Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimate Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



May 2009

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Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

Defense	FY 2008	Price	Program	FY 2009	Price	Program	FY 2010
Threat	<u>Actuals</u>	Change	Change	<u>Estimate</u>	Change	Change	<u>Estimate</u>
Reduction							
Agency	425,924	8,517	-1,197	433,244	5,197	-34,348	404,093

CTR did not receive FY 2008 or FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental or Bridge funding.

- Description of Operations Financed: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise, including provision of the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated delivery systems and related infrastructure. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The Department of Defense (DoD) has:
 - Expanded the strategic focus of the CTR Program to reduce the threat of terrorism;
 - Increased Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) activities to consolidate and secure pathogens and to build Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) systems that provide early warning of a bio-attack; and
 - Established a program in coordination with other Federal agencies to enable non-Russian Former Soviet Union (FSU) states to detect and capture WMD crossing their borders. Other agencies include:
 - o the Department of Energy (DoE),
 - o the Department of State (DoS), and
 - o the Department of Homeland Security including the U.S. Coast Guard.
 - Initiated an assessment plan to expand the CTR Program outside the FSU.

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

The CTR Program directly supports the U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat WMD and strengthens national security by reducing the WMD threat to the U.S. and its allies; denying rogue and other unauthorized states access to WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise; jointly exploiting pathogens, data, and expertise to enhance preparedness against biological threats; and contributing to stability and cooperation with partner countries. The CTR Program continues to dismantle strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure; enhance the security of WMD and weapons material; prevent proliferation of weapons technology, materials, and expertise; and facilitate defense and military contacts to encourage military reductions and reform. Guidelines are in place to enhance interagency planning and coordination.

To maximize effectiveness and efficiency, the CTR Program requires recipient state cooperation on common program objectives. Implementing Agreements with recipient states are required before a project can begin or enter a new stage and are written with an "up to" cost limit so that CTR Program resources are not irrevocably committed to an uncooperative recipient state. Each phase of a project has exit criteria, many of which are tied to the recipient state's cooperation. If the project phase's exit criteria are not met, DoD can terminate a project. Additionally, all project acquisition strategies take into account the possibility that the recipient state's objectives or level of cooperation may change. This flexibility in CTR program management enables DoD to target its resources on the most cooperative partner countries. If a recipient state is not cooperative in developing or implementing a CTR threat reduction project, the law permits the CTR Program to shift resources to another recipient state or CTR Program upon notification to Congress. This flexible approach ensures that the CTR long-term goal of keeping the U.S. safe from WMD is maintained even when resources are directed to another country or project.

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

The CTR Program objectives and related assistance activities are:

A. Dismantle threat WMD associated infrastructure:

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The DoD, through the CTR Program, seeks to reduce this threat by providing assistance to dismantle WMD and associated delivery systems and infrastructure.

The DoD, through the CTR Program, assists Russia in dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); ICBM silo launchers and road-mobile ICBM launchers; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and the associated strategic nuclear submarine; and WMD infrastructure. DoD also assists Ukraine to store and eliminate 160 ICBM rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs.

As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons. The U.S. and other Group of Eight countries will continue to fund construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. DoD is funding the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility near the Planovy chemical weapons storage facility which contains approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions (estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles).

B. Consolidate and secure threat WMD and related technology and materials:

The CTR Program supports the 2005 Bratislava Initiative which encourages nuclear warhead dismantlement and provides enhanced security for strategic and tactical nuclear warheads stored in Russia. The CTR Program assists in the secure transport of an estimated 1,500

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

nuclear warheads per year to dismantlement or secure storage facilities and continues to procure new nuclear weapons transport railcars with security and monitoring systems to support this effort. Limited site access and other means of transparency through the Ministry of Defense (MOD) enabled DoD to enhance security and provide sustainment at 24 nuclear weapons storage areas throughout Russia. The CTR Program coordinates closely with the DoE Materials Protection, Control and Accounting assistance program.

The CTR Program consolidates dangerous virus and bacteria pathogens into safe and secure central reference laboratories or central repositories and enhances threat agent detection and response systems to provide early warning of biological outbreaks. This assistance helps prevent the theft, diversion, or accidental release of dangerous biological pathogens and strengthens DoD's ability to detect and diagnose outbreaks. Additionally, CTR Program assistance determines the causes of these outbreaks (natural or terrorist); provides access to real-time, unfiltered medical information; consolidates pathogen collections into central labs; modernizes diagnostic capabilities; and develops a network of trained, ethical recipient state scientists equipped to respond to and contain a biological release.

C. Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct:

Cooperative biological research projects enhance the U.S. capability to prevent proliferation of the former Soviet biological weapons expertise to rogue states and terrorist groups, while increasing transparency at FSU biological research facilities formerly closed to Westerners. The research projects enhance epidemiological and diagnostic capacity and advance DoD's understanding of endemic especially dangerous pathogens. The CTR Program secures the transfer of dangerous pathogens to the U.S. to improve diagnostics and therapeutics and for force health protection and forensics reference. This program encourages higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct by

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

scientists and gains transparency into research at laboratories that work on especially dangerous pathogens. Due to the Russian government's unwillingness to cooperate on biological threat reduction and without a bilateral agreement for such cooperation, DoD has reduced its engagement of scientists in Russia.

D. Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation:

The WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states and other partner countries to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across state borders. DoD provides assessments, equipment, infrastructure, logistics support, and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities that prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and related materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. DoD is currently pursuing proliferation prevention projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The WMD-PPI program coordinates with the DoD International Counter-Proliferation Program and other U.S. Government border security programs in non-Russian FSU states.

The CTR Program also supports expanded contacts between defense establishments to promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization, and democratic reforms in FSU states. DoD provides support to 32 separate major commands, service headquarters, and subordinate commands for events between the U.S. and FSU states. Events include exchange visits between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their FSU counterparts; visits between naval, air, and ground units; bilateral exercises and ship visits; and visits of the nations' senior officials. Participating states currently include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

The New Initiatives program was established with additional funding in the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations Act and DoD is completing its assessment to determine what and where CTR assistance will best support the effort to counter the threat from WMD transiting or in potential partner countries. Three countries have been identified as candidate partners: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Depending on the countries' willingness to partner, DoD will conduct BTR assessments. These assessments will identify existing capabilities and constraints relative to BTR requirements.

E. Other Program Support:

Other Assessments/Administrative Support funds the Audit and Examination (A&E) program provided for in the CTR agreements with recipient states and overall program management and administration costs. The A&E program is a means to ensure that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Other activities include CTR Program travel, translator/interpreter support, agency support services, and administrative and advisory support. CTR Program personnel assigned to Embassy offices in six FSU countries also are supported with these funds.

Program management and support costs are funded by the individual CTR Program areas and include contract logistic support, contract transportation support, administrative and advisory support, and travel. This program area maintains the capability to build a core competency necessary to destroy chemical weapons and precursors if requested by a state outside of Russia.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

DoD assists Russia to provide equipment and services and oversee destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems in accordance with the SOAE Implementing Agreement and relevant Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) provisions and agreements, including the START Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. The DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ICBM silo launchers, ICBM road-mobile launchers, SLBM launchers, and WMD infrastructure.

Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination

This project eliminates SS-25 and SS-N-20 solid propellant missile systems. Activities include operation and maintenance of Russian missile disassembly and elimination facilities and mobile launcher elimination facilities, destruction of treaty-limited components, and transportation of SS-25 missiles and solid rocket motors into and out of a temporary storage facility. The CTR Program-provided equipment used to recover missiles in case of an accident is also maintained.

<u>Liquid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile/Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</u> and Silo Elimination

This project deactivates, dismantles, and eliminates SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated launch control center (LCC) silos and destroys SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and SS-N-18 SLBMs.

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement

This project eliminates SLBM launchers from *Delta* class and *Typhoon* class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at START-designated elimination facilities. In addition, this project provides the infrastructure required to defuel the SSBNs at the

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Zvezdochka and Zvezda naval facilities. The launcher section is eliminated, the reactor section removed, and the spent naval fuel placed in casks for long-term storage.

B. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination:

One active project assists Ukraine to store and eliminate 160 SS-24 solid rocket motors from dismantled ICBMs.

C. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

This program supports the Agreement with Russia for the Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons and prevents the proliferation of chemical weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

This project provides for the creation of a Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for organophosphorous (nerve) agent-filled, man-portable munitions. The project assists with the design, construction, and equipment acquisition and installation of the facility (near Shchuch'ye, Kurgan Oblast), as well as the associated destruction process.

D. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken with Russia pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Implementing Agreement.

Site Security Enhancements

This project improves security and safety at Russia's MOD nuclear weapons storage sites. These sites include both national stockpile sites and operational storage sites of the Russian Air Force and Strategic Rocket Forces as well as temporary storage locations at road-to-rail transfer points. The DoD and DoE have worked closely with the Ministry of

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Defense of the Russian Federation (MOD-R) to provide comprehensive security enhancements at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. Permanent storage locations receiving security enhancements may contain strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. DoD, DoE and MOD-R are sustaining this installed equipment at required levels during a transition period until MOD-R builds a cadre of expertise and assumes full responsibility.

Far East Training Center

This project establishes a Far East Training Center (FETC) to complement the existing Security Assessment and Training Center at Sergiev Posad and the DoE provided Kola and Siberian Technical Center. The FETC will serve as a training facility for all branches of MOD-R involved with WMD security in the Far Eastern region. Specifically, it will train new operators, maintainers, and system administrators of physical security equipment as well as provide refresher courses for existing personnel. Additionally, the FETC will serve as a regional depot-level maintenance facility for that equipment.

Automated Inventory Control and Management System (AICMS)

This project enhances and expands the previously established automated inventory system for the tracking and cataloging of nuclear weapons to be eliminated. Additional AICMS facilities were constructed and updated hardware and software was installed at all new and existing facilities. Warranty phase and associated training continues.

E. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken with Russia pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Implementing Agreement. This program supports U.S. proliferation prevention objectives by enhancing the security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons during shipment and provides railcar maintenance and procurement.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Nuclear Weapons Transportation

This project assists Russia to transport nuclear warheads safely and securely to storage and dismantlement facilities.

Railcar Maintenance and Procurement

This project supports the certification of a required set of MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars through preventive and depot maintenance and production of up to 100 safe and secure weapons transport cars with security and monitoring systems. Russia will eliminate two older weapons transport cars for each new transport car provided.

F. Biological Threat Reduction:

This program with partner countries provides assistance to consolidate and secure dangerous pathogen collections into central reference laboratories or central repositories; improves the safety and security of biological facilities; enhances recipient states' ability to detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics; and engages scientists with biological weapons-related expertise in research that supports peaceful pursuits. DoD has cooperative projects in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. DoD's effort in Russia is limited due to Russia's reluctance to cooperate on biological threat reduction.

Biosecurity and Biosafety and Threat Agent Detection and Response

This project consolidates and secures recipient states' dangerous pathogen collections into safe, centralized facilities to prevent unauthorized acquisition of biological weapons materials. The project improves biosafety and biosecurity; enhances recipient states' abilities to detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics; and ensures the safe and secure storage and handling of especially dangerous pathogens used for peaceful research to prevent accidental release, theft, and exposure.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

DoD, with recipient and other partner states and U.S. Government departments, is developing a network of disease monitoring and diagnostic centers with trained staff throughout each country linked to a safe, secure centralized laboratory and pathogen/data repository. It is envisioned that these individual country networks will be linked with regional partners to enhance disease monitoring, reporting, and containment and ensure early warning of potential bioattacks. DoD created training modules to elevate the diagnostic and epidemiological capabilities of the scientific and technical staff and to promote bioethics, nonproliferation, biosafety, and biosecurity to ensure sustainment, effectiveness of program investment, and strategic relevance. This project promotes sustained transparency and the formation of strategic health partnerships in the war on bioterrorism. DoD's effort in Russia is limited to working through the International Science and Technology Center to provide safety and security upgrades to select former weapons facilities still involved in dangerous pathogen work.

Cooperative Biological Research

This project increases transparency, improves scientists' standards of conduct, and leverages the extensive expertise of former Soviet biological weapons scientists and epidemiologists to address DoD's bio-defense needs in force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism, and disease surveillance. U.S. researchers are currently collaborating with former Soviet biological weapons research institutes, working side-by-side with counterparts on DoD/interagency projects.

G. Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative:

This program enhances the capability of partner countries to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD or related materials. Equipment, infrastructure, and operations and maintenance training will be provided to border guards, customs officials, and MOD military for defined roles in WMD proliferation

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

prevention. The DoD assistance will complement ongoing counter-proliferation assistance provided by DoE's Second Line of Defense, DoS's Export Control and Related Border Security programs, and DoD's International Counter-Proliferation Program.

Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Ukraine)

These projects assist development of a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Moldovan and other land borders, Ukraine's maritime border, adjacent coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, and key seaports. Ukraine will achieve these capabilities by improving WMD detection, surveillance, comprehensive interdiction, communications/data storage, training, maintenance, and sustainment. The land border project is closely coordinated with DoE's Second Line of Defense effort to place portal monitors at the ports of entry.

Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Azerbaijan)

This project supports development of a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials along Azerbaijan's maritime border on the Caspian Sea. It provides maritime surveillance equipment and procedures; repair and upgrade of existing vessels; equipment for boarding crews, including devices to detect WMD; the construction, repair, and upgrade of command and control, maintenance, and logistics facilities; and the construction of an operating location along the Azerbaijan southern coast to improve the on-station time and expand the patrol areas of the Maritime Border Guard (MBG) craft.

Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan) This project secures radiological materials.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Extended Areas

Enhance the WMD detection and interdiction capabilities of other partner countries and conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts.

H. Defense and Military Contacts:

This project improves cooperation between the U.S. and FSU military establishments through increased bilateral contacts such as high-level visits and specialists' exchanges between DoD and the respective MOD. These bilateral activities engage FSU military and defense officials to promote demilitarization of excess infrastructure, defense reform and further counter-proliferation efforts.

I. New Initiatives:

The FY 2008 DoD appropriations bill funded the National Academy of Sciences to analyze options for strengthening and expanding the CTR Program's WMD proliferation prevention outside of the FSU.

J. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Audits and Examinations

This project enables the U.S. Government to examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment and evaluate whether the provided equipment, services, and training are being used for the intended purposes of the CTR Program.

Program Management/Administration

This project provides program administrative and general support costs, project development costs, an advisory and assistance services contract, Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support, and travel. This project funds six permanent full-time

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Defense Threat Reduction Embassy offices (DTROs) in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. This project maintains the capability to build a core competency necessary to destroy chemical weapons and precursors if requested by a state other than Russia.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Program/Project	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	\$76.7	\$80.0	\$66.4
Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination - Russia	\$26.6	\$37.7	\$32.6
Liquid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Silo Elimination - Russia	\$32.1	\$42.3	\$25.6
SLBM Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement - Russia	\$18.0		\$8.2
Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination	\$2.2	\$6.4	\$6.8
SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination - Ukraine	\$2.2	\$6.4	\$6.8
Chemical Weapons Destruction	\$1.0		
Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility - Russia	\$1.0		
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security	\$34.3	\$23.2	\$15.1
Site Security Enhancements - Russia	\$10.7	\$23.2	\$15.1
Far East Training Center - Russia	\$8.4		
Automated Inventory Control and Management System - Russia	\$15.2		
Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security	\$40.9	\$40.8	\$46.4
Nuclear Weapons Transportation - Russia	\$19.9	\$20.3	\$21.7
Railcar Maintenance and Procurement - Russia	\$21.0	\$20.5	\$24.7
Biological Threat Reduction	\$174.5	\$185.5	\$152.1
Biosecurity, Biosafety, Threat Agent Detection and Response	\$152.7	\$174.3	\$133.3
Cooperative Biological Research	\$21.8	\$11.2	\$18.9
WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative	\$59.0	\$59.3	\$90.9
Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention-Ukraine	\$37.6	\$25.7	\$27.4
Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention-Azerbaijan	\$10.6	\$6.3	
Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention-Kazakhstan	\$10.8	\$27.4	\$62.4
Expanded Proliferation Prevention			\$1.0
Defense and Military Contacts	\$8.0	\$8.0	\$5.0
Defense and Military Contacts	\$8.0	\$8.0	\$5.0
New Initiatives	\$10.0	\$10.0	
New Initiatives	\$10.0	\$10.0	
Other Assessments/Administrative Support	\$19.3	\$20.1	\$21.4
Audits and Examinations	\$0.5	\$0.5	\$0.5
Program Management/Administration	\$18.8	\$19.6	\$20.9
Estimated Budget for FYDP	\$425.9	\$433.2	\$404.1

Numbers may not add due to rounding

III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands):

				FY 2009			
	•		Congr	essional	Action	-	_
A. BA Subactivities	FY 2008 Actuals	Budget Request	Amount	Percent	Appro- priated	Current Estimate	FY 2010 Estimate
1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	76,652	79,985	-	_	79,985	79,985	66,385
2. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination	2,233	6,400	-	-	6,400	6,400	6,800
3. Chemical Weapons Destruction	1,000	0	-	-	0	0	0
4. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security 5. Nuclear Weapons Transportation	34,316	24,101	-891	-3.7	23,210	23,210	15,090
Security	40,900	40,800	-	-	40,800	40,800	46,400
6. Biological Threat Reduction7. WMD Proliferation Prevention	174,489	184,463	1,000	0.5	185,463	185,463	152,132
Initiative	58,986	50,286	9,000	17.9	59,286	59,286	90,886
8. Defense and Military Contacts	8,000	8,000	_	_	8,000	8,000	5,000
9. New Initiatives 10. Other Assessments/Administrative	10,000	0	10,000	-	10,000	10,000	0
Support	19,348	20,100	-	-	20,100	20,100	21,400
Total	425,924	414,135	19,109	4.6	433,244	433,244	404,093

CTR did not receive FY 2008 or FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental or Bridge funding.

B. Reconciliation Summary:	Change	Change
	FY 2009/2009	FY 2009/2010
Baseline Funding	414,135	433,244
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	20,000	-
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	-	-
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent	-	-
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	-891	-
Subtotal Appropriated Amount	433,244	433,244
Fact-of-Life Changes (CY to CY Only)	-	_
Subtotal Baseline Funding	433,244	433,244
Anticipated Wartime Supplemental	-	_
Reprogrammings	-	_
Price Changes	-	5,197
Functional Transfers	-	_
Program Changes	-	-34,348
Current Estimate	433,244	404,093
Less: Wartime Supplemental	-	_
Normalized Current Estimate	433,244	404,093

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
FY 2009 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)		$4\overline{14,135}$
1. Congressional Adjustments		19,109
a. Distributed Adjustments	20,000	
b. Undistributed Adjustments		
c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent		
d. General Provisions- Sec 8101 - Economic Assumptions	-891	
e. Congressional Earmarks - Indian Lands Environmental Impact		
FY 2009 Appropriated Amount		433,244
2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
3. Fact of Life Changes		
FY 2009 Baseline Funding		433,244
4. Reprogrammings (requiring 1415 Actions)		
Revised FY 2009 Estimate		433,244
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
FY 2009 Normalized Current Estimate		433,244
6. Price Change		5,197
7. Functional Transfers		
8. Program Increases		37,381
a. Annualization of New FY 2009 Program		
b. One-Time FY 2010 Increases		
c.Program Growth in FY 2010		
1) Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination Storage facilities and		
utilities costs increase (FY 2009 Base: \$6,400).	323	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
2) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security. Procures up to three		
additional cargo railcars and two additional satellite		
transmitters and antennas; expands the scope of training and		
technical assistance with operational integration; and cost		
escalation (FY 2009 Base: \$40,800).	5,110	
3) WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative. Increased funding for		
Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention		
(FY 2009 Base: \$59,286).	30,889	
4) Other Assessments/Administrative Support. Funds additional		
support costs associated with the Defense Threat Reduction		
Embassy Offices in partner countries(FY 2009 Base: \$20,100).	1,059	
9. Program Decreases		-71,729
a. Annualization of FY 2009 Program Decreases		
b.One-Time FY 2009 Increases		
c.Program Decreases in FY 2010		
1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination Reduction of 15 SS-18		
ICBMs, 18 SS-19 ICBMs and 18 SS-18 silo launchers(FY 2009 Base:		
\$79,985).	-14,560	
2) Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Level of sustainment reduced		
based on negotiated requirements (FY 2009 Base: \$23,210).	-8,399	
3) Biological Threat Reduction Reduction of six Zonal Diagnostic		
Laboratories and one biosafety laboratory (BSL-3). Complete		
Central Reference Laboratory construction in Georgia (FY 2009		
Base: \$185,463).	-35,674	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
4) Defense and Military Contacts Up to 96 fewer defense and		
military exchanges (FY 2009 Base: \$8,000).	-3,096	
5) New Initiatives No additional funding until additional		
refinement of this activity is completed (FY 2009 Base: \$10,000)	-10,000	
FY 2010 Budget Request		404,093

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

The CTR Program was identified in 2006 as one of DoD's programs to participate in the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), a diagnostic tool used to assess the performance of Federal programs. The Office of Management and Budget concurred with DoD's Assessment Rating of "Effective" for the CTR Program, the highest rating achievable under PART. To achieve maximum effectiveness and greatest efficiency, the CTR Program requires cooperation on common objectives from partner countries receiving assistance. The CTR Program's flexibility in program management and acquisition strategy enables it to target its efforts on the most cooperative partner countries. The full PART review can be viewed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/.

The CTR Program's annual targets as performance measures are presented in the table below. The table represents many of the programs and activities but is not inclusive. Summary accomplishments/targets for the prior years and the full FYDP period can be found in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to the Congress FY 2010.

CTR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES ANNUAL							
Calendar Year	2008	2009	2010				
WMD Means of Delivery Elimination	140	158	188				
Cumulative Eliminations	3,674	3,832	4,020				
New Railcars to Transport Nuclear Weapons	19	18	18				
Cumulative Railcar Deliveries	29	47	65				
Nuclear Weenene Cite Convity Uniquedee	0						
Nuclear Weapons Site Security Upgrades	8						
Cumulative Upgrades	24						
Biological Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories	7	15	9				
Cumulative	19	34	43				

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:

FY 2008 funds:

Eliminate 16 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommissioned and dismantled 6 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers and 1 LCC;

Decommissioned 30, dismantled 33, and eliminate 22 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;

Eliminate 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Eliminate 40 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 30 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 122 support vehicles;

Complete Typhoon 724 dismantlement, including elimination of 20 SLBM launchers;

Conduct repairs at the liquid propellant ICBM elimination facility;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Eliminate 15 SS-18 ICBMs and 28 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 16 and dismantle 18 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;

Decommission 20 and dismantle and eliminate 22 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;

Eliminate 7 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

Eliminate 36 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 31 SS-25 road-mobile launchers and demilitarize 74 support vehicles;

Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;

Conduct repairs at the liquid propellant ICBM elimination facility;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Eliminate 10 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 20, dismantle 23, and eliminate 12 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;

Eliminate 36 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 28 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;

Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;

Dismantle 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;

Conduct repairs at liquid propellant ICBM elimination facility;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and

Provide contractor administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> 2,233 6,400 6,800

B. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination:

FY 2008 funds:

Store 160 SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRMs);

Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility; and Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage buildings.

FY 2009 funds will:

Store 160 SS-24 SRMs;

Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility;

Assist Ukraine by making payments for 20 empty SRM cases; and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage buildings.

FY 2010 funds will:

Store 140 SS-24 SRMs;

Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility; and Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases.

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010

0 0

C. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

FY 2008 funds:

Complete contract closeout activities and maintain Chemical Weapons Elimination core capability.

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010

34,316 23,210 15,090

D. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security:

FY 2008 funds:

Continue construction and installation of equipment for comprehensive security upgrades at the last 8 sites identified by Ministry of Defense (MOD);

Initiate sustainment to include training, maintenance, spares, and depot support for site security enhancements;

Provide electrical and heating infrastructure upgrades for the FETC;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide hardware and software technological refresh for the existing AICMS central, regional, and field facilities, training on the AICMS system, and one year of warranty support for AICMS;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Continue sustainment for five Rail Transfer Points (RTPs) and two regional centers, Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) and Far East Training Center (FETC) to include training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts; Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Continue sustainment for five Rail Transfer Points (RTPs) and two regional centers, Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) and Far East Training Center (FETC) to include training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;

USG efforts decrease as the sustainment program continues and the Russian Federation (RF) MOD becomes more able to maintain and repair the security enhancements;

Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment; and Provide for contractor administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010

40,900 40,800 46,400

E. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security:

FY 2008 funds:

Transport approximately 53 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Procure 17 additional cargo railcars;

Retrofit 5 DoD provided guard railcars with Railcar Consist Security System (RCSS); Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

FY 2009 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Procure 14 additional cargo railcars;

Retrofit 5 DoD-provided guard railcars with RCSS;

Provide 2 of 15 satellite communication transmitters and antennas as part of a off train communications and monitoring system;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2010 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities;

Procure 17 additional cargo railcars;

Retrofit 5 DoD provided guard railcars with RCSS;

Provide 4 of 15 satellite communication transmitters and antennas as part of an off train communications and monitoring system;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical support for CTR Program-provided equipment.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> 174,489 185,463 152,132

F. Biological Threat Reduction:

FY 2008 funds:

Provide for 11 Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) projects;

Initiated assessment of Armenia BTR Program (BTRP) requirements, provide additional travel support to develop a CBR program and implement projects in Armenia;

Provide training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects;

Continue development and implementation of Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS), a computerized disease surveillance and reporting system, in Azerbaijan and Georgia;

Initiate implementation of EIDSS in Kazakhstan;

Continue construction and outfitting of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: 1
Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Georgia, complete the design adaptation and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

manage the initiation of construction of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, complete 2 repository upgrades in Russia, and begin renovation of an interim CRL in Ukraine; Establish 7 Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories (ZDLs) (2 in Kazakhstan, 1 in Azerbaijan, 3 in Ukraine and 1 in Georgia);

Sustain 19 ZDLs and train associated scientists;

Continue 5 Biosafety & Biosecurity projects in Russia; and

Provide technical, contractor administrative, and advisory contractor support services.

FY 2009 funds will:

Provide for 16 CBR projects;

Complete initial assessment of Armenian BTRP requirements and implement initial biosecurity, biosafety, and training enhancements; provide additional travel support for the development of the CBR program and implementation of projects in Armenia;

Provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, vector surveillance, laboratory and health system management, biosafety bioethics/nonproliferation, and additional topics as required;

Continue development of EIDSS in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan;

Initiate EIDSS implementation in Armenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan;

Continue construction and outfitting of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: complete construction of 1 CRL in Georgia, continue construction oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, renovate an interim CRL in Ukraine, and perform design adaptation for 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, complete 1 repository upgrade in Russia, and complete 1 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory upgrade in Uzbekistan;

Establish 15 ZDLs (1 in Armenia, 6 in Azerbaijan, 3 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Ukraine, and 2 in Uzbekistan);

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Sustain 34 ZDLs and train associated scientists;

Enhance security at a central veterinary facility in Russia;

Provide the Russian International Science and Technology Center with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects; and Provide technical, administrative, and advisory contractor support services.

FY 2010 funds will:

Provide for 24 CBR projects;

Initiate assessment of Afghanistan BTRP requirements and implement initial biosecurity fixes; provide additional travel support to develop a CBR program and implement projects in Afghanistan;

Provide bioethics/nonproliferation training and additional training as required;

Continue development and implementation of EIDSS in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan;

Initiate EIDSS implementation in Russia;

Continue construction and outfitting of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, begin construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, and perform design adaptation for 1 CRL in Ukraine;

Establish 9 ZDLs (1 in Armenia, 3 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Russia, 2 in Ukraine, and 1 in Uzbekistan);

Sustain 43 ZDLs and train associated scientists;

Initiate Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) pilot project with Russian Ministry of Agriculture;

Provide the Russian International Science and Technology Center with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects; and Provide technical, administrative, and advisory contractor support services.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2008</u> <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> 58,986 <u>59,286</u> 90,886

G. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative:

FY 2008 through FY 2010 funds provide equipment and training to improve WMD detection, interdiction capabilities, logistics support, and maintenance training for CTR Program-provided equipment. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of previous assistance and could include:

FY 2008 funds:

Ukraine: Enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border, expand the land border surveillance network, project assessments, and upgrades to additional international and state ports of entry and inland clearing stations; increase WMD detection and interdiction capability on the maritime border in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov; repair and upgrade mission critical vessels; expand the maritime surveillance network; and assess the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone.

Azerbaijan: Upgrade WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along its maritime borders on the Caspian Sea and expand the maritime surveillance network.

Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site.

Provide logistical and technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2009 funds will:

Ukraine: Enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border and the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, expand the land

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

border surveillance network, continue project assessments, and upgrade additional international and state ports of entry and inland clearing stations.

Increase WMD detection and interdiction capability on the maritime border in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov and expand the maritime surveillance network.

Azerbaijan: Support limited efforts to upgrade WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along its maritime borders on the Caspian Sea.

Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site.

Provide logistical and technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Ukraine: Enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities along the Moldova/Transnistria border and the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, expand the land border surveillance network, continue project assessments, and upgrade additional international and state ports of entry and inland clearing stations.

Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test

Extended Areas: Enhance the WMD detection and interdiction capabilities of other partner countries and conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts.

Provide logistical and technical support services and contractor administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands) FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 8,000

5,000

8,000

H. Defense and Military Contacts:

FY 2008 funds approximately 253 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2009 will fund approximately 248 defense and military exchanges.

FY 2010 will fund approximately 152 defense and military exchanges.

(\$ in Thousands) FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 0

I. New Initiatives:

FY 2008 and FY 2009 funds:

Studies by the National Academy of Science as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2008; and

Initial biological threat reduction assessments for new countries.

(\$ in Thousands) FY 200<u>8</u> FY 2009 FY 2010

Other Assessments/Administrative Cost:

FY 2008 through FY 2010 funds support approximately 8-12 Audits and Examinations per year and provide agency support services as well as contractor administrative and advisory support. Funds provide Embassy support for six DTRA/CTR offices within the FSU.

V. Personnel Summary: N/A

VI. OP32 Line Items as Applicable (\$ in Thousands):

		Change from			Change			
			FY 2008 to	FY 2009		FY 2009 to	FY 2010	
Line		FY 2008	Price	Program	FY 2009	Price	Program	FY 2010
Item	Description	Program	Growth	Growth	Program	Growth	Growth	Program
308	Travel of Persons	3,490	70	318	3,878	46	-221	3,703
399	Total Travel	3,490	70	318	3,878	46	-221	3,703
932	Mgmt & Prof Spt Services	8,366	167	-1,133	7,400	89	111	7,600
	Engineering Technical							
934	Services	23,372	467	-5,739	18,100	217	883	19,200
	Other Intra-governmental							
987	Purchases	52,053	1,041	-15,731	37,363	449	2,824	40,636
998	Other Costs	338,643	6,772	21,088	366,503	4,396	-37,945	332,954
999	Total Other Purchases	422,434	8,447	-1,515	429,366	5,151	-34,127	400,390
9999	TOTAL	425,924	8,517	-1,197	433,244	5,197	-34,348	404,093

CTR did not receive FY 2008 or FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental or Bridge funding.

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