Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

March 2014
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Cooperative Threat Reduction: ($ in Thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>Program Change</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>8,430</td>
<td>45,790</td>
<td>500,455</td>
<td>8,738</td>
<td>-144,085</td>
<td>365,108</td>
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I. Description of Operations Financed:
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program’s overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, facilities, and expertise. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, and consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The CTR program also focuses on building partner capacity to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials in transit across international borders. The CTR Program contributes to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts by:

- Supporting a layered defense approach to countering weapons of mass destruction;
- Building strategic relationships with key international partners that enhance threat reduction on a global scale; and
- Supporting the resilience of the global nonproliferation framework by building partner capacities to enforce the tenets of that framework.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

The CTR Programs objectives are:

- Objective 1: Reverse WMD programs by dismantling and destroying stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery that partner countries own, possess, or that is in their control.

- Objective 2: Account for, secure and safeguard nuclear, chemical and biological materials, equipment or expertise, which, if vulnerable to theft or diversion, could result in WMD threats.

- Objective 3: Prevent and detect acquisition, proliferation, and use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery and knowledge.

The CTR Program is currently authorized to operate in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Afghanistan, Africa, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Southeast Asia, Libya, and the Middle East as well as world-wide for the transport of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components and the disposition of interdicted WMD and WMD-related materials.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

The CTR Program areas and related assistance are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in thousands</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) program eliminates WMD delivery systems and associated infrastructure. This program supports destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine. The CTR program provides equipment and services to destroy or dismantle Intercontinental-range Ballistic Missile (ICBM), ICBM silo launchers, road-mobile launchers, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), SLBM launchers, nuclear reactor cores of strategic SSBNs, and WMD infrastructure. This work is conducted under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program (MNEP) in the Russian Federation (RF). The bilateral protocol between the U.S. and the RF signed in June 2013 adopted select provisions of the MNEP to replace the expired U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement. In Ukraine, DoD provides assistance with the storage and elimination of solid rocket motors (SRM) from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs. This includes the provision of selected...
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

maintenance, consumables, and technical assistance to ensure the proper operation of the elimination facility, which Ukraine intends to use to remove solid propellant through water washout and subsequently incinerate the SRM cases. SOAE maintains readiness to respond to any WMD delivery systems elimination in other countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Chemical Weapons Destruction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69,030</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>15,720</td>
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The Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) program works with partner nations to reduce the threat from chemical weapons (CW) by securing and destroying CW stockpiles and eliminating chemical agent research capabilities and production facilities. The CWD program is assisting the government of Libya in meeting its commitment to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile. The CWD program is also providing safety and security improvements to the Ruwagha Chemical Weapons Storage Facility (CWSF) in the form of physical upgrades, and ongoing destruction operations. The CTR program is partnering with the Libyan National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the German Federal Foreign Office on these efforts. The CTR program is the primary source of funding for destruction and external security in assisting the OPCW with respect to destroying Syrian chemical weapons. Contingency planning continues in order to be prepared to support CW nonproliferation and elimination activities elsewhere.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in thousands</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Global Nuclear Security

The Global Nuclear Security (GNS) program consolidates ongoing efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials in the FSU and new initiatives to secure nuclear materials across the globe in support of the President’s Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative. This program will augment security enhancements identified for Russia and expand nuclear security cooperation to new countries and regions, consistent with legislation and in coordination with the efforts of other United States Government (USG) Department and international partners. This program also helps establish Centers of Excellence and conduct technical exchanges with partner countries to enhance training capabilities, consistent with international best practices related to nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transportation security, emergency response capabilities, and other activities important to improving nuclear security.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

The GNS program transitioned remaining responsibility for safe and secure warhead transportation and physical security sustainment to the RF Ministry of Defense (MOD) in June 2013. The GNS program plans to continue to work with Russia to improve nuclear security. Technical exchanges with the MOD will continue under a DoD Joint Staff – MOD General Staff Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), while work on nuclear materials security with Rosatom will be conducted under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR). Outside Russia and the FSU, the GNS program works closely with Department of Energy (DoE) and partner countries under various agreements and MOUs in accordance with existing authorities and determinations.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in thousands</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>211,014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>256,762</td>
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D. Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE):

The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) supports the “National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (Presidential Policy Directive-2, signed by the President on November 23, 2009),” which seeks to prevent terrorists or non-state actors from accessing biological material of security concern or expertise that could contribute to a biological weapons capability. The Program builds upon the indigenous capacities of regions and partner countries to safely and rapidly detect and report dangerous infections, enhances biorisk management, consolidates and secures pathogens of security concern, and establishes and enhances international research partnerships. The program builds regional and bilateral partnerships to mitigate biological risks and initiate
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

timely and effective measures to contain trans-border disease threats. The program trains partner country experts in current best practices across clinical, epidemiology, laboratory, veterinary, and environmental vector surveillance disciplines to detect, diagnose, report, and predict new and emerging disease threats rapidly and effectively. The program supports training and exercises for National response teams thereby enhancing response to and identification of the cause of outbreaks and subsequently reporting the findings to appropriate international bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO).

CBEP strategic policy objectives are to:

1) Dismantle, destroy, and prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or use of stockpiles of biological weapons, means of delivery, and biological weapons related equipment, technology, and infrastructure.

2) Enhance partner country/region's capability to identify, consolidate, and secure collections of pathogens and diseases of security concern in order to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of such pathogens and diseases.

3) Enhance partner country/region's capability to rapidly and accurately survey, detect, diagnose, and report biological terrorism and outbreaks of pathogens and diseases of security concern in accordance with international reporting requirements.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  
Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actuals</td>
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<td>Estimate</td>
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E. Proliferation Prevention (PP):

The Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) builds partner countries’ capacity to interdict illicit trafficking of WMD, and related components and technology. The program assists Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Middle East and Southeast Asia to develop self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, components, and technologies across their borders. The funds are used to develop our partners' capacity in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, border security and interdiction, disposition, and other areas related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) identification, security, and consequence incident response. The funds provide for equipment, training, and related assistance. Projects are executed incrementally and do not proceed until successful implementation of a previous stage to provide flexibility and management control while minimizing program risk. Projects are also designed and executed with the long-term sustainment of U.S.-provided equipment in mind to ensure that each partner country has the capability and resources to sustain project equipment upon project completion. This program complements ongoing United States Government (USG) and international counter-proliferation assistance provided by the DoE Second Line of Defense Program, the Department of State (DoS) Export Control and Related Border Security Program, and the DoD’s International Counterproliferation Program. The Program also complements the assistance provided by other USG and international partners that enhance counter-smuggling capacities, enhance border
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

security, and increase maritime domain awareness and interoperability. Projects are leveraged with other U.S. and international programs to avoid duplication of effort. Beginning in FY 2013, the Proliferation Prevention Program began expansion outside of the FSU to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In FY 2014, Proliferation Prevention will continue expansion activities in the Southeast Asia region on a bilateral and regional basis and expand work with partners in the Middle East.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F. Threat Reduction Engagement</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,375</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Threat Reduction Engagement Program (TREP) supports activities that are linked to the advancement of the CTR program efforts. The CTR program issued new policy and program guidance in July 2012 and encourages proposals from Combatant Commands with a specific focus on bio-engagement and proliferation prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The program also encourages proposals on bio-engagement, proliferation prevention, and nuclear security in Southeast Asia. The CTR Program is also working with interagency partners to ensure that TREP-funded activities complement and leverage other USG engagements with partner countries’ respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs). New guidance now allows non-military/defense personnel participation so long as their participation or attendance directly supports the execution of approved TREP events.
I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G. Other Assessments/Administrative Costs</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actuals</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,045</td>
<td>20,434</td>
<td>27,844</td>
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</table>

The Other Assessments/Administrative Costs (OAAC) contributes to the overall implementation of the CTR Program in areas not unique to established projects; for example, negotiations on an implementing agreement or operational support for nine overseas Embassy offices: Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Southeast Asia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. This program also supports required audits and examinations (A&Es) of CTR mission efforts and overall program management and administration.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:

The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) program supports destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine. The CTR program provides equipment and services to destroy or dismantle ICBMs, ICBM silo launchers, road-mobile launchers, SLBMs, SLCM launchers, nuclear reactor cores of strategic SSBNs, and WMD infrastructure.

SOAE – Russia

DoD plans to transition all elimination activities for SS-25 road-mobile launchers and SS-25 ICBMs, SS-18 and SS-19 silos and ICBMs, SS-N-18 SLBMs, and SLBM launchers to Russia by the middle of FY 2014.
II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination – Ukraine
The project provides for preventive and corrective maintenance of the Empty Motor Case (EMC) elimination Facility. The facility permits safe, ecologically sound incineration of residual propellant and EMCs. DoD will also support a controlled environment for storage of the remaining SRMs and movement of the SRMs within and between storage areas.

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction:
The Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) program reduces the threat from chemical weapons (CW) by securing and destroying CW stockpiles and eliminating chemical agent research capabilities and production facilities.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Technical Support – Russia
This project provided Russia with technical advice, repair parts procurement, and other assistance to support chemical agent destruction at the Shchuch’ye and Kizner CWDFs until June 2013.

Chemical Weapons Destruction – Libya
The project is providing safety and security improvements at the Ruwagha CWSF, to include safety and physical security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) planning advice, equipment upgrades, equipment operation and maintenance training, and other enhancements to improve existing capabilities. The United States is assisting Libya in destroying its CW munition stockpile.
II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Chemical Weapons Destruction – Middle East
This project is new and supports a request from the OPCW for technical and resource support to destroy chemical agent declared by Syria in late 2013.

Chemical Weapons Destruction – Syria
This project provides for the provision of shipping containers and material handling equipment to support Syrian Chemical Weapons destruction, logistics support, mobilization and modification of the Motor Vessel (MV) CAPE RAY, and installation of the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System (FDHS) aboard MV CAPE RAY, to conduct chemical weapons elimination at sea using the FDHS.

C. Global Nuclear Security:
The Global Nuclear Security (GNS) program consolidates ongoing efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials in the FSU and new initiatives to secure nuclear materials across the globe in support of the President’s Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative.

Global Nuclear Security – Russia
This project provides assistance and technical expertise to improve physical security and to securely transport spent naval fuel that is potentially vulnerable and meets the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) definition for weapons usable material.

This project provided comprehensive physical security enhancements and the ability to sustain those enhancements at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. The DoD assisted the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) in sustaining this installed equipment and infrastructure during a transition period while the MOD builds the capacity to assume
II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

full responsibility. Sustainment and operational control of the DoD efforts were transferred to the Russian government in June 2013

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence
This project helps to establish Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and other activities important to improving nuclear material security. The project will facilitate training course development and delivery, and will provide equipment to enhance nuclear security, material control, and inventory management.

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:
This program builds upon the indigenous capacities of regions and partner countries to safely and accurately diagnose and rapidly report dangerous infections, and establishes and enhances international research partnerships. The program is regionally organized and implements in cooperation with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Agency for International Development and partner countries. Projects are ongoing in: Former Soviet Union, Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. To fill gaps in many countries International Health Regulations (IHR) diagnostic and reporting as well as biorisk management capabilities, the program is initiating work with additional high priority countries. Additional details on planned project activities are provided in Section IV.
II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

E. Proliferation Prevention:

The Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) addresses the vulnerability of partner countries to interdict illicit trafficking of WMD, and related components and technology. The program assists Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Southeast Asia to develop self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, components, and technologies across their borders.

Green Border Project – Armenia
The project is continuing with a new increment to assist the Armenian Border Guard (ABG) and provide co-sponsorship of cross-border detection and interdiction exercises with Georgia.

Green Border Project – Moldova
The project is improving the capability of the Moldovan Border Police and the Moldovan Customs Services to prevent border-crossing of WMD and related materials. Special emphasis will be put on ensuring the government of Moldova can sustain and build upon these capabilities over the long term.

Georgia
The project includes construction of small boat facilities, allowing decreased response time, in addition to organic boat haul out capability, and several maintenance and training enhancements at key Georgian Coast Guard (GCG) sites. The project improves the GCG’s response time, and interdiction capability, and reduces the operating and maintenance costs of the GCG fleet. These efforts are coordinated with other USG ongoing efforts in country.
II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Southeast Asia
The project will enhance the capabilities of partner countries within the Southeast Asia region to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea and in other regional waters; enhance port security; and conduct assessments for future maritime and land border efforts. Initial efforts are focusing on providing maritime domain awareness support to the nascent Philippines Coast Watch Center/System and providing maritime-focused command and control, surveillance and WMD-related training and equipment to Malaysia and Vietnam. The PPP is also supporting other maritime domain awareness and interoperability efforts and is in project design discussions for additional bilateral maritime border security projects with other Southeast Asia partners.

Middle East
The project engages the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi borders to enhance their WMD proliferation prevention capabilities. Phase 2 of the Jordan Border Security project will enhance the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) capabilities to detect, identify, track, and interdict potential illicit traffickers on the Jordan border.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement:
The Threat Reduction Engagement Program (TREP) supports activities that are linked to the advancement of the CTR program efforts. TREP intends to work closely with all the Combatant Commands to identify relationship-building opportunities in their respective AORs, including Regional Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-2, Symposium on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism at the Near East South Asia Center for
II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Strategic Studies, and the United Arab Emirates Bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Low-Yield Explosive Defense Initiative.

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

The Other Assessments/Administrative Costs (OAAC) contributes to the overall implementation of the CTR Program in areas not unique to established projects.

Audits and Examinations (A&Es)
The goal of A&Es is to ensure that the CTR Program’s assistance is accounted for and used efficiently and effectively for its intended purpose. In accordance with umbrella and implementing agreements, and other political frameworks, the United States has the right to examine the use of any material, training, or other services provided under these agreements and frameworks during implementation and for a follow-on period.

Program Management/Administration
The project provides program administrative and general support; project development cost estimates; advisory and assistance services; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support to the CTR program; and travel. The project funds permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Offices (DTROs) in Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Southeast Asia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Additional DTROs may be opened as CTR projects expand into new countries.
**Defense Threat Reduction Agency**
**Cooperative Threat Reduction Program**
**Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates**

### III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. BA Subactivities</th>
<th>FY 2013 Actual</th>
<th>Budget Request</th>
<th>Congressional Action</th>
<th>Current Estimate</th>
<th>FY 2015 Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10,000</td>
<td>-4,300</td>
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<td>5,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Chemical Weapons Destruction</td>
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<td>61,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Cooperative Biological Engagement</td>
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<td>306,325</td>
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<td>5. Proliferation Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Other Assessments/ Administrative Support</td>
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<td>-7,741</td>
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<td>20,434</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>446,235</strong></td>
<td><strong>528,455</strong></td>
<td><strong>-28,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>500,455</strong></td>
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**III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)**

**B. Reconciliation Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<th>Change</th>
<th>FY 2014/FY 2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
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<td>Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)</td>
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<td>Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent</td>
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<td>Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Appropriated Amount</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fact-of-Life Changes (2014 to 2014 Only)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Baseline Funding</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplemental</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reprogrammings</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Price Changes</td>
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<td>Functional Transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Changes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current Estimate</strong></td>
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<td>365,108</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less: Wartime Supplemental</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Normalized Current Estimate</strong></td>
<td>500,455</td>
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### III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

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<th>Description</th>
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<th>Totals</th>
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<td>528,455</td>
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<tr>
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<td>b. Undistributed Adjustments</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. General Provisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2014 Appropriated Amount</td>
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<td>500,455</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fact-of-Life Changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2014 Baseline Funding</td>
<td>500,455</td>
<td>500,455</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revised FY 2014 Estimate</td>
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<td>5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings</td>
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<td>FY 2014 Normalized Current Estimate</td>
<td>500,455</td>
<td>500,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Price Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Functional Transfers</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Program Increases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Annualization of New FY 2014 Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. One-Time FY 2015 Increases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Program Growth in FY 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Other assessments/Administrative Costs (OA)</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The OA funds the Audits and Examinations (A&Es) provided for in the CTR agreements with partner countries, overall program management and organizational costs. The A&E program is a means to ensure the DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended uses.
C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Embassy Support Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The funding increase in FY 2015 reflects the impacts of ramping down the embassy support services required for current and emerging DTRA/CTR offices in partner countries. (FY 2015 Baseline: $20,434 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Global Nuclear Security (GNS)</td>
<td>954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GNS program supports efforts to transport and secure nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) through consolidation and is prepared to assist with new initiatives to secure nuclear materials across the globe in support of the President's Global Nuclear lockdown initiative. The FY 2015 budget for GNS is base-lined on efforts that have been completed and now operating in Russia. The funding increase in FY 2015 is for new projects that involve GNS engagements outside of Russia that are in the development phase. (FY 2014 Baseline: $20,703 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE)</td>
<td>848</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This program supports relationship-building engagements intended to advance the CTR mission. Engagements will continue with the FSU states, but will also include new geographic areas to support the CTR Program in states outside the FSU, in accordance with existing authorities and determinations. The funding increase in FY 2015 will allow the opportunity to increase engagements with partners in new geographical areas and the Unified Combatant Commands. (FY 2014 Baseline: $1,500 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Program Decreases -152,929
III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Annualization of FY 2014 Program Decreases</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. One-Time FY 2014 Increases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Program Decreases in FY 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Proliferation Prevention (PP)</td>
<td>-71,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Proliferation Prevention Program's funds will address the vulnerability of partner countries to trafficking of WMD and related components and assist them to develop self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, components, and technologies across their borders. The funding decrease in FY 2015 represents the anticipated completion of work supporting the Jordan border security surveillance network project. (FY 2014 Baseline: $110,421 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)</td>
<td>-68,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CWD Program works with partner nations to reduce the threat from chemical weapons (CW) by eliminating CW stockpiles; chemical agent research, production, and storage facilities; delivery systems; expertise; and related technologies; and securing such assets until they can be destroyed. The funding decrease in FY 2015 is due to the expiration of the Umbrella Agreement between the United States of America (U.S.) and Russia Federation (RF), which ends U.S. assistance to the RF chemical demilitarization program. (FY 2014 Baseline: $83,000 thousand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Cooperative Biologica Engagement (CBE)</td>
<td>-7,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This program counters the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III. Financial Summary ($ in thousands)

#### C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-4,802</td>
<td>365,108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

biological weapon. To counter the evolving threat, CBE will focus on pathogens and diseases of security concern defined as pathogens and toxins contained on the U.S. Select Agent and Toxin List, deliberate biological threats, and other potentially threatening emerging and/or re-emerging diseases. The decrease is to fund biological safety and security enhancements, disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements. (FY 2014 Baseline: $260,000 thousand)

4) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

SOAE provides assistance in the defueling and dismantlement of nuclear ballistic missile submarines and elimination of their submarine launched ballistic missile launchers. The funding decrease in FY 2015 represents the end of US assistance for land-based strategic launcher and missile elimination in Russia. (FY 2014 Baseline: $5,700 thousand)
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Complete dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;
- Assist Ukraine by financing 45 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine’s remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Support elimination and program activities in the RF;
- Assist Ukraine by financing 20 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine’s remaining SRMs and continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Complete elimination and program activities in Ukraine;
- Be prepared to address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  
Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates  

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:  

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):  

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:  

- Provide physical security and safety improvements for chemical weapons storage and guard force training;  
- Assist with Libyan and Syrian chemical weapons elimination operations;  
- Prepare U.S. Navy ship for Syria CW destruction project, provide packaging for Syrian CW and dangerous precursors;  
- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support in other regions to eliminate and improve safety and security of chemical weapons;  
- Support contract closeout for projects in Russia; and  
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.  

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:  

- Provide physical security and safety improvements for chemical weapons storage and guard force training in Libya;  
- Assist with Syrian chemical weapons elimination operations;  
- Destroy Syrian CW and dangerous precursors, support the external security of the destruction operation and work with others to dispose of the residual hazardous waste;  
- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support in other regions to eliminate and improve safety and security of chemical weapons;
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IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Support contract closeout for projects in Russia; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical and procurement advice and support in other regions to eliminate and improve safety and security of chemical weapons; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Establish and support technical exchanges with the Russian MOD on nuclear weapons security topics with the goal to enhance and improve security systems, procedures, and best practices;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable weapons and useable material or special nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and other nuclear material that meets the IAEA criteria as “weapons-usable” to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue to support technical exchanges with the Russian MOD on nuclear weapons security topics with the goal to enhance and improve security systems, procedures, and best practices;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material;
- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of SNF and other nuclear material that meets the IAEA criteria as “weapons usable” to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue to support technical exchanges with the Russian MOD on nuclear weapons security topics with the goal to enhance and improve security systems, procedures, and best practices;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management, and emergency response;
- Support shipments of SNF and other nuclear material that meets the IAEA criteria as “weapons-usable” to consolidate and facilitate the disposition of the nuclear material; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund biological safety and security (BS&S) enhancements as detailed below:

   Former Soviet Union (FSU)

   - Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Armenia and Ukraine;
   - Complete construction of a Ministry of Health training center in Uzbekistan;
   - Continue construction of the CRL in Kazakhstan;
   - Continue oversight of Azerbaijan CRL construction and installation of BS&S systems and equipment;
   - Continue the programmatic development and country-specific implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; and
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue the provision of Biorisk Management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

**Africa**

- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya;
- Install Pathogen Asset Control System (PACS) at key laboratories and conduct PACS training in South Africa; and
- Conduct Biorisk Management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa.

**Middle East/South Asia (MESA)**

- Initiate laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
- Conduct Biorisk Management training for scientists from Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Demonstrate electronic reporting system in Iraq

**Southeast Asia (SEA)**

- Conduct Biorisk Management workshops in Malaysia; and
- Install BS&S equipment and conduct associated operation and maintenance training in Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Cambodia and Vietnam.

2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

CTR-1164
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FSU

- Continue human and veterinary training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;
- Continue cooperative biological research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine;
- Continue transition of sustainment of diagnostic laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; and
- Continue Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) implementation, training and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan.

Africa

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda;
- Install laboratory diagnostic equipment in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as well as conduct associated operation and maintenance training;
- Initiate cooperative biological research activities in Kenya; and
- Continue cooperative biological research activities in West Africa.

MESA

- Install EIDSS and conduct associated training at multiple locations in Baghdad and Iraq;
- Install laboratory diagnostic equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan and conduct associated operation and maintenance training; and
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Conduct epidemiology training in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SEA
- Install laboratory diagnostic equipment in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam as well as conduct associated operation and maintenance training;
- Conduct laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam; and
- Continue laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia.

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund BS&S enhancements as detailed below:

FSU
- Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Armenia and Ukraine;
- Continue construction of the CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Continue oversight on construction of CRL in Azerbaijan and installation of BS&S systems and equipment;
- Continue the programmatic development and country-specific implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region; and
- Continue the provision of Biorisk Management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Africa

- Continue implementing BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Uganda and Tanzania;
- Conduct Biorisk Management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa; and
- Initiate gap analysis with Ethiopia.

MESA

- Continue laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue Biorisk Management training for scientists from Iraq and Afghanistan; and
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SEA

- Conduct Table Top Exercise and plan for regional outreach workshop with Malaysia on multi-sectorial Biorisk Management;
- Initiate Biorisk Management workshops in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Install BS&S equipment in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
IV. **Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:**

- Assist with integrated BS&S design in a Vietnam-built diagnostic lab
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and
- Initiate gap analysis in Philippines and Indonesia.

2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

**FSU**

- Continue human and veterinary training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine;
- Continue transition of sustainment of laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; and
- Continue EIDSS implementation, training and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

**Africa**

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda;
- Continue laboratory equipment and facility upgrades in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda;
- Initiate research activities in Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa; and
- Continue research activities in Kenya and West Africa.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

MESA
- Continue installation of EIDSS and conduct training in Baghdad and Iraq;
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan and assess needs in Jordan;
- Conduct laboratory diagnostic training in Iraq; and
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SEA
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Continue laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia;
- Initiate EIDSS and PACCS demonstration in Vietnam;
- Initiate gap analysis in Philippines; and
- Initiate research activity in Thailand and Vietnam.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

1) Fund BS&S enhancements as detailed below:

FSU
- Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Armenia and Ukraine;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Complete construction of the CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Continue oversight on construction of CRL in Azerbaijan and installation of BS&S systems and equipment;
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures across the region; and
- Continue the provision of Biorisk Management training in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

Africa

- Complete BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania;
- Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in up to three new countries; and
- Conduct Biorisk Management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and up to three new countries.

MESA

- Continue laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue Biorisk Management training in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
- Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

SEA

- Conduct Biorisk Management workshops in Philippines and Indonesia and fill identified gaps;
- Continue Biorisk Management workshops in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and
- Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard Operating Procedures in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

2) Fund disease detection, diagnosis and reporting enhancements as detailed below:

FSU

- Continue human and veterinary training in epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;
- Continue research activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine; and
- Continue transition of sustainment of laboratories in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; and
- Complete EIDSS implementation, training and upgrades in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

Africa

- Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory management and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and up to three new countries;
- Install laboratory equipment in up to three new countries; and
IV. **Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:**

- Continue research activities in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, and West Africa.

**MESA**
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Fill gaps in diagnostics and reporting in Jordan;
- Continue epidemiology training in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- Continue EIDSS and PACS installation and operator training; and
- Continue diagnostic training in Iraq.

**SEA**
- Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
- Install laboratory equipment in Philippines and Indonesia;
- Initiate lab management training in Philippines and Indonesia;
- Introduce EIDSS and PACS to human and vet ministries in Philippines;
- Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia and Vietnam;
- Conduct laboratory management training in Lao PDR;
- Complete laboratory diagnostic training/capacity building activity in Cambodia; and
- Continue research activity in Thailand and Vietnam.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

E. Proliferation Prevention (PP):

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Armenia: Continue improvements to Armenian Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgian green border;
- Southeast Asia: Continue to increase WMD Proliferation Prevention command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in the Philippines, the South China Sea, and in other regional waters; continue project assessments;
- Middle East: Begin engagement in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian green border to enhance WMD Proliferation Prevention detection and interdiction capabilities in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident and assess potential similar engagements in Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon if the security situation allows;
- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Armenia: Further continue improvements to Armenian border guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgian green border;
- Moldova: Continue to enhance WMD Proliferation Prevention capabilities by filling equipment and training gaps identified by concept of operations development activities and operational exercises, and enhance capabilities for safe transportation and disposition of interdicted materials;
- Georgia: Complete improvements to Georgian Coast Guard supply chain management, logistics planning, vessel maintenance capabilities, and tactical infrastructure to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea;
- Cambodia: Work with DOE to strengthen WMD detection and interdiction capabilities at key points of entry through equipment, training, and exercises;
- Philippines: Continue to increase WMD and maritime security communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment through the implementation of the National Coast Watch System and development of a concept of operations to aid in command and control and interagency coordination;
- Vietnam: Begin engagement to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment with training and infrastructure support capabilities;
- Southeast Asia: Begin engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities as well as bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities;
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Middle East: Continue engagement in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders to enhance WMD Proliferation Prevention detection and interdiction capabilities in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components and to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident and continue similar engagements with Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon;
- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2015 funds executed over three years will:

- Armenia: Complete improvements to Armenian Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgian green border;
- Moldova: Complete enhancements to WMD Proliferation Prevention capabilities by filling equipment and training gaps identified by concept of operations development activities and operational exercises, and enhance capabilities for safe transportation and disposition of interdicted materials;
- Philippines: Complete improvements to increase WMD and maritime security communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment through the implementation of the National Coast Watch System and development of a concept of operations to aid in command and control and interagency coordination;
- Vietnam: Complete improvements to enhance the maritime security and law enforcement equipment and infrastructure support capabilities;
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IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Southeast Asia: Continue engagements in other littoral Southeast Asia countries to enhance national maritime security and WMD detection capabilities as well as bolster regional proliferation prevention awareness and capabilities;
- Middle East: Complete detection and interdiction upgrades in order to prevent the illicit flow of WMD and related components with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the Syrian and Iraqi green borders Continue training and exercises with Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon to ensure resilience in the event of a WMD incident;
- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE):

- FY 2013 through FY 2015 funds will continue to support specific relationship-building opportunities with existing FSU countries while shifting towards engagements and expansion of CTR Program areas with partners in new geographical areas including cooperation and coordination with cognizant Unified Combatant Commands (UCCs) to advance CTR Program goals.
IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support (OA):

FY 2013 through FY 2015 funds support approximately 8-12 Audits and Examinations per year, provide agency support services, contractor administrative and advisory support, and provide U.S. Embassy support for current and emerging DTRA/CTR offices in partner countries.
## Defense Threat Reduction Agency
### Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
#### Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor FTEs (Total)</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>-409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decrease in contractors FTEs for FY 2015 represents the end of US assistance for land-based strategic launcher and missile eliminations in Russia; and the anticipated completion of program assistance to destroy Libyan and Syrian chemical weapons. This effort is in coordination with the OPCW and other foreign governmental entities. Decreases are also a result of the completion of EIDSS implementation in FSU designated countries; and anticipated completion of work supporting the Jordan border security surveillance network project.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>308 Travel of Persons</strong></td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-1,575</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>399 Total Travel</strong></td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-1,575</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>932 Mgt Prof Support Svcs</strong></td>
<td>6,618</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>7,177</td>
<td>129</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>934 Engineering &amp; Tech Svcs</strong></td>
<td>20,490</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>4,270</td>
<td>25,149</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>985 Research &amp; Development, Contracts</strong></td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>987 Other Intra-Govt Purch</strong></td>
<td>97,800</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>-24,078</td>
<td>75,580</td>
<td>1,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>989 Other Services</strong></td>
<td>308,364</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td>54,032</td>
<td>368,255</td>
<td>6,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>990 IT Contract Support Services</strong></td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>999 Total Other Purchases</strong></td>
<td>440,475</td>
<td>8,321</td>
<td>47,365</td>
<td>496,161</td>
<td>8,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>446,235</td>
<td>8,430</td>
<td>45,790</td>
<td>500,455</td>
<td>8,738</td>
</tr>
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</table>