# Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction

(Cooperative Threat Reduction Program)



February 2004

#### Summary:

FY 2003	Price	Program	FY 2004	Price	Program	FY 2005
Actual	Change	Change	Estimate	Change	Change	Estimate
414.36	5.387	28.896	448.645	6.281	-45.726	409.200

#### I. Description of Operations Financed:

The mission of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies and expertise from former Soviet Union (FSU) states, preferably through the safe destruction of Soviet era WMD, associated delivery systems and related infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DoD) has expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program to support the Global War on Terrorism. It has broadened the scope of Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention activities and initiated a program in coordination with other Departments to permit non-Russia FSU states to detect and capture WMD crossing their borders.

The CTR program directly supports the U.S. National Security Strategy and Strategy to Combat WMD and contributes to national security by reducing the WMD threat to U.S. and allies; denying rogue states and terrorists access to WMD and related materials, technologies and expertise; exploiting the Soviet legacy of pathogens, data and expertise to enhance preparedness against biological threats; contributing to stability and cooperation in the FSU; and expanding U.S. influence in the FSU states. The CTR program continues at the source to dismantle strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure, enhance the security of WMD and weapons material, prevent proliferation of weapons technology, materials, and expertise and facilitate defense and military contacts to encourage military reductions and reform.

The Administration has taken a new approach toward providing assistance to Russia that stringently applies the conditions that must be met to certify Russia for CTR and

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

Freedom Support Act (FSA) assistance. Concern over Russian commitment to comply with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC and CWC respectively) and to forego military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements resulted in the Administration not certifying Russia in fiscal year (FY) 2002, FY 2003, and FY 2004. Instead, the Administration requested and exercised certification waivers in order to be able to continue to provide CTR and FSA assistance to Russia because of its important contributions to U.S. national security. The Administration has developed interagency guidelines that govern potential dual use assistance. The Department has augmented these guidelines that require strict accountability and oversight for dual use assistance such as cooperative biological research projects.

CTR Program objectives and related assistance activities are described below.

A. Objective One: Dismantle former Soviet Union WMD and associated infrastructure.

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. DoD, through the CTR Program, seeks to reduce this threat by providing assistance to FSU states to dismantle WMD and associated delivery systems and infrastructure.

DoD, through the CTR program, assists Russia in dismantling Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); silo launchers and road and rail mobile ICBM launchers; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and associated submarines; and WMD infrastructure. Additionally, DoD is assisting Ukraine in eliminating Tu-142 Bear and Tu-22M Backfire bombers and Kh-22 nuclear capable air to surface missiles.

Biological weapons capabilities in FSU states also pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. DoD estimates that approximately 40 Biological Research and Production Centers (BRPCs) are located in FSU states. DoD has funded a project to dismantle infrastructure associated with BW production or research at Soviet legacy

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

facilities. This project will eliminate infrastructure, equipment, and facilities previously used to perform BW related research and/or produce BW.

As a State Party to the CWC, Russia has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons and demilitarize its former CW production facilities. Subject to Russia's being certified for the conditions specified by Congress or a presidential waiver being authorized and exercised beyond FY 2004, CTR assistance will continue to fund construction of a CW destruction facility (CWDF) for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. DoD will construct the CWDF near the Shchuch'ye CW storage facility which contains approximately 47 percent of the Russian nerve agent-filled artillery munitions (estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles). Additionally, CTR assistance supports demilitarization of OAO Khimprom former nerve agent production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk in Russia. Demilitarization will decontaminate, dismantle and destroy specialized equipment and features related to the production, transfer and storage of chemical agents/weapons as outlined in the CWC.

The CTR program also is eliminating nuclear weapons storage bunkers in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

#### B. Objective Two: Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials.

The CTR Program in Russia encourages nuclear warhead dismantlement; provides enhanced security for strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in storage; and provides safe and secure storage for fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads. The CTR Program assists in the secure transport of an estimated 2,000-2,500 nuclear warheads per year to dismantlement or secure storage facilities. Conclusion of a limited access protocol and associated arrangement with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) enables DoD to enhance security at more than 32 nuclear storage areas throughout

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

Russia. CTR assistance is coordinated with the Department of Energy's (DOE) Materials Protection, Control and Accounting assistance program.

CTR is assisting Kazakhstan in preventing the proliferation of previously unsecured nuclear materials.

CTR provides for consolidation and enhanced security and safety systems for dangerous virus and bacteria pathogen repositories at biological research centers. This assistance will help prevent the theft, diversion, or accidental release of dangerous biological pathogens.

CTR assistance under the projects to secure WMD storage sites is helping to establish personnel reliability programs to enhance the ability to screen and evaluate personnel who have access to nuclear and chemical weapons, and biological pathogen materials.

## C. Objective Three: Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct.

CTR Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) enhances the U.S. capability to prevent proliferation of the former Soviet BW scientific and technology base to rogue states and terrorist groups, while increasing transparency at FSU biological research facilities. Research projects address biotechnology issues between U.S. and FSU scientists in the areas of force health protection, medical countermeasures, counterterrorism and modeling. They provide the U.S. access to scientific expertise and the opportunity to transfer dangerous pathogens to the U.S. for forensics reference. Cooperative research through DoD's partnership with the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) encourages higher standards of openness, ethics and conduct at the scientist level and preempts potential "brain drain" of scientists to rogue states. Due to continuing concerns over Russia's compliance with the BWC, stringent management oversight is enforced for CBR activities in Russia.

### I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

D. <u>Objective Four</u>: Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation.

The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative will enhance the capability of non-Russian FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials, and to respond to WMD incidents at the border or in country. DoD will provide equipment, training, infrastructure and logistics support to enhance national and regional capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. DoD is pursuing maritime border control projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, land and maritime border control projects in Ukraine, and a portal monitor project in Uzbekistan.

In the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention area, DoD will undertake new Biological Threat Agent Detection and Response activities that will strengthen DoD's ability to detect and diagnose outbreaks, to attribute them to natural or terrorist causes, to access real-time, unfiltered medical intelligence, to consolidate pathogen collections into central labs, to modernize diagnostic capabilities to minimize need for pathogen retention at vulnerable field stations, and to develop a network of trained, ethical partner scientists equipped to prevent, deter, and contain a bioattack. This project also will enhance Russian smallpox vaccine production capacity to deter and counter smallpox terror threats outside the United States.

The CTR Program also supports expanded contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization and democratic reforms in FSU states. DoD has negotiated a series of implementing arrangements with FSU states that govern the Defense and Military Contacts program. DoD has provided support to 32 separate major commands, service headquarters, and subordinate commands for approximately 1,452 events between the U.S. and FSU states. Future events will include exchange visits between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with their FSU states' counterparts; visits between naval, air and ground units; bilateral

### I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (Continued)</u>:

exercises and ship visits; and visits of the nation's senior officials. Participating states currently include Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

# E. Other Program Support: (Supports all four objectives)

Other Assessments/Administrative Support funds the Audits and Examination (A&E) program as identified in the appropriate umbrella and implementing agreements with CTR Program recipient states and overall program management and administration costs. The A&E program ensures that DoD-provided equipment, services, and training are fully accounted for, used effectively and efficiently for the purpose intended, and support CTR Program objectives. Additional CTR funding is required to support CTR delegation and technical teams' travel expenses, translator/interpreter support, and systems engineering and technical assistance.

#### II. Force Structure Summary:

- A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) Russia: Assists Russia in eliminating and destroying strategic delivery systems and infrastructure. CTR assistance is an incentive for Russia to draw down its legacy of former Soviet nuclear forces, thereby reducing opportunities for their proliferation or use. DoD is providing, through the CTR program, equipment and services to destroy or dismantle ICBMs, ICBM silo launchers, and road/rail mobile launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers and associated strategic submarines, and WMD infrastructure. Also, CTR assistance supports the disposition of spent naval reactor fuel from dismantled SSBNs and the provision of emergency response support equipment. Written legal commitments are replacing good faith obligations whenever CTR provides infrastructure or equipment to carry out these elimination projects.
- B. Weapons Storage Security Russia: CTR assistance is providing MOD an enhanced inventory control and management system to track deactivated strategic and tactical nuclear weapons; improved security at nuclear weapons storage sites that have either or both strategic and tactical weapons; guard force training; and personnel reliability program (PRP) equipment and training to deter the theft, diversion, or sabotage of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.
- C. Weapons Transportation Security Russia: CTR assistance supports the safe and secure transportation of nuclear warheads from operational sites to dismantlement or secure storage facilities. MOD provides technical and security personnel and their equipment. CTR assistance will be used to certify and maintain MOD nuclear weapons transportation cargo and guard rail cars, to include life extension. If life extension and certification is unsuccessful, DoD may procure nuclear weapons cargo and guard railcars with improved alarm, monitoring and access denial systems. DoD will require written legal commitments from MOD to use the new cars to transport nuclear weapons to enhanced storage or dismantlement facilities.

#### II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

- D. <u>Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Russia</u>: CTR assistance supports the U.S. objectives of eliminating CW and preventing proliferation of CW capabilities to rogue states and terrorist groups. The CTR program is assisting in the design and construction of the CWDF for organophosphorus (nerve) agent filled munitions. Continued CTR support is contingent upon Russia's meeting congressional conditions for this assistance or Congress's providing, and the President's exercising, a waiver for these conditions in FY 2005 and beyond. The CWD program area also assists in demilitarizing former CW production facilities in Russia.
- E. <u>Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) Ukraine</u>: Assists Ukraine in destroying nuclear delivery systems and infrastructure to prevent the proliferation of technology. The CTR program will eliminate Tu-142 bombers, Tu-22M bombers and Kh-22 nuclear capable air to surface missiles.
- F. Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) Ukraine: Eliminates facilities for storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons.
- G. <u>Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) Kazakhstan:</u>
  Supports projects to secure fissile and radioactive materials, and eliminates a former nuclear weapons storage area.
- H. Biological Weapons (BW) Proliferation Prevention: CTR assistance consolidates and secures or eliminates dangerous pathogen collections at biological research institutes; dismantles former Soviet BW research and production facilities; targets cooperative biological research to prevent the proliferation of expertise on dangerous pathogens and to encourage higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct at the scientist level; and provides Biological Threat Agent Detection and Response. DoD is partnering with the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) for projects in Russia, and continues to pursue an implementing agreement. Implementing agreements are in effect with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, and an agreement with Ukraine is nearing signature.

#### II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

- I. <u>WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative</u>: CTR assistance will enhance the capability of non-Russian FSU military, internal security forces, border guards and customs forces to prevent, deter, detect and interdict unauthorized movement of WMD or related materials across borders, and to respond effectively to WMD incidents at the border.
- J. <u>Defense and Military Contacts</u>: CTR funding expands contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization and democratic reform. The Defense and Military Contacts program is intended to: encourage and assist FSU states in downsizing their defense establishment; encourage support for democratic reform; assist the FSU states' military to better understand Western society, including civil-military relations; and to support mutual counter-proliferation objectives.
- K. Other Assessments/Administrative Support: CTR funding supports a congressionally mandated Audits and Examinations (A&E) program and overall program administrative and support costs. Activities include CTR delegation and technical team travel, translator/interpreter support, project requirements development, embassy support costs, and contracted technical and analytical program support.

# III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands):

A. Sub-Activity Group		FY 2004				
	FY 2003 Actuals	Budget Request	Appro- priation	Current Estimate	FY 2005 Estimate	
A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination-Russia	70,100	57,600	66,600	66,600	58,522	
B. Weapons Storage Security-Russia	39,800	48,000	48,000	48,000	48,672	
C. Weapons Transportation Security-Russia	19,600	23,200	23,200	23,200	26,300	
D. Chemical Weapons Destruction-Russia	132,900	200,300	200,300	200,300	158,400	
E. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination-Ukraine	6,400	3,900	4,900	4,900	-	
F. WMD Infrastructure Elimination-Ukraine	8,700	_	-	-	-	
G. WMD Infrastructure Elimination-Kazakhstan	8,900	_	-	-	-	
H. BW Proliferation Prevention	54,700	54,200	54,200	54,200	54,959	
I. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative	39,800	39,400	29,400	29,400	40,030	
J. Defense and Military Contacts	18,800	11,100	8,945	8,945	8,000	
K. Other Assessments/Administrative Support	14,662	13,100	13,100	<u>13,100</u>	14,317	
Total	414,362	450,800	448,645	448,645	409,200	

# III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

# B. Reconciliation Summary

	Change	Change
	FY 2004/FY	FY 2004/F
	2004	200
1. Baseline Funding	450,800	448,645
a. Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	-	N/A
b. Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	-	-
c. Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	-2,155	-
d. Congressional Earmarks	-	-
e. Congressional Earmark Billpayers	_	-
2. Appropriated Amount (Subtotal)	448,645	_
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent	-	-
Across-the-board Reduction (Rescission)	-	-
Approved Reprogrammings/Transfers	_	_
3. Price Change	_	6,281
4. Program Changes	_	-45,726
5. Current Estimate	448,645	409,200
Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases:		
		450,800
FY 2004 President's Budget Request		450,800
FY 2004 President's Budget Request		<b>4</b> 50,800 -
FY 2004 President's Budget Request 1. Congressional Adjustment		<b>450,800</b> - -
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment  a. Distributed Adjustment		<b>4</b> 50,800 - - -
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment a. Distributed Adjustment b. Undistributed Adjustments		<b>450,800</b>
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment  a. Distributed Adjustment  b. Undistributed Adjustments  c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent		<b>450,800</b> 2,155
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment  a. Distributed Adjustment  b. Undistributed Adjustments  c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent  d. General Provisions  (1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies		- - -
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment  a. Distributed Adjustment  b. Undistributed Adjustments  c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent  d. General Provisions  (1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies  FY 2004 Appropriated Amount		- - - - -2,155
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment  a. Distributed Adjustment  b. Undistributed Adjustments  c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent  d. General Provisions  (1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies  FY 2004 Appropriated Amount		- - - - -2,155
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment     a. Distributed Adjustment     b. Undistributed Adjustments     c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent     d. General Provisions         (1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies  FY 2004 Appropriated Amount  2. Emergency Supplemental	P.L. 108-106)	- - - - -2,155
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment     a. Distributed Adjustment     b. Undistributed Adjustments     c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent     d. General Provisions         (1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies  FY 2004 Appropriated Amount  2. Emergency Supplemental     a. Emergency Supplemental Funding Carryover     b. FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (1)	P.L. 108-106)	- - - - -2,155
FY 2004 President's Budget Request  1. Congressional Adjustment     a. Distributed Adjustment     b. Undistributed Adjustments     c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent     d. General Provisions         (1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies  FY 2004 Appropriated Amount  2. Emergency Supplemental     a. Emergency Supplemental Funding Carryover     b. FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (1)  3. Fact-of-Life Changes     a. Functional Transfers	P.L. 108-106)	- - - -2,155
<ul> <li>a. Distributed Adjustment</li> <li>b. Undistributed Adjustments</li> <li>c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent</li> <li>d. General Provisions <ul> <li>(1) Section 8126a - Management Efficiencies</li> </ul> </li> <li>FY 2004 Appropriated Amount</li> <li>2. Emergency Supplemental <ul> <li>a. Emergency Supplemental Funding Carryover</li> <li>b. FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (1)</li> </ul> </li> <li>3. Fact-of-Life Changes</li> </ul>	P.L. 108-106)	- - - - -2,155

## III. Financial Summary (FSU: \$ in Thousands) (Continued):

c. Emergent Requirements	_			
Baseline Funding				
4. Reprogrammings (requiring 1415 Actions)				
a. Increases	-			
b. Decreases	-			
Revised FY 2004 Estimate	448,645			
5. Less: Emergency Supplemental Funding				
Normalized Current Estimate for FY 2004	448,645			
6. Price Change	6,281			
7. Program Increases				
a. Program Growth in FY 2005	14,027			
1) Weapons Transportation Security-Russia(FY 2004 Base: \$23,200) Funds 2,775 increasing tariffs to ship warheads to dismantlement/storage facilities.				
Workload remains the same.				
2) WMD Proliferation Prevention (non-Russia FSU) (FY 2004 Base: \$29,400) 10,218  Initiates additional proliferation prevention efforts to include portal monitors, enhanced maritime and air surveillance.				
3) Other Assessments/Administrative Support (FY 2004 Base \$13,100) 1,034				
Provides additional in country embassy support in Russia.				
8. Program Decreases				
a. Program Decreases in FY 2005	-59,753			
1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination-Russia (FY 2004 Base: \$66,600)No -9,010 funding required for spent naval fuel containers.				
2) Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination-Ukraine (FY 2004 Base: \$4,900) No -4,900 additional funds required due to rescoping of projects.				
3) Chemical Weapons Destruction (FY 2004 Base \$200,300): Aligns funds to -44,773				
the revised construction schedule for the Chemical Weapons Destruction				
Facility.				
4) Defense and Military Contacts (FY 2004 Base \$8,945): Reduction aligns -1,070				
funds to the anticipated program requirements.				
FY 2005 Budget Request	409,200			

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2003</u> <u>FY 2004</u> <u>FY 2005</u> 70,100 66,600 58,522

## A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination(SOAE)-Russia

FY 2003 funds will:

Complete elimination of 20 SLBM launchers and one associated SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers and one associated SSBN;

Procure 36 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel;

Transport, dismantle, and eliminate 27 liquid fueled SLBMs;

Eliminate two road mobile ICBM regiments;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 50 road mobile, solid fuel ICBMs/launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 6 rail mobile, solid fuel ICBMs/launchers;

Eliminate 9 liquid fueled ICBM silo launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 7 liquid fueled ICBMs and make improvements to the infrastructure of the missile elimination and dismantlement facility;

Remove propellant from ten solid fuel SLBMs by open burn and eliminate the motor cases; and

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

#### FY 2004 funds will:

Eliminate 16 SLBM launchers and one associated SSBN;

Procure 48 transport/storage containers for spent naval fuel;

Transport, dismantle, and eliminate 65 liquid fueled SLBMs;

Eliminate three road mobile ICBM regiments;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 50 road mobile, solid fuel ICBMs/launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 9 rail mobile, solid fuel ICBMs/launchers;

Eliminate 15 liquid fueled ICBM silos;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 9 liquid fueled ICBMs;

Remove propellant from five solid fuel SLBMs by open burn and eliminate the motor cases; and

# IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

#### A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination(SOAE)-Russia (Continued):

FY 2005 funds will:

Eliminate 16 SLBM launchers and one associated SSBN;

Transport, dismantle, and eliminate 20 liquid fueled SLBMs;

Eliminate three road mobile ICBM regiments;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 50 road-mobile, solid fuel ICBMs/launchers;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 6 rail-mobile, solid fuel ICBMs/launchers;

Eliminate 17 liquid fueled ICBM silos;

Transport, dismantle and eliminate 10 liquid fueled ICBMs;

Remove propellant from five solid fuel SLBMs by open burn and eliminate the motor cases; and

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR provided equipment.

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2003</u> <u>FY 2004</u> <u>FY 2005</u> 39,800 48,000 48,672

# B. Weapons Storage Security - Russia:

#### FY 2003 funds will:

Continue maintenance and life cycle support of the Automated Inventory Control and Management System at 19 sites;

Continue to procure additional personnel, reliability, and safety equipment to include 20,000 urinalysis test cups;

Provide project support for guard force training systems;

Provide additional firefighting, site preparation, and environmental control equipment;

Provide vulnerability analyses, site designs, site renovations, procurement, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at two to four MOD nuclear weapons storage sites;

Provide security upgrades for two road to rail nuclear warhead transfer sites; and

# IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

#### B. Weapons Storage Security - Russia (Continued):

#### FY 2004 funds will:

Provide for the monitoring of PRP program development;

Provide vulnerability analyses, site designs, site renovations, equipment, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at MOD nuclear weapons storage sites (depending on MOD's identification of the sites, that may include two large sites, three to six small sites or a combination of large and small sites); and

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

#### FY 2005 funds will:

Provide for the monitoring of PRP program development;

Provide vulnerability analyses, site designs, site renovations, equipment, and installation for comprehensive security upgrades at MOD nuclear weapons storage sites (depending on MOD's identification of the sites, that may include two large sites, three to six small sites or a combination of large and small sites); and

Provide consolidated logistical support to maintain CTR-provided equipment.

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

19,600 23,200 26,300

# C. Weapons Transportation Security - Russia

#### FY 2003 funds will:

Transport approximately 72 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,500 to 2,000) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for 80 MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and

# IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide equipment to ensure the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons to include the procurement of five guard cars.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

#### C. Weapons Transportation Security - Russia (Continued):

#### FY 2004 funds will:

Provide for increasing tariffs and transport approximately 72 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,500 to 2,000) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for 80 MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars;

Provide for procurement of rail cars that support the transportation of nuclear weapons, to include the manufacture of four additional guard cars; and

Provide equipment to ensure the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons in support of dismantlement objectives.

#### FY 2005 funds will:

Provide for increasing tariffs and transport approximately 72 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,500 to 2,000) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Provide maintenance/certification for 80 MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars;

Provide for the procurement of cargo rail cars that support the transportation of nuclear weapons.

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2003</u> <u>FY 2004</u> <u>FY 2005</u> 132,900 200,300 158,400

# D. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia

#### FY 2003 funds will:

Continue construction of underground utility system;

Continue construction of primary building;

Continue construction of utility buildings;

Initiate procurement of long lead items;

Initiate construction of industrial support, safety and service buildings; and Continue demilitarization of former CW production facilities at Novocheboksarsk.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

#### D. Chemical Weapons Destruction - Russia (Continued):

#### FY 2004 funds will:

Continue procurement of long lead equipment;

Continue construction of industrial support, safety and service buildings;

Continue main process facility construction;

Commence equipment installation; and

Commence utility tie in to equipment and facilities; and

Continue demilitarization of former CW production facilities at Novocheboksarsk.

#### FY 2005 funds will:

Complete construction of industrial support, safety and service buildings;

Complete construction of main process facility;

Continue equipment installation;

Commence systemization of installed equipment and systems;

Commence training program for operating personnel; and

Complete demilitarization of former CW production facilities at Novocheboksarsk.

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

6,400 4,900 -

## E. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) - Ukraine

#### FY 2003 and FY 2004 funds will:

Support Storage and Elimination of 163 SS-24 Missile Motor located at Pavlograd Chemical Plant and Pavlograd Mechanical Plant.

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$'s in thousands)
<u>FY 2003 FY 2004</u> <u>FY 2005</u>

#### F. WMD Infrastructure Elimination - Ukraine

FY 2003 funds will:

Eliminate equipment and infrastructure at three nuclear weapons storage areas.

(\$'s in thousands)

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

# G. WMD Infrastructure Elimination - Kazakhstan

FY 2003 funds will:

Continue to prevent proliferation of fissile and radioactive material; Complete the elimination of equipment and infrastructure at liquid missile propellant handling and storage facilities; and Demilitarize a former nuclear weapons storage site.

> (\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2003</u> <u>FY 2004</u> <u>FY 2005</u> 54,700 54,200 54,959

# H. BW Proliferation Prevention:

FY 2003 funds will:

Initiate four additional cooperative biological research projects and continue ongoing cooperative biological research which provides in-lab collaborators for dangerous pathogen research in the FSU;

Provide biosafety training for scientists from former BW institutes;

Complete nine Threat and Vulnerability Assessments and four Emergency Security Upgrades in two facilities in Kazakhstan, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Georgia;

Complete one new building design of a Pathogen Collection facility in Kazakhstan;

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Begin demolition of one Biological Weapons facility in Kazakhstan; and
Begin to provide equipment, disease surveillance transportation systems and
training to establish a Biological Threat Agent Detection and Response system
that includes eight disease monitoring field stations in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.

#### FY 2004 funds will:

Initiate four additional cooperative biological research projects and continue implementing ongoing cooperative research (provide additional in-lab collaborators as required dangerous pathogen research in the FSU);

Complete four security system upgrades in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan;

## H. BW Proliferation Prevention (Continued):

- Complete 11 Threat and Vulnerability Assessments in four facilities in Kazakhstan, three in Uzbekistan, and two each in Georgia and Ukraine;
- Continue demolition of one facility in Kazakhstan and commence demolition of one (each) facility in Uzbekistan and Georgia;
- Begin construction/reconstruction of a central reference laboratory in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan;
- Continue to provide equipment, disease surveillance transportation systems and training to establish a Biological Threat Agent Detection and Response system that includes eight additional disease monitoring field stations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and commence system creation in Georgia.
- Consolidate pathogens from remote field stations and provide equipment, and training to establish two additional disease monitoring field stations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan;
- Begin the installation of a computerized disease diagnostic capability for a bio-attack early warning system in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; and
- Complete testing and make operational the BW disease surveillance transportation systems in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as required.

### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

#### FY 2005 funds will:

Initiate four additional cooperative biological research projects and continue implementing ongoing cooperative biological research (provide additional inlab collaborators as required for dangerous pathogen research in the FSU);

Complete five site security upgrades in Russia and two full security upgrades in Kazakhstan and Georgia;

Complete four Threat and Vulnerability Assessments and Emergency Security Upgrades in Uzbekistan and Ukraine;

Begin demolition for one site in the Ukraine;

Begin the operations of the BW disease surveillance transportation system in Ukraine and Georgia; and

Complete the disease surveillance transportation system projects in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Georgia.

(\$'s in Thousands)
FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

# I. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative - (non-Russia FSU)39,80029,400 40,030

#### FY 2003 funds will:

Support initial efforts with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan focusing on securing the maritime borders in the Caspian Sea;

Support initial efforts in Ukraine that will enhance security along the Moldova/Transnistria border; and

Deploy portal monitors and related equipment at key ports of entry in Uzbekistan;

#### FY 2004 and FY 2005 funds will:

In general continue the efforts initiated with FY 2003 funds to provide equipment and training to improve WMD prevention border control capabilities and consolidated logistics support and maintenance training of CTR provided

## IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

equipment. Specific additional assistance will be conditioned on progress of effectiveness of initially provided assistance but could include:

Ukraine: upgrade of ports of entry, enhancing capabilities of mobile response teams, enhancing air surveillance along land and sea borders, enhancing maritime proliferation prevention capability in the Black Sea;

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: enhancing maritime surveillance and patrol capabilities in the Caspian Sea to include radars, command control, vessel upgrades, boarding equipment and training, and WMD detection equipment;

Uzbekistan: Onuclear detection portal monitors for additional ports of entry along with communications equipment and training of customs personnel; and Proliferation Prevention Initiatives in other FSU countries may be started as the political situation allows.

(\$'s in Thousands)

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

18,800 8,945 8,000

## J. Defense and Military Contacts

FY 2003 funds will fund approximately 627 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2004 funds will fund approximately 298 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2005 funds will fund approximately 267 defense and military exchanges.

(\$'s in Thousands) <u>FY 2003</u> <u>FY 2004</u> <u>FY 2005</u> 14,662 13,100 14,317

#### K. Other Assessments/Administrative Support

FY 2003 through FY 2005 funds will conduct 20 Audits and Examinations per year and fund contracts for technical and program support.

# V. Personnel Summary: N/A

# VI. Summary of Price and Program Changes (\$ in Thousands):

			Changes FY 2003 to FY 2004		Changes FY 2004 to FY 2005			
Line Item	Description	FY 2003 Actual	Price Growth	Program Growth	FY 2004 Estimate	Price Growth	Program Growth	FY 2005 Estimate
0308	Travel of Persons	2,005	26	349	2,380	34	1,081	3,495
0399	Total Travel	2,005	26	349	2,380	34	1,081	3,495
0920	Supplies & Materials(Non-centrally managed)	60	1	-1	60	0	50	110
0925	Equipment Purchases(Non-centrally managed)	25,860	336	2,196	28,392	398	1,782	30,572
0933	Studies, Analysis, & Evaluations	600	8	-8	600	8	-8	600
0987	Other Intra-governmental Purchases	63,162	821	-9,670	44,313	620	159,703	204,636
0998	Other Costs	322,675	4,195	36,030	372,900	5,221	-208,334	169,787
0999	Total Other Purchases	412,357	5,361	28,547	446,265	6,247	-46,807	405,705
9999	GRAND TOTAL	414,362	5,387	28,896	448,645	6,281	-45,726	409,200