# Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



February 2016

(This page intentionally left blank)

Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

	FY 2015	Price	Program	FY 2016	Price	Program	FY 2017
	Actual	Change	Change	Enacted	Change	Change	Estimate
CTR	365,108	5,844	-12,456	358,496	6,145	-39,037	325,604

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, facilities, and expertise. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, and consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The CTR Program also focuses on building partner capacity to prevent and deter the proliferation of WMD materials in transit across international borders. The CTR Program contributes to the Department of Defense's (DoD) efforts by:

- Supporting a layered defense approach to countering weapons of mass destruction;
- Building strategic relationships with key international partners that enhance threat reduction on a global scale; and,
- Supporting the resilience of the global nonproliferation framework by building partner capacities to enforce the tenets of that framework.

The CTR Program's objectives are:

• Objective 1: Dismantle and destroy stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery that partner countries own, possess, or control.

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

- Objective 2: Account for, secure, and safeguard nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, equipment or expertise, which, if vulnerable to theft or diversion, could result in WMD threats.
- Objective 3: Prevent and detect acquisition, proliferation, and use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery and knowledge.

The CTR Program is currently authorized to operate in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Afghanistan, Africa, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Southeast Asia, Libya, the Middle East, and North Africa. The CTR Program is currently authorized to facilitate the detection, safe and secure transportation, storage, and elimination, of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons components, weapons-related materials, high-threat radiological material, and associated strategic delivery vehicles.

The CTR Program areas and related assistance are:

	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2015 FY 2016 FY		016 FY 2017
	Actuals	Estimate	Estimate
A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	6,720	1,289	11,791

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program secures and eliminates WMD delivery systems, technology, and supporting infrastructure and addresses potential WMD delivery system threats via contingency planning pertaining to countries of concern. Historically, the program has

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

provided equipment and services to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM silo launchers, road-mobile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, nuclear reactor cores of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and WMD infrastructure. In Ukraine, DoD assists with the storage and elimination of solid rocket motors (SRMs) from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs. The program provides construction, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure enabling the removal of solid propellant through water washout and subsequent incineration of the SRM cases. The program maintains readiness to respond to emerging requirements for WMD delivery systems elimination in other countries.

# WMD Delivery Vehicle Contingency Planning - Global

Contingency planning continues to facilitate support for WMD delivery vehicle nonproliferation and elimination activities globally.

# SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination - Ukraine

This project provides secure, safe, ecologically sound incineration of residual propellant and SRM empty motor cases. It also supports a controlled environment for storage of the remaining SRMs and their movement within and between storage areas pending destruction.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

	\$ in thousands		
		FY 2016 Estimate	
B. Chemical Weapons Destruction	950	942	2,942

The Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction program works with partner nations to reduce the threat from chemical weapons by securing and eliminating CW stockpiles, chemical agent research capabilities, and production facilities and mitigating proliferation risk of CW materials and expertise.

<u>Chemical Weapons Contingency Planning - Global</u> Contingency planning continues to facilitate support for CW nonproliferation and elimination activities globally.

## Cooperative Chemical Security - Global

This project provides for the planning, design, development, and installation of security enhancements to partner nation facilities housing toxic industrial chemicals and materials.

	<u>\$</u>	\$ in thousands		
		FY 2016 Estimate		
	Accuais	Escimace	Escimace	
C. Global Nuclear Security	20,702	20,555	16,899	

The Global Nuclear Security program consolidates its efforts to secure nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and high-threat radiological material in storage and in transit across

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

the globe. This program is expanding nuclear security cooperation to new countries and regions consistent with legislation and nuclear threat reduction guidance and in coordination with the efforts of other U.S. Government (USG) entities and international partners' strategic objectives including:

- Dismantle and destroy nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and related weapons-delivery systems;
- Securely transport and store nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and related weapons-delivery vehicles in order to prevent theft or proliferation; and,
- Enhance a partner country's capability to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and nuclear weapons-related technology and expertise.

This program supports the President's Nuclear Security Summit agenda by assisting with the development of Centers of Excellence and conducting technical exchanges with partner countries to enhance training capabilities. Training enhancements are consistent with international best practices related to nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transportation security, emergency response capabilities, and other activities important to improving nuclear security.

This program works with Kazakhstan to help develop its Nuclear Security Training Center and corresponding curricula related to guard force training, emergency response, and inventory management. Work on nuclear security with Kazakhstan is conducted under the Agreement on the Elimination of Infrastructure for Weapons of Mass Destruction (as amended). This Agreement was signed by the United States Department of Defense and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan on October 3, 1995.

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

The Global Nuclear Security program works closely with the Department of Energy and partner countries under various agreements and Memorandums of Understanding in accordance with existing authorities and determinations. Partner countries include Kazakhstan, India, Ukraine, Jordan, and South Africa.

This program enhances security of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and high-threat radiological material. These activities improve the capability of physical security systems to address threats from any source.

## Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence

This project helps to support Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and other activities important to improving nuclear material security. The project facilitates training course development and delivery and provides equipment to enhance nuclear security, material control, and inventory management both bilaterally and through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

## Transportation Security

This project enables the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons, nuclear material, and high-threat radiological material. The project works with partner countries to load, transport, and offload materials, weapons, and spent fuel for the purpose of destruction or down blending. These efforts include implementing physical security solutions for in-transit shipments to maintain positive control; providing equipment to facilitate movement of materials, weapons, and spent fuel; conducting

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

maintenance on shipping equipment; and developing and delivering training for safe and secure transportation.

	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017
	Actuals	Estimate	Estimate
D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:	256,762	264,618	213,984

The Cooperative Biological Engagement program (CBEP) seeks to prevent terrorists or nonstate actors from accessing biological material of security concern or expertise that could contribute to a biological weapons capability. The program builds regional and bilateral partnerships to mitigate biological risks and initiate timely and effective measures to contain biological threats. The program trains partner country experts in current best practices across clinical, epidemiology, laboratory, veterinary, and environmental vector surveillance disciplines. The objective of the training is to enable partner countries to detect, diagnose, report, and predict new and emerging disease threats rapidly and safely. The program supports training and exercises for national response teams; thereby enhancing preparedness efforts that will position partners to quickly identify the cause of outbreaks and report findings to internal decision makers to deploy the appropriate response measures, as well as inform international bodies such as the World Health Organization.

Strategic policy objectives of CBEP are to:

• Dismantle, destroy, and prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or use of stockpiles of biological weapons, means of delivery, and biological weapons related equipment, technology, and infrastructure;

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

- Enhance partner country's/region's capability to identify, consolidate, and secure collections of pathogens of security concern to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of such pathogens; and,
- Enhance partner country's/region's capability to rapidly, safely, and accurately survey, detect, diagnose, and report suspected acts of biological terrorism and outbreaks of pathogens of security concern in accordance with international reporting standards.

The effective implementation of the CBEP strategic objectives contributes to the White House Global Health Security Agenda announced in February 2014 and the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.

This program builds upon the resident capacities within regions and partner countries to safely and accurately diagnose and rapidly report on pathogens of security concern. The program also focuses on establishing and enhancing international research partnerships focused on pathogens of security concern. The program is regionally organized and implemented in cooperation with partner countries and several U.S. interagency partners, such as the Department of State, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Agency for International Development. Projects are ongoing in the FSU, Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. The program is initiating work with additional high priority countries to fill gaps in many countries' compliance with World Health Organization International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) diagnostic and reporting requirements, as well as strengthening biorisk management capabilities.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

\$	in thousa	nds
FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017
Actuals	<u>Estimate</u>	Estimate
49,753	38,945	50,709

#### E. Proliferation Prevention:

The Proliferation Prevention program builds partner countries' capacity to interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related components and technologies. The program develops self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, components, and technologies across country borders. The program develops our partners' capacities in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, border security and interdiction, disposition, and other areas related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear identification, security, and consequence management incident response. The projects provide for equipment, training, and related assistance. Projects are also designed and executed with the long-term sustainment of U.S. provided equipment and skills in mind to ensure that each partner country has the capability and resources to sustain project equipment across its entire life cycle. This program complements ongoing USG and international counter-proliferation assistance provided by the Department of Energy Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence, the Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Program, and the DoD's International Counterproliferation Program. The program also complements the assistance provided by other USG and international partners to enhance counter-smuggling capacities, enhance border security, and increase maritime domain awareness and interoperability. The program leverages projects with other U.S. and international programs to avoid duplication of effort.

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

## Ukraine

This project builds upon recent assistance in providing solutions to immediate, urgent vulnerabilities caused by the Russian Federation incursion into Eastern Ukraine, which may make Ukraine more vulnerable to the potential smuggling of WMD-related materials from Russia. The project will undertake a multi-year effort to assist the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service in establishing and maintaining a permanent presence on their borders.

## Armenia

This project is continuing with a new increment that focuses on delivering equipment and training intended for use on the Iranian border that expands on previous assistance on the Georgian border. This new increment will enhance the Armenian Border Guard capabilities in communications, surveillance, and WMD detection and ensure that the Armenian Border Guard can sustain and maintain these capabilities in the long-term.

# Moldova

Efforts will focus on ensuring that the Moldovan Border Police and the Moldovan Customs Services can sustain and build upon previously provided assistance related to the trafficking of WMD over the long-term.

# Georgia

The focus of this effort is to improve the command and control, WMD detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities of the Georgian Border Police along Georgia's green border sectors. The primary focus will be the border with Armenia, and then expansion to Georgia's borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Project efforts such as

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

delivering equipment, equipment-related training, and improving border sector facilities will enhance capabilities in command and control, communications, surveillance, and WMD detection and interdiction and ensure that the Government of Georgia can sustain and build upon these capabilities for the long-term. The program will transition any/all preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, and training capabilities to the Government of Georgia.

## Philippines

This effort continues to expand the size of the network coverage for the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) to all regions in the Philippines. The NCWS is a Philippine government initiative to enhance maritime domain awareness capabilities. DTRA began the initial increment of work in 2013 and expects to complete work by the end of 2020 resulting in the host nation being able to successfully deter, detect, and interdict WMD and related materials transiting through or near its territorial waters.

## Vietnam

Pending the successful completion of the initial increment of work with the Vietnamese Coast Guard, which is focused on training, developing maritime concept of operations, and establishing a maintenance and sustainment capability for vessels provided under other USG assistance programs, DTRA will begin enhancing the Vietnamese Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness capability by partnering with other USG and international programs to develop command, control, communications, and surveillance capabilities of the Vietnamese Coast Guard and other Vietnamese maritime security agencies such as the Border Guard and Maritime Administration. The goal is to provide the capability to successfully deter, detect, and interdict WMD and related materials transiting through or near Vietnamese national waters.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

Other Southeast Asia Littoral Countries

DTRA will continue engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities and bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

#### Jordan

The project enhances the WMD proliferation prevention capabilities of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders. Efforts will continue to focus on providing the capability to detect, identify, track, and interdict potential illicit traffickers.

## Lebanon

Pending the successful completion of the initial increment of work, DTRA intends to expand upon assistance provided under the Lebanon Border Security Program. Similar to the Jordan Border Security Program, albeit on a much smaller scale, the Lebanon Border Security Program is a "system of systems" that will provide layered border security and enhance the Lebanese Armed Forces' ability to prevent, deter, detect, and interdict illicit crossings and WMD-related materials. Efforts will focus along the border shared with Syria, as Syria remains the source of WMD threat to Lebanon.

	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2015 FY 2016 FY		
	Actuals	Estimate	Estimate
F. Threat Reduction Engagement	2,375	2,827	2,000

## I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

The Threat Reduction Engagement program (TREP) supports activities that strategically advance the CTR Program's mission and identifies opportunities for new partner country engagements. The TREP provides the CTR program the ability to work closely with Combatant Commands on bio-engagement, proliferation prevention, and nuclear security to identify relationship-building opportunities in their respective Areas of Responsibility.

	<u>\$</u>	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 201	FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2		
	Actuals	Estimate	Estimate	
G. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs	27,846	29,320	27,279	

The Other Assessments/Administrative Costs Program provides general program administrative support and project development costs for the CTR program. The program funds internal and external stakeholder travel, executive language services, operating costs of the Defense Threat Reduction Offices and Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices at embassy locations overseas, program management for CTR logistics support, and advisory and assistance services. This program also supports required audits and examinations of CTR mission efforts and overall program management and administration.

## Audits and Examinations

The goal of this project is to ensure that the CTR Program's assistance is accounted for and used efficiently and effectively for its intended purpose. In accordance with umbrella and implementing agreements, and other political frameworks, the United States has the right to examine the use of any material, training, or other services provided under these agreements and frameworks during implementation and for a follow-on period.

# I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

## Program Management/Administration

The project provides program administrative and general support, project development cost estimates, advisory and assistance services, DTRA infrastructure support to the CTR program, and travel. The project funds support of CTR's program expansion efforts into new countries with new emerging regional CTR offices at embassies worldwide. The project funds permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Offices and Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices in the FSU, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. CTR plans to close some Defense Threat Reduction Offices in the FSU and establish a new Regional Cooperative Engagement Office in the Middle East to better align the overseas office structure with the CTR Program's new geographic areas of emphasis.

## II. Force Structure Summary:

N/A

	-	FY 2016				_	
		_	Cong	ressional	Action		
A. <u>BA Subactivities</u> 1. Strategic Offensive	<b>FY 2015</b> <u>Actual</u> 6,720	Budget <u>Request</u> 1,289	Amount 0	Percent	Appropriated 1,289	Current Enacted 1,289	<b>FY 2017</b> <u>Estimate</u> 11,791
Arms Elimination	0,720	1,205	0	0.0	1,205	1,205	11,771
2. Chemical Weapons Destruction	950	942	0	0.0	942	942	2,942
3. Global Nuclear Security	20,702	20,555	0	0.0	20,555	20,555	16,899
4. Cooperative Biological Engagement	256,762	264,618	0	0.0	264,618	264,618	213,984
5. Proliferation Prevention	49,753	38,945	0	0.0	38,945	38,945	50,709
6. Threat Reduction Engagement	2,375	2,827	0	0.0	2,827	2,827	2,000
7. Other Assessments/ Administrative Costs	27,846	29,320	0	0.0	29,320	29,320	27,279
Total	365,108	358,496	0	0.0	358,496	358,496	325,604

	Change	Change
B. Reconciliation Summary		FY 2016/FY 2017
Baseline Funding	358,496	358,496
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)		
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)		
Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent		
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)		
Subtotal Appropriated Amount	358,496	
Fact-of-Life Changes (2016 to 2016 Only)		
Subtotal Baseline Funding	358,496	
Supplemental		
Reprogrammings		
Price Changes		6,145
Functional Transfers		
Program Changes		-39,037
Current Estimate	358,496	325,604
Less: Wartime Supplemental		
Normalized Current Estimate	358,496	

c.	Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
FY	2016 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)		358 <b>,</b> 496
1.	Congressional Adjustments		
	a. Distributed Adjustments		
	1) Program Decrease		
	b. Undistributed Adjustments		
	c. Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent		
	d. General Provisions		
FY	2016 Appropriated Amount		358,496
2.	War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
3.	Fact-of-Life Changes		
FY	2016 Baseline Funding		358,496
4.	Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)		
Re	vised FY 2016 Estimate		358,496
5.	Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental		
Ap	propriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings		
FY	2016 Normalized Current Estimate		358,496
6.	Price Change		6,145
7.	Functional Transfers		
	a. Transfers In		
	1) Enter Description		
	b. Transfers Out		
	1) Enter Description		
8.	Program Increases		23,525
	a. Annualization of New FY 2016 Program		
	b. One-Time FY 2017 Increases		
	c. Program Growth in FY 2017		
	1) Proliferation Prevention	11,063	
	The funding increase in FY 2017 expands capability of		
	partner nations to prevent the proliferation of WMD		
	and related materials by reducing trafficking by non-		

c.	Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
	state networks in regions destabilized by Russian		
	aggression; reducing the Islamic State in Iraq and		
	Levant (ISIL) threat in the Middle East; and reducing		
	trafficking dual-use items in South East Asia. (FY		
	2016 Baseline: \$38,945 thousand)		
	2) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	10,479	
	The increase in funding from FY 2016 to FY 2017 will		
	fund operation and maintenance of newly completed		
	infrastructure for SS-24 solid rocket motor		
	elimination. This represents a continuation of the		
	previous line of effort to eliminate these motors,		
	but at an increased pace. (FY 2016 Baseline: \$1,289		
	thousand)		
	3) Chemical Weapons Destruction	1,983	
	The funding increase in FY 2017 is due to the		
	commencement of the Cooperative Chemical Security		
	project to assist with the enhancement of partner		
	nation facilities housing toxic industrial chemicals		
~	and materials. (FY 2016 Baseline: \$942 thousand)		
9.	Program Decreases		-62,562
	a. Annualization of FY 2016 Program Decreases b. One-Time FY 2016 Increases		
	c. Program Decreases in FY 2017		
	1) Cooperative Biological Engagement	-55,089	
	The funding decrease eliminates efforts in countries where access is lacking or have not been initiated.		
	Current and new efforts will leverage partnerships		
	with interagency organizations that allows for more		
	efficient targeting of biosafety and biosecurity		
	threats. (FY 2016 Baseline: \$264,618 thousand)		
	CITEACS, (FI ZUIU DASCIIIC, SZUT, UIU CHUUSAHU)		

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
2) Global Nuclear Security	-4,026	
The funding decrease in FY 2017 is due to cost		
savings associated with the Russian Spent Nuclear		
Fuel project. (FY 2016 Baseline: \$20,555 thousand)		
3) Other Assessments Administrative Costs	-2,569	
The funding decrease reflects the impacts of		
transitioning to a new overseas office structure that		
better aligns with the CTR Program's new geographic		
areas of emphasis resulting in a cost savings. (FY		
2016 Baseline: \$29,320 thousand)		
4) Threat Reduction Engagement	-878	
The funding decrease reduces the number of		
engagements by two to fund the Proliferation		
Prevention Program to reduce the emerging ISIL		
threats in the Middle East. (FY 2016 Baseline:		
\$2,827 thousand)		
FY 2017 Budget Request		325,604
II 201, Dudget Kequebe		5257004

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Assist Ukraine by financing elimination of 600 tons of Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) propellant and 12 SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs awaiting destruction;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs and continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2017 funds executed over three years will:

- Assist Ukraine by financing elimination of 1100 tons of SRM propellant and 22 SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs and continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### B. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support for contingency planning to eliminate and improve safety and security of chemical weapons; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support for contingency planning to eliminate chemical weapons and to improve safety and security of chemical weapons until they can be safely eliminated; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2017 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide chemical security enhancements to partner nation facilities housing toxic industrial chemicals and materials;
- Provide technical and contracted advice and support for contingency planning to eliminate chemical weapons and to improve safety and security of chemical weapons until they can be safely eliminated; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### C. Global Nuclear Security:

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable weapons and useable material or special nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of nuclear material that meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria as "weapons-usable" to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material;
- Securely transport weapons useable nuclear material and high-threat radiological material; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue support and expanding efforts for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Support shipments of nuclear material that meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria as "weapons-usable" to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2017 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of nuclear material that meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria as "weapons-usable" to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material;
- Securely transport weapons useable nuclear material and high-threat radiological material; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund biological safety and security (BS&S) enhancements as detailed below:

Former Soviet Union (FSU)

- Continue construction of human and veterinary Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) and regional laboratories in Armenia;
- Continue BS&S upgrades to veterinary laboratories in Ukraine;
- Continue the construction of the CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Continue construction oversight of a Government of Azerbaijan funded CRL and installation of BS&S systems and equipment in Azerbaijan;
- Continue standup, operationalization, and sustainment of the Lugar Center in Tbilisi, Georgia under the agreed upon terms of the joint transition agreement;
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region;
- Continue the provision of biorisk management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue the construction of human and animal health Regional Diagnostic Labs and Epidemiological Support Unit in Western Uzbekistan; and,
- Continue the construction of the animal health training facility in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

Africa

• Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya and Uganda;

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Inventory pathogens of security concern in Kenya;
- Complete laboratory design and campus master plan development in Ethiopia; and,
- Conduct BS&S training for participants from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and South Africa.

Middle East/South Asia (MESA)

- Continue to facilitate laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan, as necessary;
- Continue biorisk management training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
- Continue the implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue to encourage and facilitate multisectoral collaborations within MESA countries and across the region;
- Continue to facilitate the development of biosafety and biosecurity legislation via the National Biorisk Management Committee in Iraq;
- Complete the establishment of a biorisk management training facility at the Jordan University of Science and Technology;
- Conduct an animal health biosafety level-2 design charrette for Iraq;
- Initiate the transition of facility operations and maintenance of the Central Public Health Lab (CPHL) in Kabul, Afghanistan; and,
- Continue the stand-up and transferred ownership of the Mobile Diagnostic Unit (MDU) to the Government of Pakistan.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Southeast Asia (SEA)

- Conduct biorisk management workshops in the and Malaysia and fill identified gaps;
- Continue biorisk management workshops in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and,
- Initiate the development and implementation of a national sample transport and referral system and national policies in Cambodia and Lao People's Democratic Republic.
- 2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis, and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Continue human and veterinary sector training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and differential diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine;
- Continue to transition U.S. sustainment support of laboratories and training facilities in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine to partner governments; and,
- Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan; and explore opportunities in Ukraine.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

# Africa

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and laboratory diagnostics in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Senegal;
- Conduct Viral Hemorrhagic Fever and Personal Protective Equipment training in Cameroon and Tanzania;
- Conduct Pathogen Asset Control System (PACS) installation and operator training in Uganda, South Africa; and,
- Continue research activities in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, and Uganda.

#### MESA

- Provide laboratory equipment to select facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Address gaps in diagnostics and reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
- Continue EIDSS implementation and training in Iraq with the Ministry of Health;
- Continue training engagement series with Government of Pakistan Ministry of Defense; and,
- Complete Mobile Diagnostic Unit (MDU) operator training to Government of Pakistan personnel.

## SEA

- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia;
- Install laboratory equipment in the Philippines;
- Initiate lab management training in the Philippines;

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Enhance disease surveillance systems and introduce PACS to human and veterinary ministries in the Philippines;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Complete laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Continue partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to enhance diagnostic capacity of Global Disease Detection element in India; and,
- Continue research activities in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund BS&S enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Complete construction of human and veterinary Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) and regional laboratories in Armenia;
- Complete construction of the CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Continue construction oversight of Government of Azerbaijan funded CRL and installation of BS&S systems and equipment in Azerbaijan;
- Continue standup, operationalization, and sustainment of the Lugar Center in Tbilisi, Georgia under the agreed upon terms of the joint transition agreement;
- Continue the programmatic development and country-specific implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region;
- Continue the provision of biorisk management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine; and,
- Complete the construction of human and animal health Regional Diagnostic Labs and Epidemiological Support Unit in Western Uzbekistan.

# IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## Africa

- Continue implementing BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Uganda and Tanzania;
- Conduct biorisk management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa, Cameroon;
- Complete gap analysis with Ethiopia; and,
- Initiate gap analysis in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

## MESA

- Continue implementing BS&S upgrades to select facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, as necessary;
- Continue biorisk management training for human and animal health scientists/technicians from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Initiate initial engagements with multiple Turkish ministries;
- Support multisectoral workshops in Turkey;
- Initiate and complete the biosurveillance network and laboratory facility assessment in Jordan; and,
- Complete the transition of the operations and maintenance of the Central Public Health Lab in Kabul, Afghanistan to the Government of Afghanistan.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

#### SEA

- Conduct Tabletop Exercise and plan for regional outreach workshop with Malaysia on multi-sectorial biorisk management;
- Initiate biorisk management workshops in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Vietnam;
- Install BS&S equipment in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Assist with integrated BS&S design in Vietnam-built diagnostic labs;
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Initiate gap analysis in Indonesia; and,
- Conduct Tabletop Exercise in India.

2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Continue human and veterinary sector training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;
- Continue transition of U.S. sustainment of laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia; and,

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

• Continue EIDSS implementation, training and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

Africa

- Conduct training in epidemiology, differential diagnosis laboratory management and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda;
- Continue laboratory equipment and facility upgrades in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda;
- Continue research activities in Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, and Tanzania; and,
- Initiate new research activities in Ethiopia and West Africa.

MESA

- Complete EIDSS installation and training in Iraq with the Ministry of Health;
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan (as necessary),
- Continue laboratory equipment procurement and installation in Jordan, as identified in the assessment;
- Continue training engagement series with Government of Pakistan Ministry of Defense;
- Continue collaborative research activities in Iraq, Pakistan, and Jordan;
- Continue collaborative research activities with Turkey;
- Continue laboratory diagnostic training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan; and,
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Turkey.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

SEA

- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Initiate electronic disease surveillance workshops and PACS demonstration in Vietnam;
- Initiate gap analysis in the Philippines;
- Continue partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to enhance diagnostic capacity of Global Disease Detection element in India; and,
- Continue research activities in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

FY 2017 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund BS&S enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Continue BS&S upgrades to veterinary laboratories in Ukraine;
- Complete construction oversight of Government of Azerbaijan funded CRL and installation of BS&S systems and equipment in Azerbaijan;
- Continue standup, operationalization, and sustainment of the Lugar Center in Tbilisi, Georgia under the agreed upon terms of the joint transition agreement;
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region; and,
- Continue the provision of biorisk management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## Africa

- Complete BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Ethiopia, Cameroon, Senegal, Gabon, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; and,
- Conduct biorisk management training in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal.

## MESA

- Complete BS&S upgrades to select facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue biorisk management training in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan;
- Initiate biorisk management training in Turkey;
- Continue multisectoral workshops and Tabletop Exercise in Turkey; and,
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan.

#### SEA

- Conduct biorisk management workshops in the Philippines, Malaysia, and fill identified gaps;
- Continue biorisk management workshops in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and,
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis, and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Continue human and veterinary sector training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and differential diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine;
- Continue the transition of U.S. sustainment support of laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine to partner governments; and,
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training, and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

Africa

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management, differential diagnosis, and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal; and,
- Continue research activities in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia, and West Africa.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

MESA

- Continue installation of laboratory equipment to select facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, as necessary;
- Support diagnostics and reporting capability development in Jordan;
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Turkey;
- Continue research activities in Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey; and,
- Continue diagnostic training in Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Turkey.

SEA

- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Install laboratory equipment in Indonesia;
- Initiate lab management training in Indonesia;
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in the Philippines;
- Continue lab management training in the Philippines;
- Introduce EIDSS and PACS to human and veterinary ministries in the Philippines;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Complete laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Continue partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to enhance diagnostic capacity of Global Disease Detection element in India; and,
- Continue research activities in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## E. Proliferation Prevention:

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

#### FSU

- Continue improvements to Armenian and Moldovan Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, and WMD detection and interdiction capabilities;
- Complete improvements to Georgian Coast Guard supply chain management, logistics planning, vessel maintenance capabilities, and tactical infrastructure to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea maritime; and,
- Support Ukraine's effort to perform and sustain counter-WMD missions in and around conflict zones in eastern regions affected by pro-Russian aggression.

SEA

- Work with Department of Energy to strengthen WMD detection and interdiction capabilities at key points of entry through equipment, training, and exercises;
- Continue to increase WMD Proliferation Prevention command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in the Philippines and Vietnam, the South China Sea, and in other regional waters; and,
- Continue project assessments.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## Middle East

- Continue engagement in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKOJ) along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident; and,
- Pursue limited engagements in Lebanon to prevent illicit flow and use of WMD.

FY 2016 funds executed over three years will:

- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FSU

- Build upon previous efforts to improve the ability of the Government of Ukraine to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials along Ukraine's borders, particularly focusing on threats originating from Russia;
- Complete improvements to Armenia and Moldovan Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, and WMD detection and interdiction capabilities; and,
- Initiate efforts in Georgia to improve detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities along its green borders with Armenia and Turkey.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## Philippines

• Continue to increase WMD and maritime security communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment through the implementation of the National Coast Watch System (NCWS). Support development of a concept of operations to aid in command and control and interagency coordination.

## Vietnam

• Continue engagement to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment with training and infrastructure support capabilities.

## SEA Regional

• Begin engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities as well as bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

## Middle East

- Continue engagement in the HKOJ along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident; and,
- Provide equipment and training to those agencies in Lebanon responsible for preventing the illicit flow and use of WMD.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2017 funds executed over three years will:

- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and,
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FSU

- Continue to build upon previous efforts to improve the ability of the Government of Ukraine to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials along Ukraine's borders, particularly focusing on threats originating from Russia; and,
- Continue to develop modest but longer-term WMD threat reduction activities with CTR partners sharing borders with Russia.

## Philippines

- Sustain existing efforts and complete planned improvements of the NCWS. The NCWS will increase WMD and maritime security command, control, communications, surveillance, detection, and interdiction capabilities; and,
- Support development of a concept of operations to better facilitate interagency coordination in the maritime domain.

Vietnam

• Complete improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

## SEA Region

• Continue engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities as well as bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities.

## Middle East

• Complete detection and interdiction upgrades in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components with the HKOJ along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders.

## F. Threat Reduction Engagement:

- FY 2015 through FY 2017 funds will allow the program to continue to invite representatives from CTR countries to specific events to facilitate regional cooperation; and,
- Funds will also allow the opportunity to conduct events to assess WMD proliferation and threat reduction gaps in new geographic areas, in cooperation and coordination with cognizant Unified Combatant Commands to strategically advance CTR Program goals, pending a determination by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence by the Secretary of State to do so.

## G. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs:

FY 2015 through FY 2017 funds support advisory and assistance services to all CTR programs, U.S. Embassy support, and operating costs for the overseas Defense Threat Reduction Offices and Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices. This plan also funds administrative and contracted support services to the CTR program, program management for

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

worldwide CTR contract logistics support, approximately 6-10 Audits and Examinations per year, and travel by DTRA and stakeholder personnel not in support of a single CTR program.

V. Personnel Summary	<u>FY 2015</u>	<u>FY 2016</u>	<u>FY 2017</u>	Change FY 2015/ FY 2016	Change FY 2016/ FY 2017
Contractor FTEs (Total)	637	455	552	-182	<u>97</u>

<u>Changes in Program Growth/Reduction</u>: CTR had a \$36.0 million increase from FY 2016 current year estimate to FY 2017 budget request.

The increase is primarily in 251, which is primarily attributable to the implications of the new PSC object class mapping. However, the increase can also be attributed to a realignment of execution between CBEP Economy Act execution (decrease) and anticipated execution for PPP Kazakhstan and Tunisia effort. Although these efforts are still forthcoming and the object classes have not been solidified, we expect they will execute in object class 251. Note: DTRA implemented the new Product Service Code (PSC) to object class (OC) mapping mid-year in FY 2014 resulting in budget variances by object class. The first full-year implications are evident in the FY 2015 execution data as presented in the FY 2017 President's Budget. Additionally, the FY 2017 budget year has been revised to reflect the new mapping. For FY 2016, the impact of the PSC to OC mapping will be reflected in the FY 2018 PB submittal.

## VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

	Change				Change			
	FY 2015	FY 2015/FY 2016		FY 2016	FY 2016/FY 2017		FY 2017	
OP 32 Line	Actual	Price	Program	Enacted	Price	Program	Estimate	
308 Travel of Persons	2,606	44	3,949	6,599	119	10	6,728	
399 Total Travel	2,606	44	3,949	6,599	119	10	6,728	
914 Purchased Communications (Non- Fund)	0	0	0	0	0	1,805	1,805	
920 Supplies & Materials (Non- Fund)	13,587	231	-13,818	0	0	0	0	
923 Facilities Sust, Rest, & Mod by Contract	2,100	36	-2,136	0	0	0	0	
924 Pharmaceutical Drugs	70	3	-73	0	0	0	0	
925 Equipment Purchases (Non-Fund)	415	7	-422	0	0	2,452	2,452	
932 Mgt Prof Support Svcs	16,620	283	-6,226	10,677	192	27,736	38,605	
934 Engineering & Tech Svcs	161,164	2,740	-140,521	23,383	421	70,588	94,392	
957 Other Costs (Land and Structures)	47,081	800	-47,881	0	0	0	0	
985 Research & Development, Contracts	21,465	0	-4,313	17,152	0	2,065	19,217	
987 Other Intra-Govt Purch	75,100	1,277	10,164	86,541	1,558	-17,726	70,373	
988 Grants	13,275	226	-13,501	0	0	8,079	8,079	
989 Other Services	8,792	149	195,949	204,890	3,688	-133,619	74,959	
990 IT Contract Support Services	2,833	48	6,373	9,254	167	-427	8,994	
999 Total Other Purchases	362,502	5,800	-16,405	351,897	6,026	-39,047	318,876	
Total	365,108	5,844	-12,456	358,496	6,145	-39,037	325,604	