Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 Budget Estimates Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation

(Cooperative Thereat Reduction Program)



February 2002

CTR-1

Summary:

FY 2001	Price	Program	FY 2002	Price	Program	FY 2003
Actual	Change	Change	Estimate	Change	Change	Estimate
442.425	5.474	-47.700	400.199	6.003	10.498	416.700

I. Description of Operations Financed:

Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (Nunn Lugar Act) to assist the former Soviet Union (FSU) in destroying, safeguarding and preventing the proliferation of Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related expertise. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program continues as an element of our national security strategy for the 21st century. At their source, the CTR program dismantles strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure, enhances the security of WMD and facilitates defense and military contacts to encourage military reductions and reform. At the borders of non-Russian FSU states the CTR program is improving means to prevent WMD proliferation. The Department of Defense (DoD) has revised the CTR program objectives to reflect DoDs effort to address high priority security and proliferation concerns in Russia and the FSU.

A. Objective One:

Dismantle former Soviet Union WMD and associated infrastructure.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and related technologies is a serious concern to U.S. and international security. In a joint statement by President Bush and President Putin on November 14th, 2001: "We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons." The CTR program continues to dismantle Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), silo, road and rail mobile ICBM launchers, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and associated submarines, and WMD infrastructure.

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

The elimination of Ukraine's SS-24 ICBMs is also a priority for the CTR program. All missiles were removed form the silos, and the silos and launch centers were eliminated in accordance with START I requirements. Missile disassembly was complete in January 2002, and 166 missile motors are stored in constructed or renovated facilities. An SS-24 solid rocket motor propellant extraction facility will be built to remove the propellant from the missile motors and permit safe elimination. Additionally, up to 40 TU-22M Backfire bombers and approximately 230 KH-22 nuclear capable air to surface missiles will be eliminated.

Biological weapons capabilities in the FSU also pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. DoD estimates that approximately 40 Biological Research and Production Centers (BRPCs) are located in the former Soviet Union. The DoD has funded a project to dismantle infrastructure associated with BW production or research at FSU facilities. This project will eliminate infrastructure, equipment, and facilities previously used to perform research or produce BW.

As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons and demilitarize its former CW production facilities. Subject to Russia being compliant with conditions specified by Congress, CTR assistance will construct a CW destruction facility (CWDF) for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. DoD will construct the CWDF near the Shchuch'ye CW storage facility which contains approximately 47 percent of the Russian nerve agent filled artillery munitions (estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warhead/projectiles). CTR assistance supports demilitarization of OAO Khimprom former nerve agent production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk in Russia, the Nukus Chemical Weapons Research Institute in Uzbekistan, and the Pavlodar chemical production facility in Kazakhstan. Demilitarization will decontaminate, dismantle and destroy specialized equipment and special features related to the production, transfer and storage of chemical agents/weapons and their precursors as outlined in the CWC.

The CTR program is also eliminating WMD infrastructure in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. These programs eliminate nuclear weapon storage areas, equipment and infrastructure at

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

liquid propellant storage facilities, and facilities at airbases that supported long-range heavy bomber operations.

B. Objective Two:

Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials.

CTR Program assistance is central to U.S. and international efforts to prevent the proliferation of FSU nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The DoD Program in Russia encourages nuclear warhead dismantlement; provides enhanced security for strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in storage; and provides safe and secure storage for fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads. DoD transports an estimated 2000-2500 nuclear warheads per year to secure storage or dismantlement facilities, and plans to enhance security at more than 40 nuclear storage areas through Russia.

DoD is providing equipment, training, and services to design and construct to western standards a safe, secure and ecologically sound storage facility for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons at Mayak, Russia. The Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) will have a capacity to store up to 25,000 containers of weapons grade fissile material from approximately 6,250 weapons.

Security enhancements at FSU BW facilities provide enhanced security and safety systems for dangerous virus and bacteria pathogen repositories at biological research centers, and consolidate existing peaceful pharmaceutical production at fewer facilities. DoD estimates that there are approximately 40 FSU BW institutes. The CTR program intends to initiate four security enhancement or consolidation projects per year.

C. Objective Three:

Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct.

The BW collaborative research enhances the U.S. capability to prevent proliferation of the FSU BW scientific and technology base to states hostile to America and terrorist

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

groups and to increase transparency at FSU BW facilities. Collaborative research through DoD's partnership with the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) encourages higher standards of openness, ethics and conduct at the scientist level and preempts potential "brain drain" of scientists to rogue states.

D. Objective Four:

Support defense and military cooperation with objective of preventing proliferation.

A new project has been established to enhance the capability of non-Russian FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials, and to respond to WMD incidents at the border or in country. The DoD will provide equipment, training, infrastructure and logistics support to enhance national and regional capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime.

This objective also supports expanded contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization and democratic reforms in the FSU. DoD has negotiated a series of implementing arrangements between the Department and new independent states (NIS) which govern the Defense and Military Contacts program. The Department has provided support to 32 separate major commands, service headquarters, and subordinate commands for approximately 1,400 events between the U.S. and NIS. Future events will include exchange of visits between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with their NIS counterparts; visits between naval, air and ground units; bilateral exercises and ship visits; and visits of the nation's senior officials. Participating nations currently include: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

E. Other Program Support: (Supports all four objectives)

Other Assessments/Administrative Support funds the Audits and Examination (A&E) program as identified in the appropriate umbrella and implementing agreements with CTR Program recipient nations and overall program management and administration costs. The

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

A&E program ensures that DoD provided equipment, services, and training are fully accounted for, used for the intended purpose effectively and efficiently, and support CTR Program objectives. Additional CTR funding is required to support CTR delegation and technical teams travel expenses, translator/interpreter support, and scientific, engineering and technical assistance.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) - Russia</u>: Accelerates destruction of strategic weapon systems and infrastructure, thereby removing opportunities for their proliferation or use. The Department is providing equipment and services to destroy or dismantle ICBMs, ICBM silos, and road/rail mobile launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, and associated strategic submarines, strategic bombers, and WMD infrastructure. In addition, the CTR effort supports the transportation, storage, and disposition of liquid/solid rocket motor propellants; the disposition of low level radioactive waste and spent naval reactor fuel from dismantled SSBNs; and the provision of emergency response support equipment.

B. <u>Weapons Storage Security - Russia</u>: CTR assistance provides MOD an enhanced inventory control and management system to track strategic and tactical nuclear weapons; improved security at nuclear storage sites that have both strategic and tactical weapons; guard force training; and personnel reliability program equipment and training to deter the theft, diversion, or sabotage of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

C. Weapons Transportation Security - Russia: CTR assistance supports safe and secure transportation of nuclear warheads from operational sites to secure storage or dismantlement facilities. MOD provides technical and security personnel and their equipment. The Department will certify and maintain MOD nuclear weapons transportation and guard rail cars, to include life extension. If life extension and certification is unsuccessful, DoD may procure nuclear weapons and guard railcars with improved alarm, monitoring and access denial systems. DoD also will continue to enhance MOD's nuclear weapons accident response capability.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

D. <u>Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) - Russia</u>: DoD construction of a Fissile Material Storage Facility will provide centralized, safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons. The effort supports enhanced material control and accounting and transparency measures, which provide confidence, that the stored fissile material is from dismantled nuclear weapons, is safe and secure, and is not reused in weapons.

E. <u>Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) - Russia</u>: Effective with FY 2003, and pending Congressional approval, the DoD will transfer the EWGPP to the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE has more technical expertise in the areas of building fossil fuel power plants and demilitarizing fissile materials than the DoD, and has the ability to execute the program without programmatic schedule impediments.

F. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) - Ukraine: Destroys WMD delivery systems and infrastructure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. DoD has eliminated SS-24 missile launch silos and control centers; and is dismantling the launch control centers and performing technical site restoration. The DoD effort disassembled all SS-24 missiles; operates and maintains facilities to temporarily store SS-24 missile motors; and eliminates accountable missile components per START protocols. The CTR program will eliminate Tu-22M bombers and Kh-22 nuclear capable air to surface missiles.

G. Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) - Ukraine: Eliminates equipment and facilities that were used to support the deployment and operation of weapons of mass destruction. Equipment and infrastructure at liquid missile propellant storage facilities, facilities for storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons, and infrastructure at former heavy bomber bases are being dismantled and eliminated.

H. Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) - Kazakhstan: Supports projects to secure fissile and radioactive materials, and eliminates equipment and facilities that were used in support of weapons of mass destruction. Equipment and infrastructure at liquid missile propellant handling and storage facilities,

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

infrastructure at former heavy bomber base, and a former chemical weapons production facility will be dismantled and eliminated.

I. <u>Biological Weapon (BW) Proliferation Prevention</u>: CTR assistance consolidates and secures or eliminates dangerous pathogen collections at biological research institutes, dismantles former Soviet BW research and production facilities, and targets collaborative research to encourage higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct at the scientist level and preempt potential "brain drain" of scientists to rogue states. DoD is partnering with the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) for projects in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Georgia; and the Science and Technology Center (STC) for Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Implementing agreements are in effect with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and one is being negotiated with Ukraine.

J. <u>Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia</u>: CTR assistance supports the U.S. objective of preventing proliferation of the FSU CW capabilities to rogue states and terrorist groups. The Department is designing, and subject to Russia being compliant with conditions specified by Congress, will construct a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) for organophosphorus (nerve) agent filled munitions. This program also enhances the site security at Russian CW nerve agent storage facilities, and facilitates the demilitarization of former CW production facilities.

K. <u>Nukus Chemical Research Institute Dismantlement - Uzbekistan</u>: Dismantles a former Soviet chemical weapons production and research facility.

L. <u>WMD Proliferation Prevention</u>: CTR assistance will enhance the capability of non-Russian FSU military, internal security forces, border guards and customs forces to prevent, deter, detect and interdict unauthorized movement of WMD or related materials across borders, and to respond effectively to terrorist incidents at the border.

M. <u>Defense and Military Contacts</u>: CTR funding expands contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization and democratic reform. The Defense and Military Contacts program is intended to: encourage and assist the NIS in downsizing its defense establishment; encourage support for democratic reform; assist the

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

NIS military to better understand Western society, including civil military relations; and to support mutual counter-proliferation objectives.

N. Other Assessments/Administrative Support: CTR funding supports a Congressionally mandated Audits and Examinations (A&E) program and overall program administrative and support costs. Activities include CTR delegation and technical team travel, translator/interpreter support, project requirements development, embassy support costs, and contracted technical and analytical program support.

III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands):

A. Sub-Activity Group			FY 2002		
	FY 2001 Actuals	Budget Request	Appro- priation	Current <u>Estimate</u>	FY 2003 Estimate
1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination-Russia	177,800	133,405	133,405	133,405	70,500
2. Weapons Storage Security-Russia	89,700	56,000	55,000	55,000	40,000
3. Weapons Transportation Security-Russia	14,000	9,500	9,500	9,500	19,700
4. Fissile Material Storage Facility-Russia	56,425	0	0	0	0
5. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production-Russia 1/	32,100	41,700	41,700	41,700	0
6. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination-Ukraine	35,900	51,500	50,000	50,000	6,500
7. WMD Infrastructure Elimination-Ukraine	0	6,024	6,024	6,024	8,800
8. WMD Infrastructure Elimination-Kazakhstan	0	6,000	6,000	6,000	9,000
9. BW Proliferation Prevention	12,000	17,000	17,000	17,000	55,000
10.Chemical Weapons Destruction-Russia	0	50,000	50,000	50,000	133,600
11.Nukus Chemical Research Institute Dismantlement-Uzbekistan	2,500	0	0	0	0
12.WMD Proliferation Prevention	0	0	0	0	40,000
13.Defense and Military Contacts	9,000	18,650	18,349	18,349	18,900
14.Other Assessments/Administrative Support	13,000	13,221	13,221	13,221	14,700
Total	442,425	403,000	400,199	400,199	416,700

1/ DoD is working with OMB to transfer prior-year unobligated balances associated with this program to DOE.

III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

B. <u>Reconciliation Summary</u>	Change FY 2002/FY 2002	Change FY 2002/FY 2003
1. Baseline Funding	403,000	400,199
a. Congressional Adjustments	0	N/A
(Distributed)		
b. Congressional Adjustments	-2,801	0
(Undistributed)		
c. Congressional Adjustments	0	0
(General Provisions)		
d. Congressional Earmarks	0	0
e. Congressional Earmark Billpayers	0	0
2. Appropriated Amount (Subtotal)	400,199	0
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent	0	0
Across-the-board Reduction (Rescission)	0	0
Approved Reprogrammings/Transfers	0	-41,700
3. Price Change	0	6,003
4. Program Changes	0	52,198
5. Current Estimate	400,199	416,700

III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases:

1.	FY 2002 Amended President's Budget		403,000
2.	Congressional Adjustment (Distributed)	0	
	Total Congressional Adjustment (Distributed)		0
3.	Congressional Adjustment (Undistributed)		0
	Management Headquarters Reduction	0	
4.	Congressional Adjustment (General Provisions)		
	Section 8098-Legislative Affairs Reduction	0	
	Section 8102-Reduction in Travel Costs	0	
	Section 8123-Reduction for Business Process Reform, etc.	-2,801	
	Section 8135-FOL changes in Utility Costs	0	
	Section 8146-Savings from Government Purchases Card	0	
	Total Congressional Adjustment(General Provisions)		2,801
5.	Congressional Earmarks		0
6.	FY 2002 Appropriated Amount		400,199
	Price Change		-2,048
	Program Increases		,
	a. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination-Russia (FY 2002 Base \$133,405)	2,048	
Q	Increased cost for the solid propellant disposition facility. Total Program Increases		2,048
9.	Iotal Floglam Incleases		2,040
10.	Revised FY 2002 Estimate		400,199
11.	Functional Transfers-Out		
	Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production-Russia ^{1/} Effective with FY 2003, and pending Congressional approval, the DoD will transfer the EWGPP to the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE has more technical expertise in the areas of building fossil fuel power plants and demilitarizing fissile materials than the DoD, and has the ability to execute the program without programmatic schedule impediments.	-41,700	
12.	Total Functional Transfers-Out		-41,700
13.	Price Changes		6,003

 $1/\ {\rm DoD}$ is working with OMB to transfer prior-year unobligated balances associated with this program to DOE.

14. Program Increases:

III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

	a.	Weapons Transportation Security-Russia(FY 2002 Base: \$9,500) Manufacture 16 nuclear weapons, guard railcars, and provide maintenance and certification for 115 MOD nuclear weapons railcars	10,058	
	b.	Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination-Ukraine (FY 2002 Base \$6,024) Increased costs for second year of contracts for Airbase Eliminations	2,686	
	c.	Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination-Kazakhstan (FY 2002 Base \$6,000) Increased Fissile and Radioactive Material Prevention	2,910	
	d.	BW Proliferation Prevention-FSU(FY 2002 Base \$17,000) Expand BW Production Facility Dismantlement and collaborative Research	37,745	
	e.	Chemical Weapons Destruction-Russia (FY 2002 Base \$50,000) Additional funds for second year of Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Contract	82,850	
	f.	WMD Proliferation Prevention-FSU(FY 2002 Base \$0) Initiates WMD proliferation prevention project	40,000	
	g.	Defense and Military Contacts (FY 2002 Base \$18,349) Increase support travel cost for seven additional exchange visits.	276	
	h.	Other Assessments/Administrative Support (FY 2002 Base \$13,221) Increased cost for embassy support	1,280	
15.	Tota	l Program Increases		177,805
16.	Prog	ram Decreases		
		Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination-Russia (FY 2002 Base \$133,405) Liquid and Solid Propellant Elimination Facilities Completed	-65,342	
	b.	Weapons Storage Security (FY 2002 Base \$55,000) Storage security upgrades at two facilities have been delayed.	-15,825	
	с.	Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination-Ukraine(FY 2002 Base: \$50,000) Completed Bomber elimination, SS-24 Missile Disassembly	-44,440	
17.	Tota	l Program Decreases		-125,607
18.	FY 2	003 Budget Request		416,700

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

	(Dol	lars in Tho	usands)
	FY 200	FY 2002	FY 2003
A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination(SOAE)-Russia	177,80	133,405	70,500

FY 2001 funds will: Eliminate 48 SLBM launchers and three associated SSBNs: Transport, dismantle and eliminate 20 liquid fueled SLBMs; Procure six spent naval fuel transport railcars; Procure 40 additional storage pads for spent naval fuel casks; Begin renovation of a spent naval fuel storage facility; Procure additional 97 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel; Complete construction and begin operation of the liquid fuel disposition systems; Transport, dismantle and eliminate 48 liquid fueled ICBMs; Eliminate a road mobile ICBM base; Complete design and continue construction of the solid propellant disposition facility; Configure one solid ICBM disassembly facility and one mobile ICBM launcher elimination facility; Continue construction of the liquid oxidizer disposition systems; Eliminate ten solid fuel SLBMs by open burn/open detonation; and Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment. FY 2002 funds will: Eliminate 16 SLBM launchers and one associated SSBN; Transport, dismantle, and eliminate 46 liquid fueled SLBMs; Procure additional 48 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel; Complete renovation of a spent naval fuel storage facility; Continue operations and maintenance of the liquid propellant disposition systems; Transport, dismantle and eliminate 48 liquid fueled ICBMs; Eliminate one road and one rail mobile ICBM base; Complete construction, start-up, certify and turn over to the RF the solid propellant disposition facility;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination(SOAE)-Russia (Continued): Complete construction of the oxidizer disposition facility; Configure two solid ICBM disassembly facilities and one mobile ICBM launcher elimination facility; Repair transfer facilities and infrastructure required to disassemble 4 mobile ICBM regiments; Transport, dismantle and eliminate 24 solid fuel ICBMs; Eliminate 30 mobile ICBM launchers; Eliminate ten solid fuel SLBMs by open burn/open detonation; and Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment. FY 2003 funds will: Eliminate 36 SLBM launchers and two associated SSBNs; Transport, dismantle, and eliminate 24 liquid fueled SLBMs; Procure additional 24 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel; Continue operations and maintenance of the liquid propellant disposition systems; Transport, dismantle and eliminate 48 liquid fueled ICBMs; Eliminate one road and one rail mobile ICBM base; Repair transfer facilities and infrastructure required to dismantle 8 mobile ICBM regiments; Transport, dismantle and eliminate 42 solid fuel ICBMs; Eliminate 33 mobile ICBM launchers; Eliminate ten solid fuel SLBMs by open burn/open detonation; and Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment. (Delleve in Theureede)

	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
B. <u>Weapons Storage Security - Russia</u> :	89,700	55,000	40,000

FY 2001 funds will:

Continue maintenance and life cycle support of AICMS at 19 sites; Complete AICMS facility designs, facility modifications, and install at 19 sites;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

B. Weapons Storage Security - Russia (Continued):

Provide vulnerability analysis, site designs, provide site renovations, procurement, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at 12 nuclear weapons storage sites;

Provide site renovation and installation for three nuclear warhead storage sites; Continue to procure additional portable drug and alcohol testing equipment; Continue to procure communication, safety, and support equipment for 40 sites; Install perimeter security systems at 31 MOD nuclear weapons storage bunkers; and Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

FY 2002 funds will:

Continue maintenance and life cycle support of AICMS at 19 sites; Continue to procure additional portable drug and alcohol testing equipment; Provide vulnerability analysis, site designs, provide site renovations, procurement, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at 18 additional nuclear weapons storage sites;

Provide site renovations and installation for an additional five nuclear warhead storage sites;

Continue to procure communication, safety, and support equipment for 15 sites; Install perimeter security systems at 31 MOD nuclear weapons storage bunkers; and Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

FY 2003 funds will:

Continue maintenance and life cycle support of AICMS at 19 sites;

- Continue to procure additional personnel, reliability, and safety equipment to include 20,0000 urinalysis test cups;
- Provide vulnerability analysis, site designs, provide site renovations, procurement, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at five to seven MOD nuclear weapons storage sites;
- Provide additional safety and support equipment for the associated five to seven MOD nuclear weapons storage sites;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

B. Weapons Storage Security - Russia (Continued):

Provide additional guard force equipment to upgrade security at MOD's nuclear weapons storage sites; and Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

	(Dollar	(Dollars in Thousands)			
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003		
C. <u>Weapons Transportation Security - Russia</u>	14,000	9,500	19,700		

FY 2001 funds will:

Continue procurement of communication equipment, survey equipment, and related training to enhance MOD's accident response;

Transport approximately 84 train loads of deactivated nuclear warheads (2000 to 2500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities; and

Provide maintenance and Railway Ministry certification for approximately 144 MOD nuclear weapons transportation rail cars.

FY 2002 funds will:

Transport approximately 84 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (2000 to 2500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities.

FY 2003 funds will:

- Transport approximately 84 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (2000 to 2500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;
- Provide maintenance and certification for 115 MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars;
- Provide equipment and material to enhance MOD's capability to respond to nuclear weapons transportation accidents and more efficiently mitigate their consequences; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

C. Weapons Transportation Security - Russia (Continued):

Provide material to ensure the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons in support of dismantlement objectives.

	(<u>Dollars in Thousands</u>)			
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	
D. Fissile Material Storage Facility - Russia	56,425	0	0	

FY 2001 funding will: Complete construction of the Fissile Material Storage Facility.

	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
E.Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) - Ukraine	35,900	50,000	6,500

FY 2001 funds will: Disassemble the remaining 8 SS-24 missiles; Provide storage of 163 missile motors; Eliminate the remaining 20 sets of START I accountable SS-24 missile components [other than motor cases]; Provide maintenance and operation of facilities and equipment required to eliminate missile accountable components; Begin equipment procurement and construction of the SS-24 solid propellant disposition facility; Eliminate the remaining 31 Tu-22M Backfire bombers and 230 Kh-22 ALCMs; and Provide consolidated logistical support of CTR provided equipment.

Complete construction of the SS-24 solid propellant disposition facility; Remove propellant from and eliminate 66 of the 163 missile motors; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide consolidated logistical support of CTR provided equipment.

E. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) - Ukraine (Continued):

FY 2003 funds will:

Continue to provide maintenance and storage of 97 missile motors; Remove propellant from and eliminate 66 of the 97 missile motors; and Provide consolidated logistical support of CTR provided equipment.

	(Dolla:	(Dollars in Thousands)			
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003		
F. WMD Infrastructure Elimination - Ukraine	0	6,024	8,800		

FY 2002 funds will:

Eliminate equipment and infrastructure at 2 to 3 liquid missile propellant handling and storage facilities; and

Initiate elimination of airbase infrastructure at former heavy bomber bases.

FY 2003 funds will:

Continue the elimination of equipment and infrastructure at another 2 to 3 liquid missile propellant handling and storage facilities; and

Continue elimination of airbase infrastructure at former heavy bomber bases.

	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
G. WMD Infrastructure Elimination - Kazakhstan	0	6,000	9,000

FY 2002 funds will:

Continue to prevent proliferation of fissile and radioactive material; Initiate infrastructure elimination at the Pavlodar CW production facility; Initiate infrastructure elimination at the Chagan airfield; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Initiate the elimination of equipment and infrastructure at liquid missile propellant handling and storage facilities.

G. WMD Infrastructure Elimination - Kazakhstan (Continued):

FY 2003 funds will:

Complete infrastructure elimination at the Pavlodar CW production facility; Continue to prevent proliferation of fissile and radioactive material; Complete elimination of infrastructure at the Chagan airfield; and Continue the elimination of equipment and infrastructure at liquid missile propellant handling and storage facilities.

	(Dollars in Thousands)			
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	
H.BW Proliferation Prevention	12,000	17,000	55,000	

FY 2001 funds will:

Initiate four and continue support for 14 existing collaborative research projects on biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU BW scientists in the areas of force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism and modeling;

- Upgrade two former BW institute's vivaria;
- Purchase equipment and animals for four collaborative research projects;
- Provide training for 30 FSU BW scientists from eight former BW institutes in proper animal care and use issues;
- Provide biosafety training for 20 FSU scientists representing five former BW institutes;
- Initiate three new and continue four existing security enhancement projects to secure pathogen repositories at former BW institutes; and
- Continue consolidation/dismantlement of BW production/research facilities.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2002 funds will:

Initiate four and continue support for 18 existing collaborative research projects
 on biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU BW scientists in the areas of force
 protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism and modeling;
Configure two former BW institute's vivaria to meet DoD animal use standards;
Purchase equipment and animals for four collaborative research projects;

H. BW Proliferation Prevention (Continued):

Provide training for 20 FSU BW scientists in proper animal care and use issues; Provide biosafety training for 20 FSU scientists representing five former BW institutes;

Continue seven and initiate three new security enhancement projects at pathogen repositories at former BW institutes; and

Continue consolidation/dismantlement of BW production/research facilities.

FY 2003 funds will:

- Initiate additional projects and continue support for existing collaborative research projects on biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU BW scientists in the areas of force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism and modeling;
- Purchase equipment and animals for former BW institutes to support DoD sponsored research;
- Provide training for FSU BW scientists in proper animal care and use issues to support DoD sponsored research;
- Provide biosafety training for FSU scientists at former BW institutes storing dangerous pathogens;
- Continue and initiate additional security enhancement projects at pathogen repositories at former BW institutes;
- Continue consolidation/dismantlement of BW production/research facilities; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide advice, equipment, and training to establish syndromic reporting system in FSU states for BW diseases that enhances national and international BW disease surveillance capabilities.

(Dollars in Thousands) <u>FY 2001</u> <u>FY 2002</u> <u>FY 2003</u> <u>0</u> 50,000 <u>133,600</u>

I. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia

FY 2002 funds will: Complete site preparation and limited site utilities; Initiate construction of underground utility system; Initiate construction of foundation and slabs for primary building; Initiate construction of utility buildings; Complete demilitarization of former CW production facilities at Volgograd; and Continue demilitarization of former CW production facilities at Novocheboksarsk.

I. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia (Continued)

FY 2003 funds will: Continue construction of underground utility system; Continue construction of primary building; Continue construction of utility buildings; Initiate procurement of long lead items; Initiate construction of industrial support, safety and service buildings; and Continue demilitarization of former CW production facilities at Novocheboksarsk.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
J. Nukus Chemical Research Institute Dismantlement - Uzbekistan	2,500	0	0

FY 2001 funds will:

Complete dismantlement of the former Soviet chemical weapons research, development and testing capabilities within the Nukus Chemical Research Institute.

	(Dollars in	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	FY 2001 FY 2)02 FY 2003		
K. WMD Proliferation Prevention - (non-Russia FSU)	0	0 40,000		

FY 2003 funds will:

Provide equipment and training to improve border control capabilities; and Provide consolidated logistics support and maintenance training of CTR provided equipment.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

	(Dollars in Thousands)			
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	
L. Defense and Military Contacts	9,000	18,349	18,900	

FY 2001 will fund approximately 225 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2002 will fund approximately 500 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2003 will fund approximately 507 defense and military exchanges.

	(Dollars in Thousands)			
	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	
M. Other Assessments/Administrative Support	13,000	13,221	14,700	

FY 2001 through FY 2003 funds will conduct 22 A&Es per year and fund contracts for technical and program support.

V. Personnel Summary: N/A

VI. Summary of Price and Program Changes (\$ in Thousands):

Line Item	Description	FY 2001 <u>Program</u>	Price <u>Growth</u>	Program <u>Growth</u>	FY 2002 Estimate	Price Growth	Program <u>Growth</u>	FY 2003 Estimate
0308	Travel of Persons	2,477	40	355	2,872	43	-910	2,005
0399	TOTAL TRAVEL	2,477	40	355	2,872	43	-910	2,005
0915	Rents (Non-GSA)	435	7	-344	98	1	-99	0
0920	Supplies and Materials	70	1	-1	70	1	-11	60
0925	Equipment Purchases	12,582	201	22,069	34,852	523	-9,515	25,860
0933	Studies, Analysis & Evaluations	600	10	-10	600	9	-9	600
0987	Other Intra-Governmental Purchases	100,278	0	-37,087	63,191	948	-677	63 , 462
0989	Other Contracts	18	0	-18	0	0	0	0
0998	Other Costs	325,965	5,215	-32,664	298,516	4,478	21,719	324,713
0999	TOTAL OTHER PURCHASES	439,948	5,435	-48,055	397,327	5,960	11,408	414,695
9999	Total	442,425	5,474	-47,700	400,199	6,003	10,498	416,700