FY 2007 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Department of Defense
February 2007
The Department of Defense requests an emergency supplemental appropriation of $93.4 billion to fund the costs of ongoing military operations in the Global War on Terror during the remainder of Fiscal Year 2007.

The following volume provides a summary justification for this request in order to provide a clear explanation of the need for these funds and their uses. The military departments are providing the Congress with more detailed information on this request in additional volumes.

This justification explains what America’s warfighters need to continue the Global War on Terror – in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in other locations around the globe. Included are amounts needed for troop subsistence; special pays; supplies; fuel; ammunition; and transportation for troops, tanks, vehicles, helicopters, and other equipment.

The Department’s request also supports the enhancement of U.S. ground forces, including the President’s decision to increase U.S. military forces in Iraq with additional troops, as well as the acceleration of two Brigade Combat Teams and the establishment of one new Marine Regimental Combat Team.

Included in this request are funds for training and equipping the Iraq and Afghan military and police units, which must bear the principal responsibility for security in their own countries. Additional funds will enable this vital program to go forward both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The following pages also include a summary of the costs associated with reconstituting the force. This involves repairing or replacing the hundreds of thousands of pieces of military equipment that have been destroyed, damaged, or worn out during military operations in a very challenging environment and equipment for force readiness.

By timely consideration and funding of this emergency supplemental request, Congress will ensure that the Armed Forces of the United States are prepared to continue the Global War on Terror and to meet threats to American security.

Signature on File

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense
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OVERVIEW – FY 2007 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

The Department of Defense requests $93.4 billion in an emergency supplemental appropriation to continue contingency operations in the Global War on Terror through fiscal year (FY) 2007. These funds are in addition to the $70.0 billion appropriated by Congress in September for the global war on terror (GWOT). Total funding for FY 2007 would be $163.4 billion for the GWOT (Figure 1). This level of funding represents a 42 percent increase above the FY 2006 funding level of $115 billion. This increase is due largely to policy changes to enhance U.S. ground forces, increases in force protection, and the need to replace and repair major weapons systems – such as, tanks, trucks, armored vehicles, helicopters, aircraft, and munitions – as well as to replace systems stressed beyond projected rates of use.

The cumulative effect of five years of operations is creating additional strain on both personnel and equipment. This supplemental funds special pays and benefits for personnel to sustain the all-volunteer force and maintain and replace equipment lost, worn out or stressed by years of use.

Executing the GWOT has increased defense spending significantly over the course of the past five years. Nonetheless, Defense spending is at the lowest level for any comparable period of conflict when measured as a percentage of U.S. gross domestic product or as a percentage of total federal spending (Figure 2).

US ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

The goal of U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is to establish stable, democratic and secure nations, free of terrorism, with the institutions and resources needed for each nation to provide for its own security.

IRAQ

The goal of the United States and its Coalition Partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve stability and national unity. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as development of more capable security forces. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the government and people of Iraq.
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**Figure 2. Defense Spending in Context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Gulf War</th>
<th>GWOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Historical Table, Budget of the United States Government

**Progress to Date**

Iraq has become the central front in the GWOT. Success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against an extremist ideology that breeds international terrorism. Unlike past wars, however, victory in Iraq will not come in the form of an enemy’s surrender or be signaled by a single event.

Since March 2003, Iraq has made significant progress in overcoming the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. In the course of reviveing Iraqi society and establishing democratic rule, Iraq has achieved many significant milestones:

- June 2004: Iraqis resume the exercise of sovereign power as the Coalition Provision Authority closes down.
- January 2005: Iraqis elect a Transitional National Assembly in the 1st national election in 50 years.
- December 2005: Iraqis elect the Council of Representatives (CoR), which in turn forms the first government under the permanent constitution.
- July 2006: Iraqis assume responsibility from Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) for the security of Muthanna province, the first to be transferred to Iraqi civilian control.
- September 2006: The G0I stands up the military Joint Headquarters and the Ground Forces Command, which assume command and control of a portion of its armed forces.
Military Achievements
By the end of 2006, the Coalition had trained and equipped 328,500 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members, which include the Army, the local and national police, border guards and specialized units. The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility, and are demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations. There are 8 division headquarters, 31 brigade headquarters, and 94 Iraqi Army battalions that assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in their areas of operation. In September 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) assumed control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, and 3 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions. (The other divisions are scheduled to come under the IGFC in 2007). In total, 106 Iraqi Army combat battalions and 12 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are “in the fight.”

Political Achievements
Following popular approval of the Iraqi constitution in October 2005 and elections in December 2005, the leaders of Iraq’s major political parties formed a unity government, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced and won Council of Representatives (CoR) approval for his cabinet. Representation includes all major regions, sects, and ethnic groups. This completed the political transition process laid out in the Transitional Administrative Law and endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. The Iraqi CoR has taken important steps toward passing key legislation to implement the Constitution.

Economic Achievements
The GoI continues to face serious challenges in the execution of its own budget and programs and has made only incremental progress in economic reform. The GoI remains committed to economic reform and implemented some positive, concrete steps, such as raising gas prices and passing important legislation, such as the Fuel Import Liberalization Law and the Investment Law.

Strategic Partnership
The U.S. bilateral relationship with Iraq is evolving as the GoI and Iraqi security forces become increasingly capable of providing for the security needs of their country.
UNSCR 1723 extended the mandate of the MNF-I until the end of December 2007. In his letter to the UNSC president requesting the extension, Prime Minister Maliki said security and stability in Iraq are the responsibility of the GoI but this vision for the future of Iraq can only become reality with the help of the international community.

Much Remains To Be Done
From August to November 2006, the total number of attacks increased 22 percent. Coalition forces remained the main target of attacks (68 percent), but the overwhelming majority of casualties were suffered by Iraqis.

Violence in Iraq is divided along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines, and political factions within these groups. Concern regarding civil war runs high among the Iraqi population.
The number of infrastructure attacks continues to decrease, but lack of recovery from the cumulative effects of these attacks, combined with ineffective repair and maintenance of the infrastructure, impede the delivery of essential services and undermine the legitimacy of the GoI among the Iraqi people.

Shift in the Operational Theater
The environment has shifted from deposing a brutal dictator, to fighting insurgents, to preventing a civil war. The environment is
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made more complex today by the combination of militias, death squads, insurgents, and a fledgling government in need of Coalition help. The Iraqi people, while telling public opinion polls that they want the U.S. and Coalition forces to leave, do not want them to leave before the job is complete. Moderates of all communities see Coalition forces as a source of protection against extremists.

Reassessment of United States Government (USG) Policy

Success in Iraq remains critical to U.S. national security. Failure would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and for the region. Failure would result in:

- An emboldened Al Qaeda movement;
- Strengthened Iranian and Syrian influence;
- A loss of confidence in the U.S. among key allies in the region; and
- A severe setback to U.S. credibility, freedom of maneuver, and influence in the region and throughout the world.

In short, U.S. failure would put the American people’s safety at greater risk.

It is critical to U.S. national security that Iraq achieve the ability to govern, secure and sustain itself, and be an ally in the struggle against extremism. It is also critical the U.S. aggressively prosecute the fight in Iraq against Al Qaeda and its associated movements.

Most important for long-term political stability is the success of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. So far, this project has made little progress, despite meetings among political, religious, tribal, and sectarian leaders. Without such progress, gains in security achieved by military means are not sustainable.

THE PRESIDENT’S NEW STRATEGY

The President's new Iraq strategy is rooted in six fundamental elements: first, let the Iraqis lead; second, help the Iraqis protect the population; third, isolate the extremists; fourth, create space for political progress; fifth, diversify the political and economic efforts; and sixth, have a regional approach to the problem.

Security

The Iraqis should publicly acknowledge that all parties in Iraq are responsible for quelling sectarian violence. The Iraqis should:

- Work with the Coalition to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi people;
- Deliver the necessary Iraqi forces to secure Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference once they are in place;
- Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis;
- Plan and fund the eventual demobilization program for militias.

The Coalition should agree that helping Iraqis to provide the population with security is necessary to enable an accelerated transition and political progress. All parties should agree to provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission. The Coalition should increase efforts to support those tribes that are willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar and accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.

The Coalition and the Iraqis should continue their counterterror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations and take more aggressive action against death squad networks. The Coalition should accelerate transition efforts to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
The U.S. and Coalition should increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions Headquarters, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions. Together they should establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force and help reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.

**Political**

The Government of Iraq should commit to reforming its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery and act on promised reconciliation initiatives such as the oil law, de-Baathification law and Provincial elections. Authority should be given to Coalition and the ISF to pursue all extremists. All Iraqi leaders should support reconciliation and a moderate coalition must emerge as a strong base of support for unity government.

The Coalition should build and sustain strategic partnership with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds as part of a broader effort to support political moderates so they can take on the extremists. Another responsibility is to support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead. The Coalition should diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad and provide more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders. Efforts should include expansion and increased flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) footprint and focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at the local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.

Together, the Coalition and Iraqis should establish a partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities. Both should strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption and build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations. They should work to make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's communities on an impartial basis.

**Economic**

The Iraqis should deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities. This includes focusing more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth, capitalizing and executing jobs-producing programs and matching U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer-term sustainable Iraqi programs. Finally, the Iraqis should enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.

The Coalition should refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas critical to the success of the Government of Iraq (e.g. budget execution, key ministries). It should decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone including the
doubling of the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone and establishing PRT-capability within Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Finally, the Coalition should bring greater integration of economic strategy with military effort, including joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT and the removal of legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.

Regional

The Iraqis should vigorously engage Arab states and take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood. Furthermore, it should counter negative foreign activity in Iraq and increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

The Coalition should increase military presence in the region and in particular, intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq. It should also strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region and continue to seek the region’s full support in the Global War on Terror and the Government of Iraq. Finally, it should continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.

Together, the Coalition and the Iraqis will focus on the International Compact and retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.

This security plan is designed to have Iraqi forces lead a campaign with U.S. and Coalition forces in support, to protect the population of Baghdad from intimidation and violence instigated by Sunni and Shi’a extremist groups and to enable the Government of Iraq to take the difficult steps necessary to address that nation’s underlying issues. This means, above all, strengthening those in Iraq who are prepared to address its problems peacefully against extremists who use violence to disrupt Iraq and pursue radical ideologies.

Ministry of Defense Forces

Under the revised strategy, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces will be trained and equipped to be principally responsible for quelling sectarian violence. They will lead the effort against militias and all lawless forces, with Coalition support as required. Coalition forces, with Iraqi forces in support, will be responsible for operations to defeat Al Qaeda and associated movements. The program accelerates the hand-over of responsibility, while at the same time continues training and equipping of MoD forces. The original force is comprised of a 137,000 soldier/10 division Army, a basic infantry force with limited mechanized capability, support units, a small air force for reconnaissance and logistics and a small coastal patrol force.

This program builds on the current successes of MoD forces. The Iraqis have fought bravely with Coalition forces and have the respect of many of the Iraqi people. Specifics include: force enhancements to include 33,000 trained Iraqi soldiers, sailors and airmen; logistics capabilities to build strategic/operational-level support units, sustainment stocks, maintenance capability and transport equipment; Combat support units to include engineering units, counter-IED capabilities, military Intel companies, Military Police and headquarters service companies; Mobility/Force Protection to include pure combat support wheeled vehicles and infrastructure survivability and equipment upgrades/interoperability with the U.S. such as assault rifles; machine guns; night vision, howitzers, mortars, airlift, air assault, UAVs and offshore naval capability.

Ministry of Interior Forces

Under the revised strategy, Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces will be trained and equipped like MoD forces. They will have lead responsibility for quelling sectarian violence and will lead in the effort against militias, with Coalition support as required. Community policing, safeguarding the public and providing
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internal security at the local level remains important for long-term success in achieving rule of law. The U.S. will create robust DoD advisory teams within MoI forces by embedding U.S. advisors down to the army battalion/police station level. The U.S. will also press senior Iraqi officials to emphasize national priorities over ethno-sectarian groups in hiring and command selection.

The program accelerates the hand-over of responsibility, while at the same time it would continue training and equipping the MoI forces. The program would fund force structure increases, such as 4,000 police for forensic specialties; Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Vehicles and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), tactical gear and body armor; National Police reform training, including rule of law/ethics training, leader development and National Police transformation; investigation capability, including surveillance system equipment; and life support capability, the development of an MoI logistics structure, and infrastructure sustainment.

AFGHANISTAN

Progress to Date
When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001, we started with two missions: defeat Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan, and – with the Afghan people and the international community – create a stable, moderate democracy that will never again provide sanctuary for terrorists.

It is hard to comprehend how destitute Afghanistan was at that time. A lawless region that provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, Afghanistan had suffered from decades of violence that resulted in millions of casualties and billions of dollars in economic damage. Significant progress has been made toward accomplishment of those two missions.

Military Achievements
Five years later, Afghanistan is no longer an open sanctuary for Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. While Afghanistan remains a central front in OEF, on October 5, 2006, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took the lead for international forces in the country. ISAF now accounts for more than two-thirds of the international forces operating in Afghanistan, tasked with assisting the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in providing stability and security, extending governance, and defeating the remnants of the former Taliban regime and other spoilers that are attempting to derail progress.

Political Achievements
Afghanistan now has a democratically elected and representative government and has met each Bonn Accord milestone laid out in December 2001. In January 2004, the Afghanistan Constitution was signed into law, including provisions to protect individual rights for men and women. In October 2004 Afghans elected a President. And in September 2005 Afghans elected a National Assembly. During the National Assembly’s first session, the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) confirmed 20 ministers and 2 Supreme Court justices and passed a national budget.

The GoA is extending its reach by providing services to the Afghan people and building national institutions. At least 5 million students are enrolled in schools, a 500 percent increase since 2001, of which 40 percent are women and girls. Over 80 percent of the population now has access to at least basic healthcare.
Economic Achievements
The Afghan economy has been growing steadily. It was valued at $2.4 billion in 2002. The estimate for 2006 is $7.3 billion. Both the economy and Afghan government revenues are projected to continue to rise in the future. The Afghan people are seeing the impact: Per capita income has doubled since 2001, and agricultural opportunities are increasing.

Strategic Partnership
The U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral relationship has grown significantly. The two countries now share a close friendship, united not only in the Global War on Terror, but also by common interests and values. In May 2005, President Bush and President Karzai reaffirmed our commitment and signed the Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership.

Much Remains to be Done
Afghanistan remains the target of terrorist groups, remnants of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements, drug traffickers, and a determined criminal element. This past year, a resurgent Taliban focused on testing the expanding ISAF forces, but ISAF and ANSF demonstrated that they will stand, fight, and defeat the Taliban attacks.

A significant increase in narcotics production in 2006 highlights a significant challenge ahead. Drugs and drug money also threaten to corrupt and undermine the new institutions of the Afghan state.

The greatest challenge lies in fostering the overall conditions that will give the Afghan people confidence that their elected government, supported by the international community, will deliver long-term security and stability. Five years after the start of OEF, the people of Afghanistan have increased hopes and expectations.

A Shift in the Strategic Environment
This past year's increase in violence and narcotics production represents a shift in the strategic environment. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the south, and the relatively weak institutions of the GoA enable insurgents to operate in the absence of government presence.

As a result, the United States, in cooperation with ISAF partners, must accelerate and increase our efforts if Afghanistan is to succeed. The U.S. government has identified areas where efforts can be increased, expanded, and/or better coordinated to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity, and providing security in Afghanistan.

Implications for Security Sector
For the security sector in particular, more needs to be done in response to the resurgent Taliban. Operations by U.S. and international forces last summer faced the enemy in larger-scale operations and more-intense fighting. The strategy of a series of operations and ISAF’s Operation Medusa focused on denying the enemy safe havens, interdicting its movement, and targeting its routes. The ANSF played an increasingly important role as these operations progressed.

The combat phases of these operations, however, were only the precursors to efforts focused on extending the authority of the GoA and strengthening the rule of law, reconstruction programs, humanitarian assistance, and economic development.

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are a key element of our military strategy in Afghanistan. CERP provides the commander the funds required to bring needed assistance and reconstruction to areas that have been affected by conflict. Unlike other U.S. resources, CERP provides a quick impact and demonstrates immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan.
The shift in the strategic environment also highlighted the need to revise and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. In order to enable the ANSF to respond to the resurgent Taliban, the ANSF Train and Equip program must be accelerated to expand the size and capabilities of these forces. The desired end state for the ANSF remains a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable force, less reliant on international assistance and more capable of taking the fight to the Taliban.

**Afghan National Army (ANA)**

Under the revised program, the ANA will be trained and equipped to provide for internal security and to assume leadership for counterinsurgency and internal operations.

The program builds on current success of the ANA. Afghan soldiers have fought bravely side-by-side with the international forces and won the respect of the Afghan people, despite less-reliable weapons and weaker force protection.

Soldiers will be armed with reliable and more capable weapons including assault rifles, machine guns, and mortars. Soldiers will also receive body armor, Kevlar helmets, armored vehicles, and advanced first aid kits to ensure care for those who are injured.

The final Afghan National Army will include better capabilities, including a small, capable air corps. Six battalions will receive specialized training to become the rapid response Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission. In addition, the Army will include combat support units, consisting of engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police.

**Afghan National Police (ANP)**

The revised program recognizes that a more robust police force is required to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, particularly in areas from which the ANA and international forces have cleared Taliban fighters following combat. The original ANP program focused on a more narrow law enforcement mission, leaving the ANP less capable to address the security environment complicated by Taliban, narco-traffickers, and other illegal elements.

In addition, the ANP will receive additional attention and resources under this plan because it has lagged in progress compared with the ANA, due in part to institutional corruption, low literacy rates among recruits, and a history of low pay.

The Counternarcotics Police (CNP-A) program will be accelerated to develop a force modeled on the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The CNP-A will target drug traffickers and producers, improving Afghanistan’s interdiction capabilities. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) also will receive additional capabilities and equipment.

Additionally, a new unit will be established to fill a gap in ANP capability. The Civil Order Police (COP) will be established as a specialized unit, with tactical gear, improved force protection, and specialized equipment, to be the rapid response force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots.

**The Way Ahead**

The U.S. cannot achieve or sustain these ANSF objectives alone. The GoA has committed to providing the manpower to meet these objectives. Equally important, the Afghan leaders have committed to make the necessary security sector reforms that will ensure that the ANSF are responsible and lasting institutions. Through ventures like the Border Management Initiative, the United States is also helping the GoA to increase revenues, which will provide a source of income to support and sustain the forces.
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The international community also has a role in building the ANSF. Millions of dollars of equipment have been donated by countries for both the ANA and the ANP. Germany has played a key part with its police training program, and ISAF countries contribute Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams that embed with trained ANA units to provide in-the-field mentoring. NATO is also exploring near- and long-term ways that it can assist with equipping and training.

SUMMARY

The Department of Defense has a long history of engaging in “irregular warfare,” but that experience has been based on limited engagements and for limited periods of time, normally in association with conventional military operations. No previous conflict has been as global in nature, including such a wide range of adversaries and in such a complex battle space.

DoD has succeeded in engaging opponents who employed unconventional or asymmetric capabilities in a variety of scenarios in the last century. Our military forces continue to apply lessons learned from this experience. Guided by the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT), the Department has made progress toward each of its strategic objectives. Continued success depends on timely Congressional support for this emergency supplemental request.
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JUSTIFICATION – FY 2007 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

These supplemental appropriation justification materials are presented by category of expenditures for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. These categories are linked to the appropriation accounts through which the Department typically requests its funding, but they provide a clearer understanding and increased transparency into overall expenditures on the war effort.

CONTINUING THE FIGHT

Operations ($39.3B)

The Operations request would fund the incremental costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of FY 2007. It funds aircraft flying hours, Navy steaming days, Army vehicle miles used in the conduct of operations on a daily basis. The estimate covers special pays, benefits, medical supplies, and subsistence costs – food, water, and ice – for an average of 140,000 troops deployed in Iraq and 20,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan. This category includes transportation inter-and intra-theater, including long haul supply flights from the United States to Afghanistan and Iraq. Operations category also pays for the cost of forward deployed forces, in places like Qatar and Kuwait.

Force Protection ($8.0B)

In the GWOT, military capabilities are not the primary target of the terrorists. Rather people, particularly military personnel, are the primary targets. Terrorists can select their targets at a time and place of their choosing. This in turn requires us to maintain a robust posture 24 hours per day.

Accordingly, it is critical that U.S. troops are protected from the many and varied terrorist threats. This includes providing effective lightweight body armor, armored vehicles, safe and secure operating bases, identity management for access control, and persistent surveillance capabilities.

Force protection is both a natural extension of protecting and defending the homeland and a key enabler of all military strategic objectives in the war on terror. To succeed in the GWOT, the U.S. military must have the best force protection equipment and technology available.

Improvized Explosive Device (IED) Defeat ($2.4B)

IEDs have become the weapon of choice of terrorists. They are the number one killer of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and are...
the greatest emerging threat in Afghanistan. They pose a highly lethal and growing threat which is asymmetric in nature and extremely difficult to counter by conventional means. Ongoing investment in technologies that defeat these weapons is crucial to the security of forces in the GWOT. Also, we must continue to invest in intelligence, information operations, and training, which enable identification and targeting of bombmaking networks.

Without ongoing attempts to defeat IEDs, Coalition forces will be increasingly limited in their ability to engage in any military strategic objective in the GWOT. Indeed, increasing use of IEDs will reverse a key strategic goal of the war on terror by creating an environment inhospitable to U.S. forces. This is a lethal threat which demands the highest emphasis and support.

Military Intelligence ($2.7B)

A key enabling priority of the NMSP-WOT is to improve traditional and non-traditional intelligence operations. Continuous enhancement of intelligence capabilities is required to understand the complex and clandestine organizational structure and operating systems of terrorists. With this knowledge comes the ability to best identify enemy vulnerabilities. Using these vulnerabilities, we can then rapidly defeat the enemy.

Military reliance upon both current intelligence and long-term analysis is both unprecedented and growing. Adversaries are fully aware of our reliance upon information, and they are developing capabilities to counter our access and match our abilities. Although the United States has numerous efforts underway to improve and expand current intelligence capabilities, the intelligence requirements of commanders on the ground should be met both to provide for the security of Coalition forces and to enable access to a wide variety of targets.

Iraqi Security Force ($3.8B)

The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve peace and national unity. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as development of more capable security forces. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the Iraqi government and people.

By the close of 2006, the Coalition had trained and equipped 328,500 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which include the Army, the local and national police, border guards and specialized units. (Not included are approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 different ministries). The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility, and they are demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counter-insurgency operations. There are 8 Division Headquarters, 31 Brigade Headquarters, and 94 Iraqi Army battalions that have assumed the lead in their areas of operation for counter-insurgency operations. The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) came under the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in September 2006 and assumed command and control of the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, and 3 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions (4th and 8th). The other divisions are scheduled to come under the IGFC in 2007. In total, 106 Iraqi Army combat battalions and 12 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are “in the fight.”

Afghan Security Force ($5.9B)

When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, we started with two missions:
Defeat Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan, and,

- With the Afghan people and the international community, create a stable, moderate democracy that will never again provide sanctuary for terrorists.

It is hard to comprehend the destitution present in Afghanistan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. A lawless region that provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, Afghanistan had suffered from decades of violence that resulted in millions of casualties and billions of dollars in economic damage.

Five years later, Afghanistan is no longer an open sanctuary for Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. While Afghanistan remains a central front in Operation Enduring Freedom, on October 5, 2006, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took the lead for international forces in the country. ISAF now accounts for more than two-thirds of the international forces operating in Afghanistan, tasked with assisting the Government of Afghanistan in providing stability and security, extending governance, and defeating the remnants of the former Taliban regime and other forces that are attempting to derail progress.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are steadily growing in strength and capability. Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and an effort that requires consistent support.

Despite the progress made to date, much remains to be done, and the U.S. strategy reflects a shift in the strategic environment. This past year's increase in violence and narcotics production represents such a shift. Taliban presence and strength has grown in some areas of the country, especially the south, and the relatively weak institutions of the Afghan government enable insurgents to operate in the absence of government presence.

As a result, the United States is accelerating and increasing efforts to meet its objectives for Afghanistan. The Administration has identified areas where efforts can be increased, expanded, and better coordinated to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity and providing security.

**Coalition Support ($1.0B)**

Wherever possible, the United States works with or through Coalition partners. Training and equipping partner nations institutionalizes skills and alliances needed for the Global War on Terror. This is key to the long-term success of the GWOT. As our partner nations enhance their counterterrorism capabilities at home and in their region, our own forces can increasingly disengage, deploying only to critical areas of responsibility or in training partners.

Reimbursing allies, providing lift and sustainment support and increasing train and equip funds are our most effective tools for the NMSP-WOT objective of enabling partner nations to counter terrorism. Investment in this area lessens the length and the cost of the GWOT in the long term.

**Commander's Emergency Response Program ($0.5B)**

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) supports Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. CERP provides ground commanders with funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction in their areas of responsibility. The Program supports GWOT by helping to win the trust of the local populations and improving civil infrastructures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Military Construction ($1.1B)

The supplemental request includes $1.1 billion for urgent construction projects in support of OIF, OEF and the GWOT. The request will provide funds for a variety of projects critical to ongoing operations.

Included are about $980M for needed Army projects such as airfield, operational, and support facilities; billeting; fuel handling and storage; utility systems; and roads in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Among the Navy projects to be funded are:

- Electrical power and water facilities at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti ($63.1M);
- Critical facility to house switching gear and diesel generators at Guantanamo Bay ($22M); and

Air Force priority projects require $60.2M for a taxiway and a “Hot Cargo” pad at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.

Regional War on Terror ($0.3B)

Funding is required to support the Department of Defense (DoD), Regional War on Terror campaign plan for the GWOT. The purpose of this plan is to operationalize the national Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT). This plan synchronizes supporting campaign plans and major operations; establishes intelligence priorities; and prioritize resources consistent with strategic objectives. The U.S. Joint Forces Command and Combatant Commanders will complement and support the U.S. led international effort to systematically deny terrorist networks what they require to operate and survive and contribute to the overarching national goals of disrupting and attacking the enemy and protecting the American homeland.

Reconstitution ($13.9B)

Reconstitution of the force replenishes consumables, as well as replaces, repairs and maintains all equipment destroyed, damaged or stressed in support of operations Iraq and Afghanistan. Reconstitution is central to maintaining U.S. military warfighting capabilities. As equipment is damaged in the GWOT, it is replaced or repaired so that the equipment is placed back into operation. All forces are reconstituted as equipment and supplies are used. This includes aircraft and heavy combat equipment such as tanks, helicopters, and assault vehicles.

A local Afghan worker helps U.S. Army Soldiers from Alpha Company, 27th Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., move a steel section of a Bailey bridge to its destination along the Pech River in Afghanistan.

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In addition, reconstitution includes equipment procured to provide additional enhanced capabilities. This equipment includes a wide range of items, across multiple warfighting functions. For example, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are being procured to replace lightly protected trucks. In addition, the request will provide increased survivability and defense capabilities for aircraft flying in theater and also improve our ability to counter IEDs.

This request includes $0.7B for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs to be able to respond to situations for which a technological capability is not currently available. Funding is also being requested to improve the performance of unmanned systems in a desert environment, development of wide area detection and surveillance technologies to mitigate insurgent activities, and development of automated language translation systems.

ENHANCING GROUND FORCES

U.S. Forces “Plus Up” ($5.6B)

The President has directed the Secretary of Defense to increase forces in the Iraqi theater of operations to support the Iraqi government with 21,500 U.S. ground forces to secure Baghdad and surrounding areas and an expanded Naval presence in the theater of operations.

Accelerate Brigade Combat Teams / Establish Regimental Combat Team ($3.6B)

Much has been asked of our ground forces, both the Army and Marines, in the past five years of the GWOT. As readiness for warfighting continues to be a concern, both Services have worked to improve the readiness and deployability of units and provide for a less stressful deployment schedule. Force structure improvements enable strategic flexibility for GWOT contingencies.

The supplemental includes funding to accelerate the development of two Army Brigade Combat Teams and one Marine Regimental Combat Team, composed of three Marine battalions and enablers, to provide a critical increase to the rotational pool of forces for current operations and to increase our presence on the ground.

Grow The Force ($1.7B)

The President has directed an increase in ground forces – Army and Marine Corps forces – to improve worldwide military readiness. Given the current level of operational tempo, this force increase will allow Soldiers and Marines more time between deployments to recuperate and spend time with their families.

Non-DoD Classified ($3.6B)

Details on this section will be provided separately to Congress in a classified annex.

Global War on Terror Campaign Plan

Funding this request will directly support activities complementing U.S. efforts to systematically deny terrorists networks that they require to operate and survive as well as contribute to the overarching goals of countering ideological support for the enemy, disrupting and attacking the enemy, and protecting the homeland. These funds will support national, departmental and Combatant Commander objectives and requirements in the GWOT.
Operations

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure that our all-volunteer men and women of the Armed Forces engaged in the global war on terror and have the funds, supplies, and logistical support they need to conduct military operations.

Funding: $39.3B
- Incremental pay and benefits for ~320,000 military personnel
- Military operations to include transportation inter- and intra-theater of operations, aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, vehicle and ground miles
- Subsistence (food and water) and logistics support
- Operating and restocking supply depots
- Baseline fuel price increases
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

### Operations

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1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

Numbers may not add due to rounding

### DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $39.3 billion for conducting military operations and intelligence activities supporting OEF and OIF for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding for operations for FY 2007 is $69.9 billion, a 4 percent increase over FY 2006. Operations costs are directly linked to the pace of operations (optempo) in frontline combat and support forces in the theater.

### FUNDING REQUEST

The Operations category supports the full spectrum of military personnel, operation and maintenance, supply, and fuel requirements for military Reserve Component (RC) mobilization, deployment and redeployment of all forces, as well as theater operations and sustainment. This request supports projected FY 2007 levels of approximately 140,000 service members in Iraq and 20,000 in Afghanistan.

More than 15 Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and 2 Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces, as well as supporting Airmen and Sailors, are participating in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom today. (see U.S. Forces “Plus Up” section). Of the Army BCTs, more than half are “heavy units,” which are equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that consume large amounts of resources (i.e., fuel, parts, supplies, etc.). The remaining combat forces, although designated as “light units,” are equipped with a full complement of vehicles and support equipment that includes trucks, trailers, generators, radars and other items. Operations in theater remain high: U.S. forces are heavily engaged in fighting the insurgency, maintaining the peace and training the new military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

### Pay and Benefits

This portion of the request funds:

- Incremental pay and allowances for deployed active personnel (special pays);
- Subsistence;
- Permanent-change-of-station travel;
- Other military personnel costs for mobilizing reserve component personnel, active component overstrength, and
Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) uniformed personnel deployed in support of contingency operations;

- Recruiting and retention bonuses and incentives.

Major requirements are as follows:

**Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty:** The force mix needed to support combat operations and the world-wide fight against terrorism includes a combination of active component units and Reserve Component personnel serving on active duty (mobilized under presidential call-up authority or serving in ADOS status). All basic military pay and entitlements – basic pay, Basic Allowance for Housing, retired pay accrual, Social Security contributions, and incentive pay – are incremental to the base budget and must be supported with supplemental appropriations. The FY 2007 request is based on a projected Reserve Component (RC) mobilization of over 100,000 RC personnel for the Army.

**Active Component Overstrength:** In FY 2007, the Army and Marine Corps will maintain an increased end strength to meet GWOT deployment commitments and in the case of the Army to enable conversion to the modular force structure. As a result, military personnel costs are above the baseline appropriation, primarily in the area of pay and allowances.

**Subsistence:** Requested funds provide Subsistence-in-Kind – subsistence for dining facilities, operational rations, and augmentation ration – for all U.S. military forces deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

**Reserve and National Guard:** Funds requested in the Reserve Component military pay appropriations provide primarily for pre-mobilization training and support, recruiting and retention and family support programs, for deployed forces.

**Military Operations**

The Operation and Maintenance appropriations for active and reserve requests are required to cover the costs of the military operations including transportation, supplies, communications and fuel consumed in pre-deployment training and operations in theater. Operations funding includes requirements for incremental pre-deployment training and support, transportation to and from theater, operating tempo in theater, sustainment of equipment, and the full range of logistics and communications and intelligence assets support. The National Guard Operation and Maintenance appropriation funds incremental training and support costs prior to mobilization, recruiting and retention, and support programs for both deployed forces and their families. Detailed requirements are outlined in the supporting budget exhibits.
Major subcategories of operation and maintenance include:

Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO): Provides fuel, supplies, repair parts, etc., for combat teams and supporting forces operating continuously in harsh conditions. Provides funds:

- For Army, OPTEMPO funds the sustainment of light, mixed, and heavy unit equipment in the full range of Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support units conducting day-to-day operations in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Sustainment includes forward deployment training, air and ground OPTEMPO facility support, organizational maintenance, and communications support. The Army incurs both direct and indirect OPTEMPO costs. Direct OPTEMPO costs include fuel, oil, repair parts, etc. Indirect OPTEMPO costs generally include combat training center support, Soldier support, training aids, devices, simulations and simulators and selected contracted logistics support, facilities and base support.

- Air Force operations also includes flying missions, maintenance, communications, command and control, and facility operations in theater.

- Funds for Naval Forces cover Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, aviation support (Carrier Air Wings and land-based Maritime Patrol and support aircraft) conducting Maritime Security Operations. This includes funding for materials/supplies, training, operating tempo (flying, steaming and ground equipment), C4I, facilities, and support to Coalition Forces.

- For U.S. Special Operations Command for travel, billeting, deployment gear, emergency medical supplies and services; pre-deployment/forward deployment training; aviation parts, consumables, and fuel, SOF unique facility requirements; equipment maintenance; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); transportation support including sealift, inter-theater and channel cargo airlift, port handling/inland transportation, second destination charges, and commercial tenders used as transport carriers. Also civilian overtime and temporary overhires to support the incremental workload associated with OIF and OEF deployments.

Base Support: Provides base operations services, supplies and equipment, maintenance and storage facilities, pre-deployment training support and the full range of activities at DoD bases supporting mobilization and deployment missions.

In-Theater Maintenance: Provides for contract labor and repair parts for forward activities that perform maintenance and repair of such key systems as Unmanned Aircraft, Light Utility Helicopters, missiles and radar, Stryker combat vehicles, HMMWV and tank engines, the Armored Security Vehicle, and C130s.

Theater Communications and Intelligence: Funds critical strategic and tactical communications infrastructure in theater. Also supports intelligence activities (non-MIP), such as, electronic warfare and sensor systems sustainment, and counter-intelligence programs. Includes requirements associated with the Army’s role as DoD executive agent for contract linguists and cultural advisors and reconnaissance aircraft operations as well as upgraded Joint Intelligences and Operations Centers to streamline information sharing among geographically-separated headquarters.

Transportation: Supports deployment, sustainment, redeployment and reconstitution of forces. Includes strategic lift by air and sea, port handling operations, and second destination transportation.

Personnel Support Costs: Provides service members with family counseling and support services, such as extended child care; Military Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services in-theater; Rest and Recuperation (R&R) travel; and civilian special pays.
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Services and Related Support: Funds are requested for the Defense Agencies to support GWOT activities such as contract management and audit services in theater; secure credentials; personnel and support costs for military trials; and rewards for information provided by local nationals. This request also includes $1.6 million to support military commissions at Guantanamo, Cuba.

Subsistence and Logistics Support

These funds are requested to cover the costs of Logistics support in theater, e.g., operations of the theater bases for deployed troops and subsistence costs for civilians and contractors.

Theater Base Camp and Logistics Support: Includes Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) base camp and life support services – power generation, facilities management, billeting, dining services, latrines and waste management – at sites in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait.

Consumables: Subsistence requested funds cover the costs of food and other consumables for DoD civilians and DoD contractors, deployed in theater.

Operating and Restocking Supply Depots

Funds are required to re-establish stocks of spare parts, including war reserve equipment, that have been released in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Army Working Capital Fund Supply: Funds replenishment of stocks issued to combat units deploying to OIF (Authorized Stockage List, Prescribed Load List, and Unit Basic Load). Also included are medical supplies for combat support hospitals and surgical teams. Supplemental funding is requested to replace aviation, missile, and ground combat system secondary items that have been lost to enemy action or lost/damaged during shipment to the theater. Additionally, the national inventory must be augmented to address significant increases in the demand for spares by deployed units. Funding is requested to pay for this war-related inventory growth.

Navy and Marine Corps Working Capital Fund Supply: Funds War Reserve Material to replenish Marine Corps war reserve inventory which has been consumed since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism.

Defense Wide Working Capital Fund Supply: Funds combat inventory associated with clothing, ground vehicle repair, construction and equipment items, and medical stocks. Funds in-theater distribution and demilitarization operating costs within the AOR. Funds fuel losses experienced at tactical fuel sites and along fuel delivery routes due to combat losses. Funds transportation and delivery of fuel within the AOR.

SUMMARY

Given the pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the supplemental request is required to continue current levels of operations. Without these funds, the military Services will reduce the level of military operations. These actions would preclude success in Iraq and Afghanistan and would undermine future warfighting capabilities and undermine U.S. security.
A Day in the Life of the Air Force in the Global War on Terror

- 24,000 Airmen committed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom / Operation Iraqi Freedom
- ~400 daily sorties in Operation Enduring Freedom / Operation Iraqi Freedom

Global Power
- 80 strike / Electronic Warfare/Non-Traditional ISR sorties in AOR
- Fired 1000 rounds and delivered 3 tons of bombs
- 7 Special Ops / Search and Rescue sorties in AOR

Global Vigilance
- 16 air sorties in AOR; 10 UAV orbits in AOR
- 15 U.S. satellites “parked” above Baghdad
- Track satellites from 55 countries – 560 satellite overflights daily
- 100+ operational US satellites, 450+ satellite ops events

Global Reach
- 1 departure every 90 seconds . . . 24/7/365
- 250 airlift sorties, 2500 PAX, 1000 tons, 58 offloads
- 30 tanker missions in AOR

- 13 AirEvac missions with 50 patients
- Airlift took 8K people per month off Iraqi convoy duty
**Force Protection**

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**Policy**
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide U.S. armed forces with the best protection and the latest technology against all forms of hostile action.

**Funding: $8.0B**
- Body armor and other personal protection items
- Equipment
  - Aircraft survivability components
  - Command and control equipment
  - Radios
  - Night vision equipment
- Armored vehicles and HMMWV Fragmentation Kits
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**Force Protection**

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1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)

2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

**DESCRIPTION**

The Department of Defense requests $8.0 billion to ensure that the Armed Forces of the United States are adequately protected. The total funding level for Force Protection for FY 2007 is $11.4 billion, a 111 percent increase over FY 2006.

The insurgency presents a dynamic threat that quickly adapts to the tactics and techniques employed by U.S. and coalition forces. In order to provide our service men and women with the best protection possible, the DoD is continuously researching, testing and procuring the latest in force protection tactics, techniques and technologies. The Department also disseminates lessons learned as rapidly as possible.

Force Protection requirements will remain at the current level, or grow, until insurgent activity and hostilities against U.S. and Coalition forces are reduced significantly. Funds utilized for Force Protection requirements directly impact our ability to save lives and increase the operational effectiveness of our troops on the ground.

**FUNDING REQUEST**

The request funds multiple requirements for passive and active protection for U.S. Soldiers and DoD Civilians. These needs include an array of specialized equipment intended to protect forces while maintaining a high level of force mobility and lethality.

**Body Armor**

**Individual Body Armor (IBA):** IBA provides an increased level of protection for forces on the ground and in the air. The Department is purchasing next generation body armor systems to take advantage of the latest technology.

Body armor is purchased in both individual sets and replacement parts and components. Body armor requirements have evolved from an initial basic vest with chest and back protection in FY 2004 (Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) combined with 2 rifle plates called Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) and Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI)), to include side, leg, and neck protection (Deltoid Auxiliary Protection System which provides additional shoulder protection and protection against armor piercing rounds (Level IV protection). Level IV body armor protection is the minimum protective level for all combat operations. It is worn to stop small arm and shrapnel wounds to upper body area.

In addition, other personal protection not specifically labeled as body armor, includes helmet (including the new Advanced
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Combat Helmet), earplugs, gloves, boots and other items. This may result in problems in making year-to-year comparisons on how many "sets" of body armor procured each year.

Except for a small quantity for the Air Force, through FY 2007, the Department has procured or expects to procure 100 percent of its requirements for Active, Reserve and National Guard units. Quantities about that level reflect replacement and outfitting with newer, enhanced body armor models and components.

**Advanced Combat Helmets (ACH) to Aircrew and Ground support personnel:** The ACH outperforms the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT) Kevlar helmet in survivability and injury avoidance. The ACH was initially tested by the Army and fielded to their deploying forces beginning in May 2005. The ACH has better ballistic and impact protection, increased 9mm bullet protection, and improved field of vision and localization.

**Force Protection Equipment and Activities**

_A “TIPS” hotline program for reporting insurgent activities:_ Request provides theater wide intelligence operations aimed at preventing and reducing insurgent activities within OIF. The TIPS Hotline enables Iraqis to inform U.S. DoD personnel of insurgent activities in the local communities.

_Fire-retardant clothing for protection against fuel-enhanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs):_ Request provides fire-retardant “Nomex” uniforms designed to protect Soldiers from fuel-based accelerants used in conjunction with IEDs. The fuel based IEDs are inflicting serious burns to gunners and operators of tactical vehicles. The Nomex fabric provides protection up to 700 degrees Fahrenheit. Nomex adds an additional 2 to 4 seconds of fire protection for vehicle egress. Funds will provide Soldiers with two sets of uniforms, gloves and a balaclava type hood per gunner. The complete uniform ensemble will include 154,000 Nomex Combat Vehicle Crewmember Coveralls (2 per service member), 154,000 Nomex Gloves (2 per service member), and 15,000 Nomex Balaclava Hoods (1 per gunner).

_Munitions clearance of unexploded and known ammunition caches:_ Request provides for the securing of sites and the removal, relocation and destruction of munitions found inside of Iraq. Program secures the known weapons caches, and continues with the destruction of enemy munitions and large ammunition dumps. Insurgents use munitions from stolen caches to construct IEDs. The destruction of such munitions has a direct impact on the insurgents’ ability to produce IEDs. Weapons caches must be destroyed to stop the supply of materials to construct IEDs. Costs cover only destruction of currently known weapons caches. The amount of and type of caches awaiting destruction include: 338 block buildings, 426 Castle (in ground) magazines/bunkers, 131 Arched Steel magazines/bunkers, 314 storage warehouses, 13 missile maintenance facilities, 3,391 open storage revetments, and 310 known buried sites across 18,000 Grids. Without supplemental funds to preserve 20 teams, only 3 teams can be supported in the FY 2007 budget.

_Newly fielded combat uniforms for desert warfare operations:_ Request provides ACU's for approximately 130,000 deployers to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. Improved uniform capabilities include better camouflage and improved performance for desert warfare operations.

_Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG):_ AWG is the Army’s organization designed to study and provide recommendations to commanders on the ground for the neutralization and defeat of improvised explosive devices and other insurgent tactics to harm U.S. and coalition forces. The organization is actively engaged in real-time assessment and quick response solutions, and coordinates closely with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device

1000055
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

**FORCE PROTECTION**

Rapid Equipping Force (REF): The REF bridges the gap between the lengthy acquisition process and immediate warfighter needs. Specifically, the Rapid Equipping Force is charged to:

- Equip operational commanders with off-the-shelf (government or commercial) solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed and acquired quickly – ideally, within 90 days;
- Insert future force technology solutions that engaged and deploying forces require by developing, testing and evaluating key technologies and systems under operational conditions;
- Assess capabilities and advise Army stakeholders of findings that will enable forces to confront an adaptive enemy rapidly.

**Investments and Force Protection:**

- **Unmanned Aircraft Systems.** The request funds the procurement of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). UAS support night operations, counter-IED operations, convoy protection and border surveillance. ASE provides infrared countermeasures against man-portable air defense systems for Army aircraft flying in support of OIF/OEF.
- **Dominant Maneuver.** Funds increase Soldier survivability against an ever-evolving lethal threat by providing improved body armor, head protection, thermal weapon sights and night vision goggles. Additionally, the Army will procure Route Clearance Vehicles, which are critical to maintaining main supply routes, allowing Combatant Commanders freedom of movement and protecting our Soldiers from IED attacks. The Army also will acquire Rapid Response Vehicles (Cougar) for deploying explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies.
- **Precision Strike.** The request funds procurement of counter-rocket/mortar radars, which are critical to protecting Soldiers from cannon, rocket and mortar fire. The funding will also be used to purchase Bradley Fire Support team vehicles and Combat Observation and Lasing Team vehicles, which

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Numbers may not add due to rounding.

(IED) Defeat Organization.
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

enhance the survivability of the forward observer teams that detect and deliver lethal fire against enemy targets.

- **Air Defense.** The supplemental would enable the Army to increase air and missile defense support to field commands, to include the ability to sense, warn and defeat enemy rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) attacks.

- **Battle Command and Control.** Funding would procure network upgrades to support the deployed force. These include equipment that connects the warfighter to the Global Information Grid with voice, data and video. The supplemental also would help the Army to transition to high-speed internet connectivity down to the battalion level. It also would provide fully digitized command posts and collaboration suites, and ensure shared Joint situational awareness for commanders at division and above.

**Aircraft Procurement:**

- Mobility and transport aircraft with infrared defensive protection capabilities to prevent and reduce damage caused by hostile fire;

- A-10 AAR-47 kits, spares, and support equipment to improve survivability against infrared threats;

- Combat enhancements to keep the A-10 close air support viable over the 21st century battlefield;

- Combat Survivor/Evader Locator Combat Radios to eliminate a severe shortfall in quantities and capabilities;

- Upgrades to the EC-130H COMPASS CALL IED Defeat Subsystems to counter new threats by improving identification of IEDs by ground forces.

**Armored Vehicles**

**Focused Logistics.** The request procures next-generation tactical vehicles with inherent armor capabilities. It also covers the purchase of equipment used to maintain the operational status of systems and for fault isolation; a software uploader/verifier which restores or provides new software to weapon systems; and calibration support to ground TOW optical sight, tactical communication, aviation and missile systems.

**Full Dimension Protection.** Supplemental funding procures systems, such as the Armored Security Vehicle and Chem/Bio protective masks, which enable Soldiers to perform security/force protection missions safely.

**SUMMARY**

Force protection is essential for keeping casualties low and improving the safety and security of U.S. troops. Without these funds U.S. soldiers, sailors, Marines, and Airmen will be placed unnecessarily in harms way.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to defeat IEDs as the enemy’s weapon of choice by attacking the IED network, defeating the device, and training our forces to defeat and disarm these weapons.

Funding: $2.4B
- Attack the Network
  – Counter Bomber
  – Counter Infrastructure
- Defeat the Device
  – Jammers (CREW, Warlock etc.)
  – Detection (ISR, X-Ray Systems, etc.)
  – Neutralize (Robots, Defusing systems)
- Train the Force
  – Personnel Training
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

IED Defeat

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1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $2.4 billion for defeating the IED threat to U.S. and Coalition forces for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding level for IED Defeat category for FY 2007 is $4.3 billion, a 30% percent increase over FY 2006. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Department has invested $6.7 billion in defeating the IED threat. This figure includes all funding (FY05-07) made available to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which was established in the third quarter of FY 2005.

The use of improvised explosive devices has proven to be a particularly challenging threat to U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the past year, the enemy has increasingly used IEDs as their primary, and most effective, weapon of choice to exploit the vulnerabilities of militarily superior Coalition forces. Additionally, the enemy continues to evolve and adapt tactics, techniques and procedures in response to countermeasures. For example, the enemy has initiated the use of multiple triggering devices and various forms of explosive devices to defeat the improved armor on vehicles.

To address this threat comprehensively, the Department of Defense established JIEDDO. The organization’s mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of efforts by the Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.

The funding requested for IED Defeat supports the following Lines of Operation:

- Attack the Network;
- Defeat the Device;
- Train the Force.

FUNDING REQUEST

This FY 2007 supplemental request will fund action against components of the IED system, the IED makers, as well as the trainers and supporting infrastructures. This helps to counter the effects of all forms of IEDs used against the United States and Coalition Forces. It includes equipment and materials used in the field for attacking the IED threat. In July, 2005 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a process to validate and resource Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) of deployed combat units.
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Attack the Network

The supplemental request will be used to meet the JUON requests of the commanders in the field as well as JIEDDO research and development activities to counter the enemy’s use of IEDs. Critical items include the following:

- **Warrior Alpha.** Day and night tactical airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide Division commanders with a better view of critical areas. It includes a full system of Ground Control Stations, SATCOM connections and remote video terminals for data dissemination, and full operations and maintenance contractor support.

- **Science and Technology for attacking IED Networks.** Connects various sensor systems and integrates them with command and control systems enabling the warfighter to conduct operations against IED networks.

- **Joint Center of Excellence.** Counters the increasingly sophisticated IED threat by providing relevant, world class, collective skills training; training on new technology; and lessons learned integration for joint coalition forces.

- **Counter IED Operational Integration Center (COIC).** Fuses intelligence products for targeting operations. The COIC develops analytical tools and analysis in near-real-time to support requirements of units.

- **Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC).** Forms, equips and trains a cell of analysts with forensics expertise. Includes miscellaneous consumables and lab equipment, tactical vehicles and facility renovations to provide intelligence on enemy patterns and operators.

- **Counter IED Targeting Program (CITP).** Provides analysis, tools, techniques and resources to increase Multinational Force-I capability to support fusion of intelligence products to target bomb maker networks.

Defeat the Device

The supplemental request funds efforts to: (1) improve our ability to detect IEDs at greater stand-off distances; (2) conduct research on counter-IED protective materials; and (3) conduct research and development of systems to detect and counter IED triggers at increasing ranges. Use of these funds affects all forms of IEDs used against the United States and Coalition Forces.

Funds will also support JIEDDO’s long and mid-range studies, assessments, modifications and testing in support of field needs to mitigate the effects of IED detonations and other emerging physical threats. Specific efforts against the devices in FY07 will...
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include the following:

- **Counter-IED Radio-Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW).** Supports requirements for technology development, production and insertion, upgrades, additional testing, field support, materials, operations, and support for fielding the current series of jammers to include Duke, Chameleon and Guardian. Supports simultaneous development and fielding of second generation jammers to ensure we can counter the evolving threat.

- **Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS).** Provides near-real-time surveillance of developing threats to improve speed, effectiveness, and safety of Quick Reaction Forces to find, fix, track, target, and engage direct and indirect fire threats.

- **“Eagle Eye” and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID).** A family of tower-based detection systems. These towers enhance mobile and fixed site security primarily for Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Force Protection disposal teams working at ERW sites. Eagle Eye can also support offensive operations against IED emplacers.

- **Passive Infrared (PIR) Defeat Systems.** Systems that provide protection against passive infrared initiated IEDs.

- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Engineer Stand-off Camera Systems.** Provides units with standoff IED detection using electro-optical and infrared methods.

- **Ground Penetrating Radar.** Systems under development to detect buried IEDs from mobile vehicle platforms.

- **Improvised Explosive Device Robot.** This initiative develops and tests communications equipment to increase the operating range of the Man-Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) Mk 1 and Mk 2.

- **“Cougar” Armor Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle.** Enables reconnaissance by Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel, which provides enhanced armor and underbelly protection against various types of IEDs.

- **Change Detection Monitoring (Systems).** A number of different systems that monitor changes in the battle environment to indicate possible location of IED threats to ground units.

**Train the Force**

Training enables commanders to use and synchronize technological solutions for attacking the network and defeating the explosive devices. Without effective training the effectiveness of other IED defeat initiatives cannot be maximized fully.

JIEDDO is fully engaged in the full spectrum of individual, collective and battle staff training – institutional training efforts, home-station training, pre-deployment training, as well as training advisors in both Iraq and Afghanistan. JIEDDO’s training program directly supports the Combatant Commanders’ mission and priorities. This supplemental request also supports known JUONs for the CENTCOM Commander as well as training technologies to support other Joint training efforts, such as:

- The Joint Center of Excellence, which counters the increasingly sophisticated IED threat by providing relevant, world class, collective skills training, new technology training, and lessons learned integration for joint coalition forces;

- Counter IED Operational Integration Center (COIC). Intelligence fusion into operational training solutions and programs;
SUMMARY
The denial or reduction of funds would severely impact the JIEDDO Mission. Most of JIEDDO’s costs (74%) are fixed. The current $2.0 billion emergency allowance covers FY 2006 requirements that have been carried forward into FY 2007, as well as requirements to procure the remainder of the jammers mandated by language in the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act. In order to meet the Congressionally mandated requirement to protect all vehicles with jammers by the end of FY 2007, prompt approval of this emergency supplemental request is required. The single largest program within JIEDDO that will be affected, if the supplemental is not approved, is the Counter-IED Radio Electronic Warfare (CREW) program. These jammers provide protection to our forces against radio-armed and radio-initiated improvised explosive devices.
Military Intelligence

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to support warfighting units with timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence.

Funding: $2.7B
• Airborne ISR
• All-Source Intelligence Analysis
• Counterintelligence (CI)
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
• Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
• Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
• Multidisciplinary Intelligence
• Operational Support
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
• Training
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Military Intelligence

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1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $2.7 billion for military intelligence programs vital to the conduct of the Global War on Terror for the remainder of FY 2007. This funding is in addition to $0.8 billion appropriated in the FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act. The total funding level for military intelligence for FY 2007 is $3.5 billion, a 133% increase over FY 2006.

FUNDING REQUEST

This request is critical to providing deployed units and next-to-deploy units with access to real-time, operationally focused intelligence. Funds support the intelligence activities of all the military Services and the Defense intelligence agencies involved in the war effort, including: the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and the Counterintelligence Field Activity Office. The details of this request are included in a classified annex provided separately to the Congress. These programs do not include those requested within the National Intelligence Program led by the Director of National Intelligence.

Military Intelligence Programs (MIP)

The MIP request is presented according to the following disciplines:

- Counterintelligence (CI);
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT);
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT);
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT);
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence;
- Operational Support;
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT);
- Training.

Airborne ISR. This discipline includes activities that synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of airborne sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. Airborne ISR is an integrated intelligence and operations function. The MIP request would fund procurement of, and modifications to, service platforms such as the Guardrail Common Sensor, U-2, Predator and Global Hawk in order to provide critical capabilities to the forces engaged in OIF, OEF and the Global War on Terror.

In particular, the Air Force request will provide key ISR platform and system field service support, aircraft/equipment maintenance contracts, and repair/replenishment of various AF MIP systems, platforms, and sensors. These funds are critical to sustain current battlespace awareness capabilities and operator proficiencies across multiple intelligence disciplines and to prevent intelligence capability gaps in an ever increasing operational tempo.
environment. AF ISR capabilities require supplemental funding to continue to provide the direct intelligence support on which the COCOM warfighters depend.

AF ISR MIPs provide a diverse set of "multi-INT" capabilities and reachback support for COCOMs engaged in the GWOT; particularly, CENTCOM. AF ISR assets including U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, RJ-135, Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), SCATHE View, and Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) provide critical intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination for combat operations in both Operations OIF and OEF. For example, DCGS provided multi-INT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, and correlation operations support for over 3,800 U-2, Global Hawk, and Predator sorties in 2006. These Air Force MIP ISR capabilities ensure that the warfighter has the real-time (or near-real-time) time-sensitive targeting, force protection (to include Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices), threat warning, and the overall situational awareness they need to directly improve joint warfighter and operational commanders’ combat effectiveness.

**All Source Intelligence.** This discipline funds activities that support the production of finished intelligence products by incorporating all sources of intelligence, to include human, signals, imagery, etc. The MIP request would fund efforts across the Services and Agencies, but particularly at the Combatant Commands (part of the DIA request). These funds are primarily in support of contracted analytic efforts and related operations tempo to enable these efforts to function 24/7 in support of operations around the world.

**Counterintelligence (CI).** The CI discipline covers information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. In particular, the MIP request would fund efforts in the Services, CIFA and DIA to support force protection, CI analysis and operations in theater, as well as CI training for deploying forces. The request funds a broad array of counterintelligence capabilities and projects in direct support of deployed forces like Counter Intelligence (CI) Support to Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies (CICODA) to provide direct CI analysis and production support to the Combatant Commands, Military Services and Defense Agencies around the world. It provides near-real-time intelligence and analytic support to protect DoD and other USG personnel, dependents, and assets against terrorist attacks and exploitation by Foreign Intelligence Services. CI Support to Critical Information Infrastructure provides response teams to collect evidence and conduct forensic analysis of IT incidents and intrusions, which assist in maintaining the integrity and security of highly sensitive networks and communications lines. CI Support to Technical Services responds to the increased
demand for CI technical services and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capabilities in response to GWOT requirements. CI Support to Force Protection (CIFP) support existing Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) efforts in the Philippines and the newly inaugurated DOMEX operations in Malaysia and Indonesia.

These funds support contracted efforts to sustain CI operations and training, as well as some equipment purchases to enable information sharing across components engaged in CI activities.

**Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT).** This discipline includes intelligence information collected from and provided by human sources. The MIP request would support evolving the counterintelligence and HUMINT architectures (hardware, communications, training, software), integrate standardized operational systems, identify technical requirements for the future force, and bolster cover and cover mechanisms. These efforts are being undertaken in the Army, DIA, and CIFA. For the Army in particular, this request sustains contract support in the development and revision of CI/HUMINT doctrine for CI source operations, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), polygraph support, biometrics, Offensive Foreign Counter-intelligence Operations (OFCO), and the restructuring of the Army CI Case Control Office and the Theater Sub-Case Control Offices.

Additionally, the request continues to support HUMINT training, contract instructors and support personnel to produce HUMINT Collectors, CI Agents, the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (Jl-CTC) and automated classroom support to produce functional and leader development training as well as capabilities development in CI/HUMINT.

**Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).** IMINT refers to intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. The MIP request includes IMINT efforts primarily through NGA which allow warfighters to “see” the battlefield, an essential capability for combating terrorism and providing quality mission planning information in the theater of operations. The funds support the procurement and operation of mobile, deployable exploitation tools as well as contracted support to enable effective and timely access of IMINT by the forces on the ground. In particular, the request supports imagery Exploitation Capability workstations, Full Motion Video (FMV) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and moving target indicator distance learning. Additionally, the request supports units in the field prior to deployment and sustainment training of FMV UAV intelligence exploitation operations.

**Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT).** MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of
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fixed and dynamic target sources. MASINT capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. MASINT provides insights into the area of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan that other intelligence sensors cannot. The MIP request supports force protection, counter-targeting, persistent surveillance, and the reduction of combat risk by funding sensors, sustaining their operation, and providing warfighters the tools to access and utilize the sensor data collected in the field. The request funds imagery products to Army Space Support Teams and Commercial Exploitation Teams deployed in the theater. This program directly supports the Warfighter by providing the capability to report information from over 1,400 ground based MASINT sensors. These systems help meet the tactical requirements for:

- Force protection;
- Counter-targeting;
- Persistent surveillance in hostile areas, and
- Reducing combat risk.

The requested funds support maintenance, spare parts, repairs and sustainment of older systems.

Multidisciplinary Intelligence. This discipline refers to the collection and processing of information by two or more disciplines, such as SIGINT and IMINT. The MIP request would fund the procurement and sustainment of platforms and systems such as the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Trojan Spirit in the Army, several direction-finding and communications interception efforts in the Navy, and digital mapping and targeting in the Air Force.

Operational Support. This discipline funds those activities that provide general, financial, and administrative functions, including logistics, comptroller, legal and audit functions, personnel management, facilities costs (utilities, leases, maintenance, and purchase), basic and applied research and development activities required to support intelligence operations, public information, medical services, supply operations, PCS and non-operational travel, base services, and property disposal. This MIP request includes sustainment of 24/7 intelligence staff support at critical operational locations, IT infrastructure support (such as the provision of SCI communications and internet capability to forces on the ground), and some training infrastructure, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. SIGINT provides Force Protection/Indications and Warning products in support of deployed forces in the theater, followed by target development, analysis and reporting of logistics, support and recruitment networks. The MIP request would fund equipment and operations, primarily in the Army, Air Force, and NSA, to equip forces with systems such as Trojan and Prophet, and to allow them to apply the information collected from these systems to ongoing operations. The TROJAN Data Network facilitates all-source analysis and SCI reach back for warfighters in support of OIF/OEF. TROJAN Classic XXI capability provides unmanned signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems in forward deployed locations, providing Actionable Intelligence to Combatant Commanders and National Users. The request provides IT personnel support to TROJAN system users worldwide at the TROJAN Network Control centers, supporting approximately 400 terminals. Provides operational management and oversight of TROJAN systems to include firewalls, router password management, Internet protocol address space, network scanning and patching, and TROJAN Bandwidth Available Upon Demand (TBAUD) assignments. This request also funds training and target familiarization to forces deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa.
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**Training.** This discipline covers efforts throughout all components to provide deploying forces, as well as deployed forces, with training in intelligence collection, exploitation and analysis, as well as how to utilize intelligence and related equipment when in the field. The MIP request would fund contracted support and personnel-related costs to ensure our forces are trained in the latest equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures. In addition, this request seeks funds to support Army Red Teaming training, to train our forces how to think like the opponents they will be facing in theater.

**SUMMARY**

Without these funds, essential surveillance against the Iraq insurgency will not be as thorough or as effective. For example, intelligence on IEDs will be reduced, leading to more deaths and injuries in the theater. Similarly, curtailed investments in critical theater-level collection systems, such as UAVs, will undermine the safety and effectiveness of U.S. forces.
Iraq Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support the security forces of the democratically elected government of Iraq until it can defend its own institutions independently.

Funding: $3.8B
- Enhance logistics capability and equipment, infrastructure and sustainment of ground forces
- Air Force (12 counter insurgency aircraft, 8 trainers and sustainment)
- Navy (41 boats and support infrastructure)
- Enhanced National Police capabilities
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### Iraq Security Forces

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| Related Activities   | 0.1     | 0.1     | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 200% |
| **Total Iraq Security Forces** | — | 3.0 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 3.8 | 5.5 | 83% |

1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

**DESCRIPTION**

The Department of Defense requests $3.8 billion to support Iraq Security Forces for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding level for Iraq Security Forces category for FY 2007 is $5.5 billion, an 83 percent increase over FY 2006.

The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq (GoI), is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve stability and national unity. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as the development of more capable security forces. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the Iraqi government and people.

As of January 2007, the Coalition has trained and equipped 328,500 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which include the Army, the local and national police, border guards and specialized units. The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility, and demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counter-insurgency operations. There are 8 Division Headquarters, 31 Brigade Headquarters, and 94 Iraqi Army battalions that have assumed the lead in their areas of
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operation for counter-insurgency operations. In September 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) assumed control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, and 3 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions. The remaining divisions are scheduled to come under the IGFC in 2007. In total, 106 Iraqi Army combat battalions and 12 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are “in the fight.”

Iraq Security Forces

The Department of Defense’s main goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqis build and sustain ISF institutional capability and to generate a professional and capable ISF. Over the coming years, the U.S. military, along with our Coalition partners will continue to build, enhance and develop the ISF to full operational capability. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must partner with the Iraqis and the Coalition to provide long-term training and funding for modernization and sustainment of the ISF. The program maintains the current force, adapts for changed conditions, and accelerates future capability. More importantly, the training will respond to the changing threat by building capability sooner and accelerating completion of the program. This allows the U.S. to shape the foundation for the U.S. and Iraq long-term security relationship. Delays in ISF development increase both the security risk and the long-term cost to the United States Government.

Ministry of Defense Forces

Under the revised strategy, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces will be trained and equipped to be principally responsible for quelling sectarian violence. They will lead in the effort against militias and other lawless forces, with Coalition support as required. Coalition forces, with Iraqi forces in support, will be responsible for operations to defeat Al Qaeda and associated movements. The program accelerates the hand-over of responsibility, while at the same time continues the training and equipping of the MoD forces. The original force is comprised of a 136,200 soldier/10-Division Army, a basic infantry force with limited mechanized capability, support units, a small Air Force for reconnaissance and logistics and a small coastal patrol force.

The future program builds on the current successes of the MoD forces. Specifically, the request would:

- Provide logistics capabilities to build strategic/operational-level support units, sustainment stocks, maintenance capability and transport equipment.
- Fund combat support units to include engineering units, counter-IED capabilities, military Intel companies, Military Police and headquarters service companies.
- Provide mobility/force protection to include pure combat support wheeled vehicles and infrastructure survivability and equipment upgrades/interoperability with the U.S. such as assault rifles.
- Fund machine guns, night vision, howitzers, mortars, airlift, air assault, UAVs and offshore naval capability.

Ministry of Interior Forces

Under the revised strategy, similar to the MoD forces, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces will be trained and equipped to be principally responsible for quelling sectarian violence, and will lead in the effort against militias and other lawless forces, with Coalition support as required. Community policing, safeguarding the public and providing internal security at the local level remains important for long-term success in achieving rule of law. The U.S. will place robust DoD advisory teams in MoI forces by embedding U.S. advisors down to the army battalion/police station level. The U.S. will also press senior Iraqi officials to put country over ethno sectarian group in hiring and command selection.
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The program accelerates the hand-over of responsibility, while at the same time continues the training and equipping of the MoI forces. Specifics of the program include: Force structure increases such as 4,000 police for forensic specialties; National Police forces provided with armored/SWAT vehicles and HMMWVs, tactical gear, and body armor; National Police reform training to include rule of law/ethics training, leader development and National Police transformation; Investigation capability to include surveillance system equipment; and life support capability to include development of a MoI logistics structure and infrastructure sustainment.

Vision for the Iraqi Armed Forces Development

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) in coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) has nearly completed the generation of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF is comprised of Army, Navy, Air Force and Civil Security Forces (CSF). Combined, these components are maturing into professional security organizations that will be sustainable, affordable, and loyal to the Government of Iraq (GoI). These components are becoming more capable of planning, controlling, executing, and leading counter-insurgency and law enforcement operations. The ISF is dedicated to protecting Iraqi citizens, maintaining national security and territorial integrity by upholding the rule of law.

In 2004, the Coalition began building the Iraqi Security Forces, concentrating almost exclusively on the Iraqi Army combat forces. Early emphasis was on getting the Iraqi forces trained and equipped to support counterinsurgency operations as quickly as possible. This strategy is paying off as more Iraqi units are assuming the lead in operations and taking over battle-space from Coalition forces. However, the decision to concentrate on generating Army combat units came at the expense of building logistical and support elements. Now that the generation of combat units is nearly completed, a rebalancing effort to focus on logistics is necessary to sustain ISF well into the future. Failure to develop logistics capability could lead to a prolonged U.S. and Coalition presence and potentially unravel progress and investments made up to this point.

It was not until January of 2006 that a full-scale effort dubbed “The Year of the Police” accelerated generation of Iraqi Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF), which includes the National Police (NP), Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), and Ports of Entry (POE). Staffing, equipping, and basing the OCSF is on track, but improving standards remains critically important. Transformation of the National Police forces is underway by rooting out corruption, militia influences and criminality. Leadership training in the IPS, DBE, and POE is also receiving increased emphasis to overcome decades of unprofessional behavior and mismanagement.
Regardless of how developed the Iraqi Military and Civil Security Forces are, neither will be able to function professionally without competent Ministerial leadership and management. It is, therefore, essential for the MoD and MoI to have the Ministerial capacity to assume control of its ISF from the Coalition. The MNSTC-I’s main focus is Ministerial development and is supported by U.S. investments in Coalition transition teams. Continued training, as well as investment in command and control, automation, and intelligence capabilities are all required to ensure the transition is successful.

**FUNDING REQUEST**

In Iraq’s rapidly changing and complex security environment, only a modern and professional ISF, led by competent Ministries will be capable of successful independent operations. To ensure this happens, it is crucial that MNSTC-I receive funding to support the following capabilities:

- Force generation and continued Ministerial capacity development;
- Develop logistics enablers;
- Enhance Air Force capability;
- Enhance Naval capability.

The above combined capabilities will establish the ISF as a credible, sustainable, and integrated fighting force. Additionally, the establishment of a professional ISF will facilitate the continued transition of the security mission from Coalition to Iraqi control and allow eventual drawdown of Coalition forces. The first priority must be funded to complete agreed upon objective ISF. The second priority establishes the logistics capability that will provide the ISF an enduring capacity for sustainment as Coalition support is reduced. The third and fourth priorities source necessary requirements to provide the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) an enhanced capability to support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction efforts.

**Top Priorities**

MNSTC-I’s top priority is to complete the Objective Counter-Insurgency (COIN) force and the Objective Civil Security force. Failure to achieve this goal will plant the seeds of doubt and mistrust in Coalition sincerity and commitment. Such a perception will negatively affect the confidence and morale of the ISF, and could potentially unravel the progress the U.S. has made over the last two-and-a-half years. Only a robust and professionalized ISF supported by capable and competent Ministerial leadership will begin to bring about real security and stability in Iraq. The success of subsequent modernization, sustainment, and expansion efforts will be contingent upon the complete and successful generation of a robust and professional ISF. These forces, when fully capable, will give the Iraqi Government the ability to protect its people and maintain stability in Iraq. Stability in Iraq will establish the conditions where Coalition forces will transition control and subsequently draw-down forces.

The second priority is to establish Logistics Enablers. This initiative will provide the ISF an enduring logistics capability that will facilitate eventual drawdown of Coalition forces across the full spectrum. The counterinsurgency tactical, operational, and strategic efforts require a sustained infrastructure. As the completion of the objective COIN force nears, prudent investments are required in order to provide a self-reliant and self-sufficient ISF.

The Iraqi Security Forces logistics system will be organized, trained and equipped to sustain independent counterinsurgency operations throughout Iraq. Once Iraqi security self-reliance is established and the Coalition forces have withdrawn, this logistics system will sustain independent operations across Iraq.
Additionally, should the Iraqis further develop its force structure, the logistics system will be able to adapt to tactical, operational, and strategic missions.

This particular logistics program will form a capability that will provide the basic infrastructure necessary to initiate independent Iraqi logistical support for the ISF. These programs form the baseline capital investment on which the Iraqi Security Ministry’s are building their broader system of support. These programs will help provide a capability that is modular and flexible enough to support larger Security Forces in the near-term as they undertake the counterinsurgency role and to support smaller Iraqi Armed Forces in the long-term as they undertake their national self-defense role. The categories of support and particular programs include:

**Sustainment:** Defined as the provision of logistic, administrative and other support required to establish, maintain and prolong operations until the successful accomplishment of the mission or task. Sustainment allows uninterrupted operations through the means of adequate logistic support. The components of sustainment are maintenance, supply, transport and health support. Some aspects of life support are also a part of sustainment. Specific aspects of sustainment include:

- Critical Infrastructure Improvements;
- Completion of Equipping of all Regional Support Units (RSU)/Garrison Support Units (GSU) and Military Specialty Schools;
- Technical Library;
- Cannibalization – Recycle Center;
- Administrative and Information Services Support to Regional Support Units (RSU)/Garrison Support Units (GSU).

**Maintenance Support:** Maintenance support is service, repair and overhaul of vehicles, weapons, aircraft, watercraft and other equipment in accordance with maintenance plans and unit equipment priorities. Components of maintenance support include:

- Joint Logistics Operations Center;
- Logistics Automation Program;
- Regional Support Units (RSU)/Garrison Support Units (GSU) and Military Specialty Schools Training Support, Work/Storage Site Improvements;
- Replacement Generators and Range Targets.

**Supply Support:** Supply support is the procurement, receiving, storing, issue and accounting of all classes of supply (as appropriate) in accordance with a sustainability statement, stockholding policy and/or contingency requirement. This includes:

- National Ammunition Depot (NAD);
- 90 Fuel Storage Points;
- Regional Support Units (RSU)/Garrison Support Units (GSU) Support equipment.

**Transport Support:** Transport support is movement of personnel, cargo and liquids to and from the National Depot, Regional Support Units, Garrison Support Units, and supported operational formations and units. The transport support component includes the National Movement Control Center.
Health Support: Health support is the single, integrated system that consists of all services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Iraqi Armed Forces. Portions of the health support area include:

- Medical Training Equipment and Supplies for the Iraqi Army Medical Force;
- Steel Hut Infrastructures (20 Sites).

The third most critical need is the establishment of a capable Air Force that can provide the necessary airpower to the ISF to defeat the insurgents. The Iraq Air Force (IQAF) has two strategic missions:

- Provide support to counter insurgency operation;
- Provide defense of Iraqi airspace and contribute to regional stability by deterring aggression in cooperation with allies.

The Iraq Air Force adds significant short, medium, and long term capability that supports all elements of Iraq’s instruments of national power including diplomatic (safe dignitary transport), informational (Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance and ISR), Military (COIN air operations), and economic (regional engagement). Accelerating modernization of the IQAF sets the conditions for the enduring airpower needed to help ensure Iraq’s national sovereignty. Within the next three years, the primary focus of IQAF development is on increasing air operational capability across the spectrum of missions supporting the COIN fight. Providing real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and enhancing security force projection through the use of rotary wing Battlefield Mobility or Fixed Wing Air Transport are the primary areas of capabilities enhancement in the near-term. Developing these capabilities also increases GoI visibility and enhances its standing among the populace helping to thwart the insurgents’ information campaign. In addition, with 10 Army Divisions spread across the country, coupled with the expanse of such provinces as Al Anbar, as well as the regional concerns of six bordering countries, a mix of rotary and fixed wing capability is essential. They allow an economically rapid and responsive movement of information or personnel, equipment, and supplies throughout the region or to forward bases and onward to the combat area in direct support of all ISF.

A secondary element to this near-term focus is the development of an armed Counter-Terrorism (CT) response capability for both fixed wing ISR and rotary wing Battlefield Mobility assets. The GoI, in partnership with the Coalition, has invested significantly in providing additional rotary wing assets and has a plan to provide additional fixed wing assets. Providing a self-defensive capability to each platform, and then an armed response option to selected assets, is a critical area for additional future Coalition commitment. Both the rotary and fixed wing CT response platforms would provide significant enhancements to both...
ground conventional and SOF elements by providing airpower capable of conducting armed overwatch, infiltration, or exfiltration missions.

Fixed wing ISR and utility helicopters provide essential support to national defense, civil-military operations, and the ISF engaged in the COIN fight. Both assets are important for supporting police operations in Iraq. In addition, utility helicopters are able to provide a range of support functions within Iraq, such as search and rescue, MEDEVAC, troop transport, troop lift and disaster relief. The Oil Platform Protection Mission will create an additional role for utility helicopters in supporting the IqN and Marines offshore. The requirement for armed fixed wing ISR and utility helicopters with robust self-protection defensive systems allows unfettered access across the battlespace and enables an effective kinetic CT response option. Developing this CT response capability would become the first steps in the ability of Coalition air forces to begin disengaging from a close air support role.

The current fixed wing ISR and utility helicopter fleet is not able to provide the capability required by a modern and mobile land force. Close air support capability only exists through the use of Coalition air forces. The IqAF’s current fixed wing ISR aircraft are becoming increasingly difficult to support because they are unsuitable to the harsh Iraqi environment and for the mission requirements. In the future, fixed wing ISR aircraft will assume greater importance for the collection of national intelligence requirements and border and infrastructure surveillance. Helicopters will assume greater importance for battlefield mobility and ground support. Both platforms in the CT response configuration will directly support Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities. Additionally, there is a requirement for a Special Operations Utility Helicopter Squadron supporting the Iraqi SOF (ISOF). This initiative has links to the following goals and projects:

- Special Operations Capabilities;
- Multi-Role Aircraft.

The third element of near-term capabilities enhancement is the development of an aircrew and specialist training pipeline to provide the airmen needed for the planned expansion of the IqAF. Out-of-country training, such as that available through International Military Educational Training (IMET) is required but insufficient to meet the near-term demands. The primary goal is to first provide a basic flight screening program within Iraq to ensure all pilots deploying for advanced training out of the country are capable of successfully completing the required course of study. The next goal is introduce single-engine advanced fixed-wing flight training through the procurement of a platform similar to the T-6/A Texan II. A turbine aircraft in this category would also be useable as a COIN attack aircraft that could provide additional close air support for the ISF. This type of aircraft can be optimized as either a single engine advanced training aircraft and as a COIN attack weapon system that could provide direct armed support to conventional ground and SOF elements of the ISF.

Air Force Pilot and Technician Training (modernization) provides training to adequately prepare and develop pilots and technicians to meet the substantial demands of Iraq’s current complex security environment and keep pace with planned aircraft/equipment modernization.

The fourth element of planned near-term Air Force capabilities enhancement is the development of an air traffic and airspace control structure that enhances near-term MoI total air space control while providing a longer-term structure for future transfer and integration of civil airspace control to the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority. Developing an Air Traffic Control system with radars capable of both military and civil functionality is the most cost effective and rapid enabler for transferring airspace control
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authority to the GoI. Moreover, the Iraqis have no long-range capability for target detection, identification and tracking in the air defense role. A “dual-use” radar system will minimize risk to friendly forces through long-range radar detection and identification friend or foe (IFF) capability.

Modernizing aircraft/equipment and capabilities are in line with the Air Force plan, which will require an increased level of pilot and technician training. To reach a level that enables the Air Force to conduct its tasks in a professional and flexible way, advanced training must correspond to the planned modernization of aircraft/equipment and capabilities. Currently, pilot and technician training are wholly inadequate, but that will change with the purchase of basic and advanced fixed-wing single- and multi-engine trainer aircraft, as well as the establishment of basic and advanced rotary wing training pipelines using existing inventory platforms. To meet the demands of the Iraqi aircraft acquisition plan, the IqAF must train, at a minimum, over 100 rotary and fixed wing pilots each year for the next 6 years.

The final element of modernization required in the immediate future is in the fixed-wing Air Transport mission area. Fixed-wing Air Transport aircraft provide economical and essential support to all components of the IqAF. The ability to conduct this mission also provides direct enhancement of the GoI governing authority by increasing the government’s presence throughout the country and region. Fixed-wing Air Transport aircraft are able to provide a range of support functions within Iraq, such as search and rescue, MEDEVAC, troop transport, re-supply, and disaster relief. The current aircraft fleet is not able to provide the capability required by a modern, mobile land force. Fixed-wing air mobility is an important and necessary capability for COIN air operations. This plan links to the following goals and programs:

- Multi-Role Aircraft;
- Air Force Capabilities.

The IqAF currently relies heavily on Coalition involvement for air mobility; close air support; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. The capability gap in equipment will be bridged with aircraft modernization. Concurrently, advanced training will be conducted on modern aircraft and equipment for pilots and technicians both inside and outside Iraq to enhance skills and technical abilities that can then be incorporated into homeland IqAF Training. This project has links to all goals and projects in the IqAF:

- Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft;
- Battlefield mobility (Helicopters);
- Flight Training;
- Airspace Command and Control;
- Air Transport in the Light/Heavy and VIP Category.

In the longer term, IqAF Air Defense modernization will provide future capability needed to maintain national sovereignty. The presence of Coalition forces currently delays the near-term implementation of this necessary capability. However, an air defense capability is needed to first provide sovereign control of Iraq’s national border and then to protect critical infrastructure and ground elements of the ISF from air threats such as low flying aircraft and armed helicopters. Initial capability, while the Coalition is present, provides mobile, short-range air point defense protection against unmanned aerial vehicles, low-flying fixed-wing aircraft, and other rotary wing platforms.

The Navy Patrol Vessel initiative will procure 15 ocean-going patrol boats, 26 fast attack boats, and supporting base infrastructure. This initiative is designed to enhance the IqN’s ability to conduct counter insurgency operations in the nation’s littorals and to protect the structures that generate over 85% of
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the nation’s gross domestic product - Iraq’s two off-shore oil platforms (OPLATs) in the Northern Arabian Gulf.

Iraq’s five current patrol boats are an important part of the Commander, U.S. Navy Central Command’s continuous overwatch of Iraq’s OPLATs, and they have been successfully operating under the tactical control of Command Task Force 158 (CTF 158) since the summer of 2005. However, these vessels are too few in number and too limited in capability to allow the Iraqis to provide the requisite OPLAT protection without significant assistance from CTF 158. Funding this initiative will provide one-third of the triad necessary for Iraq to assume sovereign control of its waters. The Iraqis themselves are attempting to purchase the other two-thirds of their naval triad in the 2006 budget. If these efforts prove successful, Coalition navies will be able to discontinue their protection of Iraq’s waters and be free to conduct other assigned missions.

Iraq’s current fleet of 10 Fast Aluminum Boats conducts part-time counter-insurgency, counter-smuggling, and counter-piracy operations within the shallows of the Khawr Abd Allah (KAA) waterway which leads to Iraq’s only deep water port in Umm Qasr. This initiative will bring their fleet of smaller attack boats to the necessary end strength required for the full-time patrol of this strategic waterway.

Purchasing these two classes of vessels will help the IqN complete its force generation process and will allow the IqN to meet the needs of many other governmental agencies including the MoI, Iraqi Customs Service, the Police, and the Coast Guard. These patrol vessels will also be able to conduct presence operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf and preserve Iraq’s maritime borders with Iran as stipulated under international law. Future operations may include peace and stability operations and theater disaster relief when required. Moreover, these vessels will allow the IqN to conduct combined training exercises and missions with its seagoing neighbors, “showing the Iraqi flag” and improving relations throughout the region. This initiative has links to the following goals and projects:

- Helicopter Capability;
- Special Operations Capabilities;
- Iraqi Forces Modernization.

The IqN Training program affords an ability to maintain the long-term viability of the IqN to support the Global War on Terrorism and to enable the IqN to independently provide for the national security of Iraq. Supplemental funds will help establish an overarching training program for the IqN, to include highly trained instructors, up-to-date lesson plans/learning materials and state of the art learning facilities/infrastructure.
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The Navy also protects the shoreline and inland waterways from insurgent and criminal infiltration. Light patrol craft and assault boats conduct patrols and interdict infiltrators before they can link-up with terrorist cells. Finally, a battalion of Marines operate as part of the Navy and provide the ability to conduct armed shipboard search-and-seizure operations. The Iraqi Navy’s current and future missions will remain similar and accomplish the following tasks:

- Defend Iraq’s coast, territorial waters, vital ports and offshore assets against both external and internal security threats.
- Respond to any environmental accident and conduct search and rescue operations.
- Contribute to regional stability by operating vessels beyond territorial waters, deterring aggression and illegal activities on the high seas, while training with other nation’s navies and thus strengthening good relations in the region.

SUMMARY

There have been significant achievements in the establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces. Any disruption of progress at this crucial juncture would prolong Iraqi Security Forces reliance on Coalition forces and hamper its ability to assume responsibility for securing Iraq and maintaining internal peace and stability. Continued investments are required to enhance command and control, infrastructure, maintenance, training and logistics in order to capitalize on previous achievements and sustain fielded units. Additionally, investments are necessary in the Iraqi Air Force and Navy to complement and support the Army and Police forces in Counterinsurgency operations as well as patrolling Iraq’s borders and littorals. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior are currently undergoing intensive transition training in a myriad of administrative functions necessary to run a modern government.

Ultimately, the success of Iraqi democracy and professional security forces relies on the success of the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces. The FY 2007 Supplemental request is necessary to ensure that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior can assume operational and strategic control from the Coalition.

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<tr>
<th>Iraq</th>
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<td>Ministry of Defense Force</td>
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<td>Iraqi Army</td>
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<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Iraqi Navy</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td>Ministry of Interior Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
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<td>National Police</td>
<td>24,400</td>
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<td>Dignitary Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI Forensics Inv. Unit</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>192,200</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Totals as of January 2007</strong></td>
<td><strong>328,500</strong></td>
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Additional details provided under separate cover
Numbers may not add due to rounding
Iraqi Security Force Lead

October 2005

- Tall ‘Afar
- Mosul
- Kirkuk
- Samarra
- Ramadi
- Fallujah
- Najaf
- Basra

November 2006

- Tall ‘Afar
- Mosul
- Kirkuk
- Samarra
- Ramadi
- Fallujah
- Najaf
- Basra

Source: MNC-I, C3 as of 30 Oct 2005 and MNC-I, C3 as of 27 Nov 2006
Afghan Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support the security forces of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan until they can provide for its own security.

Funding: $5.9B
• Continues building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
• Expands training and equipping of Afghan forces from 112,000 to 152,000 by early FY 2009
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Afghan National Security Forces

| $ in Billions | FY 2006 | | | FY 2007 | | | Percent
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title IX¹</th>
<th>Supplemental</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Title IX²</th>
<th>Supplemental</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan National Army</strong></td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan National Army</strong></td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan National Police</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>300%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Transportation</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>600%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan National Police</strong></td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan National Security Forces</strong></td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan National Security Forces</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>289%</td>
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¹ Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
² Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

It is hard to comprehend the destitution present in Afghanistan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. A lawless region that provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, Afghanistan had suffered from decades of violence that resulted in millions of casualties and billions of dollars in economic damage. The progress made in Afghanistan since that time is significant.

Five years later, Afghanistan is no longer sanctuary for Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. While Afghanistan remains a central front in Operation Enduring Freedom, on October 5, 2006, the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took the lead for international forces in the country. The ISAF now accounts

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $5.9 billion for supporting Afghan National Security Forces for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding level for Afghan National Security Forces category for FY 2007 is $7.4 billion, an increase over FY 2006 due to the acceleration of Afghan ground force training and equipping.

When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, there were two missions:

- Defeat Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan.
- Create a stable, moderate Afghan democracy that will never again provide sanctuary for terrorists.
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for more than two-thirds of the international forces operating in Afghanistan, tasked with assisting the Government of Afghanistan in providing stability and security, extending governance, and defeating the remnants of the former Taliban regime and other forces that are attempting to derail progress.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are steadily growing in strength and capability. By the end of 2006, there were 31,300 Afghan National Army soldiers and 59,700 Afghan National Police trained and equipped. Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Despite the progress made to date, much remains to be done and the U.S. strategy reflects a shift in the strategic environment. This past year’s increase in violence and narcotics production represents such a shift. Taliban presence and strength has grown in some areas of the country, especially the south, and the relatively weak institutions of the Afghan government enable insurgents to operate in the absence of government presence.

As a result, the United States is accelerating and increasing its efforts to meet its objectives for Afghanistan. The Administration has identified areas where our efforts can be increased, expanded, and/or better coordinated to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity and providing security.

Afghan National Army

Under the revised program, the Afghan National Army (ANA) will assume the lead for counterinsurgency and internal operations. As the original plan for the ANA would have created a basic infantry force that could not have conducted these missions without help from international forces, the U.S. will provide additional equipment and capabilities to the ANA and build a larger force.

The program builds on the current success of the ANA. The ANA soldiers have fought bravely side-by-side with the international forces and won the respect of the Afghan people, despite less reliable weapons and weaker force protection.

This funding request will arm Afghan soldiers with more reliable and capable weapons including assault rifles, machine guns, and mortars. Soldiers will receive body armor, Kevlar helmets, armored vehicles, and advanced first aid kits to ensure care for those who are injured.

The full force will include better capabilities like a small, capable air corps that will help them take the Army to the fight. Six battalions will receive specialized training to become the rapid response Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission. In addition, the Army will now include combat support units, including engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police.

Afghan National Police

The revised program recognized that a more robust police force is required to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, particularly in areas from which the ANA and international forces have cleared Taliban fighters following combat. The original ANP program focused on a more narrow law enforcement mission, leaving the ANP less capable to address the security environment complicated by Taliban, narco-traffickers, and other illegal elements.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) will receive additional attention and resources under the revised program because it has lagged in progress in comparison with the ANA, due in part to institutional corruption, low literacy rates among recruits, and a history of low pay.
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The Departments of Defense and State plan to train and equip a police force of 82,000, which will include specialized units to address some of Afghanistan’s key issues. The Counternarcotics Police (CNP-A) program will be accelerated to develop a force modeled on the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The CNP-A will target drug traffickers and producers, improving Afghanistan’s interdiction capabilities. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) also will receive additional capabilities and equipment to improve its ability to perform its mission.

Additionally, a new unit will be established to fill a gap in ANP capability. The Civil Order Police (COP) will be a specialized unit, with tactical gear, improved force protection, and specialized equipment, to be the rapid response force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots.

The Way Ahead

The U.S. cannot achieve or sustain these Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) objectives alone. The Government of Afghanistan has committed to providing the manpower to meet these objectives. Equally as important, Afghan leadership has committed to make the necessary security sector reforms that will ensure that the ANSF are responsible and lasting institutions. Through ventures like the Border Management Initiative, the U.S. is helping the Government of Afghanistan increase revenues, which will provide a source of income to support and sustain the forces.

The international community also has a role in building the ANSF. Millions of dollars have been donated for equipment by countries for both the ANA and the ANP. Germany has played a key part with its police training program, and ISAF countries contribute Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams that embed with trained ANA units to provide in-the-field mentoring. NATO is also exploring near- and long-term ways that it can assist with equipping and training.

For the security sector in particular, the U.S. recognizes that more needs to be done in response to the resurgent Taliban. U.S. and international forces this summer faced the enemy in larger-scale operations and more intense fighting. The combat phases of the “Mountain” series of operations and ISAF’s Operation Medusa focused on denying the enemy safe havens, interdicting its movement, and targeting its routes. The ANSF played an increasingly important role as these operations progressed.

The combat phases of these operations, however, were only the precursors to efforts focused on extending the authority of the government of Afghanistan and strengthening the rule of law, reconstruction programs, humanitarian assistance, and economic development.

The shift in the strategic environment also highlighted the need to revise and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. In order to enable the ANSF to respond to the resurgent Taliban, the U.S. needs to accelerate the pace of the ANSF train and equip program and to expand the size and capabilities of these forces. The desired end state for the ANSF remains a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable ANSF, but the force being built must be less reliant on international assistance and more capable of bringing the fight to the Taliban.

FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2007 Supplemental request would build the ANSF with the independent capabilities to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from becoming once again a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements. After thoroughly analyzing the ANSF program from January through April, the Commanding General, for the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan determined that the current program fails to develop an ANSF of sufficient capability or capacity to
address the increasing insurgent threats facing Afghanistan.

This FY 2007 Supplemental would provide sufficient resources to correct this shortcoming and meet the following program goal:

- Develop the capabilities of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations (COIN) with limited Coalition support and establish the Rule of Law throughout Afghanistan, thereby helping set the conditions for the successful completion of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Afghan National Army

The FY 2007 Supplemental request is larger than earlier appropriations because it addresses three objectives:

- Base requirements of the ANA;
- Increased capability of the ANA;
- Increased capacity of the ANA (to include critical equipment).

The FY 2007 Supplemental would provide the ANA with the resources to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations with limited foreign assistance.

ANA Base Requirements

The base FY 2007 Supplemental request would provide the ANA the ability to continue development of its Ministry of Defense (MoD), General Staff, Sustaining Institutions, Supporting Agencies and operational forces to a level where they are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining COIN operations with Coalition support. The ANA will not be able to rapidly progress to the next level and will not have sufficient capability and capacity to satisfy National Security Objectives without the funds for the enhancement effort. The investment will include equipment, infrastructure, sustainment and training but adds no additional capability and/or capacity to produce an ANA capable of independent operations.

- **Infrastructure:** The requested funds will be used to continue the efforts to establish the Air Corps training facility; continue expanding the number of Army Garrison buildings and to replace the MOD headquarters building.

- **Equipment:** These funds will be used primarily for airfield navigational aids and communication equipment, ANA Corps communication equipment; enhanced armor protection on the Afghan armored personnel carriers. In addition, the funding will purchase additional equipment to meet the requirements for the Logistics Command. Also planned is the purchase of equipment required for Ministry of Defense operations; tactical operations equipment for the Training Command, along with needed medical equipment.

- **Training:** Funds will continue to cover training for the ground forces to meet the previously established levels of an Army of 70,000 troops including specialty training.

- **Sustainment:** Planned sustainment in the base program funds costs for an Afghan Army of 70,000 troops including cost categories of personnel, fuel, weapons, maintenance and repair, communications requirements including equipment and contracts; and office supplies.

ANA Increased Capability

The request is designed to enhance Afghan National Army to conduct independent operations with limited international support. This enhancement would bring parity to the battlefield for the ANA—allowing it to conduct counterinsurgency operations with its organic combat enablers. This capability package includes a level of force protection equipment within the ANA commensurate to the threat environment. It will add a Commando capability that is lethal, mobile and able to conduct independent operations against an increasingly sophisticated, trained, and armed enemy. The Commando organization will be
supported by an expanded Air Corps with the added capability to provide for close air support (both attack and lift), as well as casualty evacuation. This capability will be linked to an improved fire support system capable of massing fires based on a targeting network. The targeting network will be connected to an intelligence structure capable of supporting these efforts independent of Coalition support. Remaining combat enablers such as the engineers, Military Police, and counter-IED bring the ANA to a level that allows for confident and effective operations with limited Coalition support.

- **Infrastructure**: These funds will be used for the Commando battalion facilities and two additional garrisons.

- **Equipment**: These funds will be used to provide the ANA with force protection equipment, in addition to the purchase of equipment for the Commando Kandars (Battalions). It will also allow for the purchase of attack and transport aircraft necessary to support the commandos, along with offensive and defensive surveillance equipment. It will also address the Corps Combat Teams and engineering brigades with Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) required capability; purchase forward surgical equipment and communication equipment to support the expanded number of units created by the ANSF funds.

- **Training**: In order to implement the expanded capabilities and capacity of the ANA, training has to expand to provide for the various combat support specialties such as Engineer Battalion level training. These funds will increase the mentors to train the ANA and provide Commando Battalion training.

- **Sustainment**: As the capacity of the Afghan Army increases to meet the recognized requirements of a more independent and organically supporting force, sustainment costs will also rise due to the increased number of troops and the requirements related to the larger number of specialties

**Afghan National Police**

The Afghan National Police (ANP) Program is the police part of the ANSF. The goal is to establish an 82,000 police force comprised of Border Police, Uniform Police, Highway Police (disbanded), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (formerly the Afghan Standby Police), and Counternarcotics Police. The program would equip, train and sustain a respected, effective, affordable, multi-ethnic and professional Police force that maintains the rule of law. The program enables the GoA to build the capability to maintain domestic order, protect the rights of Afghan citizens, deny any safe havens for terrorists, police Afghanistan’s borders and safeguard critical infrastructure. This mandate includes facilitating a well-led, motivated force capable of performing its assigned law and order missions. This force will be self-sustaining, able to attract qualified candidates and require minimal international assistance.

FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

**ANP Requirements:**

- **Infrastructure:** These funds would provide command and control facilities for Border Police brigades, Border Police battalions, Border Security Posts, Border Security Points, Border Patrol Companies Border Control Points, BP Border Check points, Afghan National Civil Order Police battalions, province command and control facilities, and District command and control facilities. The ANP infrastructure projects are crucial to ANP force protection and command and control. These structures also send a strong message to the Afghan citizens that the police force is a professional organization committed to their protection.

- **Equipment:** These funds will be used for mine-protected armored vehicles; command and control trailers and tractors; Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) vehicles; tactical equipment; squad weapons; tactical ambulances; and communication and automated network architecture for the ANP.

- **Training:** These funds will provide training dollars to the Department of State to conduct basic and specialized training. This training includes basic policing, tactical training, counter terrorism training, criminal investigation, SWAT training, and ANCOP training. These funds will also pay for operations and maintenance of one Central Training Center and six Regional Training Centers, and tactical complexes.

- **Sustainment:** These funds will be used for base salaries and benefits; vehicles; weapons and communication equipment maintenance; repair, parts and replacement for all equipment; facilities maintenance and operations; and miscellaneous expenses such as fuel, food and office supplies.

**ANP Increased Capability**

The enhancement of the ANP primarily involves the transformation of the ANCOP. Twelve battalions will be strategically placed throughout the country. These units will provide tactical response Police beyond those of the existing Afghan Standby Police. They will provide SWAT capability, maintain civil order, fortify the borders and provide quick reaction capability for national emergencies. They will provide an increased police presence throughout the country and will patrol difficult or hard to reach areas.

The additional enhancement funds provide operational support for the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNPA). These funds will be used for infrastructure, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, field trainers, aviation fuel and operations and maintenance projects.

The funds also allow the ANP to develop and sustain a border surveillance system and K-9 Units to allow the ANP to increase their ability to deter insurgencies, illegal border crossings and narco-terrorism.

- **Infrastructure:** These funds will be used for Forward Operating Bases for the ANCOP. It includes quarters, dining facilities, security perimeters, armories, command and control headquarters, and brigade, battalion and company headquarters.

- **Equipment:** The ANCOP equipment includes mine protection armored vehicles, command and control tractors and trailers, SWAT command vehicles, light tactical vehicles, specialized weapons, communications gear, ammunition, non-lethal equipment (i.e. rubber ammunition, breaching equipment, gas masks) and specialized personal gear (i.e. ballistic helmet, tactical clothing, body armor, shields, boots).
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

- **Training**: These funds will be used by the Department of State to develop and train Police officers.

- **Sustainment**: These funds will support the operations and maintenance of the ANCOP, CNPA and K-9 units to include local purchase items such as fuel, consumables, infrastructure, and food.

**ANP Critical Equipment and Manpower Capacity Package**

The FY 2007 supplemental request provides an additional 20,000 Police force for the Government of Afghanistan. The requirement emerged from recent census estimations and the ratio of Police to citizens in surrounding nations. This temporary Police force will provide the added capability to fortify the border which will in turn facilitate the recoupement of lost customs revenues, suppress insurgency and drug trafficking.

- **Infrastructure**: Provide additional FOBs, brigades, battalions, companies and district command and control centers.

- **Equipment**: Provides weapons, ammunition, uniforms and personal gear and vehicles.

- **Training**: Provides field trainers, infrastructure upgrades, and operational support.

- **Sustainment**: Provides operations and maintenance capability, fuel, food, salaries, equipment and facility maintenance and repair, and parts and recapitalization.

**Detainee Operations**

Detainee Operations mentors, organizes, trains, and equips a self-sustaining detainee program within the Ministry of Defense for the detention of Afghan enemy combatants. These funds will sustain the operation of the Afghanistan National Army detention facility at Pol-e-Charki Block IV. This includes the operation of the prison, detainee force guard barracks, and the training facilities. These funds will also provide for the mentors providing the professional development of the ANA detainee guards.

**SUMMARY**

Without U.S. funding, the Government of Afghanistan will be incapable of countering the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-coalition militia, Taliban, Al Qaeda, criminal gangs, narco-terrorists, and any other anti-government elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has neither the budget, experienced Army or Police force, nor the infrastructure to equip, build and sustain a reliable, effective police force.

**Afghanistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trained/Equipped</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense/GS</td>
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<td>Sustaining Institutions</td>
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<td>ANA Combat Forces</td>
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<td>Afghan Air Corps</td>
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<tr>
<th>Ministry of Interior Force</th>
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<td>Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID, Customs, Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals as of January 2007 | 91,000 |

Additional details provided under separate cover

Numbers may not add due to rounding
Map of Afghan Controlled Territory

As of December 2006

- **ANSF Lead with CF Support**
  - "ANSF Lead with CF Support" refers to ANSF elements that have the ability to "Lead with Coalition Support" (ANA) and "Capable with Mentor Support" (ANP) for a period of at least 30 days.

- **ANP Only Lead**
  - "ANP Only Lead" refers to areas with ANP responsibility.

Source: Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. Data as of 16 December 2006
Coalition Support

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations to counter terrorism.

Funding: $1.0B
• Supports Pakistan, Jordan and other key cooperating nations
• Funds airlift and support and military capacity building for partner nations
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Coalition Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Supplemental</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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</table>

1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)  
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $1.0 billion for supporting our coalition partners and building partner military capacity for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding requested for coalition support in FY 2007 is $1.9 billion, a 58 percent increase over FY 2006.

These funds enable the Department to leverage the support of our coalition partners by reimbursing them for expenses incurred in supporting U.S. military operations, provide logistical support (Lift and Sustain) to countries that are participating in U.S. military operations, and assist other partners (Train and Equip funds) in developing greater capacities to conduct counterterrorist operations. These programs enable coalition partners to participate in U.S. operations and to conduct counterterrorist operations when they would otherwise lack the financial means to do so. Coalition support helps to reduce the stress on U.S. forces operating in the global war on terror.

The increase in funding for FY 2007 will:

- Ensure Pakistan, Jordan, and key cooperating nations are reimbursed for support to U.S. operations.
- Provide funding to pay for lift and sustain support to Coalition partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and U.S. military operations globally.
- Finance train and equip programs that will build the capacity of partner nations.

Previous funding has supported Pakistan’s major border operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which have significantly affected terrorist networks in the region, achieving a level of success that would be difficult for U.S. Armed Forces to attain and leading to a more stable border area. In the same way, Jordan has provided key support along the Jordan-Iraq border resulting in greater force protection for U.S. forces operating in Iraq.

Lift and sustain funding allowed Poland to lead the Multinational Division Center South by providing the airlift for needy Coalition partners and sustainment support for Coalition countries during deployments.
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

FUNDING REQUEST

Coalition Support

Specific examples of Coalition support include:

- **Pakistan**
  - Since October 2001, the U.S. has reimbursed Pakistan approximately $4.5 billion for operations Pakistan conducts along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
  - Beginning in early 2006, Pakistan expects to commit $150 million a year of its own resources to improve education, road building, basic health, and water projects in the region.
  - Pakistan’s military support has significantly damaged terrorist networks in the region.
  - Since December 2001, Pakistan has conducted almost 100 major operations including 8 joint operations with Coalition forces.
  - Although taking considerable casualties itself, Pakistan has apprehended and killed many militants.
  - Pakistan has established check points and is deploying quick reaction forces in the region to support war on terror objectives.
  - Pakistan is also working to improve coordination with U.S. Central Command through increased placement of liaison officers.

- **Jordan**
  - Since October 2001, the U.S. has reimbursed Jordan almost $290 million for operations Jordan is conducting in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
  - Despite its limited economic means, Jordan has conducted border operations along the Jordan-Iraq border. These operations are having a major impact in curbing undesirables transiting across the border.
  - Jordan has also operated two field hospitals, in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing medical treatment to thousands of injured Coalition forces and civilians, which has served to free up U.S. and other Coalition medical resources to support needs elsewhere.

- **Key Coalition Partners**
  - Multinational Division—Center South: The U.S. has reimbursed Poland and other participating countries approximately $363 million for expenses incurred in taking the lead of and participating in the Multinational Division—Center South in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These expenses include airlift provided by Ukraine and others, telecommunications charges, LOGCAP support prior to FY 2005, and other base operations support typically associated with running a Division. Coalition Support Funds allowed Poland to take over the Division with the assurance that logistical support for the Coalition partners serving in the Division would be provided and would be on the same level as that provided to Coalition partners serving under U.S. command.
  - Georgia: The U.S. has reimbursed Georgia $53 million to finance pre-deployment training to ensure Georgia’s troops would be able to conduct its security mission in Operation Iraqi Freedom in a capable and expert manner. Georgia’s troops are committed to Iraq through September 2008 and have served as a significant force multiplier.
  - Mongolia: The U.S. has reimbursed Mongolia approximately $6 million for pre-deployment preparations for its seven rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. These
reimbursements resulted in adequately trained Mongolian troops who were able to support the security mission in Iraq.

- Other partners – including Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Ukraine, and Lithuania – have received reimbursements with Coalition Support Funds. These countries have been able to support the Coalition and reduce requirements for U.S. Soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Continued support from Congress for Coalition Support Funds is critical to maintaining the viability of the Coalition and supporting countries who wish to make a contribution to the war on terror but do not have the economic means to finance their participation.

Lift and Sustain

Lift and Sustain funds enable the Department to provide airlift and other logistical support to needy Coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since FY 2005, the Department of Defense has provided approximately $800 million in logistical support to Coalition partners with a lesser capacity to pay.

- Approximately $700 million has been expended for sustainment-type support for needy Coalition partners, including the LOGCAP contract for Poland’s Multinational Division—Center South.
- Approximately $100 million in airlift has been provided to allow Coalition partners without an airlift capability to deploy and redeploy to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Continued support from Congress in appropriating Lift and Sustain funds is essential to ensure Coalition partners have the ability to deploy, to redeploy, and to be sustained while serving as members of the Coalition. The result is a Coalition that contributes directly to war on terror objectives, serves as a force multiplier, and allows U.S. forces to focus their efforts elsewhere and to meet U.S. objectives more effectively.

Global Train and Equip

Global Train and Equip Funds will enable the Department to assist in building the capacity of foreign military forces to facilitate greater participation in counterterrorism and stability operations and thus relieve the stress on U.S. armed forces.

Section 1206 of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act allows the Department to conduct programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces. These foreign military forces provide critical support for counterterrorist and stability operations. Congress initially granted the Department this new authority in the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act and expanded it in FY 2007 to $300 million.

Global Train and Equip programs are national defense missions for the war on terror and should be funded by the Department of Defense. Joint control with Department of State helps to ensure separation of the military mission from State’s foreign assistance mission.

With over $1 billion in train and equip missions identified for FY 2007, the two departments are evaluating proposals now to ensure FY 2007 programs support our goals.

The train and equip missions proposed for FY 2007 include:

- Training programs and equipment in the areas of counterterrorism, civil-military operations, infrastructure security, maritime security, maintenance, border security.
- Equipment for coastal surveillance stations, patrol boats, various spare and replacement parts, avionics and communications upgrades, small arms weapons, small/large caliber ammunition, radios, computers, night vision devices, riverine assault crafts, and HMMWVs.
Support from Congress in appropriating Global Train and Equip funds is essential to protect U.S. interests and to defeating extremists globally through a force of more effective partners who are able to participate in counterterrorism and stability operations. Partner forces know local culture, language, and terrain and can save U.S. money and lives.

SUMMARY
Coalition Support Funds are critical. They enable Coalition partners to support U.S. military operations. Without this program, the U.S. will not be able to reimburse Pakistan and Jordan for critical border operations. This could discourage participation and require the U.S. military to take on operations better covered by Coalition partners. In the case of Pakistan and Jordan border operations, the U.S. would likely not be able to conduct these operations as capably as the indigenous forces can.

Without lift and sustain funding, many Coalition countries would not be able to maintain their forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a result would adversely affect U.S. operations by placing an additional burden on U.S. forces. Without support in Afghanistan, NATO members with limited economies, such as Poland and Romania, may not be able to participate thus hindering the ability of NATO and the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan.

Without funding for global lift and sustain, the U.S. would not be able to benefit from the assistance of partners who are willing to participate in global operations other than in Iraq and Afghanistan, but who are not capable of financing their own deployment expenses.

Without funding for Global Train and Equip, the U.S. will lose the opportunity to help partner nations to achieve increased capacities in counterterrorist capabilities and thus will not be able to rely as effectively on partner nations to conduct counterterrorist operations, which would result in increased stress to U.S. forces globally.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Border

The rugged mountain terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border requires large numbers of Pakistani troops to secure. The U.S. provides Pakistan critical financial support to maintain security on its border.

Source: Map - Defense Intelligence Agency, Photos – Department of Defense
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide ground commanders with a source of funds to assist local populations with urgently needed humanitarian relief and reconstruction.

Funding: $0.5B
• Funds a variety of critical, small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects as identified by commanders in the field, such as:
  – Schools
  – Power lines and generators
  – Health care centers
  – Civic and cultural facilities
  – Condolence payments

FY 2006 FY 2007

Total Annual Cost

FY 2006 FY 2007

Previously Appropriated FY07 Supplemental Request
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Commander’s Emergency Response Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Defense requests $0.5 billion for funding the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding level for CERP for FY 2007 would be $1.0 billion, an 11 percent increase over FY 2006. The CERP supports Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by providing ground commanders a source of funds to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the local population. The CERP supports GWOT by helping to win trust and improve civil infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan. It provides U.S. appropriated funds directly to operational and tactical forces, enabling them to meet emergency needs. What distinguishes CERP is that commanders spend funds based on local information. The CERP projects are the grassroots effort by local commanders to deal quickly with short-term needs. Projects are conducted in concert with large-city and nationwide projects headed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.</td>
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<tr>
<th>FUNDING REQUEST</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Commander’s Emergency Response Program enables commanders to respond quickly to urgent humanitarian relief and</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>CERP Categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types Of Payments/Projects Funded by CERP During the Past 24 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/Sanitation – Repair or reconstruction of water treatment plants, sanitation facilities, pump stations, pipelines, wells, sewers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education – School repair/furnishings; education supplies, student backpacks, sport areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity – Repair or reconstruction of electricity stations, power lines, generators, street lights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Production – Humanitarian food deliveries, livestock, animal feed, slaughterhouse repair, fish farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare – Hospital and health care center repair, medical equipment, wheelchairs, ambulances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation – Irrigation stations and canals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Measures – Private security at reconstruction projects, oil refinery and pipeline facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic/Cultural Repair – Repair to mosques, museums, libraries, cultural centers, city halls, fire stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications – Repair or reconstruction of telecommunication systems infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation – Road repair, paving, highway guard rails and lights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Condolence Payments – Payment to individual civilians for death, injury or property damage</td>
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<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
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<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148) Numbers may not add due to rounding
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

reconstruction needs by executing programs that will immediately assist people of Iraq and Afghanistan. Funds are used for projects related to water and sanitation; food production and distribution; agriculture; electricity production/distribution; healthcare; education; telecommunication; transportation; irrigation; civic cleanup; repair of civic/cultural facilities; economic, financial and management improvements; efforts to improve rule of law and governance; condolence payments, or repairs for losses incurred as a result of U.S., coalition or supporting military operations; protective measures to ensure the viability and survivability of critical infrastructure sites; and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects.

Insurgent activities and ongoing sectarian violence have continued to cause instability and a severe infrastructure, safety, health, education, and economic development crisis in Iraq and Afghanistan. The requested CERP funds will assist in alleviating the hardships inflicted on the civilian population of Iraq and Afghanistan by the on-going violence.

The CERP program is designed to enable local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to quickly respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility. As such, CERP is an extremely dynamic and robust program that is critical to the ultimate success of the OIF / OEF campaigns and the transfer of responsibility to the newly established Iraqi and Afghani governments. CERP has been instrumental in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghani people, and the requested FY 2008 funding is required to support the ground commander’s ability to respond to local humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.

SUMMARY

Without the requested funds, commanders in the field will be unable to adequately respond to immediate needs of the Iraqi people in their areas of responsibility. The inability to fund urgent reconstruction and humanitarian relief projects would constitute a major hurdle in building trust with the Iraqi and Afghan people. In effect, it would deprive U.S. Commanders of a critical and relatively inexpensive tool that has demonstrated its value repeatedly in GWOT.

Afghan boys roll their wheelbarrows away after receiving donated goods from U.S. service members during a humanitarian civic aid mission on the outskirts of Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan.

DoD photo by Cpl. Bertha Flores, U.S. Army – October 2006
Military Construction

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to employ limited construction projects to support wartime operations and enhance force protection.

Funding: $1.1B
- Operational facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Roads and bridges, primarily in Afghanistan
- Basic infrastructure
- Force protection enhancement
- Camp Lemonier, Djibouti
- Support Facilities
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Military Construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
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<tr>
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¹ Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
² Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $1.1 billion for critical military construction projects for the remainder of FY 2007. The projects are important to the success of the Global War on Terror. Military Construction is a key enabler in the GWOT, directly supporting wartime operations and enhancing force protection.

FUNDING REQUEST

The request supports various military construction projects that fulfill Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom theater infrastructure requirements.

Operational Facilities

The requested operational facilities directly support military operations. Projects include airfield improvements, fuel facilities, and communications and intelligence facilities.

The request also funds a total of $60.2 million for two construction projects at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan: Parallel Taxiway and a “Hot Cargo” pad. It constructs a concrete taxiway parallel to the new runway at Bagram AB. Construction of the runway allows close air support (CAS) aircraft to take off with a full load of weapons and fuel. The runway is 1,000 feet longer and 315 feet east of the old runway. The existing taxiway does not provide access to either end of the new runway. This requires CAS aircraft to back-taxi on the active runway, delaying operations at one of the busiest airfields in Afghanistan. Construction of this new taxiway will enhance aircraft launch and recovery operations, contributing to more robust CAS operations in direct support of troops on the ground and providing for safer airfield operations.

Further, the request funds construction of a pad for loading and unloading hazardous cargo and an access road to the munitions storage area (MSA) at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Since Bagram does not have a designated hot cargo pad, munitions are being unloaded on an active taxiway too close to inhabited facilities and parked aircraft. The current situation is high risk in terms of force protection with a combined risk of rocket attack. Hazardous cargo arriving two-out-of-three days on average.

1000055

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

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After unloading, the munitions are now transported to the MSA on a route that exposes aircraft, personnel, and other assets. This project provides for a safe location to load and unload explosives and allows for safe transit to the MSA.

Roads and Bridges

The request includes 21 road and bridge projects in Afghanistan. Experience in Afghanistan has shown that the number of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks is significantly reduced by the use of paved roads.

Paving of roads in Afghanistan greatly reduces the IED threat to US forces. This has been shown by a Combined Joint Task Force 76 and Task Force Paladin study that evaluated IED incidents on roads that had been paved. Their study revealed that paving IED hot spots reduces the ability of the insurgents to plant IEDs in the roadway (the normal method of placement in Afghanistan), that enhances U.S. forces’ ability to visually detect them. Their experience has shown that paving is one of the most...
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effective means of stopping IEDs in Afghanistan. This project covers 21 IED hot spots. The length of paving for each is approximately 10KM. The remaining road projects in this request provide internal camp roads at Anaconda, Iraq, and Bagram, Afghanistan. These roads are required for normal base operations; currently Bagram has only one road that runs through the middle of the camp causing traffic congestion and force protection problems.

Basic Infrastructure
The request funds a critical facility at Guantanamo Bay to house switching gear and diesel generators. Failure to fund will increase the risk of power failure due to increased power demands.

Other projects are aimed at the basic needs to maintain military forces in austere environments. The storage and production of potable water and the treatment of wastewater are urgently needed at Bagram, Afghanistan, and Camps Anaconda and Al Asad, Iraq. These projects will correct long-standing deficiencies in the camps infrastructure while greatly reducing the number of trucks required to enter and exit these installations daily to deliver water and take away human waste. This reduces force protection concerns and increases the capability of the camps to support their population. Electrical production and distribution grids are required at Bagram, Afghanistan, and Al Asad, Iraq to replace failing expeditionary systems, and to increase the camps capability to perform their missions.

Force Protection
The request will construct entry control points at the Logistics Support Area at Camp Anaconda, Iraq, construct perimeter fencing, and guard towers at the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Entry Control Points at Camp Anaconda are required to efficiently and safely inspect and pass vehicular traffic onto the post while maintaining a safe stand off distance from potential threats. Perimeter Fencing and Guard Towers are an urgent need for Bagram Air Force Base to correct force protection issues with the aging system currently in place.

Camp Lemonier, Djibouti
The FY 2007 Supplemental request funds a total of $63.1 million for electrical power and water production facilities and water storage and wastewater treatment facilities at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, to provide critical infrastructure in support of Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa. Failure to fund the Djibouti projects will increase the logistics footprint in a high threat environment, putting additional troops at risk.

Support Facilities
The request will provide pre-wired relocatable housing made of standard shipping-containers. It will replace initial expeditionary facilities (billeting, administrative, and community support facilities) that have outlived their intended useful life and provide new temporary construction at the final Consolidated Operating Bases in Iraq.

Fuel Storage, Air Field Infrastructure, C4I facilities, RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration) facilities and barracks are also required to support current and future operations across the CENTCOM AOR. Bulk fuel storage, a new communications facility, additional barracks and a RSOI Surge Area are required to sustain current operations conducted out of Bagram, Afghanistan. Fuel storage tanks at Bagram increase the overall efficiency, force protection and safety of fueling operations and increases the on-hand fuel capacity needed to support combat operations. Currently Bagram has all its fuel stored in bag farms that require constant maintenance and periodic replacement.

The majority of Bagram’s population live in a collection of decaying wooden barracks (B Huts), the additional troop
barracks replaces these structures and postures Bagram for an enduring presence. Similarly, airfield ramps and runway projects are required in Al Asad, Iraq to support current combat and support air missions with a heavy and transient aircraft apron and runway with shelters, as well as the needed detainee interrogation facility.

Other projects provide for the replacement of existing facilities at various locations in Iraq and will allow for the consolidation of camps being operated to support ongoing combat operations. These projects will replace unserviceable tents, containerized housing units and some dining facilities in our remaining camps, and they will expand current capabilities to accommodate surge needs and to support Multi-National Force - Iraq’s overwatch strategy.

SUMMARY

If the requested Military Construction funding is not approved, U.S. troops and coalition members will lack adequate living facilities and they will continue to be exposed to unnecessary operational dangers. This request also provides critical force protection for troops at U.S. facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, finally these funds will ensure that Camp Lemonier and Guantanamo Bay are upgraded to meet operational requirements.
Regional War on Terror

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to defeat global terrorist threats wherever they are found.

Funding: $0.3B
• Counterterrorism efforts outside Iraq and Afghanistan
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Regional War on Terror

<table>
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<th>$ in Billions</th>
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<th>FY 2007</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
2 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $0.3 billion to enhance ongoing efforts to defeat terrorist threats outside of Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding level for the Regional War on Terror category for FY 2007 is $0.3 billion.

Funding this request will directly support activities complementing U.S. efforts to systematically deny terrorists networks that they require to operate and survive, as well as contribute to the overarching goals of countering ideological support for the enemy, disrupting and attacking the enemy, and protecting the homeland. These funds will eliminate capability shortfalls required to support national, departmental and Combatant Commander objectives and requirements in the GWOT.

FUNDING REQUEST

Funding is required to support the Department’s campaign plan, Regional War on Terror, that supports the Global War on Terror. This plan will synchronize regional campaign plans and major operations in the geographic Combatant Commander areas of responsibility (AOR), including:

- **Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).** The request funds efforts in the SOUTHCOM AOR to stop terrorists in transit to the U.S. via the Caribbean area, Central America, and Southern Cone countries. It also supports partner nations in their efforts to disrupt and attack terrorist networks in the Southern Cone and Andean Ridge countries.

- **Northern Command (NORTHCOM).** The request will fund NORTHCOM’s mission of homeland defense by providing support for first responders (civil agencies) through the acquisition of equipment, exercises, enhanced command and control, and interdiction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

- **European Command (EUCOM).** The request continues Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara operations that provide training and equipment to partner nation counterterrorism forces in nine key North African nations.

SUMMARY

Failure to fund RWOT requirements will suspend or temporarily discontinue Regional War on Terrorism efforts until the FY 2008 President’s Budget is enacted, thereby increasing homeland vulnerability to terrorist attack and the possibility of increased Islamic extremism in regions other than the Middle East.
Reconstitution

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure force readiness by rapidly repairing or replacing equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out in GWOT operations and providing critical equipment and technology for future deploying forces.

Funding: $13.9B
• Equipment replacements
• Repair of tanks, vehicles, aircraft and communication systems
• Replenishment of munitions
• Rapid Acquisition Fund
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Reconstitution

<table>
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<th>$ in Billions</th>
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<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
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1 Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
2 Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289)

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $13.9 billion for reconstituting the force for the remainder of FY 2007. The total funding level for Reconstitution is $37.5 billion for FY 2007, a 95 percent increase over FY 2006.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed increasing demands on equipment that is far beyond what is typically experienced during training or home-station operations. These demands on equipment result in higher maintenance, repair and replacement.

Reconstitution includes the following:

- Replacement of combat losses – including wear-and-tear;
- Replenishment of equipment; and
- Repair and/or upgrade of equipment.

Replacement

The request includes funding for the replacement of combat and logistics support equipment needed to maintain and sustain operations in the theater, such as secure radios, communications network switches, and terrestrial and satellite receivers, night vision devices, small arms and surveillance equipment, which are needed to allow U.S. forces to maintain a tactical advantage.

Reconstitution funding also provides for the replacement of helicopters that were either destroyed as a result of hostile action or are stressed beyond repair. These include the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH), which provides tactical overhead reconnaissance in support of ground forces; the UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopter, which is used extensively in Iraq to move troops and equipment, and the CH-47 Chinook helicopter that is critical for high altitude missions in Afghan mountains.

The request also includes funding for two F-35s (Joint Strike Fighters) to replace F-15 and F-16 fighters that were lost during combat operations. The request includes the replacement of 22 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) MQ-1s (MIP assets) that will be procured to replace UAVs lost in combat operations and will preserve the persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in support of the Joint Forces Commander. In addition, funds are requested for ground stations supporting Predator flight operations.

One CV-22 Vertical Lift Aircraft would be procured to replace one of the six MH-53 helicopters lost in combat operations since 9/11. The CV-22 conducts long-range, adverse weather, clandestine penetration for Special Operation Forces (SOF) of medium-to-high threat environments. The CV-22 is being procured as a replacement for the MH-53 because the MH-53s are no longer in production.

Finally, supplemental includes funding for 5 C-130Js to replace aircraft that are stressed beyond repair. Also included in this request are up-armored vehicles, and mission-essential support equipment replacements.
Funds are also requested for aircraft modifications designed to replace or upgrade capabilities required to support GWOT operations. Modifications include:

- An upgraded ICAP III system to modify the electronic warfare capability and situational awareness in the EA-6B as well as an enhanced USQ-113 Jamming Capability upgrade that will modify existing hardware to enhance the jamming effectiveness of the system;

- F-18 Series modifications to include a 3rd generation Litening Targeting ISR pod to support USMC expeditionary F/A-18 deployments, as well as a data link capability to 88 ATFLIR pods;

- H-46 Series modifications to include Blue Force Tracking for CH-46E. This battlefield Command and Control (C2) system will be more effective and reliable than the current system and will be common with the US Army FBCB2 system;

- AH-1W modifications to integrate Blue Force Tracker as part of an upgraded cockpit control system, replacing the cockpit display navigation unit and interface control unit.

- H-1 Series aircraft require Navigation Thermal Imaging System BRITE Star, which is an electro-optical sensor with eye-safe laser rangefinder, a laser designator and TV camera for increased target detection, recognition and identification;

- C-130 series modifications include Defensive Electronic Counter Measures/Night Vision Lighting to reduce the risk of combat losses due to heat-seeking and radar-guided threats.

Replenishment
Timely replenishment of equipment is critical to ensuring the next deploying units have the equipment needed to achieve the mission. The plus up of forces makes it even more important that replenishment needs are met.

The request funds critically needed construction and force protection equipment for the Naval expeditionary combat forces. This equipment provides combat support and combat service support forces with sufficient capability and capacity to meet the requirements for major combat operations.

The Supplemental would also fund major equipment requested for the Seabees:

- Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles to replace current HMMWV lacking adequate armor;

- Bulldozers, scrapers, concrete mixers, graders and loaders, and support equipment such as air compressors, generators, and welders;

- Special-purpose trucks to support containers, panel boards, reverse-osmosis units and other pieces of minor equipment;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Replacements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-60 Utility Helicopter (BLACKHAWK)</td>
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<td>CH-47 Chinook Helicopter</td>
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<td>E/A-18G GROWLER</td>
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<td>C-130J Airlift Aircraft</td>
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<td>MQ-9 Reapers</td>
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The newly formed Riverine Force allows the Navy to conduct and support operations predominantly in the inland waterway, or “brown water” areas of the maritime environment. Major equipment being requested for the Riverine squadrons includes tactical vehicles and small boats. Funds will procure Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs), Multi-Mission Craft, and Command and Control Craft.

The request would also fund the following Marine Corps equipment replenishment:

- A passenger and recovery variant of the Assault Amphibious Vehicle to improve an amphibious capability;
- The Improved Target Acquisition System will provide long-range, lethal anti-armor fire to the infantry and tank battalions. Funding supports a deployable, self-contained, and centralized facility which provides improved command and control and situational awareness to enhance the common operational picture for the deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force;
- Expandable Capacity Vehicle variants -- improved versions of the standard HMMWV with a heavier chassis and improved engine that enable the use of removable add-on-armor protection, providing greater tactical flexibility for deploying units;
- G-Boss surveillance systems to provide persistent tracking of objects of interest in the Marine forces’ effort to prevent or mitigate hostile actions and evolving threats;
- MRAP vehicles to replace lightly protected trucks.

The Supplemental request funds the Navy’s requirement for 30 Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW) missiles to replace quantities expended during OIF/OEF. Additionally, funds are requested to procure and install 60 MK 38 Mod 2 Gun Mounts, on-board repair parts kits and special tool kits. The request also replaces unserviceable small arms and weapons which are beyond economical repair and provides a variety of vital small arms and weapons to the various deployed elements of the Navy.

The supplemental funds the Air Force M2 .50 heavy barrel machine gun. This weapon provides a heavy volume of close, accurate, and continuous fire necessary to accomplish mission attacks. The Supplemental also funds ground demolitions munitions necessary to enable war fighters to conduct the
counter improvised explosive device missions.

Funds are requested to procure one Marine Corps Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (MCTUAS) and associated support to begin the transition of Pioneer to Shadow UAS. The MCTUAS will provide Marine Corps combat units with immediate interoperability and commonality with Army Shadow units.

The Air Force request funds:

- High altitude, precision airdrop system (JPADS);
- Vehicle Explosive Detection Systems (VEDS) that provide electronic means of conclusively detecting explosives without physically contacting the subject;
- Battlefield Control Station in support of Afghanistan operations to conduct improved wide area air surveillance, aircraft identification, weapons control, and data link management;
- Replacements for combat support vehicles for fire/rescue, WMD emergency response and support vehicles;
- Night vision goggles;
- Robotized mine area clearance support platforms and equipment to clear unexploded ordnance and anti-personnel mines at austere locations.

Repair

Repair activities involve the necessary depot and intermediate level maintenance required to restore equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan to predeployment conditions.

A portion of Army and Marine equipment reconstitution was funded within Title IX. For the Navy, this supplemental requests funds for aircraft, ships and support equipment. This also includes the cost to overhaul, clean, inspect, and maintain equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of the contingency operation or unit deployment in order to be ready for the deployment. Major components include:

- Airframe rework;
- Engine rework;
- Aeronautical components;
- Ship operating systems.

The request funds Air Force Depot Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS).

Repair Depot

T-55 Engine used to power the CH-47 helicopters and an actual battle damaged CH-47 helicopter undergoing repair.

A Tank when it enters the repair facility for disassembly and the finished product without the turret.
Aircraft continuously deployed in support of OIF/OEF experiences extreme operational demands in harsh environments, thus accelerating the need for repairs to maintain operational capability. Funding will support bomber and fighter weapon systems used in support of operations including the B-1, F-15, F-16 and ground stations for Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and Global Broadcast Service (GBS). Included is CLS funding addresses the wear and tear resulting from the flying hours associated with KC-10, C-21, C-37, C-40, U-2 and Global Hawk in support of GWOT contingencies. Increased flying hours have driven increased costs for spares, repairs and replenishment, as well as additional contract Field Team Support at deployed locations.

Air Force operational requirements have increased the demand for depot level repairs, and funding provides fleet-wide refurbishment as a direct result of the Global War on Terror for active duty Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. Funding will support depot maintenance overhauls for multiple aircraft (e.g., A-10, B-52, C-5, C-130, F-16 and KC-135). Additionally, funds will allow for depot maintenance and depot software maintenance for missions.

The major overhaul effort upgrades equipment to the most current modernized configuration. An example of a major overhaul is the upgrade of M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank to the M1A2 system Enhancement Program (SEP) configuration which improves the vehicles performance against urban threats such as Baghdad.

**Rapid Acquisition Fund:** To facilitate the Department’s ability to quickly respond to urgent military requirements for specific equipment identified by battlefield commanders the supplemental request also funds $100 million for the Rapid Acquisition Fund. This allows the accelerated acquisition of articles identified as a immediate Warfighter needs, validated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that are not available within the available inventory of the Military Departments.

**SUMMARY**

Replacing, repairing and maintaining the complex equipment in the U.S. inventory is critical to continuing the fight against global terrorism. Given the harsh conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, maintenance has been central to military readiness.

Without the requested funds, overall U.S. military ability to support deploying units will suffer. Critical military capabilities will be deficient and combat air, mobility, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support pledged to Combatant Commanders will risk mission failures and cancellations.
**Ground Forces Funding Strategy**

### $ in Billions

#### Long-Term

- **Permanent End Strength**
  - +65,000 USA
  - +27,000 USMC
  - $4.9B
  - $17.0B

- **Mid-Term**
  - +2 BCT
  - +1 RCT
  - $3.6B
  - $5.2B

- **Near-Term**
  - +5 BCT
  - +2 IB
  - +1 PAT
  - +1 CSG
  - +1 MEU
  - +1 ESG
  - $5.6B

#### Mid-Term

- $12.1B
- $20.7B
- $21.0B
- $17.6B
- $16.5B
- $13.0B

#### Long-Term

- $5.6B
- $112.4B

#### Permanent End Strength

- **Today**
  - Army: 482.4K
  - USMC: 175.0K
- **2013**
  - Army: 547.4K
  - USMC: 202.0K

### Source:
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

### Notes:
- *$1.2 Billion in FY 2007 and $1.4 Billion in FY 2008 for Military Personnel and Support also a subset of $4.9 Billion shown for Permanent End Strength
- Source: FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request
U.S. Forces “Plus Up”

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States that the security situation in Iraq must be strengthened, and the President has directed the Defense Department to increase forces in the region including five additional Brigade Combat Teams, consisting of approximately 21,500 troops and expanded naval support.

Funding: $5.6B
• Increases five Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq to support the Iraqi government’s security efforts
• Deploys a Carrier Strike Group to support security efforts in the region
The Department of Defense requests $5.6 billion to provide a “Plus Up” of U.S. Forces to Iraq and the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order to assist the Government of Iraq with securing Baghdad and the surrounding areas, enabling economic and political development.

The plus-up in the CENTCOM AOR includes an approximately 21,500 ground force increase and the deployment of additional supporting naval forces. The plus-up increases Army Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq from 15 to 20, and Marine Infantry Battalions from 6 to 8. The Navy will increase forces to maintain two Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) in the CENTCOM AOR while sustaining one CSG in the PACOM AOR. Additionally, one Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) will be extended concurrent with extension of its associated Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This funding finances personnel costs, supplies, spare parts, contractor support and transportation for both units extending their time in-country and for the additional units deploying to the region. Operational Commanders may adjust the plus-up over time as conditions warrant.

The plus-up in the CENTCOM AOR includes an approximately 21,500 ground force increase and the deployment of additional supporting naval forces. The plus-up increases Army Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq from 15 to 20, and Marine Infantry Battalions from 6 to 8. The Navy will increase forces to maintain two Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) in the CENTCOM AOR while sustaining one CSG in the PACOM AOR. Additionally, one Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) will be extended concurrent with extension of its associated Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This funding finances personnel costs, supplies, spare parts, contractor support and transportation for both units extending their time in-country and for the additional units deploying to the region. Operational Commanders may adjust the plus-up over time as conditions warrant.

FUNDING REQUEST

Force Structure Summary

An increase of $5.6 billion is required to support a force structure addition of approximately 21,500 personnel in the Iraq theater for up to 8 months. The forecasted force structure increase for the “Plus Up” includes 5 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equivalents, 1 Army Patriot Battalion, 2 Marine Infantry Battalions, 1 Navy Carrier Strike Groups and 1 Navy Expeditionary Strike Group. The changes in force structure will require unit extensions and additions in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps footprint. The $5.6 billion finances personnel costs, supplies, fuel, maintenance, spare parts, contractor support and transportation for units extending their time in-country and for the additional units deploying to the region.

Naval Forces

Naval Forces will provide increased support for operations in the AOR. Through a combination of extending and accelerating forces, the Navy will maintain two Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) of approximately 6,500 personnel each in the CENTCOM AOR and maintain one CSG in the PACOM AOR. The CSG will
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

provide sea and air power projection in the region, support ground forces, provide Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) support, and secure sea lanes of communication. Additionally, one Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) will be extended to support the transition of the additional USMC ground forces. The ESG will also be used to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) to safeguard and control ships entering and transiting the region.

**Ground Forces**

Approximately 21,500 troops will be added to the 140,000 in Iraq to support the government of Iraq securing Baghdad and the surrounding areas in order to allow economic and political development to occur.

- Army - 20 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) by May
  - The Army will increase their ground forces from 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in theater to a total of 20 BCTs by May. The Army will provide these forces by deploying 1 BCT formerly on-station in Kuwait, accelerating a second BCT that is currently en-route to Kuwait, and accelerating the deployment date of 3 additional BCTs from CONUS.
  - Of the original 15 BCTs, 1 BCT (ARNG) will be extended 124-days and two others are programmed to be extended 90 days each to sustain a total of 20 BCT equivalents in Iraq.
  - 15 BCTs currently in theater
  - Plus up of 5 BCTs in Iraq will bring total to 20 in theater
  - Extend one ARNG BCT by 125 days; planning is ongoing to determine additional active component extension requirements
  - Deploy one Patriot Battalion

- USMC - 8 Infantry Battalions by March
  - USMC will support the effort by extending two Infantry Battalions up to 90 days, and accelerating the deployment of two Infantry Battalions from CONUS.
  - The USMC effort will sustain 8 total Infantry Battalions (up from 6) from March through the end of the fiscal year. The Marines will also extend their currently deployed MEU in order to overlap the next normal MEU deployment. This will provide 2.0 MEU presence for 43-days starting in January to support the overall USMC transition to 8 Infantry Battalions in theater.
  - Six Infantry Battalions currently in theater.
  - Extend 15th MEU for 43-days (January – March).
  - Normal deployment of 26th MEU (Arrive January).
  - Extend two Infantry Battalions up to 90 days (8 total in theater).
  - Accelerated deployment of two Infantry Battalions (8 total in theater through FY 2007).
Accelerate Brigade Combat Teams/Establish Regimental Combat Team

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to improve the capability and effectiveness of U.S. forces in theater.

Funding: $3.6B
• Accelerates the transition of 2 Army Brigade Combat Teams
• Establishes 3 new Marine Corps battalions to form the 9th Regimental Combat Team

FY 2006 FY 2007
$0 $3.6B

Total Annual Cost

Previously Appropriated
FY 07 Supplemental Request
The Department of Defense requests $3.6 billion for strengthening force capability through the acceleration of two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the Army and creation of one Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in the United States Marine Corps. The total funding level for BCTs/RCT for FY 2007 is $3.6 billion.

FUNDING REQUEST

The Army has identified the brigades required to fulfill the combatant commander’s request for forces for OIF/OEF rotation 08-10. In order to meet the deployment timeline, the Army must accelerate the conversion of two units from legacy structures to the modular BCT structure. The Secretary of Defense has approved the Army’s selection of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division (3/1AD) at Fort Riley, KS, and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (3/1ID), to be built at Fort Hood, TX, and stationed at Fort Knox, KY, in FY 2009 following its deployment and stability period. The acceleration of these brigades’ conversion requires funding above the Army’s baseline to cover Manning, training, facilities and equipment. In FY 2007 the Army intends to standup, train and prepare both brigades for deployment. Each will then deploy in FY 2008 to the Central Command Area of Operation (AOR).

Adding these brigades to the rotational pool also will help the Army to improve the Active Component’s deployment-dwell ratio. Currently, Active Component units are deployed for one year, then home for one year (sometimes less) before returning to the theater. This rapid cycle is not sustainable; the Army believes it is essential to lengthen it to one year of deployment followed by two years at home station. These two new brigades will put the Army on the path to achieving this goal, enabling us to delay the redeployment of two brigades that have already been to the theater. These units will thus have more time with their families and a longer period for reconstitution and training – all of which is crucial to retaining the best Soldiers.

The Marine Corps has identified 3 infantry battalions and their corresponding enablers, a total of 4,000 additional Marines. The identified battalions are the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of the 9th Marine Regiment. They will be manned and equipped to the levels required to conduct current operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. While first producing an increased additional capability in theater, these three new
battalions will eventually contribute to an increased deployment to dwell ratio which will relieve the operational tempo stress on Marines and their families.

**Military Personnel**

The request includes funding for the Army for recruiting and retention, incremental pay and allowances, and permanent-change-of-station moves. To meet the desired brigade combat team acceleration timelines, the Army increased its FY 2007 accession mission by 6,000 Soldiers and will raise the per capita cost of the Selective Reenlistment bonus in order to retain the correct grades and skills for these two units. Additional pay and allowances funding also will be needed to cover the associated increase to the Active Component (AC) overstrength. (The remainder of the AC overstrength requirement, strength that exceeds the 482,400 personnel funded in the base, is contained in the Operations portion of the FY 2007 supplemental request.) The Army also expects to execute more than 2,300 additional operational permanent-change-of-station moves to distribute the force at the correct grade and skill mix in preparation for deployment.

The request also includes funding for the Marine Corps to pay recruiting and retention incentives to man one Regimental Combat Team (RCT). In addition, funds will provide for the pay and allowances, incentive pays, combat pays, and bonuses of these Marines. This 4,000 Marine increase will contribute to attaining USMC end strength of 202,000.

**Operation and Maintenance**

**Manning.** The Army requires additional funds to meet recruiting and retention challenges. To meet the desired brigade combat team reset timelines, the Army increased its FY 2007 accession mission by an additional 6,000 Soldiers. To reach this target, the Army needs an extra 450 recruiters. As the Army does not have the ability to use more non-commissioned officers as recruiters, the Army must hire additional contract recruiters. Costs associated with these contract recruiters include meals, lodging and travel, and equipment.

**Training.** The requested funds cover one-half of the annual incremental OPTEMPO growth, which will support the FY07 training mission; mobile training teams used in unit training; additional range operations at the identified installations; an increase in training aids, devices, simulations and simulators at the training installations; and the purchase of OMA-funded items from the Common Table of Allowance and Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.

**Procurement**

The Army requires equipment for the accelerated BCTs, including:

- **M1A2 SEP Abrams Tanks, M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicles and all other associated vehicles and equipment for one Heavy BCT.**

- **Individual and crew served weapons, night vision goggles, missile systems and mortars for one Infantry BCT.**

- **A complete suite of automated logistics management, logistics automation communication and logistics-in-transit visibility systems for both BCTs.**

- **Light, medium and heavy trailers and vehicles.**

- **Airspace control/management cells, which provide three-dimensional situational understanding that reduces fratricide and deconflicts fires. Currently, these BCTs do not have the near-real-time capability to track and monitor aerial targets in their area of operation.**

- **High-speed, line-of-sight and satellite communications (voice, data and video) to fulfill a DoD requirement for unit-status**
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

reporting and a deployment/redeployment planning capability, which enables the Army to support the Joint fight.

- Blue Force Tracker (BFT) systems, which enable full battle-command capability.

The Marine Corps requires equipment for the establishment of a Regimental Combat Team:

- Radiation and chemical agent detectors, decontamination materials, and protection.
- HMMVW's, trailers and associated support supplies.
- Radios, GPS locators, information technology, networking and satellite communications equipment.
- Toolkits to support equipment in theater and on base.
- Weapons, demolition equipment, tents, camouflage netting, night vision equipment.

**Ammunition to support training.** These modular units are equipped with significantly more weapons, including machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, shoulder-fired rockets, demolition charges and non-lethal weapons and munitions, which require individual and crew training to reach proficiency prior to deployment.

**Military Construction**

Permanent facilities are programmed for construction in FY 2008 and FY 2009, but the fielding of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Fort Hood, TX, and the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (reflagged from 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division) at Fort Riley, KS, must occur in FY 2007. The requested funding will be used to provide interim barracks, unit operational facilities and unit motor pools needed to support the accelerated brigade combat team fielding, to include the renovation of existing facilities and provision of furnishings and some information technology items. The request also includes projected base support costs for one-half of the year.

The Marine Corps military construction projects support establishment of a Regimental Combat Team (RCT). The low density, high demand capabilities that are consistently requested
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

for Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom are also those capabilities that the joint force will need to support future GWOT requirements. For the Marine Corps, these military construction projects will increase critical intelligence, reconnaissance, military police, engineer, helicopter, ground mobility, and infantry capacities. This is viewed as a strategic initiative since OPTEMPO has a direct impact on institutional force (personnel and equipment) readiness.

Military construction projects included a Maintenance/Operations Complex for the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. This project will construct operations and maintenance facilities for the stand-up of 3/9 as an additional infantry battalion under the operational control of the 2nd Marine Division Regimental commands. The facilities will include:

- A battalion headquarters,
- An armory,
- A motor transport maintenance facility, and
- An indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer.

A Bachelor Enlisted Quarters to provide 600 additional billeting spaces at Camp Lejeune. Existing barracks inventory will not support stand-up of the 3/9.

- A Mess hall to feed the additional Marines at Camp Lejeune.
- An addition to the Regimental Headquarters at Camp Lejeune to provide additional administrative space to support the additional personnel.
- Facilities do not currently exist at Camp Lejeune to provide the 3/9 with adequate operations and maintenance facilities.

**A Military Police Company Operations Complex.** This project will provide Company Headquarters, supply, armory and Vehicle Maintenance Facilities for the MP Company. Facilities do not currently exist at Camp Lejeune to provide the MP Company with adequate operations and maintenance facilities.

**A Truck Company Maintenance/Operations Complex.** This project will construct a consolidated motor transport complex. The facilities will include a battalion headquarters, an armory, motor transport maintenance and operations facility, company
headquarters, weapons storage, and weapons cleaning facilities. Existing facilities at Camp Lejeune have insufficient space to support the additional truck company required for the stand-up of 3/9.

The requested funds will also fund addition to the existing Explosive Ordnance Disposal facilities at Camp Lejeune to provide additional space to support the additional personnel and equipment associated with the stand-up of the 3/9.

**SUMMARY**

Without the requested funds, the Army and Marine Corps will not have the time they need for their forces to rejuvenate and to repair and replace lost equipment.

The transformation of U.S. forces will thus be delayed, which will reduce their capability and effectiveness. Moreover, without these funds, the services will have difficulty meeting the deployment timelines, which will place a greater burden on troops currently in theater and delay the impact of the President’s decision to increase U.S. forces.
Grow the Force

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps to build combat capability and lengthen the time that Soldiers and Marines have between deployments.

Funding: $1.7B
- Construction and other infrastructure improvements to support the growing force
- Equipment for the new forces
FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

**Grow the Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Billions</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title IX</strong></td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grow the Force</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1 | Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148) |
| 2 | Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-289) |
| 3 | Does not include any military pay and allowances (funded in Operations and Accelerate BCTs/RCT sections) |

**DESCRIPTION**

The Department of Defense requests $1.7 billion for military construction and equipment to begin the increase of U.S. ground forces.

The President announced in January 2007 that the United States would strengthen the military for the war against terrorism by authorizing an increase in the overall strength of the Army and the Marine Corps. The two services will be increased by 92,000 Soldiers and Marines over the next five years – 65,000 active component Soldiers and 27,000 Marines. This increase will enhance overall U.S. ground forces and reduce the stress on deployable active duty personnel.

**FUNDING REQUEST**

It is critical that assets and resources are in place to ensure that the new troops may be deployed promptly. The requested $1.7 billion reflects the urgent need to grow the pool of combat units in light of the demands and experience in OEF, OIF, and GWOT. The funding is necessary to enable targeted end strength increases (547K Active Component Army, 202K USMC) to be reached by 2012. This investment accelerates the increase in units available for combat duty to improve the dwell time currently stressing our forces and enable the current level of forces deployed forward to be reliably sustained. The balance of the investments to grow the Army and Marine Corps to 547K and 202K respectively will be funded in the DoD base budget beginning in 2009.

**Infrastructure**

Request will fund the initial incremental requirements to begin to grow the Army. The Army will retain or upgrade facilities for two BCTs and provide temporary facilities for a third BCT. The facilities will be used as interim barracks, unit operational facilities, and unit motor pools. Military Construction funds will provide for site preparation for the temporary facilities, new construction or revitalization of training support facilities, land acquisition, and initial Planning and Design efforts.

**Operations and Maintenance**

These funds will support additional accession, training and recruiting needed to support the increased end strength.

**Equipment**

Equipment includes necessary weapons, trucks, training devices, information systems, command and control systems, night vision equipment, and diagnostic systems.

**SUMMARY**

Without the FY 2007 Supplemental funding, both Services will be unable to start recruiting and retention of additional Soldiers and Marines, to begin Military Construction projects, and to order long-lead-time equipment to stand up operational units.
THE COST OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the President directed Department of Defense to conduct three major military operations:

- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) covering Afghanistan and other global counterterrorism operations from the Philippines to Djibouti, which began immediately after the September 11 attacks and continues;
- Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases and other homeland security, which was launched in response to the 9/11 attacks; and
- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the build up of US troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continues with counterinsurgency and stability operations today.

These operations have been funded largely through supplemental appropriations (Figure 1). Since September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated $455 billion for the conduct of these three operations of which $452 billion has been appropriated in supplementals. Approximately $372 billion of the appropriated funds have been obligated through November 2006, (Figure 2) which is the most recent obligation estimate at the time of printing.

The difference between the appropriated and obligated funds is $83 billion. Of this amount, $27 billion has been obligated for non-DoD classified activities, but is not reflected in DoD financial systems. The remaining $56 billion is for reconstitution and maintenance of equipment and for continuing military operations for the remainder of FY 2007 in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regions of the world under Operation Enduring Freedom.

FLUCTUATIONS IN WAR COSTS

Important war cost drivers are:

- The number of troops deployed or anticipated to deploy;
- The pace of operations;
- The amount of equipment and number of personnel to be transported to the theater of operations, within the theater, and the type and level of various support for troops;
- The rate at which equipment breaks down or is stressed beyond its projected rate of use and the extent and pace of replacing and upgrading equipment; and, finally
- Military basing plans that underlie construction requests.

Figure 1. GWOT Funding
FY01 to FY07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Base Budget</th>
<th>Supplementals Enacted</th>
<th>Defense Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY01</td>
<td>$311</td>
<td>$14</td>
<td>$328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY02</td>
<td>$345</td>
<td>$17</td>
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<td>FY03</td>
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<td>FY05</td>
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<td>FY06</td>
<td>$526</td>
<td>$115</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>$598.4</td>
<td>$163.4</td>
<td>$761.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Department calculates average monthly cost of the global war on terror using only defense expenditures. These calculations do not include the monthly costs incurred by national intelligence programs or programs of the Department of State, or other agencies.

Moreover, the monthly costs of military operations – fuel, food, water, contract support, tank miles, flying hours, steaming days – tend to be constant. Monthly cost of major procurements to replace lost or stressed equipment tends to be episodic and “pushed” toward the end of the fiscal year when contracts negotiations are completed. This has a skewing effect on monthly obligations and makes them inherently more difficult to predict.

In FY 2006, the average monthly cost of operations and equipment reconstitution for Iraq and Afghanistan reached $8.2 billion, (Figure 3) 21 percent higher than in FY 2005, with about three-quarters dedicated to operational costs and one-quarter to investment.

In FY 2007 the average monthly cost of operations and equipment through November is $1.8 billion higher than the FY 2006 rate. Two-thirds of this difference is due to increased procurement of force protection equipment and the remaining one-third is for increased maintenance, inflation, and higher fuel prices.
## FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

### Table 1. Funding by Military Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Millions</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>Title IX</th>
<th>FY 2007 Supplemental</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>59,177</td>
<td>64,530</td>
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<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>5,690</td>
<td>24,775</td>
<td>30,465</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Noble Eagle&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified</td>
<td>5,740</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>6,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-GWOT&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,593</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>3,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,527&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
<td><strong>70,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>93,382</strong></td>
<td><strong>163,382</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Congress added $136M for Operation Noble Eagle in the FY 2006 Title IX appropriation
2. FY 2006 does not include $1.5B in non-GWOT activities
3. The FY 2007 supplemental request includes baseline fuel
4. Congress does not appropriate Supplemental funds by military operation. This estimate by operation is subject to change depending on the needs of commanders in the theater.
# FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request

Table 2. Funding by Functional Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Millions</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Continuing the Fight</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
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<td>Force Protection</td>
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<td>IED Defeat</td>
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<td>1,958.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>1,499.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq &amp; Afghan Security Funds</td>
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<td>4,915.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition Support</td>
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<td>1,200.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
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<td>423.0</td>
<td>923.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td>214.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional War on Terror</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modularity</td>
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<td>5,000.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reconstituting the Force</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstitution</td>
<td>8,991.2</td>
<td>10,208.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enhancing Ground Forces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Forces “Plus Up”</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTs / RCT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow the Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Non-GWOT</td>
<td>2,765.3</td>
<td>2,975.0</td>
<td>5,740.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,500.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,027.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,527.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Reflects FY 2006 Enacted amounts
2. Does not include $1.5B for Non-GWOT activities

Numbers may not add due to rounding
## Table 3. Funding by Appropriation Title

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th></th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>6,144.5</td>
<td>10,278.8</td>
<td>16,423.3</td>
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<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
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<td>29,992.0</td>
<td>59,230.0</td>
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<td>37,162.9</td>
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<td>6,462.7</td>
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<td>20,373.8</td>
<td>16,603.9</td>
<td>23,077.8</td>
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<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>123.5</td>
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<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,854.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Freedom Fund /JIEDDO</td>
<td>1,360.0</td>
<td>1,958.1</td>
<td>3,318.1</td>
<td>1,970.7</td>
<td>2,638.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Health Program</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,153.6</td>
<td>1,153.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,073.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Afghan Security Forces</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,915.1</td>
<td>4,915.1</td>
<td>3,200.0</td>
<td>9,748.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working Capital Fund</td>
<td>2,516.4</td>
<td>516.7</td>
<td>3,033.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,320.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>45,734.7</td>
<td>63,052.3</td>
<td>108,787.0</td>
<td>64,866.8</td>
<td>89,755.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Non-GWOT</td>
<td>2,765.3</td>
<td>2,975.0</td>
<td>5,740.3</td>
<td>5,132.2</td>
<td>3,627.2</td>
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<td>70,000.0</td>
<td>93,382.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Reflects FY 2006 Enacted amounts
2 Does not include $1.5B for Non-GWOT activities

Numbers may not add due to rounding
Contributors to the FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Justification Book

In addition to the significant contributions of the individuals listed below, hundreds of individuals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Services contributed to the development of these justification materials.

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Liz Griffith  Gary Pennett  Pentagon
Daniel Grimm  Maria Probst  Document
Dayna Hutchings  CDR Mark Pyle  Automation & Production
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Deb Kelley  John Raisigel


DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel, U.S. Army 01/03/07