Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



April 2013



Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

	FY 2012	Price	Program	FY 2013	Price	Program	FY 2014
	Actual	Change	Change	Estimate	Change	Change	<u>Estimate</u>
CTR	508,219	10,165	727	519,111	9,863	-519	528 , 455

- I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The CTR Program also focuses on building partner capacity to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials across borders or in transit across international borders. The Department of Defense's (DoD) approach to this set of activities includes:
 - Supporting a layered defense approach to countering weapons of mass destruction;
 - Building strategic relationships with key international partners that enhance threat reduction on a global scale;
 - Supporting the resilience of the global nonproliferation framework by building partner capacities to enforce the tenets of that framework.

In 2010, in accordance with the authorities of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the CTR Program began partnerships with countries beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU) to address emerging security challenges and urgent threats in other regions of the world. The CTR Program is currently authorized to operate in the FSU, Afghanistan, Africa, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

The CTR Program areas and related assistance are:

\$ in the	usands	
FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
Actuals	Estimate	Estimate

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

28,221 23,271 10,000

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The SOAE program eliminates WMD delivery systems and associated infrastructure.

In Russia, SOAE eliminates strategic offensive arms in a manner consistent with the New START Treaty (NST). The CTR Program also supports additional elimination activities beyond the NST protocols that are appropriate and support shared nonproliferation objectives. More specifically, the DoD achieves threat reduction value through assisting the Russian Federation (RF) in dismantlement of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); ICBM silo launchers and road-mobile ICBM launchers; submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); SLBM launchers, and associated strategic nuclear submarines; and infrastructure related to these systems. However, due to diminishing elimination activities needed for the RF to meet NST requirements, the DoD intends to transition remaining responsibility for elimination activities to the RF in 2014.

The DoD also assists Ukraine with the storage and elimination of solid rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs and will remain prepared to respond to any WMD delivery systems elimination responsibility for requirements in other countries.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

<pre>\$ in thousands</pre>						
FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014						
Actuals	<u>Estimate</u>	Estimate				
9,804	38,630	21,250				

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):

Russia, as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, agreed to eliminate its stockpile of over 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. The United States, Russia, and other international partners funded construction of the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. This CWDF is located near the Planovy chemical weapons storage facility, which contained approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions, estimated at 5,460 metric tons in over two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles. Russia began chemical weapons destruction operations at Shchuch'ye in March 2009 and, as of the end of 2012, has completed the elimination of over 3,321.5 metric tons of nerve agent. The DOD is providing technical and procurement advice and assistance support for the destruction operations at the Shchuch'ye CWDF.

The Kizner CWDF, a Russian built facility similar to Shchuch'ye, will begin to destroy approximately 5,645 metric tons of nerve agent, also in rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles after construction is complete, destruction efforts are estimated to begin late in 2013. The DoD has agreed to provide the Kizner CWDF with technical and procurement advice and assistance support. In May 2012, support efforts were initiated to help transfer process and equipment design modifications and improvements from

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

Shchuch'ye to the Kizner facility to facilitate systemizing the destruction processing equipment in preparation for formal start-up for destruction operations.

The CTR program will assist the government of Libya in meeting its commitment to the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to destroy it chemical weapons stockpile.

\$ in the	usands	
FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
<u>Actuals</u>	Estimate	Estimate

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

151,143 72,289 86,508

This program area includes all the DoD CTR activities related to nuclear material security, including security for nuclear warheads, weapons-usable nuclear material, and other nuclear material. These efforts provide enhanced security by maintaining and building logistics support capacity for physical security system upgrades, increasing inventory management capacity, enhancing security training support, improving transport security, developing emergency response capacity, and maintaining personnel reliability support for strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The program also improves security for at-risk nuclear material. In addition, the CTR Program assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to dismantlement facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition. This program also helps establish Centers of Excellence with

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, and inventory management. The CTR Program partners and coordinates closely with other related efforts within the U.S. Government and international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

\$ in the	usands	
FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
Actuals	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE):

229,470 241,014 306,325

This program counters the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a biological weapon. The program destroys or secures Select Agents at their source, builds partner capacity to sustain a safe, secure disease surveillance system to accurately detect, diagnose, and timely report Select Agent outbreaks. The CBEP works collaboratively with partner-country scientists/epidemiologists in research and surveillance efforts that will support the ethical application of biotechnology to identify the endemicity and transmission vectors of Select Agents and their near-neighbors for effective control/prevention.

The program collaborates closely with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, international partners, and the private sector. The program delivers tailored approaches that recognize, build upon, and enhance regional and partner countries' indigenous capacities. The CBE mission is achieved through the integration of three key product lines: 1) Biological Safety & Security (BS&S) capacity building, 2) Cooperative Biological Research and Engagement (CBR), and 3) Disease Surveillance, Detection, Diagnosis, Reporting, and Response (DSDDRR).

The CBE program activities directly support the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-2 "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats" FY 2014 major priorities for countering biological threats. The Directive spells out four major focus areas executed

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

by the CBE program: 1) Promote global health security efforts through building and improving international capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, whether caused by natural, accidental, or deliberate events. 2) Establish and reinforce norms against the misuse of the life sciences. 3) Expand our capability to prevent, attribute, and apprehend those engaged in biological weapons proliferation or terrorism, with a focus on facilitating data sharing and knowledge discovery to improve integrated capabilities. 4) Leverage science, technology, and innovation through domestic and international partnerships and agreements to improve global capacity to respond to and recover from biological incidents. Details on CBE activities are provided in Section IV of this document.

\$ in the	usands	
FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
<u>Actuals</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>

63,080 118,287 73,822

E. Proliferation Prevention (PP):

The Proliferation Prevention program enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states and other partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across international borders. The DoD provides assessments, equipment, infrastructure, logistics support, and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities that prevent the proliferation of WMD, its components, and related materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. This program is coordinated with the DoD International Counterproliferation Program, other U.S. Government border security and related law enforcement programs and international partners, and furthers inter-agency collaborations that contribute to a holistic approach

to export control, border security, and law enforcement-related capacity building

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

efforts. Beginning in FY 2012, the Proliferation Prevention program began expansion outside of the FSU to Southeast Asia. In FY 2013 and FY 2014, Proliferation Prevention will continue expansion activities in the Southeast Asia region on a bilateral and regional basis and begin to work with partners in the Middles East.

\$ in the	usands	
FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
Actuals	Estimate	<u>Estimate</u>

2,375

2,500 2,375

F. Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE):

This program supports relationship-building engagements intended to advance the CTR mission. Engagements will continue with the FSU states, but will also include new geographic areas to support the CTR Program in states outside the FSU, in accordance with existing authorities and determinations. The TRE program supports the following WMD related activities: non-proliferation or counter-proliferation symposia or workshops; bilateral or regional CTR-related symposia; high level exchanges or planning activities; and tabletop exercises.

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed (cont.)</u>

\$ in th	ousands	
FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
Actuals	Estimate	Estimate

28,175

24,001 23,245

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support (OA):

The OA funds the Audits and Examinations (A&Es) provided for in the CTR agreements with partner countries, overall program management and organizational costs. The A&E program is a means to ensure the DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Other activities include the CTR program travel, translator/interpreter support, and other agency support services to include organizational costs. The CTR Program personnel assigned to U.S. Embassy offices in partner countries are also supported with these funds.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:

The DoD provides equipment and services, and oversees destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems consistent with relevant implementing and arms control agreements. The DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ICBM silo launchers, ICBM road-mobile launchers, SLBM launchers, and infrastructure related to these systems in Russia and Ukraine and remains prepared to eliminate WMD delivery systems beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU).

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination - Russia

This project shares costs with Russia to deactivate, dismantle, and eliminate the SS-25 solid propellant ICBM system, liquid propellant SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

launch control center (LCC) silos; it eliminates SS-18 ICBMs, SS-19 ICBMs, and SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 SLBMs. This project also shares costs with Russia to remove and transport spent nuclear fuel and eliminate SLBM launchers from *Delta*-class and *Typhoon*-class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).

SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination - Ukraine

This project assists Ukraine with storing and removing propellant from SS-24 solid rocket motors. The DoD is also supporting the construction of the Empty Motor Case Elimination and Incineration Facility, including the procurement of an incinerator in partnership with the Department of State (DOS). This facility will permit safe, ecologically sound incineration of residual propellant and empty motor cases.

Offensive Arms Elimination - Non FSU

This project will remain prepared to eliminate WMD delivery systems beyond the former Soviet Union.

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

This program supports destruction of chemical weapons and reduces the risk of their proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Technical Support - Russia

This project will provide technical assistance and spare parts to two Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (near Shchuch'ye, Kurgan Oblast and Kizner, Udmurt Republic) for the elimination of organophosphorous (nerve) agent-filled, man-portable artillery munitions.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Chemical Weapons Destruction - Libya

This project is new and supports a request from the government of Libya for technical and resource support to destroy previously declared chemical agent and recently discovered chemical weapons.

C. Global Nuclear Security:

This program enhances the security, control, and accountability of partner countries' nuclear weapons and/or nuclear material.

Spent Naval Fuel/Fissile Material Disposition - Russia

The DoD provides assistance and technical expertise to improve physical security and to securely transport spent naval fuel that is potentially vulnerable and meets the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) definition for weapons-usable material.

Nuclear Security Enhancements - Russia

The DoD and Department of Energy (DOE) have provided comprehensive physical security enhancements and the ability to sustain those enhancements at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. These sites include both national stockpile sites and operational storage sites administered by the 12th Main Directorate at the Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Forces bases as well as temporary storage locations at road-to-rail transfer points. The DoD and DOE are assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD in sustaining

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

this installed equipment and infrastructure during a transition period while the MOD builds the capacity to assume full responsibility.

Nuclear Weapons Transportation - Russia

This project assists Russia in transporting nuclear warheads safely and securely to consolidated secure storage and dismantlement facilities.

<u>Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention - Kazakhstan</u>
This project secures radiological materials.

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence

This program helps establish Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and other activities important to improving nuclear material security. The program will facilitate training course development and delivery, and will provide equipment to enhance nuclear security, material control, and inventory management.

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

The CBE program is functionally organized and implements through partner countries including: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cambodia, Djibouti, Georgia, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, as well as other regional engagements. The DoD's efforts in Russia and Uzbekistan are limited due to both countries reluctance to cooperate with the DoD Cooperative Biological Engagement Program. Additional details on planned project activities are provided in Section IV.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

E. Proliferation Prevention:

This program enhances the capability of partner countries to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. The DoD support includes equipment, infrastructure, operations, and maintenance training for border guards, customs officials, and maritime military forces and enforcement agencies with defined roles in WMD proliferation prevention. This program complements ongoing United States Government and international counterproliferation assistance provided by the DOE's Second Line of Defense program, the DOS's Export Control and related Border Security program, and the DoD's International Counterproliferation program, and all programmatic efforts are closely coordinated across these Departments. It also complements the assistance provided by other USG and international partners that enhance countersmuggling capacities, enhance border security, and increase maritime domain awareness and interoperability.

Land Border Proliferation Prevention - Armenia

This project enhances the capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Armenia-Georgia land border. It also reinforces complementary, USG interagency and EU efforts to further cross-border cooperation with Georgia, to include a multi-agency, yearlong intensive effort to improve cross-border communication and coordination against nuclear smuggling.

Maritime Border Proliferation Prevention - Georgia

This project will enhance maritime WMD detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea while reducing operating costs for the Georgian Coast Guard. The project serves to reinforce the long and close USG-Georgia CTR nonproliferation relationship. It will address critical infrastructure, maintenance, logistics, and sustainment gaps and

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

support the past and on-going efforts of existing USG programs, e.g. State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) and the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement programs. WMD-PPP support for infrastructure, maintenance, and logistics enhancements will greatly increase Georgian capabilities to survey/patrol its territorial waters and identify, detect, and interdict WMD at sea.

Land Border Proliferation Prevention - Moldova

This project will enhance the capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting Moldova's borders with Ukraine and Romania and across the region of Transnistria. The project complements on-going border security efforts of the European Union and the European Commission and will complement the significant PP land border efforts in Ukraine.

Maritime and Land Border Proliferation Prevention - South East Asia

This program will enhance the capabilities of partner countries within the Southeast Asia region to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea and in other regional waters; enhance port security; and conduct assessments for future maritime and land border efforts. Initial efforts are focusing on providing maritime domain awareness support to the nascent Philippines Coast Watch Center/System and providing maritime-focused command and control, surveillance and WMD-related training and equipment to Malaysia. The PPP is also supporting other maritime domain awareness and interoperability efforts and is in project design discussions for additional bilateral maritime border security projects with other Southeast Asia partners.

Land Border Proliferation Prevention - Middle East

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

CTR is working closely with countries in the Middle East to prevent proliferation of WMD across borders shared with Syria.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement:

This program supports specific relationship-building opportunities, which could lead to the CTR Program developments in new geographic areas and the achievement of other CTR Program benefits.

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Audits and Examinations

This project enables the U.S. Government to examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment and evaluate whether the provided equipment, services, and training are being used for the intended purposes.

Program Management/Administration

This project provides program administrative and general support, project development costs, an advisory and assistance services contract, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support, and travel. This project funds permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Offices (DTROs) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Additional DTROs may be opened as CTR projects expand into new countries.

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

FY 2013 Congressional Action FY 2012 Budget Current FY 2014 A. BA Subactivities Actual Request **Estimate** Amount Percent Appropriated Estimate 1. Strategic Offensive 28,221 23,271 23,271 10,000 Arms Elimination 2. Chemical Weapons 9,804 38,630 38,630 21,250 Destruction 3. Global Nuclear Security 151,143 72,289 72,289 86,508 4. Cooperative Biological 241,014 229,470 241,014 306,325 Engagement 5. Proliferation 118,287 118,287 73,822 63,080 Prevention 6. Threat Reduction 2,500 2,375 2,375 2,375 Engagement 7. Other Assessments/ 24,001 23,245 23,245 28,175 Administrative Support 508,219 519,111 519,111 528,455 Total

В.	Reconciliation Summary	FY	Change 2013/FY 2013	
	Baseline Funding		519,111	519,111
	Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)			
	Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)			
	Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent			
	Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)			
	Subtotal Appropriated Amount		519,111	
	Fact-of-Life Changes (2013 to 2013 Only)			
	Subtotal Baseline Funding		519,111	
	Supplemental			
	Reprogrammings			
	Price Changes			9,863
	Functional Transfers			
	Program Changes			-519
	Current Estimate		519,111	528,455
	Less: Wartime Supplemental			
	Normalized Current Estimate		519,111	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
FY 2013 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)		519,111
1. Congressional Adjustments		
a. Distributed Adjustments		
b. Undistributed Adjustments		
c. Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent		
d. General Provisions		
FY 2013 Appropriated Amount		519,111
2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
3. Fact-of-Life Changes		
FY 2013 Baseline Funding		519,111
4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)		
Revised FY 2013 Estimate		519,111
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental		
Appropriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings		
FY 2013 Normalized Current Estimate		519,111
6. Price Change		9,863
7. Functional Transfers		
8. Program Increases		78 , 066
a. Annualization of New FY 2013 Program		
b. One-Time FY 2014 Increases		
c. Program Growth in FY 2014		
1) Cooperative Biological Engagement	60 , 732	
This program counters the threat of state and non-		
state actors acquiring biological materials and the		
expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a		
biological weapon. The increase in FY 2014 initiates		
bio-engagement efforts in select areas of Africa,		
Middle East, and SE Asia to include regional		
engagements; secure 12 Labs in Afghanistan, Armenia,		
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda, Tanzania,		

C.	Recor	ciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
		and Ukraine to fill gaps in analytical bio-		
		surveillance capacity; initiate construction and		
		equipment installation of secure pathogen		
		repositories to include construction of the National		
		Public Health Laboratory (NPHL) in Afghanistan;		
		conduct facility-specific biorisk assessments in CBE-		
		engaged countries and provide BS&S upgrades as		
		required; initiate CBR projects in Africa, Armenia,		
		Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan,		
		Ukraine, and other CBE-countries as valuable projects		
		are approved.		
		(FY 2013 Baseline \$241,014)		
	2)	Global Nuclear Security	12,846	
	,	GNS supports all DoD CTR activities related to	,	
		nuclear material security, including security for		
		nuclear warheads, weapons-usable nuclear material and		
		other nuclear material. The increase in FY 2014		
		transports approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated		
		nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed		
		locations; supports future Spent Naval Fuel (SNF)		
		that meet the IAEA criteria; provide logistical,		
		administrative, and advisory support. (FY 2013		
		Baseline \$72,289)		
	3)	Other Assessments / Administrative Support (OA)	4,488	
	,	This increase supports costs associated with eight or	,	
		more Audits and Examinations. Increase also funds		
		new Defense Threat Reduction Regional Embassy Offices		
		in new geographical areas. Funding provides for		
		management & professional support services and		
		contractual support. (FY 2013 Baseline \$23,245)		

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases 9. Program Decreases a. Annualization of FY 2013 Program Decreases	Amount	Totals -78,585
 b. One-Time FY 2013 Increases 1) Proliferation Prevention This program enhances the capability of parter countries to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. The decrease is due to the initiation of 	-46,713	
the Middle East effort being funded with FY 2013 funds. (FY 2013 Baseline \$118,287) 2) Chemical Weapons Destruction This program supports destruction of chemical weapons and reduces the risk of their proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups. The reason for the decrease is due to the initiation of the Libya effort being funded with FY 2013 funds. (FY 2013 Baseline \$38,630)	-18,114	
c. Program Decreases in FY 2014 1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) SOAE program provides nonproliferation value through assisting Russia in the elimination of strategic offensive arms in a manner consistent with the New Start Treaty. This decrease represents the DoD's decision to transition all elimination activities in the Russian Federation (RF) to the RF. Reduction made to travel, contractual support and engineering technical services. Remaining funds will complete elimination and program closeout activities in the RF; assist Ukraine by making payments for 30 empty Solid Rocket Motors (SRM) cases; store Ukraine's	-13,713	

C. Reco	remaining SRMs; continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and address WMD delivery system threats in other countries. (FY 2013 Baseline \$23,271)	Amount	Totals
2)	Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE) The FY 2014 funding supports specific relationship- building opportunities with existing FSU countries and increasing engagements with partners in new geographical areas and the Unifiec Combatant Commands. Decrease reduces training for 10 partner nation officers and their US counterparts. (FY 2013 Baseline \$2,375)	-45	
FY 2014	Budget Request		528,455

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 9 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 9 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Repair rail infrastructure to sustain SS-18/SS-19 ICBM elimination operations
- Initiate dismantlement of the nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;
- Transport SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRM) in Ukraine to the propellant removal facility;
- Assist Ukraine with SRM elimination by making payments for 30 empty SRM cases;
- Store remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Complete infrastructure improvements in Ukraine for incineration of excess washed-out propellant and disposal of SS-24 empty motor cases (EMC); and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 4 SS-18 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 18 SS-19 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 20 SS-18 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Dismantle and eliminate 30 SS-19 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Eliminate 7 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 30 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Eliminate 4 SS-N-18 SLBMs;
- Complete dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1

 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 85 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Complete elimination and program closeout activities in the RF;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 30 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs, continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Address WMD delivery system threats in other countries; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

 Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support for the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) and technical and procurement advice and assistance support to transfer process and equipment

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

design improvements to the Kizner CWDF, responding to process and equipment failure; conducting root cause analysis and developing corrective actions; providing advice and assistance to maintain and repair equipment; procuring spares, repair parts, and materials; training operations and maintenance workforce; and

Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support for the Shchuch'ye and Kizner CWDFs, responding to process and equipment failure; conducting root cause analysis and developing corrective actions; providing advice and assistance to maintain and repair equipment; procuring spares, repair parts, and materials; training operations and maintenance workforce;
- Initiate efforts to destroy the chemical agent and weapons in Libya; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical and procurement advice and assistance support for the Shchuch'ye and Kizner CWDFs, responding to process and equipment failure; conducting root cause analysis and developing corrective actions; providing advice and assistance to maintain and repair equipment; procuring spares, repair parts, and materials; training operations and maintenance workforce;
- Complete the elimination of chemical agent and weapons in Libya; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will: Continue Russia Nuclear Security Enhancements and Sustainment Initiatives to include: vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems, Personnel Reliability Programs, live fire ranges, Mobile Repair Vehicles, a Centralized Maintenance Management System, a Unified Operation Center, and On-Site Repair Points;

- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Complete the Automated Inventory Control and Management hardware and software expansion to Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) sites;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Provide for nuclear security Centers of Excellence outside the FSU in coordination with the U.S. interagency;
- Secure spent naval fuel (SNF);
- Continue building Russian capacity to sustain security upgrades at 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, and sustainment for 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers; Security Assessment & Training Center (SATC) and Far East Training Center (FETC) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;
- Install additional security measures for radiological material in Kazakhstan;
- Complete construction to enhance capabilities at SATC; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue building Russian capacity to sustain (to include training, maintenance, and repair) 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, and sustainment of 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC), vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems and live fire ranges, Personnel Reliability Programs, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points:
- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Complete additional security measures for radiological material;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Support shipments of SNF; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue building Russian capacity to sustain (to include training, maintenance, and repair) 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, and sustainment of 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC), vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems and live fire ranges, Personnel Reliability Programs, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points;
- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Support future shipments of SNF that meet the IAEA criteria;
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement in Cambodia, Djibouti, India, Iraq, Laos, South Africa, Tanzania, and Vietnam;
- Secure 3 Diagnostic Labs in Ukraine;
- Continue sustainment of 39 Secured Labs in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, limited support in Uzbekistan;
- Initiate planning to improve BS&S and related infrastructure conditions in Iraq at the Central Public Health Lab (CPHL) and Central Veterinary Lab (CVL), including sustainment and training;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of secure pathogen repositories to include: equipage and construction oversight of a Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Azerbaijan, security upgrades at a repository in Kazakhstan, and construction of a CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Construct Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU) in Kenya;
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Conduct facility-specific biorisk assessments in CBE-engaged countries and provide BS&S upgrades as required, to include: upgrades at facilities in Armenia, Kenya, Uganda, and to a Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL) in Afghanistan;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate cooperative biological research project in Armenia and continue to provide for cooperative biological research projects in Africa, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine;
- Continue to implement the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support, including East Africa Regional Biosurveillance Workshop in Uganda; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement in select areas of Africa, the Middle East, and SE Asia, to include regional engagements;
- Secure 11 labs in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Kazakhstan;
- Continue sustainment of 31 secured labs in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan;
- Complete sustainment of 11 secured labs in Azerbaijan;
- Initiate design for Afghanistan National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL);
- Initiate construction and equipment installation of secure pathogen repositories to include: security upgrades at the APS in Azerbaijan, security upgrades at an interim veterinary pathogen repository in Ukraine, and construction of a Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility (CDF) in Ukraine;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of secure pathogen repositories to include: equipage and construction oversight of a CRL in

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Azerbaijan, security upgrades at the APS in Azerbaijan, security upgrades at a repository in Kazakhstan, and construction of a CRL in Kazakhstan;

- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Conduct facility-specific biorisk assessments in CBE-engaged countries and provide BS&S upgrades as required;
- Begin to build out a capacity to detect, diagnose and report disease outbreaks in the Lower Mekong countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
- Initiate or continue cooperative biological research projects in Africa, SE Asia, the Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine and other countries as projects qualify for funding;
- Continue to implement EIDSS in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to provide bio-related conference support; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement in select areas of Africa, the Middle East, and SE Asia, to include regional engagements;
- Secure 12 Labs in Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ukraine to fill gaps in analytical bio-surveillance capacity;
- Continue sustainment of 42 Secured Labs in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate construction and equipment installation of secure pathogen repositories to include: construction of the NPHL in Afghanistan;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: construction of a CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Complete construction and equipment installation for Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: equipage and construction oversight of a CRL in Azerbaijan, security upgrades at a repository in Kazakhstan, and construction of the veterinary CDF in Ukraine;
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Conduct facility-specific biorisk assessments in CBE-engaged countries and provide BS&S upgrades as required;
- Continue to build out a capacity to detect, diagnose and report disease outbreaks in the Lower Mekong countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and begin enhancing lab capacity to detect disease outbreaks in other SE Asia countries.
- Initiate or continue CBR projects in Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, and other CBE-countries as valuable projects are approved;
- Continue to implement EIDSS in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to provide bio-related conference support; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

E. Proliferation Prevention (PP):

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders;
- Armenia: Increase Armenian Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgian green border;
- Moldova: Begin initial engagement to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment;
- Georgia: Improve Georgian Guard supply chain management, logistics planning, vessel maintenance capabilities, and tactical infrastructure to improve WMD detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea;
- Southeast Asia: Begin initial engagements to assess and derive requirements for WMD Proliferation Prevention to include: command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment within the Straits of Malacca and in other regional waters. Initiate specific programs in the Philippines and Malaysia; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Armenia: Complete improvements to Armenian Border Guard command and control, communications, surveillance, WMD detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgian green border;
- Moldova: Complete WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment;
- Southeast Asia: Continue to increase WMD Proliferation Prevention command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in initial countries along the Straits of Malacca, in and around the South China Sea, and in other regional waters and on land borders, and continue project assessments;
- Middle East: Continue to train and equip border security staff in Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and other countries where the risk of WMD proliferation are identified;
- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2014 funds executed over three years will:

 Southeast Asia: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in initial countries and begin implementation in additional countries along the

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

Straits of Malacca, in and around the South China Sea, and in other regional waters and on land borders, and continue project assessments;

- Middle East: Continue to train and equip border security staff in Jordan, Iraq,
 Turkey and other countries where the risk of WMD proliferation are identified;
- Support WMD Proliferation Prevention projects and activities in regions and countries in accordance with authorities and determinations; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE):

• FY 2012 through FY 2014 funds will continue to support specific relationship-building opportunities with existing FSU countries while shifting towards engagements with partners in new geographical areas including cooperation and coordination with cognizant Unified Combatant Commands (UCCs) to advance CTR Program goals.

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support (OA):

■ FY 2012 through FY 2014 funds support approximately 8-12 Audits and Examinations per year, provide agency support services, contractor administrative and advisory support, and provide U.S. Embassy support for current and emerging DTRA/CTR offices in partner countries.

V. <u>Personnel Summary</u>	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	Change FY 2012/ FY 2013	
Contractor FTEs (Total)	1,102	1,170	1,161	<u>68</u>	<u>-9</u>

The DTRA has initiated a phased approach in FY 2013 to modify contracts as new contracts are issued or bilateral modifications are made to existing contracts. These modifications will direct private sector firms including sub-contractors to report actual direct labor hours and direct labor costs on all service contracts. The statement of work modification will require that direct labor hours/costs be reported into the Enterprise-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (eCMRA). The DTRA will ensure that all contract services procured will be executed in accordance with the DOD requirements.

VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

		Change		Change			
	FY 2012	FY 2012/FY 2013		FY 2013	FY 2013/FY 2014		FY 2014
OP 32 Line	Actual	Price	Program	<u>Estimate</u>	Price	Program	<u>Estimate</u>
308 Travel of Persons	3,127	63	39	3,229	61	1,004	4,294
399 Total Travel	3,127	63	39	3,229	61	1,004	4,294
932 Mgt Prof Support Svcs	9,175	184	-2,373	6,986	133	58	7,177
934 Engineering & Tech Svcs	19,186	384	5,342	24,912	473	64	25,449
987 Other Intra-Govt Purch	64,063	1,281	-17,674	47,670	906	11,465	60,041
989 Other Services	407,368	8,147	20,799	436,314	8,290	-13,110	431,494
990 IT Contract Support Services	5,300	106	-5,406	0	0	0	0
999 Total Other Purchases	505,092	10,102	688	515,882	9,802	-1,523	524,161
Total	508,219	10,165	727	519,111	9,863	-519	528,455