- Predator unmanned aerial vehicles
- Equipment for All-Source-Analysis, Human Terrain, and Counter-intelligence teams
Military Intelligence

Military Intelligence support to the GWOT continues to provide critical tactical actionable intelligence to field commanders and individual soldiers. Current operations, which emphasize the clear and hold strategy, have greatly increased the demand on intelligence support. The Predator Unmanned Aerial Systems continue extended Airborne ISR operations around the clock in all conditions. The request replaces the loss of 3 Predator aircraft and funds 24 additional aircraft and related support equipment for 6 additional orbits. (Each orbit requires 4 aircraft for 24/7 operations.)

Additional funds are requested for All Source Analysis, Human Terrain Teams, and Counter-intelligence teams, which have proven invaluable in identifying and tracking threats. Funds requested would procure additional communications, sensors, and related equipment for deployed teams. Funding for all-source-analysis equipment will enable the integration of intelligence data from multiple sources to be combined to produce a complete operational picture.

Funding for Operational Support and SIGINT will procure Blue Force Tracking equipment for friendly force location, while the SIGINT equipment geo-locates hostile emitters. Integration of the friendly force location and geo-location of hostiles enables combat teams to pinpoint fire support and avoid fratricide. Funding for IMINT provides for deployed as well as reach-back support for imagery, full motion video, and data exploitation.

**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**

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Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Iraq Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support the security forces of the democratically elected government of Iraq until it can defend its own institutions independently.

February Request: $2.0B
• Enhance logistics capability, equipment, and sustainment of ground forces
• Enhance Army and Naval capabilities
• Provide training in logistics and maintenance
• Continue enhancing the objective Civil Security Force
• Continue development of ministerial functions

Amendment: +$1.0B
• Increase security force structure including personnel, equipment, training, and facilities
IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

The Department requests an increase of $1.0 billion to provide the initial resources to begin the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) expansion plan and support related requirements. A larger ISF is required for Iraq to concurrently secure its borders and conduct COIN operations, as well as to provide depth of forces and continuous ISF presence in the battle space. The Amendment also includes a realignment of the February Request in the amount of $125 million in response to current developments.

Analysis of the current and future threat in Iraq suggests that the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces do not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations concurrently. This capability will be required as Coalition forces increasingly assume an overwatch mission. To achieve the ability to operate independently, Iraqi forces must also develop capabilities to replace the Coalition enablers on which they now rely, such as

IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

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*Includes detention centers and rule of law complexes

Numbers may not add due to rounding

IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

The Department requests an increase of $1.0 billion to provide the initial resources to begin the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) expansion plan and support related requirements. A larger ISF is required for Iraq to concurrently secure its borders and conduct COIN operations, as well as to provide depth of forces and continuous ISF presence in the battle space. The Amendment also includes a realignment of the February Request in the amount of $125 million in response to current developments.

Analysis of the current and future threat in Iraq suggests that the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces do not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations concurrently. This capability will be required as Coalition forces increasingly assume an overwatch mission. To achieve the ability to operate independently, Iraqi forces must also develop capabilities to replace the Coalition enablers on which they now rely, such as...
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

combat support (including aviation support), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management and maintenance), and training. In particular, this requires a larger logistics and maintenance system. Similarly, the Iraqi Air Force and Navy will require additional personnel to improve logistics and maintenance. The expansion plan for ISF addresses these requirements.

The ISF expansion plan also includes an increase in MoI forces in large part due to the requirement to hold areas cleared in the last several months, particularly in Baghdad and al Anbar and Diyala provinces. Local hiring of police in the regions has created a training requirement that is resourced in the expansion plan. In addition, the MoI has re-evaluated the force structure necessary to maintain security in the COIN and counter-terrorism environment in larger cities, including Baghdad, resulting in additional police requirements. Additionally, like the Iraqi Armed Forces, the Department of Border Enforcement lacks sufficient logistics, support systems and infrastructure to maintain forces in the field. Finally, to support the success of MoI forces, the capability to detain and process insurgents and criminals must be enhanced.

Consequently, the ISF will need to expand by about 41,000 to reach 529,000 by the end of 2007, and by an additional 59,000 by the end of 2008, to fill critical capability gaps currently not sourced or being satisfied by Coalition forces. This amendment requests $1.0 billion of additional funds toward the development of ISF forces and related activities, such as detention centers and rule of law complexes, in combination with additional Government of Iraq contributions.
Afghan National Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support the security forces of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan until it can provide for its own security.

February Request: $2.7B
• Continue building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
• Develop a Counter Narcotic Police capability

Amendment: None
• None, but includes realignment of $182.1M from the Afghan National Army to the Afghan National Police and detainee operations infrastructure
The Department’s total request for Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) remains unchanged at $2.7 billion. However, the Department is requesting a realignment within the total to support changes in the operational environment and to ensure that the U.S. is training and equipping the ANSF for the challenges that they face.

An essential element of the realignment is the request to shift $182.1 million from the Afghan National Army (ANA) to the Afghan National Police (ANP) to bolster the ANP’s counterinsurgency capabilities. The ANP are on the front lines of the fight for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, and in many cases are the only representative of the Government of Afghanistan in a remote district or region. However, due to limited investment over the past few years, the ANP are significantly behind the ANA in terms of capabilities, training, and equipment. Because of their critical importance to governance, their presence in small, isolated outposts, and their

<table>
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*Numbers may not add due to rounding*
comparative weakness to the ANA and international forces, the Afghan National Police are a favored target of the insurgency and are taking casualties at a high rate.

With the proposed reallocated funds, the Department plans to provide equipment, training, and infrastructure that will better protect the ANP from these targeted attacks and enable them to increasingly provide stability and rule of law independently. To this end, we plan to provide improved personal security equipment and counter-IED training. Funds will also be used to strengthen ANP command, control, and communications, which will enhance their ability to respond to attacks and improve performance of their basic policing mission. Additionally, we plan to expand medical treatment and trauma care availability to assist those injured in attacks.

The Department also proposes shifting an additional $0.5 million from the ANA to support the Government of Afghanistan’s detainee operations infrastructure to increase the capacity of support facilities and to accommodate a larger prison guard force. By providing billeting and increasing the size of the dining facility, this funding will minimize the frequency with which prison guard personnel have to travel through an area of known high threat while transiting to and from the secluded prison facility.
Coalition Support

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the United States to support coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations to counter terrorism.

February Request: $1.7B

• Supports Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations
• Funds airlift and support and military capacity building for partner nations

Amendment: None

Total Annual Cost

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FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

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Numbers may not add due to rounding

COALITION SUPPORT

No amendment requested.

ORIGINAL FUNDING REQUEST

The Department of Defense requests $1.7 billion to continue support to U.S. Coalition partners for FY 2008, an 11 percent decrease from the FY 2007 level. These programs enable Coalition partners to participate in U.S. operations from which they would otherwise lack the financial means to do so. Coalition support helps to reduce the stress on U.S. forces operating in the global war on terror.

The funding request for FY 2008 will:

- Ensure Pakistan, Jordan, and key cooperating nations are reimbursed for support to U.S. operations;
- Provide funding for lift and sustain support to Coalition partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations globally.

Previous funding ($4.5 billion since 2001) has supported Pakistan’s major operations along the Afghanistan border, which have significantly affected terrorist networks in the region, achieved a level of success that would be difficult for U.S. Armed Forces to attain, and led to a more stable border area. Similarly, Jordan has been reimbursed $290 million for its critical support along the Jordan-Iraq border, which has resulted in greater force protection for U.S. forces operating in Iraq.

Partners, including Georgia, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Ukraine, and Lithuania, have received reimbursements with Coalition Support Funds. The support of these countries has reduced requirements for U.S. soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Lift and sustain funding has allowed Coalition partners with a lesser capacity to pay to contribute directly to war on terror objectives, serve as a force multiplier, and allow U.S. forces to focus efforts elsewhere. Notably, Poland has led the Multinational Division Center South by providing airlift for Coalition partners and sustainment support for Coalition countries during deployments.

Without Coalition Support funding, the United States could not benefit from the assistance of partners who are willing to make valuable contributions to combined operations in and outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, but are unable to finance their own deployment expenses.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide ground commanders with a source of funds to assist local populations with urgently needed humanitarian relief and reconstruction.

February Request: $1.0B
• Funds a variety of critical, small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects as identified by commanders in the field, such as:
  – Power lines and generators
  – Health care centers
  – Civic and cultural facilities
  – Condolence payments

Amendment: +$0.2B
• Additional requirements for operations in Afghanistan
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) provides ground commanders with funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction in their areas of responsibility. The Program supports GWOT by helping the U.S. win the trust of local populations by improving urgent civil infrastructures. An additional $242 million is requested to increase the funding available for commanders in Afghanistan to respond to basic safety and civic needs, including roads.

Construction of CERP-funded roads provides to increase security in the remote areas where the insurgency has been most successful is having an enduring impact. CERP-funded roads allow local police, governors, Coalition forces, and Afghan National Army units to extend the reach of the central government, dramatically increasing security. Without the increased security that CERP-funded roads will provide, good governance by the central government will not be as strong and needed economic benefits will not be realized. This is key to maintaining the support of the local population in those remote areas in which the proposed CERP-funded roads will be built.

Road construction in Afghanistan is one of the primary requirements for reconstruction, and provides an immediate and positive effect for the populace. CERP gives Maneuver Commanders the opportunity to make that impact at a grassroots level, providing near-and-far ranging socio-economic benefits to Afghan people. CERP roads support the growth of governance and development across the nation by enabling commerce, education, health care, police, and security forces to reach areas previously untouched by the central government. Roads funded by CERP are critical to the “COIN fight” in Afghanistan and create required conditions for success by:

- Improving population access to local and regional markets and commerce, and increasing access to health care facilities and education opportunities;
- Quickly enabling improved governance and allowing greater access and interaction for the Afghan National Security Forces and local villages that previously have been cut off from the rest of the nation;
- Providing increased employment in the construction industry through the Afghan First initiative and facilitating increased flow of traffic, which benefits all sectors of economic growth;
- Visibly demonstrating U.S. support to the Afghan people and government;
- Directly and positively affecting the lives of the Afghan people, helping to legitimize the local and national government, and ultimately isolating the insurgents from the people, which is the U.S.’ ultimate aim.

### CERP

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Numbers may not add due to rounding
This year, U.S. maneuver forces operating in Afghanistan have doubled, growing from one BCT to two. If this CERP request, especially those funds earmarked for roads, is not met, U.S. forces will effectively have only half the capability needed to produce an immediate and positive impact on the Afghan people. If the Department does not receive the additional CERP funding, an opportunity will be lost that our increased presence could have achieved.

CERP-funded roads are not intended for use by U.S. forces. Roads constructed by military engineers, or funded by Military Construction appropriations, directly support the freedom of maneuver or force protection of U.S. forces. This distinct difference in purpose is the reason CERP is used to fund roads that support Afghan development and governance and Military Construction is used to support military operations.
Military Construction

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to employ limited construction projects to support wartime operations and enhance force protection.

February Request: $0.7B
• Operational facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Roads and bridges
• Basic infrastructure
• Force protection enhancement
• Support facilities
• Landfills

Amendment: +$1.0B
• Operational facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Roads and bridges
• Basic infrastructure
• Force protection enhancement
• Support facilities
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

Military Construction

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Numbers may not add due to rounding

**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**

The initial Global War on Terror request for FY 2008 included $0.7 billion for military construction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. This Amendment provides for an additional $1.0 billion for military construction projects in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), which would provide needed operational and force protection facilities, promote the consolidation of bases, replace deteriorated expeditionary facilities, and address safety concerns.

**Operational Facilities**

As base consolidation commences, locations with an increase in aircraft require proper air traffic control facilities and ramps to reduce congestion, gain separation of aircraft, and make airfield operations safer. The Amendment includes construction of airfield ramps, parking aprons, and taxiways to accommodate high-volume aircraft operations (close air support, rotary wing, strategic airlift, and ISR).

The Amendment also provides facilities for detainee operations in Iraq. It includes a juvenile Theater Internment Facility Reintegration Center (TIFRIC) at Camp Constitution to rehabilitate captured juvenile combatants. Facilities include living and support facilities, education, religious, and sports program facilities away from adult detainee populations. The Amendment will provide a brick factory at the Camp Cropper TIFRIC for a detainee work program. The end state of this voluntary program is to provide the detainee population with a productive and viable activity in support of their reintegration to Iraqi society.

**Roads and Bridges**

The Amendment includes two road paving projects in Afghanistan. The Paving of roads in Afghanistan greatly reduces the IED threat to U.S. and Coalition forces. This has been shown by a Combined Joint Task Force 76 and Task Force Paladin
study that evaluated IED incidents on roads that had been paved. Their study revealed that paving IED hot spots reduces the ability of the insurgents to plant IEDs in the roadway (the normal method of placement in Afghanistan), which enhances U.S. and Coalition forces’ ability to visually detect them. Their experience has shown that paving is one of the most effective means of stopping IEDs in Afghanistan.

The Amendment also includes a perimeter road at Bagram Airfield. This project is required to support vehicle traffic and provide alternate routes to ease traffic flow and provide diversions for construction traffic. The road is critical to emergency response vehicles ability to reach all Bagram Airfield facilities.

Basic Infrastructure
The Amendment provides additional water treatment and storage capacity at Scania and the Victory Base Complex in Iraq to accommodate additional personnel due to base consolidations.

Furthermore, the Amendment includes a project at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar to replace aging and failing temporary and expeditionary structures and utilities that have outlived their useful life. Many facilities at Al Udeid Air Base were constructed to expeditionary standards. The infrastructure has experienced heavy use in a harsh climate and has deteriorated significantly. An immediate requirement exists for replacement of these structures in support of ongoing operations.

Force Protection
Force protection projects include overhead cover systems to protect high troop concentration areas (such as dining facilities and gyms) from mortar and rocket fire, entry control points and perimeter fencing.

It also provides for the consolidation and expansion of the Kabul Compound in Afghanistan. The project allows for the closure of scattered safe-houses and Camp Eggers. These closures will save $5.8 million in lease costs and mitigate force protection vulnerabilities presented during commutes from the safe houses to Kabul. Camp Eggers has numerous and uncorrectable force protection vulnerabilities.
Camp Lemonier, Djibouti

The long-term lease with the Government of Djibouti provides additional land to allow for proper antiterrorism and force protection setbacks but returns other tracts of land at Camp Lemonier, necessitating the relocation of facilities. Projects in the Amendment invest in infrastructure upgrades to meet land-return requirements (per the host-nation lease), replacement and relocation of existing facilities due to structural and force protection deficiencies, command and control facilities, and a water production facility.

Support Facilities

The Amendment includes an Aircraft Maintenance Hangar at Bagram Airfield. Extreme weather conditions at Bagram hinder aircraft maintenance during a seven-month period beginning in November with freezing conditions and continuing through May with high wind conditions. Maintenance crews are forced to repair damaged C-130 aircraft outdoors in these extreme conditions. Consequently, timely and safe maintenance is limited due to potential component damage and personnel safety hazards resulting from the extreme environmental conditions.

The Amendment also includes the third and fourth phases of the Bulk Fuel Storage and Supply project at Bagram Airfield. The project mitigates uncertain fuel deliveries to this landlocked operational hub. Existing bags are susceptible to indirect fire and pose a hazard to nearby buildings. The project is required for Bagram Airfield to provide the capability to receive, store, and dispense a minimum of 10 million gallons of fuel in support of ongoing operations.

Another project will upgrade and enhance the Convoy Support Center in Adder, Iraq, in support of base consolidation in Iraq.

The Amendment includes a Hazardous Waste Incinerator at Annaconda, Iraq. The project is required to dispose of U.S.-generated hazardous waste that has been accumulating in Iraq since 2003. No means of disposal exists in Iraq. The hazardous waste incinerator is an environmentally safe and acceptable disposal option for liquid hazardous wastes such as used fuels, oil, lubricants, antifreeze, hydraulic fluids, paints, contaminated soil, pesticides, flammable aerosols, acids, adhesives, etc. The incinerator will eliminate the need to ground transport material across Iraq.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

Figure 5. Military Construction Projects $1.0B

Iraq $359.7M
- Overhead Cover – eGlass
- Convoy Support Center Relocation
- Helo Maintenance Facilities
- Airfield Apron (India Ramp)
- Hot Cargo Ramp

Kuwait $30.0M
Theater Communications Facility

Qatar $46.6M
- Al Udeid Facility Replacement
- Logistics Storage Warehouse

Oman $6.3M
Expeditory Tent Beddown Site Work

Djibouti $75.9M
- CJTF HOA HQ Facility
- Water Production
- Dining Facility

Kyrgyzstan $30.3M
Strategic Airlift Ramp

Afghanistan $322.7M
- Ramp Expansion / East Side Helo
- Strategic Ramp
- C-IED Road
- Kabul Compound
- Construct ISR Ramp
- Road Construction
- Bulk Fuel Storage and Supply (Phase 3)
- Bulk Fuel Storage and Supply (Phase 4)
- Parallel Taxiway (Phase II)

$84.1M for Planning & Design

Source: Adapted from U.S. CENTCOM FY08 GWOT Amendment Requests
Factory Restart

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
The policy of the Department of Defense is to support our Nation’s security interests in Iraq by revitalizing the Iraqi economy and reducing the rampant unemployment of the Iraqi population.

February Request: None

Amendment: +$0.1B

- Reenergize supply chains in targeted economic sectors (e.g., textiles, chemicals, manufacturing and heavy industries) that re-establish prior trade relationships within Iraq
- Target investments to rebuild and revitalize factory capacity, encourage rapid privatization of restarted industries, and establish free-market business principles across industrial sectors
- Identify and procure equipment and raw materials
- Provide training necessary to enable factory restarts
FACTORY RESTART

The state of the Iraqi economy, to include the extremely high unemployment rate, is fueling the insurgency. Economic stabilization and putting people to work are important ways to reduce tensions. Given the pre-war structure of the Iraqi government, restarting State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is among the most effective ways to accomplish this goal. In this Amendment, funding is requested to continue factory restart. Standing up or increasing industrial capacity will jump-start local communities and reemploy idle Iraqis, reducing levels of unrest and insurgent activity.

The Task Force to Support Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TFBSOI) leads this effort. Industrial restarts cover a wide range of commerce including dairy farm equipment, tires, textile and rug factory equipment and supplies, and drug and chemical factory requirements. TFBSOI utilized $50 million in FY07 funds for the first Factory Revitalizations, which provided substantial benefit to over 30 factories and related service providers:

- The Tikrit Flour plant was reopened in September 2007. It now employs dozens of Iraqis, provides a market for grain grown in the province, and is reenergizing a distribution network of flour to bakeries and homes.

- Cancer drug production was added to a modern but, until recently, idle pharmaceutical plant, employing thousands.

- The textile industry was revitalized, enabling the reemployment of thousands, including many women, and stimulating the cotton and wool industries of Iraq.

- Long-idled farm tractor production was reestablished at the State Company for Mechanical Industries for assembly and final preparation for retail sales.

Funding requested in this Amendment is essential to continue TFBSOI operations. Over 100 potential projects have been identified to provide the economic stimulus that will lead to greater stability. The reindustrialization of Iraq and associated job opportunities are critical elements in improving Iraq’s political and economic situation, which in turn will decrease the level of insurgency and enable the Iraqi government to achieve the conditions needed for the U.S. to reduce its role in Iraq.
Reconstitution

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure force readiness by rapidly repairing or replacing equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out in GWOT operations, and by providing critical equipment and technology for future deploying forces.

February Request: $37.6B
• Equipment replacements
• Repair of tanks, vehicles, aircraft and communication systems
• Replenishment of munitions
• Replacement of combat losses, including wear-and-tear
• Replenishment of equipment; and
• Repair and/or upgrade of equipment

Amendment: +$8.8B
• Similar uses as February Request
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed increasing demands on equipment that is far beyond what is typically experienced during training or home-station operations. These demands on equipment result in higher maintenance, repair, and replacement.

Reconstitution includes the following:

- Replacement of combat losses, including wear-and-tear;
- Replenishment of equipment; and
- Repair and/or upgrade of equipment.

Financing for the Amendment’s $8.8 billion for reconstitution comes from two elements of cost: restoral of $1.1 billion that was used in July to finance the continuation of MRAP procurement and $7.7 billion of additional financing.

**Replacement ($2.9 billion)**

The Department requests $2.9 billion to procure combat and logistics support equipment needed to maintain and sustain operations in the theater. The request includes $0.7 billion for aircraft such as $0.2 billion for 11 Predator UAVs, $0.1 billion to replace 3 MH-60 helicopters that have worn out due to high operational tempo, and $0.4 billion for 1 F-18E/F and 5 EA-18G aircraft for the Navy, which replace aircraft that have suffered from excessive stress due to high utilization rates. Also included is $0.2 billion for communications systems, $0.2 billion for counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) jammers, $0.2 billion for critical time sensitive rapid acquisition funding, and $0.8 billion for various trucks and support vehicles. In addition, $0.8 billion is requested for various items such as Ammo & Guns Replacement, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and route clearance equipment, Pollution Abatement Equipment, Mobile Port Operations Center, Thermal Imaging System, Rugged Deployable Satellite communications systems, tents, Convoy/Combat Simulators, and Construction Equipment.

**Replenishment ($5.3 billion)**

The Department requests $5.3 billion to procure equipment to replenish that consumed during combat and support operations in the theater. This request would replenish prepositioned stocks of trucks of all types ($0.6 billion), 383 Strykers ($0.3 billion), and other tactical vehicles ($0.4 billion). The Amendment includes $0.4 billion for various weapons, generators, and other combat-related equipment. The Department requests replenishment of theater provided equipment to include tactical vehicles ($2.0 billion). This equipment is prepositioned and available in Iraq or Afghanistan and ensures that units operating within theater maintain maximum capability at all times and have the best equipment available to accomplish their mission.

The Amendment also requests funding for tactical bridges ($0.1 billion), communications and radios ($45 million), and various support equipment ($0.1 billion). It includes $1.0 billion for
improvements to the Navy P-3 aircraft radar detection equipment. The Replenishment category also includes $0.3 billion for the development of specific technologies to improve the survivability of U.S. personnel and equipment. This includes funding for the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) for use on the B-2 bomber; Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) communications equipment to improve the interoperability of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS); and the A-10 Propulsion Upgrade Program (PUP). The PUP Program was initiated in response to theater commander concerns about the survivability of the A-10 aircraft. It increases the A-10 engine thrust to enable full fuel and weapons loads when operating from ‘high-hot’ airfields such as Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and to decrease the time needed to climb beyond threats such as Man-Portable Air Defense Missiles (MANPADs). The Amendment will also fund the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System for F-15E front cockpits, which provides a significant increase in air-to-ground combat capability; improved protection for A-10 aircraft from Intra-Red (IR) SAM threats during air-to-surface missions by adding IR Missile Warning System which allows the pilot to effective manage and dispense countermeasure at optimum performance; and SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods with Video Downlink, which provides rapid long-range target acquisition and expanded weapons delivery.

Repair ($0.6 billion)

The Department requests $0.6 billion for necessary depot and intermediate level maintenance, which is required to restore equipment returning from the theater of operations to pre-deployment conditions. The Amendment includes funding for Ship Depot Maintenance ($0.2 billion), Aircraft Depot Maintenance ($0.1 billion), Combat Support Depot Maintenance ($0.2 billion), and maintenance of other systems ($0.1 billion).
Accelerate Brigade Combat Teams/ Establish Regimental Combat Team

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to improve the capability and effectiveness of U.S. forces for 21st century theaters.

February Request: $1.6B
- Funds recruiting and retention, incremental pay and relocation
- Funds OPTEMPO of additional Brigade Combat Teams and Regimental Combat Team
- Military Construction

Amendment: None
The Department of Defense requests $1.6 billion for continued support to two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the Army, and one Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in the United States Marine Corps that will be accelerated in FY 2007.

The Army has identified brigades required to fulfill the combatant commander’s request for forces for OIF/OEF rotation 2008-2010. In order to meet the deployment timeline, the Army must accelerate the conversion of two units from legacy structures to the modular BCT structure. The Secretary of Defense has approved the Army’s selection of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division (3/1AD) at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (3/1ID), to be built at Fort Hood, Texas, and stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in FY 2009 following its deployment and stability period.

The Marine Corps has identified the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of the 9th Marine regiment and their corresponding enablers for the RCT. They will be manned and equipped to the levels required to conduct current operations in the CENTCOM AOR, which will require funding above that already requested.

Adding these brigades and battalions to the rotational pool will help improve the deployment-dwell ratio to relieve stress on soldiers, Marines, and their families. This acceleration will continue the transformation of U.S. forces, enhancing capability and effectiveness. FY08 funding is required for:

- Military personnel costs (e.g., incremental pay and allowances) for the Army and the Marine Corps;
- Incremental OPTEMPO growth, mobile training teams used in unit training, and additional range operations and training support at the identified installations;
- New military construction projects to accommodate additional personnel and equipment due to the mission increase at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton in California; Twenty-Nine Palms, California; and Camp Lejuene, North Carolina.

**BCTs/RCT**

No amendment requested.

**ORIGINAL FUNDING REQUEST**

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**Numbers may not add due to rounding**
**Restore the Force**

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**Policy**

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure force readiness, optimize the Army’s ability to provide Commanders with additional ready and relevant forces, and fund equipment shortfalls in a timely manner.

**February Request: None**

**Amendment: +$5.4B**

- Additional equipment for the Army’s Active, National Guard, and Reserve units such as:
  - Light medium tactical vehicles
  - Medium tactical vehicles
  - SINCGARS radios
  - Heavy tactical vehicles
  - STRYKER vehicles for the ready-to-fight fleet
  - HMMWVs
  - Medical command for combat casualty care units
  - Petroleum quality analysis systems

**Total Annual Cost**

- **FY 2006:** $0.0
- **FY 2007:** $0.0
- **FY 2008:** $5.4

$ in Billions

**FY 2008 Global War on Terror**

**$5.4B**
The Army requests additional equipment for its Active, National Guard and Reserve units. This equipment will:

- Increase types and quantity of equipment available for next-to-deploy forces in Active and Reserve Components;
- Improve readiness of all Bridge Combat Teams (BCTs) by allowing units to train at battalion and brigade levels sooner, prior to deployment;
- Enhance the Army’s ability to provide combatant commanders with additional ready and relevant forces;
- Meet BCT equipment needs for combat vehicles, command, control and communications equipment, logistics vehicles, and individual and crew-served weapons.

With a significant portion of available combat equipment deployed or allocated to next-to-deploy units, the inventory of equipment available for reserve forces, or those held for other potential military requirements, is now below the level needed to maintain a combat ready force. The objective of the Restore the Force Request is to re-stock equipment inventories of combat support (CS/CSS) brigades, which have been forced to release their unit equipment to operational BCTs, and which have resulted in an overall loss in operational readiness.

Examples of the equipment that would be procured with these resources include:

- Light medium tactical vehicles;
- Medium tactical vehicles;
- SINCgars radios;
- Heavy tactical vehicles;
- STRYKER vehicles for the ready-to-fight fleet;
- HMMWVs;
- Medical command for combat casualty care units;
- Petroleum quality analysis systems.
Strengthening the Army Guard and Reserve

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to optimize training of our Reserve Component personnel while being mindful of the impact that mobilization has on reservists, their families, and their communities.

February Request: None

Amendment: +$1.0B
• Pre-deployment training
• Builds required readiness at home station prior to mobilization
• Increases man-days for training support and schools
• Allows for increased theater combat time; less time training while mobilized
STRENGTHENING THE ARMY GUARD AND RESERVE

These funds provide pre-mobilization training and increased readiness to units in order to reduce post mobilization training and maximize soldier in-theater time in support of the GWOT. The new training strategy is a direct result of the Secretary of Defense’s Utilization of the Total Force policy signed on 19 January 2007. The benefits of shifting to a 12-month mobilization time for Army Reserve Component units allows them to have more time at home station and contact time with employers as well as families. This will build the required readiness of a unit at home station rather than at the mobilization station by providing the additional increase levels of man-days, training, support, and schools, prior to unit mobilization. Units in the first and second years prior to mobilization are required to be certified for assigned military missions in individual and collective training in order to maximize the use of the unit in the 12-month mobilization time. Given this new strategy, only 2 to 3 months of additional in theater training for the units specified mission will be required. This will allow for 9 to 10 months in theater combat time.

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Russell Lee Klika – August 2007
**Additional Emergency Requests**

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**February Request:** None

**Amendment:** +$2.5B
- Fuel Cost Increases ($0.8B)
- National Capital Region Acceleration ($0.4B)
- Wounded, Ill, and Injured Soldiers ($0.5B)
- Enhance Soldier and Family Support ($0.8B)

* See note on following page
ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY REQUESTS

Fuel Price Increase
The Amendment includes $761.5 million for Service and Department Agency accounts to pay for baseline fuel price increases. Increases in world fuel market costs, reflected in the mid-session fuel projections from OMB, necessitated an increase to the FY 2008 fuel price.

The baseline fuel requested in the Amendment funds the impact of fuel price increases on Department fuel customers.

NCR Acceleration
To provide the best possible medical facilities for the care and recovery of our wounded servicemen and women in the National Capital Region, the Department is accelerating the closing of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington D.C. and the opening of the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), Maryland, and the new Fort Belvoir Army Community Hospital (ACH), Virginia.

Wounded, Ill and Injured Soldiers
In an effort to address certain deficiencies and further improve the world class trauma and rehabilitative care being provided in Army Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) worldwide, the Army has developed the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). This plan,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Emergency Requests</th>
<th>FY 2007 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2008 Request</th>
<th>Amendment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Price Increase*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR Acceleration</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded, Ill, and Injured Soldiers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance Soldier and Family Support</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Additional Emergency Requests</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.4</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the February FY08 GWOT Request, Baseline Fuel Price Increases had been shown in the Operations section with $2.9B in FY06 Enacted, $0.5B in the FY07 Enacted, and $0 in the FY08 request. Fuel Price Increases have been removed from Operations and are now shown in the Additional Emergency Request section for consistency.

Numbers may not add due to rounding
when fully implemented, will be a significant step forward in developing a sustainable medical and vocational rehabilitation system to provide treatment and care for our Wounded, Ill, and Injured (WII) soldiers.

The AMAP has three components totaling $504.2 million, which are part of a systematic effort to address identified deficiencies and further improve the world-class treatment and rehabilitation services that our WII soldiers and their families already receive:

Care for WII ($183.4 million):
• $172.8 million to increase the number of military and civilian medical support personnel (case managers, technicians, etc.);
• $10.6 million in support of patient administration and training (supplies, equip, DoD/DVA cross training, etc.).

Renovate Existing Facilities In Support Of WII ($161.7 million):
• $100.0 million Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (e.g. barracks);
• $61.7 million Base Operating Support.

New Facilities In Support Of WII ($159.1 million):
• $21.0 million Brooke Army Medical Center Burn Center;
• $138.1 million Barracks and Transitioning Warrior Support Complexes to meet and facilitate the needs of our WII soldiers and their families.

Enhance Soldier and Family Support
The Department recognizes the effect of repeated and continued deployments on the All-Volunteer Force and is making an increased commitment to improve functions critical to Soldier and family well being and retention. This Amendment will support include programs for wounded warriors, family readiness, and community support. Funds will stand up Warrior Transition Units...
dedicated to caring for Soldiers and Marines returning to duty or transitioning to civilian life. Warrior Transition Unit funds are requested for staff, facilities, and equipment. Funds will fully implement the Army Chaplaincy’s Strong Bonds Marriage Program for Soldiers and family members of all Army components and extend the program to families of deployed and wounded Soldiers. Funds will provide a large increase in the number of Family Readiness Support Assistants for the Army and Marine Corps. These assistants augment the volunteer efforts of family members to provide support to affected families in dealing with the absences of their deployed Soldiers. Funds will substantially increase the level of services for Army and Marine Corps child care, Community Services, and youth programs.

Without these funds, wounded warriors will not receive the best possible quality of support, the Army’s high divorce rate will continue, and we will begin to see similar rates for the Marine Corps. Family members of deployed Soldiers and Marines will have far fewer resources to contend with issues created by the absence of their deployed Soldiers and Marines if support programs do not surge to keep pace with continuous and prolonged deployments. Potentially, retention and recruiting will suffer, and the viability of the All-Volunteer Force could be degraded.

The troop surge and extended length of deployments magnified the need for Soldier and Family Support. A significant increase for these programs is needed immediately. Delaying these increased services until 2009 will increase the stress on Soldiers and Marines and their families.
### FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment

#### Table 1a. Funding by Military Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Millions</th>
<th>FY 2007 Total</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Request</td>
<td>Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)</td>
<td>124,563.6</td>
<td>114,278.3</td>
<td>35,450.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)</td>
<td>31,140.9</td>
<td>26,806.0</td>
<td>3,506.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Noble Eagle (ONE)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified</td>
<td>8,599.2</td>
<td>5,920.6</td>
<td>833.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Emergency Requests</td>
<td>5,195.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,521.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | **169,499.6** | **147,004.9** | **42,311.4** | **189,316.3**

1. Congress does not appropriate Supplemental funds by military operation. This estimate by operation is subject to change depending on the needs of commanders in the theater.

2. The FY 2008 GWOT Amendment includes funding for Baseline Fuel Increase, National Capital Region Acceleration, Wounded, Ill and Injured Soliders, and Enhance Soldier Support.

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#### Table 1b. FY07 & FY08 Iraq and Afghanistan Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Millions</th>
<th>OIF Cost of Operations ²</th>
<th>OEF Cost of Operations ²</th>
<th>Iraq Train &amp; Equip</th>
<th>Afghanistan Train &amp; Equip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007 Title IX ¹ (Enacted)</td>
<td>29,246.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1,700.0</td>
<td>1,500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007 Supplemental (Enacted)</td>
<td>34,974.0</td>
<td>10,626.5</td>
<td>3,842.9</td>
<td>5,906.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008 GWOT Request</td>
<td>59,166.0</td>
<td>11,393.4</td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
<td>2,700.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2008 Defense Base Budget</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008 GWOT Amendment</td>
<td>6,008.9</td>
<td>300.4</td>
<td>1,000.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Refers to Title IX of the FY 2007 Defense Appropriation Act
2. Cost of Surge is included in Cost of Operations

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Numbers may not add due to rounding.
### Table 2. Funding by Functional Category

|$ in Millions |
|---|---|---|
| **Continuing the Fight** | Title IX | Enacted | Total |
| Operations *(Includes Plus-Up)* | 30,548.0 | 45,600.4 | 76,148.4 |
| Force Protection | 3,387.4 | 9,962.4 | 13,349.8 |
| IED Defeat | 1,920.7 | 2,479.3 | 4,400.0 |
| Military Intelligence Program | 795.3 | 2,648.4 | 3,443.7 |
| Iraq Security Forces | 1,700.0 | 3,842.9 | 5,542.9 |
| Afghan Security Forces | 1,500.0 | 5,906.4 | 7,406.4 |
| Coalition Support | 900.0 | 522.2 | 1,422.2 |
| CERP | 500.0 | 456.4 | 956.4 |
| Military Construction | 0.0 | 940.0 | 940.0 |
| Factory Restart | 0.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 |
| Provincial Reconstruction Teams | 0.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| **Reconstituting the Force** | 23,615.4 | 12,733.7 | 36,349.1 |
| Reconstitution | 23,615.4 | 12,733.7 | 36,349.1 |
| **Enhancing Ground Forces** | 23,615.4 | 12,733.7 | 36,349.1 |
| BCTs / RCT | 0.0 | 3,647.1 | 3,647.1 |
| Grow the Force | 0.0 | 1,498.8 | 1,498.8 |
| Restore the Force | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Strengthening the Army Guard and Reserve | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Non-DoD Classified & Additional Emergency Requests | 5,133.2 | 9,111.6 | 14,244.8 |
| **Total** | 70,000.0 | 99,499.6 | 169,499.6 |

**FY 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Request</th>
<th>MRAP Amendment</th>
<th>Amendment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations <em>(Includes Plus-Up)</em></td>
<td>70,559.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6,309.3</td>
<td>76,868.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>11,219.4</td>
<td>5,340.0</td>
<td>13,901.6</td>
<td>30,461.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED Defeat</td>
<td>4,000.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>269.0</td>
<td>4,269.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
<td>2,714.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>991.3</td>
<td>3,706.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Security Forces</td>
<td>2,000.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,000.0</td>
<td>3,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Security Forces</td>
<td>2,700.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,700.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Support</td>
<td>1,700.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,700.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>977.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>242.0</td>
<td>1,219.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>738.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>955.6</td>
<td>1,694.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Restart</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconstituting the Force</strong></td>
<td>37,577.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8,789.5</td>
<td>46,366.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution</td>
<td>23,615.4</td>
<td>12,733.7</td>
<td>36,349.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enhancing Ground Forces</strong></td>
<td>1,557.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,557.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTs / RCT</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3,647.1</td>
<td>3,647.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow the Force</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,498.8</td>
<td>1,498.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore the Force</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5,403.9</td>
<td>5,403.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Army Guard and Reserve</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>994.2</td>
<td>994.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Additional Emergency Requests</td>
<td>5,920.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3,355.0</td>
<td>9,275.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>141,664.9</td>
<td>5,340.0</td>
<td>42,311.4</td>
<td>189,316.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percent Change*

**FY 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations <em>(Includes Plus-Up)</em></td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>128%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED Defeat</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Security Forces</td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Security Forces</td>
<td>-64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Support</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Restart</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTs / RCT</td>
<td>-57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grow the Force</td>
<td>-100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restore the Force</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Army Guard and Reserve</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Additional Emergency Requests</td>
<td>-35%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*
### Table 3. Funding by Appropriation Title

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Enacted</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>5,386.5</td>
<td>12,359.6</td>
<td>17,746.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>37,582.2</td>
<td>34,675.5</td>
<td>72,257.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>16,603.9</td>
<td>25,421.6</td>
<td>42,025.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>512.3</td>
<td>635.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,670.2</td>
<td>1,670.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFF/JIEDDO</td>
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<td>2,788.4</td>
<td>4,759.1</td>
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<td>Defense Health Program</td>
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<td>2,091.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq and Afghan National Security Forces</td>
<td>3,200.0</td>
<td>9,748.7</td>
<td>12,948.7</td>
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<td>Working Capital Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>64,866.8</td>
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<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Additional Emergency Requests</td>
<td>5,133.2</td>
<td>9,111.6</td>
<td>14,244.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70,000.0</td>
<td>99,499.6</td>
<td>169,499.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*