# FY 2001 Budget Estimate

# Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation



I. <u>Description of Operations Financed:</u> With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have embarked on a path leading to historic reductions in nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, political fragmentation, economic disarray and formidable numbers of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and the threat of proliferation of WMD pose serious challenges ahead for U.S. national security. With the 1991 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act and subsequent legislation, Congress sought to reduce the threat to the U.S. and funded Department of Defense (DoD) implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. In the

FY 2000 President's Budget submission and in the April 1999 Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative Report, the Administration recognized the need for additional CTR Program assistance to Russia and other new independent states (NIS) to meet arms control commitments, reduce WMD to desired levels, and to address increasing WMD proliferation risks. The situation in Russia and the NIS is considered one of the most significant international security challenges facing the U.S. and our Allies. Based on the CTR legislation, U.S. National Security policy, and an assessment of opportunities for cooperative engagement with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other independent states of the FSU, DoD has revised the five CTR objectives:

### A. Objective One:

Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reductions to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels.

The START implementation is integral to the development of the U.S. national security strategy. The START II, as revised by the Protocol to the Treaty in New York, requires mandatory reductions to 3,000-3,500 deployed strategic warheads and elimination of all SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) by 2007. Presidents Yeltsin's and Clinton's Helsinki Summit Joint Statement on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, reaffirmed as recent as June 1999, in Cologne, Germany, calls for lower aggregate levels of warheads to 2,000-2,500 and for CTR assistance to accomplish early deactivation of missile systems to be eliminated under START II.

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

Consistent with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) guidance and Russian requests for assistance, the CTR program is prepared to assist in the dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems to levels at or below those specified by START protocols. The CTR funding facilitates the destruction and/or dismantlement of: strategic missile

systems; ICBM silos, road and rail mobile launchers; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and both liquid/solid fuel and strategic bombers. Destruction and dismantlement of these delivery systems contribute to proliferation prevention. Major Western contractors provide integrating contractor management support, equipment, training and logistic support. Direct contracts with Russian enterprises, such as shipyard elimination facilities, SLBM missile elimination facilities and design institutes are incorporated, as necessary, to meet this objective.

### B. Objective Two:

Enhance safety, security, control, accounting, and centralization of nuclear weapons and fissile material in the FSU to prevent their proliferation and encourage their reduction.

This objective is central to controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material from the FSU. As part of this objective, all nuclear weapons were consolidated in Russia by late 1996. Pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS) Agreement, CTR assistance will improve control, security, and safety of nuclear weapons while in transit and storage pending dismantlement by providing equipment to and services for the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MOD). The NWSS enhancements include a nuclear weapon automated inventory control and management system and the development of an integrated physical security and access denial system for 123 storage structures. The 123 sites include 50 storage structures of the MOD's Twelfth Main Directorate, 48 Air Force and Navy structures, and 25 Strategic Rocket Forces structures.

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

The CTR plan is to procure, deliver, and certify hardware and software, and establish and begin administering a system configuration control board for the warhead automated inventory control and management system. Plans are to ship equipment to operating locations, perform facility renovation, and install the warhead inventory control and management system. The CTR will continue to test and evaluate candidate nuclear warhead storage security equipment and systems at the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) and begin procurement, check-out, and training on a fully integrated nuclear warhead security system and non-integrated equipment for the 123 storage locations.

Furthermore, CTR is planning to provide shipment and installation of storage site perimeter security systems (Quick Fix) at any site the MOD is unable to complete installation. To enhance weapons guard forces at Twelfth Main Directorate storage sites, CTR plans to construct the small arms training simulators (SATS) training and maintenance facility at the SATC and to procure sixty (60) SATS sets. The CTR will also continue providing operations and logistics support to the fixed drug testing laboratory, procure additional polygraph systems, and provide additional field test kit consumables, for the MOD personnel reliability program (PRP). Finally, to enhance safe handling of nuclear weapons, CTR plans to initiate facility modifications for the MOD Center for Technology Diagnostics (CTD) to support the testing and certification of warhead handling equipment and environmental control systems, procure equipment for diagnostics field teams, and train the MOD operators in the use and maintenance of the CTD equipment.

Pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) Agreement, CTR assistance supports the safe and secure transportation of nuclear warheads from

deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities. While the number of warheads per shipment and the distance of each shipment will vary, over 120,000 kilometers of shipments are planned each year. The CTR also funds maintenance and Railway Ministry required certification of MOD nuclear weapons guard and cargo rail cars. The

project will provide required maintenance on approximately 215 railcars. Procurement of

### I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (Continued)</u>:

additional transportation safety equipment will provide enhanced communications, diagnostics, emergency access, and cold weather capability.

Equipment, training, and services support the design and construction of a safe and secure fissile material storage facility (FMSF) at Mayak, Russia. The facility will have a capacity to store 50,000 containers of weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from at least 12,500 weapons in two storage wings. This facility significantly enhances the material control and accounting, transparency, and safeguarding of fissile materials removed from dismantled FSU nuclear weapons. The construction schedule and funding are linked to accelerated rates of weapons dismantlement and Helsinki agreed warhead levels. Fissile material removed from dismantled nuclear weapons would not have adequate security and storage without this project. The CTR funds assist Russia in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons i.e., inserts for loading fissile material into fissile material containers. The CTR plan is to fund reshaping of the plutonium and HEU from nuclear warheads into unclassified shapes. The resulting shapes will be loaded into 3 millimeter wall thick stainless steel cladding for long term stability, and placed into inserts prior to placement into fissile material containers (FMCs).

The elimination of weapons grade plutonium production through reactor core conversion in Russia was directed by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission agreement and expanded in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. Russian production of weapons grade plutonium will cease and improve operational safety by converting the reactor core design configuration of the reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Currently, three reactors can produce up to 1.5 metric tons of plutonium per year. The reactors also provide critically needed district heat and electricity to Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.

#### C. Objective Three:

Assist Ukraine and Kazakhstan to eliminate START-limited systems and weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

Ukraine officially became a non-nuclear weapons state in June 1996. However, dismantlement of Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs, strategic bombers, and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) is a top U.S. Government priority. A broad range of national security, arms control, and nonproliferation objectives are met with this effort. In 1997 Ukraine decided to eliminate the SS-24 weapon system that consisted of the remaining 55 SS-24 missiles, 46 silos, 5 launch control centers, and supporting infrastructure. The DoD CTR assistance will provide U.S. integrating contractors to manage construction of temporary missile storage (missiles awaiting elimination), dismantlement of silo launchers in accordance with START I protocols, building and operating a SS-24 solid rocket motor propellant extraction facility, and SS-24 missile component elimination. The elimination of approximately 44 bombers and over 1,000 ALCMs supports the December 1997 SECDEF/Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) Brussels Statement of Intent to eliminate strategic bombers and associated ALCMs. Kazakhstan is a non-nuclear weapons state and no additional funding is requested.

### D. Objective Four:

Assist the FSU to eliminate and prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and associated capabilities.

Biological and chemical weapons capabilities in the FSU pose urgent non-proliferation and public safety concerns. The CTR biological weapons (BW) initiative will support collaborative research efforts with FSU scientists through direct oversight designed to address DoD bio-defense needs in the areas of force protection, medical countermeasures and modeling. The CTR augments other DoD research capabilities while gaining transparency into FSU biotechnology activities. BW security enhancement will address significant physical security deficiencies at the extensive repositories of dangerous virus and bacteria pathogens. Assistance to dismantle FSU biological weapons infrastructure is also provided.

### I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (Continued)</u>:

The chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) effort supports the Presidential commitment to support Russian participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and The President's Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative program. With the FY 2001 budget, the Administration requests a lifting of the prohibition for planning, design, or construction of in Russia, specified by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000, Section 1305, Limitation use of Funds for Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Department considers implementation of the chemical weapons destruction facility project to be fully consistent with the CTR program focus on eliminating the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The project fulfills the U.S. objective to "jump start" the Russian CW destruction program by providing a critical pilot facility to prove technology and procedures necessary for the Russian federation to complete the destruction of a 32,500 metric ton nerve agent stockpile.

### E. Objective Five:

Encourage military reductions and reforms and reduce proliferation threats in the FSU.

The CTR efforts to establish and expand a network of professional exchanges between U.S. and FSU defense and military establishments include: bilateral working group meetings and Joint Staff talks between senior defense officials, a wide range of delegation exchanges on defense and military topics, base/unit exchanges, and combined exercises. In accordance with Congressional direction provided by the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 104-201, DoD is expanding this program to other countries of the FSU besides Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan (original recipients of CTR assistance). DoD has already held events with its counterparts in Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.

### I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (Continued</u>):

### F. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Funds the Audits and Examinations program provisions which have been negotiated with CTR recipients as part of all CTR Implementing Agreements. This Congressional interest item ensures that DoD provided equipment, services, and training are used for the intended purpose, and support CTR Program objectives. Funding also supports: CTR delegation and technical team travel expenses, translator/interpreter support, and contracted scientific, engineering and technical assistance.

### II. Force Structure Summary:

A. <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination - Russia</u>: Accelerate Russian activities to meet strategic arms reduction goals in accordance with the June, 1999 Cologne, Germany Joint Statement between the U.S. and Russian Federation Concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and Further Strengthening of Stability. The CTR Program is providing equipment and services to dismantle strategic nuclear delivery systems including: ICBM silos, mobile launchers, ICBMs, SLBMs, SLBM launchers and associated SSBN, and heavy bombers. Funding also supports transport, storage, and disposition of liquid/solid rocket propellants and disposition of spent fuel from SSBNs; and emergency support equipment.

- B. <u>Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Russia</u>: Provide inventory control system, security enhancements, CTD guard force training assistance, and personnel reliability program support to Russian nuclear weapons storage sites in order to deter the theft, diversion, or sabotage of weapons.
- C. <u>Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Russia</u>: Supports the transport of warheads from deployed locations to secure storage sites and to dismantlement facilities. Funds maintenance and Railway Ministry certification of MOD nuclear weapons cargo and guard rail cars. The CTR will procure additional transportation safety equipment.
- D. <u>Fissile Material Storage Facility Russia</u>: Rectify Russia's shortage of enhanced secure storage facilities for fissile materials from dismantled weapons. The CTR Program is providing materials, services, and training related to the design and construction of a safe, secure, and ecologically-sound FMSF at Mayak, Russia.
- E. <u>Fissile Material Processing and Packaging (Warhead Dismantlement Processing) Russia</u>: Assist Russia in dismantling nuclear weapons by preparing the plutonium and HEU for long term storage in FMCs at the FMSF.

### II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

- F. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Russia: Ceases production of weapons-grade plutonium at the three remaining production reactors. Assist Russia in the design and installation of improved operational safety features, and preparation of the production capability for manufacturing fuel elements and neutron absorber elements. Provides technical assistance in the review of the reactor design by U.S. experts.
- G. <u>Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination Ukraine</u>: Assist Ukraine in meeting arms reductions under START. The CTR Program provides equipment and services to dismantle Ukrainian SS-24 missiles and launchers, strategic bombers, and ALCMs; transport and dispose of propellants; and provide emergency response equipment.
- H. <u>BW Proliferation Prevention</u>: Continue the biological weapons proliferation prevention program with FSU biological weapons institutes/laboratories working through the International Science and Technology Center. The program will redirect the efforts of the scientists through direct contracts with former BW scientists and with United States collaborators and perhaps selected National Alliance Treaty Organization nation collaborators. Funds will also be used for security enhancement of BW pathogens and for dismantlement of biological agent production/research facilities.
- I. Chemical Weapons Destruction Russia: Assist Russia in the safe, secure, and ecologically sound destruction of its CW stockpile and minimize the potential for proliferation. The CTR Program is completing the design of the first CW Destruction Facility (CWDF) for weaponized nerve agent at Shchuch'ye, Russia; responding to concerns regarding the proliferation of CW weapons by demilitarizing former CW production facilities, and enhancing site security at CW storage facilities.
- J. <u>Defense and Military Contacts</u>: Encourage military reductions and reforms in the FSU by supporting defense and military contacts that promote national sovereignty,

democratic reform, and regional cooperation. Reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by promoting safety and security of residual weapons,

### II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

promoting the safety and security of borders from possible smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting cooperation in non-proliferation.

K. Other Assessments/Administrative Support: Fund a Congressionally mandated Audits and Examinations (A&E) program and CTR program administrative and support costs. Activities include CTR delegation and technical team travel, translator/interpreter support, project requirements development, embassy support costs, and contracted technical and analytical program support.

### III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands):

A. Sub-Activity Group	FY 1999	Budget		Current	FY 2001
	Actuals	Request	Appropriation	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>
1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination -	142,400	157,300	182,300	182,300	152,800
Russia					
2. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia	41,700	40,000	84,000	84,000	89,700
3. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security -	10,300	15,200	15,200	15,200	14,000
Russia					
4. Fissile Material Storage Facility - Russia	60,900	64,500	64,500	62,119	57,400
5. Fissile Material Processing and Packaging	9,400	9,300	9,300	9,300	9,300
- Russia					
6. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium	29,800	20,000	32,200	32,200	32,100
(RCC) - Russia					
7. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination -	47,500	33,000	35,000	35,000	29,100
Ukraine					
8. BW Proliferation Prevention	2,000	2,000	14,000	14,000	12,000
9. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia	88,400	130,400	20,000	20,000	35,000
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10.Defense and Military Contacts	0	2,000	2,000	2,000	14,000
-		•	·		·
11.Other Assessments/Administrative Support	8,000	1,800	2,000	2,000	13,000
	•	•	,	,	•
Total	440,400	475,500	460,500	458,119	458,400

### III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

В.	Reconciliation Summary	Change	Change	
		FY 2000/FY 2000	FY 2000/FY 2001	_
	<ol> <li>Baseline Funding</li> </ol>	475,500	458,119	
	<ul><li>a. Congressional Adjustment (Distributed)</li></ul>	s -15,000	N/A	
	<pre>b. Congressional Adjustment</pre>	s 0	0	
	<pre>c. Congressional Adjustment</pre>	s 0	0	
	d. Congressional Earmarks	0	0	
	e. Congressional Earmark Bi	llpayers 0	0	
	2. Appropriated Amount (Subtot	al) 460,500	0	
	Adjustments to meet Congres Intent	sional 0	0	
	Across-the-board Reduction (Rescission)	-2,381	0	
	Approved Reprogrammings/Tra	nsfers 0	0	
	3. Price Change	-1,381	6,872	
	4. Program Changes	+1,381	-6,591	
	5. Current Estimate	458,119	458,400	
C.	Reconciliation of Increases and Dec	reases:		
	1. FY 2000 President's Budge		475,500	
	2. Congressional Adjustment	(Distributed)	-15,000	
	Total Congressional Adj	justment (Distribute	d)	_
15,0	000			
	3. Congressional Adjustment	(Undistributed)		0
	Congressional Adjustment	(General Provisions)		0
	4. Congressional Earmarks			0

### III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

### C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases (Continued):

5.	FY 2000 Appropriated Amount	460,500
6.	FY 2000 Rescission	-2,381
7.	Functional Transfers-In	0
8.	Other Transfers-In (Non-Functional)	0
9.	Functional Transfers-Out	0
10.	Other Functional Transfers-Out	0
11.	Price Change	-1,381
12.	Program Increases	0
	a. Fissile Material Storage Facility - Russia Restores funding gained through retained inflation savings to offset the effect of the congressionally directed across the board recission.	1,381
13.	Total Program Increases	1,381
14.	Program Decreases	0
15.	Revised FY 2000 Estimate	458,119
16.	Price Growth	6,872
17.	Transfers In	0
18.	Transfers Out	0
19.	Program Increases:	

a. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia (FY 2000 Base: \$84,000) 4,440
Provides procurement, integration, training, site renovations and
installation of an additional 17 nuclear warhead storage site
enhancement equipment suites.

b. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia (FY 2000 Base: \$20,000)
 Initiates site preparation, procurement of long lead items and planning for construction procurement.

### III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

- C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases (Continued):
  - 19. Program Increases (continued):
    - c. Defense and Military Contacts (FY 2000 Base: \$2,000) 11,970 Funds for approximately 300 additional defense and military exchanges.
    - d. Other Assessments/Administrative Support (FY 2000 Base: \$2,000) 10,970 Previous baseline was selected to permit obligation of older unobligated funds. Increase represents actual annual requirement.
  - 20. Total Increases 42,080

### 21. Program Decreases:

- a. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)-Russia (FY 2000 Base: \$182,300) -32,234
   SLBM launcher eliminations and spent naval fuel disposition eliminations reduced.
- b. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Russia (FY 2000 Base: \$15,200)
   Reduced to align funding with projected transport costs.
- c. Fissile Material Storage Facility Russia (FY 2000 Base: \$62,119)
   -5,651
   Estimate on material costs reduced based on actual expenditures.
- d. Fissile Material Processing and Packaging (Warhead Dismantlement Processing)
   -140
   Russia (FY 2000 Base: \$9,300)

e. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium (Reactor Core Conversion) - Russia -583 (FY 2000 Base: \$32,200)
Increase in installation costs offset by delay in installation costs.

f. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE)-Ukraine (FY 2000 Base: \$35,000) -6,425 Budget reduction due to completion of SS-24 silo and bomber elimination.

### III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

Minor facility modifications complete.

- C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases (Continued):
  - 21. Program Decreases (continued):
    - g. BW Proliferation Prevention (FY 2000 Base: \$14,000) -2,210

      Collaborative research and security enhancement effort reduced by 20%.
  - 22. Total Decreases -48,671 23. FY 2001 Budget Request 458,400

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Objective One - Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reductions to START levels:

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)-Russia 142,400 182,300 152,800

#### FY 1999 funds:

Eliminate 144 SLBM launchers and associated SSBNs;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 100 liquid fueled SLBMs;

Provide assistance to eliminate 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Procure transportation/storage containers for spent naval fuel;

Provide assistance to store or reprocess spent naval fuel from 6 SSBNs;

Construct two on-shore spent naval fuel defueling facilities;

Initiate volume reduction of 4,000 cubic meters (m3)of liquid and 400 m3 of solid LLRW;

Repair/recertify 125 rail cars and 670 intermodal containers for rocket fuel/oxidizer;

Construct mobile plant to eliminate 123,000 metric tons (MT) of liquid ICBM/SLBM oxidizer;

Provide equipment and initiate facility modifications to assist in the elimination of up to 60 SS-17/19 ICBMs per year;

Refurbish/repair infrastructure and equipment to eliminate liquid fueled ICBMs and launchers;

Initiate integration efforts for the elimination of liquid fueled ICBMs and launchers;

Eliminate 6 SS-18 ICBM silos; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

### A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) - Russia (Continued):

#### FY 2000 funds will:

Eliminate 47 SLBM launchers and associated SSBNs;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 100 liquid fueled SLBMs;

Procure additional 50 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel;

Store or reprocess spent naval fuel from 10 SSBNs;

Continue volume reduction of 4,000 m3 of liquid and 400 m3 of solid low level radiation waste (LLRW);

Conduct operations and maintenance of the liquid propellant disposition systems;

Refurbish/repair infrastructure and equipment in support of liquid fueled ICBM and launcher elimination;

Continue integration efforts for the elimination of liquid fueled ICBMs and associated launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 60 liquid fueled ICBMs;

Eliminate 24 ICBM silos;

Complete construction of the solid propellant disposition facility;

Refurbish/repair infrastructure and equipment in support of solid fueled ICBM/SLBMs and associated mobile launcher elimination;

Initiate integration efforts for the elimination of solid fueled ICBM/SLBMs and associated mobile launchers; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

#### FY 2001 funds will:

Eliminate 100 SLBM launchers and associated SSBNs;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 100 liquid fueled SLBMs;

Procure additional 48 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

### A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) - Russia (Continued):

FY 2001 funds will (continued):

Provide assistance to store or reprocess spent naval fuel from 9 SSBNs;

Continue volume reduction of 4,000 m3 of liquid and 400 m3 of solid LLRW;

Conduct operations and maintenance of the liquid propellant disposition systems;

Refurbish/repair infrastructure and equipment in support of liquid fueled ICBM and launcher elimination;

Continue integration efforts for the elimination of liquid fueled ICBMs and associated launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 62 liquid fueled ICBMs;

Conduct operations and maintenance of the solid propellant disposition facility;

Refurbish/repair infrastructure and equipment in support of solid fueled ICBM/SLBMs and associated mobile launcher elimination;

Continue integration efforts for the elimination of solid fueled ICBM/SLBMs and associated mobile launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 30 solid fuel ICBM/SLBMs;

Eliminate 25 mobile ICBM launchers; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

Objective Two - Enhance the security, control, accounting, and centralization of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia to prevent their proliferation and encourage their reduction:

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 1999</u> <u>FY 2000 FY 2001</u> 41,700 84,000 89,700

### B. <u>Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia</u>

#### FY 1999 funds:

Complete equipment purchases for the warhead automated inventory control and management system for 19 sites;

Begin certification of hardware and software for the warhead automated inventory control and management system at 19 sites;

Test and evaluate up to 50 candidate nuclear warhead storage security equipment types at the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC);

Ship 73 sets of storage site perimeter security systems (Quick Fix) to MOD nuclear weapons storage sites;

Install 20 storage site perimeter security systems (Quick Fix) that have not been installed by MOD;

Procure 60 small arms training systems (SATS) and 12 shooting ranges to enhance weapons guard forces at Twelfth Main Directorate storage sites;

Begin laboratory renovation, procurement of long lead-time equipment, and training on the MOD Center for Technology Diagnostics (CTD) to support the testing and certification of warhead handling equipment and environmental control systems for MOD nuclear storage bunkers; and, Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

#### FY 2000 funds will:

Complete certification of the hardware and software for the warhead automated inventory control and management system at 19 sites;

Ship equipment, renovate facilities, install, and provide communications services for the warhead inventory control and management system at 19 sites;

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

### B. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia (Continued):

#### FY 2000 funds will (continued):

Complete test and evaluation of up to 50 candidate nuclear warhead storage security equipment types at the SATC;

Procure, checkout, and train on guard force equipment for MOD's 123 nuclear warhead storage sites;

Procure, checkout, integrate, and train for 3 nuclear warhead storage site security enhancement equipment suites;

Provide site renovations and installation for 3 nuclear warhead storage site security enhancement equipment suites;

Install 73 sets of storage site perimeter security systems (Quick Fix) at MOD nuclear weapons storage sites;

Complete work on 12 shooting ranges;

Complete procurement and installation of equipment on the CTD, and, Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

#### FY 2001 funds will:

Conduct maintenance and life cycle support of warhead inventory control and management system at 19 sites;

Procure, checkout, integrate, and train for 20 nuclear warhead storage site security enhancement equipment suites;

Provide site renovations and installation for 20 nuclear warhead storage site security enhancement equipment suites; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$'s in Thousands)

<u>FY 1999</u> <u>FY 2000</u> <u>FY 2001</u>

C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia 10,300 15,200 14,000

#### FY 1999 funds:

Provide initial data transfer and communication equipment, survey equipment, and related training to enhance MOD's accident response;

Provide approximately 120,000 kilometers of transportation services for deactivated nuclear warhead trains from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance and Railway Ministry certification for approximately 144 MOD nuclear weapons transportation rail cars;

Begin modification of nuclear weapons railcars to provide enhanced environmental control; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

#### FY 2000 funds will:

Continue procurement of data transfer and communication equipment, survey equipment, and related training to enhance MOD's accident response;

Provide approximately 120,000 kilometers of transportation services for deactivated nuclear warhead trains from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance and Railway Ministry certification for approximately 144 MOD nuclear weapons transportation rail cars;

Manufacture 15 nuclear weapons guard cars and 40 out of 185 rail cars to provide enhanced security and environmental control; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

### C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia (Continued):

### FY 2001 funds will:

Continue procurement of data transfer and communication equipment, survey equipment, and related training to enhance MOD's accident response;

Provide approximately 120,000 kilometers of transportation services for deactivated nuclear warhead trains from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance and Railway Ministry certification for approximately 144 MOD nuclear weapons transportation rail cars;

Manufacture 90 out of 185 nuclear weapons rail cars to provide enhanced security and environmental control; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

(\$'s in Thousands)

D. <u>Fissile Material Storage Facility - Russia</u> FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 57,400

FY 1999 through FY 2001:

Supports the design, equipment, training, materials and construction services to construct a 25,000 container fissile material storage facility at Mayak.

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001

E. Fissile Material Processing and Packaging

(Warhead Dismantlement Processing) - Russia 9,400 9,300 9,300

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

E. Fissile Material Processing and Packaging (Warhead Dismantlement Processing) - Russia (Continued):

FY 1999 funds:

Provide preliminary engineering and technology assistance for development of Joint Transparency Protocol to provide confidence that fissile material to be stored is weapons origin/weapons grade.

FY 2000 funding will:

Continue preliminary engineering and technology assistance for development of Joint Transparency Protocol to provide confidence that fissile material to be stored is weapons origin/weapons grade;

Provide facility modifications, limited equipment purchases and installation, systems engineering, and start-up of production operations; and,

Provide design and systems engineering support to FMC inner container and insert production.

#### FY 2001 funding will:

Complete start-up of the production of FMC inner containers and inserts to reach a loading rate of 2,000 fissile material containers per year; and,.

Support operations costs for fissile material processing and packaging.

		(\$'s in Th	[housands]	
	FY 1999	FY 2000 I	FY 2001	
F. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium (RCC)				
- Russia	29,800	32,200	32,100	

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

### F. Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium (RCC) - Russia (Continued):

- FY 1999 funds procurement of materials and equipment necessary for conversion of the first reactor, continue the design/licensing work and continue procurement planning for the second reactor.
- FY 2000 funds will complete procurement of materials and equipment necessary for conversion of the first reactor, continue the LEU design/licensing

work, start procurement planning for the third reactor and begin long lead procurement for the second reactor.

FY 2001 funds will continue the LEU design/licensing effort, convert the first reactor, continue the procurement planning for the third reactor and continue equipment procurement for the second reactor.

Objective Three - Assist Ukraine and Kazakhstan to eliminate START-limited systems and weapons of mass destruction infrastructure:

(\$'s in Thousands)

<u>FY 1999</u> <u>FY 2000</u> <u>FY 2001</u>

G. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE)-Ukraine47,500 35,000 29,100

FY 1999 funds:

Procure storage building for 26 SS-24 missiles and motors;

Continue operational storage of SS-24 missiles and motors;

Disassemble 20 SS-24 missiles;

Continue repair and maintenance of rail infrastructure supporting missile transport;

Eliminate 10 SS-24 launch silos and one launch control center;

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 1999 funds (continued):

Destroy 11 heavy bombers and 100 air launched cruise missiles; Begin the construction of a SS-24 solid propellant disposition facility; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

#### FY 2000 funds will:

Procure storage buildings for 20 SS-24 missiles and motors;
Continue operational storage of SS-24 missiles and motors;
Disassemble 26 SS-24 missiles;
Eliminate 26 SS-24 launch silos; and 2 launch control centers;
Destroy 300 air-launched cruise missiles;
Continue the construction of a solid propellant disposition facility;
Complete the destruction of 22 heavy bombers; and,
Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

### FY 2001 funds will:

Continue operational storage of SS-24 missiles and motors; Complete the construction and initiate operation of a solid propellant disposition facility;

Continue salvage and elimination of SS-24 missiles; Repair and maintain rail infrastructure supporting SS-24 missile transport;

Complete the site restoration of 46 SS-24 launch silos and 2 launch control silos;

Destroy 93 air launched cruise missiles; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Objective Four - Assist the FSU to eliminate and prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and associated capabilities.

(\$'s in Thousands)

<u>FY 1999</u> <u>FY 2000</u> <u>FY 2001</u> 12,000

### H. BW Proliferation Prevention

#### FY 1999 funds:

Initiate four collaborative research projects on biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU BW scientists in the areas of force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism and modeling;

Upgrade 2 former BW Institute's vivaria;

Purchase equipment and animals for 2 former BW Institutes;

Train 40 FSU BW scientists from 6 former BW Institutes in proper animal care and use issues; and,

Provide biosafety training for 5 FSU scientists representing 2 former BW Institutes.

#### FY 2000 funds will:

Initiate 7 collaborative research projects on biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU BW scientists in the areas of force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism and modeling;

Upgrade 4 former BW Institute's vivaria;

Purchase equipment and animals for 4 former BW Institutes;

Provide training for 60 FSU BW scientists from 8 former BW Institutes in proper animal care and use issues;

Provide biosafety training for 20 Russian scientists representing 5 former BW Institutes; and,

Enhance security of pathogen repositories at 2-4 former BW Institutes.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

### H. BW Proliferation Prevention (Continued):

#### FY 2001 funds will:

Initiate 12 collaborative research projects on biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU BW scientists in the areas of force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism and modeling;

Upgrade 4 former BW Institute's vivaria;

Purchase equipment and animals for 6 former BW Institutes;

Provide training for 40 FSU BW scientists from 8 former BW Institutes in proper animal care and use issues;

Provide biosafety training for 20 FSU scientists representing 5 former BW Institutes;

Enhance security of pathogen repositories at 2-4 former BW Institutes; and.

Begin consolidation/dismantlement of BW production/research facilities.

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>Y 1999</u> <u>FY 2000</u> <u>FY2001</u> 88,400 20,000 35,000

### I. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia

#### FY 1999 funds:

Continue process systems and facility designs, and equipment development; Conduct laboratory studies to evaluate chemical agent monitors and obtain engineering data to support development or procurement of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) environmental monitoring system; and,

Upon authorization to begin construction of Shchuch'ye CWDF, initiate procurement to support site mobilization; and,

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

#### FY 2000 funds will:

Initiate project to identify and implement security system improvements to enhance security for the Russian chemical weapons storage at Shchuch'ye and Kizner.

#### FY 2001 funds will:

Initiate site preparation and limited site utilities;

Initiate procurement of long lead equipment items;

Initiate planning for the construction procurements; and,

Provide consolidated logistics support to maintain CW destruction Central Analytical Laboratory.

Objective Five - Encourage military reductions and reforms and reduce proliferation threats in the FSU.

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001

0 2.000 14.000

### J. Defense and Military Contacts

FY 1999 provided 300 defense and military exchanges using prior year funds.

FY 2000 funds will fund approximately 50 defense and military exchanges. The defense and military exchanges will be maintained at 300 events by using prior year funds.

FY 2001 funds will provide approximately 350 defense and military exchanges.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

K. Other Assessments/Administrative Support  $\begin{array}{c} (\$'s \ in \ Thousands) \\ \hline FY \ 1999 \\ \hline 8,000 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{c} FY \ 2000 \\ \hline 2,000 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{c} FY \ 2001 \\ \hline \end{array}$ 

- FY 1999 funds conducted 22 A&Es and funded contracts for technical and program support. The level of effort in other assessments remained constant because prior year funds were utilized.
- FY 2000 funds will conduct 22 A&Es and fund contracts for technical and program support. The level of effort in other assessments will be the same because prior year funds will be utilized.
- FY 2001 funds will conduct 22 A&Es and fund contracts for technical and program support. The level of funding in other assessments increases because all of the prior year funds will have been exhausted.

V. Personnel Summary: N/A

### VI. OP32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in Thousands):

		FY 1999 <u>Estimat</u>	Price <u>Growth</u>	Program <u>Growth</u>	FY 2000 Estimat	Price <u>Growth</u>	Program <u>Growth</u>	FY 2001 Estimat
		<u>e</u>			<u>e</u>			<u>e</u>
0308	Travel of Persons	4,128	50	-693	3,485	52	-49	3,488
0399	TOTAL TRAVEL	4,128	50	-693	3,485	52	-49	3,488
0920	Supplies and Materials	100	1	-1	100	2	-2	100
0925	Equipment Purchases	33,027	396	-1,272	32,151	482	-20,051	12,582
0933	Studies, Analysis & Evaluations	608	7	-415	200	3	397	600
0934	Engineering and Technical Services	912	11	-923	0	0	0	0
0987	Other Intra-Governmental Purchases	93,227	1,119	12,400	106,746	1,601	-3,306	105,041
0989 <b>0999</b>	Other Contracts TOTAL OTHER PURCHASES	308,398 <b>436,272</b>	3,701 <b>5,235</b>	3,338 <b>13,127</b>	315,437 <b>454,634</b>	4,732 <b>6,820</b>	16,420 <b>6,542</b>	336,589 <b>454,912</b>
9999	Total	440,400	5,285	12,434	458,119	6,872	-6,591	458,400