



The Department of Defense is grateful for the \$65.9 billion provided by Congress in June 2008 to support military operations for the first portion of fiscal year 2009. Consistent with the Obama Administration's goals for activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, this additional request of \$75.8 billion now represents the best estimate of funding needed to continue Overseas Contingency Operations and other security activities through the remainder of the fiscal year.

The following volume is a summary justification for the present request, explaining the need for those funds and their uses. Additional materials containing detailed information will be provided by the Military Departments.

This justification explains what America's servicemen and women need to carry out their missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations around the globe. Included are amounts for troop subsistence; special pay; supplies; fuel; ammunition; and transportation for troops, vehicles, tanks, helicopters, and other equipment.

Also included are funds for training and equipping Afghan military and police units, which bear the principal responsibility for security in that country, as well as funds to help the Government of Pakistan to build a counterinsurgency capability that will support U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan.

In addition, the following pages include a summary of near-term costs for reconstituting the force, including repair or replacement of equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, or worn out during operations.

Finally, it should be noted that this request is based upon the Department's current best estimate of remaining funding needs for FY 2009. If circumstances change significantly in the coming months, the Department may seek to amend this request.

Robert F. Hale Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / Chief Financial Officer

Table of Contents

Overview	
Overview	1
Justification	13
Continuing the Fight	
Operations	19
Force Protection	24
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat	31
Military Intelligence	35
Iraq Security Forces	41
Afghan National Security Forces	44
Pakistan Counterinsurgency (COIN) Capability Fund	50
Coalition Support	
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	58
Military Construction	61
Reconstituting the Force	
Reconstitution	65
Additional Emergency Requests	
Accelerate Grow the Force	70
Wounded Warrior and Family Support	
Border Security	
Military Personnel	
Resource Exhibits	
Funding Categories	81

List of Figures


Figure 1.	DoD Funding	
Figure 2.	FY 2009 Supplemental Request: \$78.4B	1;
Figure 3.	Body Armor – SAPI / E-SAPI Equivalent Sets, Quantities	20
Figure 4.	Iraq Security Forces	
Figure 5.	Security Self-Reliance	
Figure 6.	Afghan National Security Forces	40
Figure 7.	Military Construction Projects \$946.8M	64
	List of Tables	
Table 1.	Funding by Military Operation	
Table 2.	Funding by Functional Category	82
Table 3.	Funding by Appropriation Title	83

OVERVIEW - FY 2009 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

The Department of Defense requests a total of \$145.1 billion primarily to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and other security activities in fiscal year (FY) 2009 (Figure 1). In June 2008, Congress appropriated, \$65.9 billion in Bridge funding to support military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for part of FY 2009. This partial request was not intended to fund sustained military operations for all of FY 2009. As such, the Department now







^{*} FY 09 column reflects cancellations/reappropriations in Base budget and Bridge funds to partially offset requirements in the Base Budget and Overseas Contingency Operations Supplemental Request. See Resource Exhibits for clarification.

Note: Numbers in this table have been updated from previously published figures to better reflect transfers, rescissions, non-war supplementals, and scoring captured by DoD and OMB databases. Source: FY 2009 OMB Historical Tables, Table 5.4; Comptroller Information Systems

requests Congress appropriate an additional \$75.5 billion in line with what the President published in "A New Era of Responsibility" publication sent to Congress (February 2009) and \$0.3 billion for emerging security needs. Of the total \$79.2 billion required, \$3.4 billion has been proposed to be financed with a cancellation of FY 2009 DoD base funds. With this appropriation, Congress will fund U.S. military operations and emergent security needs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the globe through September 2009.

The \$3.4 billion request includes provisions to cancel and reappropriate funds in the base budget for estimated fuel savings and Army procurement items to fund higher priority emergent requirements, i.e., accelerate Grow the Force and base budget military personnel accounts.

Eight years of operations in multiple theaters have put incredible stress on personnel and equipment. Incremental Contingency Operations funding provided pay and benefits to the all-volunteer force and replaced, repaired, and replenished equipment eroded through continual use in theater. Despite these strains, the FY 2009 request represents approximately a 23 percent decrease from the Department's FY 2008 Contingency Operations budget of \$187.1 billion.

U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

The United States continues to seek positive, sustainable outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

The U.S. and its international partners are working to build an Afghanistan that is never again a safe haven for terrorists.

Achieving this strategic goal requires a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign that coordinates the security, governance, and development efforts of the United

States and the international community. Ultimately, only coordination and cooperation along the military, political, and economic lines of operations will diminish insurgent capacity, maintain security, and build the infrastructure and human capital necessary for the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

Progress to Date

Since the fall of 2001, Afghanistan has made considerable progress in overcoming the barbaric rule of the Taliban, establishing a central government, increasing gender equality, and supplying basic services to its population. Significant milestones include:

- December 2003: A constitutional Loya Jirga with Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Nuris, Turcomans, Baluchis, and 89 women delegates adopted Afghanistan's first constitution.
- October 2004: Afghanistan held its first presidential elections.
- September 2005: Afghanistan held its first round of parliamentary elections, reestablishing the National Assembly after 32 years without a legislature.
- August 2007: The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) established the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as the focal point for governance policy.
- June 2008: International donors pledged over \$20.0 billion to support Afghanistan development at the Paris International Support Conference for Afghanistan.
- August 2008: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assumed responsibility for security in the capital city of Kabul.
- September 2008: The Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) endorsed the GIRoA request to expand the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 122,000 soldiers (not including a training transient pool of 12,000).

• February 2009: The Afghan-led Voter Registration process for the 2009 Presidential election is successfully completed.

Military Achievements

Although security remains fragile in many parts of Afghanistan, the U.S. COIN approach – *clear, hold, and build* – has successfully demonstrated how combining military and civilian resources can diminish insurgent capacity, maintain security, and link the Afghan people to their government. Wherever the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are able to concentrate forces while developing resources and civilian expertise, tangible security improvements are made.

The increase in U.S. forces in the spring of 2008 reinforced Afghan and international forces' momentum and is enabling accelerated growth of the ANSF. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has demonstrated considerable improvements, leading about 60 percent of military operations in 2008. The Afghan National Police (ANP) continues to show improvement, albeit at a slower pace than the ANA. The Focused District Development (FDD) plan, led by the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has shown promise. Begun in 2007, the program removes and trains ANP from selected districts, temporarily replacing them with the highly trained and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

Political Achievements

In 2001, Afghanistan was a failed state. Over the last 7 years, Afghanistan has built national and sub-national political institutions that are increasingly able to provide basic services to its citizens. Afghanistan has held two national elections, established increasingly independent legislative and judicial bodies, and built the capacity of its key ministries, including the Ministry of Defense. The National Assembly, out of operation for

32 years, has become the center for the discussion of major national challenges among groups that were, until recently, in violent conflict.

The United States and the international community continue to assist Afghanistan in growing its national and provincial governments as well as the judicial sector. Through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the Department has conducted training for several hundred judges and assisted in constructing judicial compounds that will allow the judicial process to operate independently and bring the justice system closer to the population.

Reconstruction and Development Achievements

In addition to increased security and effective political institutions, economic growth and development are key to stability in Afghanistan. Annual gross domestic product (GDP) in Afghanistan has grown from just over \$4.0 billion in FY 2002 to over \$9.5 billion in FY 2008. In FY 2009, Afghanistan's GDP is expected to grow by 3.5 percent. Furthermore, Afghanistan has seen considerable growth in its domestic revenues as well as international reserves, which almost doubled since FY 2004.

The GIRoA, the United States, and the international community continue to work towards achieving the goals in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Afghan Compact. Attendees representing over 80 countries at the Paris International Support Conference for Afghanistan, held on June 12, 2008, pledged over \$20.0 billion in support of Afghanistan and the ANDS; the United States alone pledged over \$10.0 billion. By comparison, attendees at the 2006 London support conference pledged a total of \$10.0 billion.

Counternarcotics

Narcotics remain a significant challenge for GIRoA, threatening security gains in Afghanistan and the region. Though

Afghanistan supplied 82 percent of the world's opium in 2007, progress has been made. According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC), poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 19 percent compared to 2007. Additionally, 18 out of 34 provinces are poppy-free, with 98 percent of the cultivation occurring in 7 provinces in southern and western Afghanistan. Furthermore, approximately 66 percent of the cultivation is concentrated in a single province – Helmand.

The Department has recognized the significant connections between the Taliban and the drug trade in the southern and eastern portions of Afghanistan. Accordingly, in conjunction with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, the Department has assisted in fielding a new counternarcotics infantry kandak to provide force protection for counternarcotics activities. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense provided the authority for DoD personnel in Presidentially declared combat zones to accompany U.S. drug law enforcement agents or host nation law enforcement or security forces on actual counternarcotics field operations. This change will allow commanders in Afghanistan to develop a holistic strategy to address the military implications of drug traffickers' support to Taliban insurgents.

Much Remains to be Done

Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan has made signficant progress in enhancing the well-being of its citizens. Despite the stark contrasts between life under the Taliban and life today, much work remains to be done. Afghanistan remains the focus of insurgent groups, Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists, drug traffickers, and a determined criminal element. The competence of the GIRoA to tackle these challenges remains limited. Creating security and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region will require continued commitment and increased support from the United States, NATO, and the international community.

NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States is committed to success in Afghanistan. That success, however, cannot be achieved by military means alone. The brave work of U.S., Afghan, and Coalition forces on the battlefield must be complemented by a comprehensive and robust civilian effort on economic development, reconstruction, improved governance, the development of modern institutions, and a counternarcotics strategy.

Security

Achieving enduring security gains remains a priority for the Department. After its fall from power in 2001, the Taliban has regrouped and begun to challenge the control of the GIRoA in some areas of the country. The Department's approach to these and other security challenges is to build the capacity of the ANSF, ensure security of the Afghan population, and diminish the capacity of insurgent groups. Toward that goal, in September 2008, the President approved and the Secretary of Defense ordered the deployment of an additional U.S. Army COIN Brigade Combat Team and a Marine Battalion to Afghanistan. Furthermore, in February 2009 the President authorized the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan. These additional forces, along with increased Coalition and Afghan forces, will play a pivotal role in stabilizing the country and providing security for the upcoming elections.

Afghanistan National Security Forces

As the United States deploys more forces to Afghanistan, the Department is also taking additional steps to help the GIRoA build and sustain more forces of its own. The fluid security environment in Afghanistan requires the continual assessment of the end strength goals of the ANSF. On September 10, 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the authorized end strength of the ANA from



80,000 to 122,000 personnel (not including a trainee transient pool of 12,000) as well as to enhance the ANA Air Corps.

The readiness of the ANA and ANP continue to improve. The ANA, under the MoD, has seen a decrease in absenteeism, increased recruitment, and continued respect from the Afghan population. The ANP is improving but still lags behind the ANA in capability. The Focused District Development (FDD) Program is beginning to show results in improving district Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) units. In the fall and winter of 2008-2009, CSTC-A will implement new initiatives through the Focused Border Development (FBD) process that will boost the capability of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). However, the current lack of police mentors and trainers, force protection for the tactical trainers, and police

training infrastructure (training centers) coupled with a large number of districts (365) make this police reform and training strategy a long-term program.

Despite improvements in recruiting and retention, the MoD and Mol must continue their efforts to reduce attrition, implement pay reforms, and boost recruitment. Both the ANA and ANP have begun to use the same personnel vetting process. Further, the MoD has employed numerous incentives for the ANA, resulting in tremendous increases in retention of its soldiers. Such incentives include relocation of families, salary increases, and professional education. The Mol must implement adapted incentives to increase the professionalism and retention of ANP.

The CSTC-A, using the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) continue to lead the planning, programming and implementation of structural, institutional, and management reforms of the ANSF. These efforts will work towards equipping and sustaining the new end strength of the ANA as well as to increase the training and capabilities of the ANP. Through these efforts the United States and its Coalition partners seek to build a force that is respected by the population, professional, ethnically balanced, accountable, and eventually able to provide security for its own population.


Political

Building a responsible and accountable Afghan government is a pivotal element of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. An effective GIRoA serves as the most valuable partner for the United States and international community to maintain security gains, achieve the loyalty of the population, enable continued economic growth and development, and deliver services.

The GIRoA, however, continues to be hampered by corruption and a lack of human capital. Although notable progress has been made, most Afghan ministries lack sufficient administrative capacity necessary for effective program implementation. The United States will continue to pursue a governance assistance strategy that strengthens the GIRoA by building the human capital of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The United States provides training and mentoring to Afghan ministries and sub-national governments; provides assistance to improve legal education and build the judicial infrastructure and civil society crucial to the rule of law in Afghanistan; and promotes human rights and women's rights.

Reconstruction and Development

Sustained security achievements and accountable governance provide the groundwork for reconstruction and development



efforts to take hold. Although Afghanistan has made significant progress since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, extensive challenges remain. The GIRoA remains overly dependent on foreign aid. The cost of basic goods continues to rise, and Afghan citizens have only limited access to credit.

The development of Afghanistan requires continued implementation of the ANDS. Afghans will need to embrace free market economic policy, enhance government resources, address rising inflation, and implement structural reforms. To assist in these endeavors, the United States and the international community provide advisory services and training to the Afghan leaders and lawmakers. The Afghan citizens who staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprises of the country receive various forms of international aid, education, and training. The United States and the international community continue to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other basic infrastructure for reconstruction and development.

The PRTs are instrumental in these efforts, ensuring coordination among different contributing entities and responsiveness to the needs of the population. In addition, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) continues to be a critical part of the reconstruction and development effort in Afghanistan. The CERP provides local commanders with the funds and flexibility to bring urgent humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to areas that have been affected by years of conflict and neglect. These resources provide a unique, rapid, high-impact COIN tool that brings immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics

The battle against drug traffickers is ongoing and will continue for some time. The GIRoA's own Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) establishes the basic framework for counternarcotics success in Afghanistan. The aim of the strategy



U.S. service members from the Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team and Afghan engineers review blueprints for an Afghan National Army garrison under construction in the Farah province of Afghanistan.

DoD photo by Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt, U.S. Air Force - October 2008

is to stop current poppy cultivation and trafficking in order to dissuade Afghan citizens from participation in the narco-economy. The United States and international community efforts support the Afghan NDCS through a five-pillar counternarcotics strategy. The five pillars are:

- Public Information;
- Alternative Development;
- Elimination/Eradication;
- · Interdiction; and
- Law Enforcement/Justice Reform.

In conjunction with the Afghan MoD and the MoI, the Department has assisted in fielding a new Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK) to provide force protection for counternarcotics activities.

As stated previously, pursuant to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the Secretary of Defense provided the authority for DoD personnel in Presidentially declared combat zones to accompany U.S. drug law enforcement agents or host nation law enforcement or security forces on actual counternarcotics field operations. This change will allow commanders in Afghanistan to develop a holistic strategy to address the military implications of drug traffickers' support to Taliban insurgents.

Counternarcotics efforts support, and depend on, all the other lines of operation. The Department's efforts to enhance security for counternarcotics field operations extends the geographic authority of the GIRoA and hence its ability to stem the flow of illegal narcotics. Improved governance and rule of law reduce the corruption that abets the narcotics trade. Progress in economic development and reconstruction provides expanded opportunities in the licit economy.

Success Is Critical and Achievable

Success in Afghanistan is vital to America's security. Continued efforts by the United States will keep Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. While the United States is assisting Afghanistan, it must also help the government of Pakistan defeat extremists in the border regions between the two countries. The United States and its Coalition partners will continue to assist Pakistan in defeating extremists, who plan and execute attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and innocent civilians worldwide.

IRAQ

The United States seeks an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant; committed to just, representative, and accountable governance; neither a safe haven for, nor a sponsor of,



terrorism; integrated into the global economy; and a long-term partner contributing to regional peace and security.

On February 27, 2009, the President outlined the planned drawdown in U.S. forces in Iraq and the change in mission by August 31, 2010. By this time, U.S. forces will have completed the transition from combat and counterinsurgency to a more limited mission set focused on training and assisting the Iraq security forces (ISF), providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities; and conducting targeted counterterrorism operations and supporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts. Further drawdowns will occur in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The pace of the drawdown takes into consideration Irag's improved, yet fragile, security gains and provides U.S. commanders sufficient flexibility to assist the Iraqis with emerging challenges. As combat brigades are responsibly redeployed, the United States will also continue to pursue other aspects of its strategy, including a sustained diplomacy with a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.

Progress to Date

Since March 2003, Iraq has made significant progress in overcoming the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, in reviving Iraqi society, and in establishing democratic rule. Milestones include:

- March 2004: The Iraqi Governing Council approved the Transitional Administrative Law (interim constitution).
- June 2004: A free Iraqi became head of state of a sovereign nation as the Coalition Provisional Authority closed down.
- January 2005: Iraqis elected a transitional National Assembly in the first free election in 50 years.
- October 2005: Iraqis ratified a new permanent constitution.
- December 2005: Iraqis elected the Council of Representatives (CoR), which in turn formed the first government under the permanent constitution.
- January 2006: Iraqis assumed responsibility from Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) for the security of Muthanna province, the first to be transferred to Iraqi control. By December 2007, eight other provinces transitioned to Iraqi control.
- September 2006: The Government of Iraq (GoI) established the military Iraqi Joint Headquarters and the Ground Forces Command, with command and control of a portion of its armed forces.
- December 2007: The CoR passed the Unified Retirement Law restoring pensions to Iraqis removed from government.
- January 2008: To strengthen government functions, Iraq restructured the Provincial Council for National Security and formalized the Executive Council.

- February 2008: The CoR passed the 2008 Budget, the Amnesty Law, the Accountability and Justice Law, and Provincial Powers Law.
- August 2008: The CoR passed a \$22.3 billion midyear supplemental budget, directing a projected surplus of oil revenue into capital projects, reconstruction funds, and strengthening national ministries.
- September 2008: The CoR passed, and the Presidency Council ratified, the Provincial Elections Law. Gol also named ambassadors to six neighboring countries: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Turkey. Anbar became the tenth province to transfer to provincial Iraqi control.
- October 2008: The Gol began to assume responsibility for all 51,000 Sons of Iraq (Sol) in the Baghdad area, and began to integrate the Sol into the ISF and the civilian economy. The CoR passed an amendment to the Provincial Elections Law that sets aside seats for minority groups in three provinces, specifically Christians, Yezidis, and Shabaks.
- December 2008: Iraq's Presidency Council approved the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement, passed by the CoR on November 27, 2008. These agreements will help set the conditions for an enduring strategic relationship and enable the governments of the United States and Iraq to build on the gains we have achieved together.
- January 2009: Iraq held provincial elections in 14 provinces with over 51% registered voter turn-out and broad participation across religious and ethnic lines, brining into the political process groups that had boycotted the 2005 elections.

Military Achievements

As a result of ISF operational successes over the last year and other factors, security incidents are now at the lowest levels since August 2003. The ISF and the Coalition forces have achieved these security gains while continuing to draw down Coalition forces below pre-surge levels. Although security gains remain fragile, the ISF continue to demonstrate a growing capability and confidence while leading operations throughout the country.

As of December 31, 2008, over 614,000 ISF personnel were assigned, including the Army, Air Forces, Navy, local and national police, border guards, infrastructure security, and specialized units (589,054 personnel trained to date). 12 division headquarters, 41 brigade headquarters, and 124 Iraqi Army battalions have assumed the lead for operations.

Political Achievements

The success of the January 31, 2009 provincial elections, with a turn-out of 51% of registered voters, built on political gains and an increased willingness by the CoR to address difficult issues. After passing an omnibus of reconciliation legislation in February 2008 – the Provincial Powers, Amnesty, and Accountability and Justice Laws – Iraqi leaders have focused on implementation. The willingness of the GoI to confront militias, regardless of sect, encouraged the Tawafuq Sunni bloc to return its ministers to the government, restoring an additional avenue for Sunni participation in the political process.

Economic Achievements

Increasing GoI capacity has led to improved monetary and fiscal performance. The GoI's ability to spend its funds, provide

essential services, and promote economic development has continued to show steady, if slow, improvement. Electricity generation this year was 10 percent greater than last year and with fewer blackouts despite continued increases in demand.

The Gol is improving budget execution and has assumed the bulk of reconstruction costs. In April 2008, the Gol launched Iraq-CERP (I-CERP), modeled on the U.S.-funded CERP, with funding of \$270 million. In addition to I-CERP, the Gol has allocated and is spending over \$550 million for post-kinetic reconstruction in Basrah, Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah, and in Diyala province since May 2008. Through the end of December 2008, the Gol has spent a total of \$49.5 billion, over \$23 billion more than in 2007. Despite a significant projected drop in oil revenues by using prior year surpluses in 2009, the Gol is taking steps to ensure continued funding for key infrastructure and maintenance efforts by using prior year surpluses.



Much Remains to Be Done

Despite the positive developments, national reconciliation and accommodation continue to be hindered by the pursuit of ethnosectarian agendas and disagreements over the distribution of power and resources. This is underscored by significant distrust between partisan national leaders. Arab-Kurd tensions continue to grow, surrounding the debate over the centralization versus decentralization of power, the resolution of disputed internal boundaries, property rights and restitution, the status of the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Peshmerga, the status of Kirkuk, and the resolution of hydrocarbon policy. Tensions between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga in and around disputed territories continue to be a flashpoint for potential violence. In addition, longstanding Sunni-Shi'a discord remains, with some Sunnis suspicions of the extent of the Shi'a political parties' ties to Iran and doubtful of the Gol's long-term commitment to the Sol transition program and the implementation of the Amnesty and Accountability and Justice Laws. Furthermore, there is growing opposition between those favoring a strong central government versus a highly decentralized government. The Gol will face challenges as it continues to assume authority for security detainees and as it addresses the long-term issue of resettling refugees and internally displaced persons. These issues will require Iraq's political blocs to overcome their fears and build coalitions that reach across ethnic lines to compromise on sensitive political issues. National elections, scheduled for the end of 2009 or early 2010, will be a key turning point in the process of consolidating Iraq's democracy.

The Gol's ability to spend its resources, improve the delivery of essential services, and promote economic development has progressed measurably. However, Iraq's economy continues to be constrained by a lack of transparency, endemic corruption, weak technical skills, and a poor legal framework. The

U.S. Army 1st Lt. Anthony Sgroi questions a power plant operator about the conditions of the Abu Ghraib substation. U.S. Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, toured the Abu Ghraib power plant substation to determine whether funding from coalition forces is necessary to help in reconstruction.

U.S. Army photo by Spc. Daniel Herrera - October 2008

agricultural and agribusiness sectors could advance economic growth, but are distorted by subsidies. Declining projected oil revenues will put an added strain on a government that has had difficulty delivering basic services. Iraq will need to implement economic reforms and pass key legislation to take full advantage of foreign and domestic investment.

Debt relief, economic support, and other strategic initiatives have been established with neighboring countries and other nations. Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates have formally named ambassadors to Iraq. Egypt and Qatar have announced their intention to identify and send ambassadors. In September 2008, after significant delay, the Gol helped to strengthen these ties by appointing ambassadors to six neighboring countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria, and Bahrain. The Iraqis should continue to engage Arab states on issues of mutual concern, including refugees, border security, and economic ties.

NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ

Iraq is moving forward on the political, economic, diplomatic and security fronts.

- The Gol has assumed responsibility for the bulk of reconstruction costs. The United States is continuing to work with Iraqi officials to identify activities that can and should be assumed by the Gol, particularly as security improves and the Gol becomes increasingly capable.
- The GoI must focus on continuing efforts to relieve tensions between Arab and Kurdish leaders and resume progress on political efforts to resolve obstacles.
- The Iraqi Army and Police are increasingly capable and leading the fight to secure their country. Successful operations conducted against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and militias have significantly degraded their capabilities.
- "Bottom up" reconciliation initiatives have improved security and economic conditions at the local level. Tribes and other groups in the provinces are rebuilding local political structures and taking charge of their own affairs. The GoI is reaching out to take responsibility for and to reintegrate the SoI into the ISF and the civilian economy.
- Iraq plans to hold elections in Tamim province and the Kurdish provinces, following the successful provincial elections that were held in 14 provinces on January 31, 2009. These steps will consolidate progress and provide a way for Iraqis to settle disputes through the political process instead of through violence.
- To preserve recent security gains, the Gol will need to sustain a robust security presence and make progress in restoring a sense of normalcy to the Iraqi people by improving essential service delivery and generating employment opportunities. Reconciliation will remain central to the success of these efforts to bring long-term security and stability to Iraq.

Iraqi Security Ministries

Despite improvements at the ministerial level, capability and capacity for long-term sustainment needs improvement. The MoD and Mol continue to expand internal training capacity and ministries need to continue to expand their personnel strength, improve their budget process, and improve the speed of decision making and the distribution of resources, particularly to outlying elements. The MoD in particular must focus its efforts to acquire combat enablers, improve logistics capabilities, and develop its leaders.

For the fourth year in a row, the Gol's security budget (MoD and Mol combined) is greater than the U.S.-resourced Iraq security forces Fund (ISFF). The Gol has allocated approximately \$10.6 billion for the Ministries of Defense and Interior in the draft 2009 budget, building on the 2008 base allocation of \$9.0 billion. Falling oil revenues, however, remain a concern, and the Gol will face challenges in pursuing force generation and modernization with diminished resources.

Increased GoI spending enables decreased U.S. Government (USG) spending. The \$1.0 billion provided by Congress for the FY 2009 ISFF reflects a 66 percent reduction in ISFF spending from the FY 2008 level, and a shift in spending focus. Spending on training will shift from fielding core Iraqi military and police units to accelerating the growth of logistical units and pursuing key support capabilities that will enable and sustain established units. The FY 2009 spending will also address the requirements to continue logistics and sustainment capacity development, replenish equipment, and field equipment for aviation, engineer, and transportation units.

The MNSTC-I continues to work with the MoD and MoI, enabling them to operate increasingly independently and competently. These efforts will help the Iraqis develop six force management functions: training and development, acquisition of people,

acquisition of materiel, resource management and force sustainment and management. These efforts will increase ISF operational independence, place the ISF in the lead on security operations and help to safeguard the United States' investment in improving security. Security self-reliance is essential for the ISF to conduct operations and to sustain and regenerate themselves with competent and professional leaders, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and police committed to the GoI.

SUMMARY

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have tested the capacity of the United States – and that of its allies and partners – to adapt its militaries, governments, and strategies to meet the challenges of two COIN operations. Integrating the military and civilian, the private and the public, the international and the domestic, within the broad and complex battle spaces of Afghanistan and Iraq was, until now, unprecedented.

The Department has met these considerable challenges with an enduring commitment to bring the best capabilities to bear on the world's most formidable opponents under adverse conditions. The successes of the U.S. military have been considerable, and the Department's commitment to continued



Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and U.S. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commanding general of Multi-National Force - Iraq, attended a meeting with senior Iraqi government and security officials at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad, Iraq. Gates was in Southwest Asia to meet with Iraqi leaders and preside over the change of command of Multi-National Force-Iraq.


DoD photo by Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force - September 2008

achievement is steadfast. Past, present, and future successes, however, directly rely on the continued support of Congress and the American people and timely funding for U.S. armed forces.

JUSTIFICATION - FY 2009 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

The Department requests \$145.1 billion to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. In June 2008, Congress appropriated \$65.9 billion in Bridge funding for part of FY 2009. The remaining request of \$79.2 billion (Figure 2) sustains daily operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Of the total \$79.2 billion required, \$3.4 billion has been proposed to be financed with a cancellation of FY 2009 DoD base funds. The remaining request supports the President's decisions to both increase forces in Afghanistan and redeploy forces from Iraq for a combined average force level in these two countries of approximately

Figure 2. FY09 Supplemental Request: \$79.2B*



^{*} Reflects cancellations/reappropriations in Base budget and Bridge funds to partially offset requirements in the Base Budget and Overseas Contingency Operations Supplemental Request. See Resource Exhibits for clarification.

185,000 in FY 2009.

The request also provides critical force protection requirements; training, equipment, and assistance to U.S. coalition partners; funds to reconstitute equipment lost or stressed by the pace of wartime operations; intelligence capabilities to enable and enhance the war effort; and additional requirements. Detailed justification materials, organized by functional category, are provided in this volume to improve understanding of, and increase transparency into, requirements established by the Overseas Contingency Operations.

CONTINUING THE FIGHT

Operations

(\$76.2B: \$38.2B Bridge Enacted + \$38.0B Remaining Request)

The Operations request will fund the incremental costs of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for FY 2009. Operations costs are directly linked to the operating tempo of frontline combat and support forces in theater. This category includes the cost of military operations, pre-deployment training, inter- and intra-theater transportation, aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, and vehicle miles at a wartime operating tempo.

The Department's \$38.0 billion remaining request reflects the President's February decision to adjust U.S. deployed force structure in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Force Protection

(\$14.3B: \$4.5B Bridge Enacted + \$9.8B Remaining Request)

Force Protection remains critical to the success of U.S. operations in the Overseas Contingency Operations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, military personnel, rather than military capabilities, are the primary targets of the enemy. The Force Protection category includes lightweight body armor, armored

Note: Numbers in this table have been updated from previously published figures to better reflect transfers, rescissions, non-war supplementals, and scoring captured by DoD and OMB databases. Source: FY 2009 OMB Historical Tables. Table 5.4: Comptroller Information Systems

vehicles, safe and secure operating bases, identity management for access control, and persistent surveillance capabilities.

The Department's \$9.8 billion remaining request for Force Protection includes procurement of protective measures against insurgent attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. This funding will provide an array of body armor, protection equipment, and armored vehicles to protect forces while maintained a high level of mobility and lethality. In particular, this funding will support 1,000 lighter All-Terrain Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles for increased OEF missions; fund labor costs associated with increased OEF missions; procure test articles and perform ballistics and

U.S. Marine Corps Gunnery Sgt. Marlin Villacres, platoon sergeant of 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, checks his rear security during a patrol in Now Zad, Afghanistan. The Marine unit, which is a reinforced light infantry battalion, is clearing the city of improvised explosive devices.

DoD photo by Sgt. Freddy G. Cantu, U.S. Marine Corps. - September 2008

automotive testing; and sustain and maintain vehicles in theater.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

(\$3.5B: \$2.0B Bridge Enacted + \$1.5B Remaining Request)

The IED Defeat request will fund measures to defeat the IED threat to U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout FY 2009. Insurgents continue to use IEDs to endanger U.S. and Coalition forces, as IED makers and networks adapt their tactics to target vulnerabilities and undermine force protection. The persistent use of IEDs by the insurgency warrants continued investment in technologies, equipment, and materials that can be used in the field to defeat these asymmetric weapons.

The Department's \$1.5 billion remaining request for IED Defeat includes continued efforts to detect, defeat, and disarm these lethal weapons. This funding will help to attack the IED network, defeat the devices, and train U.S. forces to disarm these weapons before they are used.

Military Intelligence

(\$5.1B: \$1.4B Bridge Enacted + \$3.8B Remaining Request)

The Military Intelligence request funds continuous enhancements of U.S. intelligence capabilities as well as improvements of traditional and non-traditional intelligence operations. Intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities remain critical to the effective prosecution of the Overseas Contingency Operations. Adversaries continue to develop resources to counter defense capabilities and erode United States access to vital intelligence. The Military Intelligence category funds continuation of programs in all-source intelligence, counterintelligence, human source intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement signatures intelligence, and signals intelligence.

The Department requests an additional \$3.8 billion for military intelligence capabilities and programs. Specifically, the request will fund: procurement of, and modifications to, selected intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; increased capabilities in All-Source, Human Source, and Signals intelligence; intelligence support to Contingency Operations; and intelligence training for deploying and deployed forces.

Iraq Security Forces

(\$1.0B: \$1.0B Bridge Enacted; No Remaining Request)

The Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) enables the Department to support the Government of Iraq (GoI) in building security forces capable of assuming full responsibility for Iraq's security. To date, Overseas Contingency Operations funding has helped to train over 600,000 Iraqi Soldiers and Police.

The Department does not seek additional funding for ISFF at this time. The Department has continually worked with the Iraqis to find areas of financial responsibility to transfer to the Gol. With the Iraqis taking over more responsibility for their own defense, the Department is now able to reduce its annual funding for ISFF by approximately two-thirds. The Department requires no additional funding for FY 2009 but needs Congress to enact legislation to provide the flexibility to execute those funds provided in the FY 2009 Bridge through FY 2010.

Afghan National Security Forces

(\$5.6B: \$2.0B Bridge Enacted + \$3.6B Remaining Request)

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) request funds the acceleration of U.S. efforts to build military and police forces capable of conducting independent operations and providing for the long-term security of Afghanistan. With a resurgent Taliban, narco-terrorists, and the persistent threat of Al Qaeda, it is a critical priority to continue building the capabilities of the ANSF.

The Department's \$3.6 billion remaining request funds the



increase in Afghan National Army (ANA) end strength from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers (not including a training/transient pool of 12,000), and the continued development of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The Department's goal is to complete the growth of the ANA by December 2011. The ANSF funding also addresses current equipment and infrastructure requirements to enable the ANSF and expand their capacity. Finally, sustainment funding in the request ensures existing ANSF institutions can continue to support domestic stability inside Afghanistan. The Department also needs Congress to enact legislation to provide the flexibility to execute those funds provided in the FY 2009 Bridge through FY 2010.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

(\$0.4B: No Bridge Funding + \$0.4B Remaining Request)

The Pakistan Counterinsurgency (COIN) Capability Fund will provide funding to build the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan's security forces to secure its borders, deny safe haven

to violent extremists, and fight insurgents. This support to Pakistan's forces fighting on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border will make Pakistan a more effective partner to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and ultimately contribute to success in this volatile region.

The Department's \$0.4 billion request for FY 2009 funds a robust counterinsurgency capability for Pakistan to serve as a combat multiplier and increase successes by U.S. forces in the Overseas Contingency Operations.

Coalition Support

(\$1.7B: \$0.3B Bridge Enacted + \$1.4B Remaining Request)

The Coalition Support request funds the Department's continuing effort to work with or through Coalition partners, thereby reducing the burden on the U.S. Armed Forces. Funding for Coalition Support allows the United States to reimburse cooperating nations and provide lift and sustainment



support to partner nations in support of U.S. military operations. The constant participation and commitment of U.S. allies is a critical element of the Overseas Contingency Operations, helping to reduce stress on U.S. forces and increasing the military capacity devoted to counter terrorism.

The Department's \$1.4 billion remaining request enables the United States to leverage the capacity of Coalition partners, limit the exposure of U.S. forces, and focus U.S. forces on other critical areas of Overseas Contingency Operations by reimbursing key cooperating nations for their direct support to U.S. military operations. These funds ensure key cooperating nations are reimbursed for their support to U.S. operations; finance lift and sustain support to coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq; and provide an air traffic control and safety system for the Kyrgyz Republic, a key transit location for U.S. and Coalition aircraft.

Commander's Emergency Response Program

(\$1.4B: \$1.0B Bridge Allocation + \$0.5B Remaining Request)

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) request provides flexible funds for commanders in the field to finance small-scale, urgent civil and humanitarian needs. By enabling projects like the repair of water treatment plants, the creation of irrigation canals, the building of roads, or the reconstruction of power lines, the CERP has proven that it can help United States forces garner the trust of local populations and ultimately protect U.S. and Coalition lives.

The Department's \$0.5 billion remaining request provides continued funding for the CERP activities in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The request, a reduction from the FY 2008 enacted amount, reflects increased investments by the Gol and improvements in that government's capacity to deliver basic services to its citizens. The CERP funds will continue to help

fund urgent civil and humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan as it builds capacity.

Military Construction

(\$0.9B: No Bridge Funding; \$0.9B Remaining Request)

The Military Construction request provides funding for construction projects in support of OEF. Included in this category are projects that support operational and aviation requirements, supporting facilities, housing, command and control facilities, roads, and basic infrastructures such as utility complex.

The Department's \$0.9 billion remaining request will primarily fund needed infrastructure enhancements associated with the realignment of U.S. forces into and within Afghanistan, broaden U.S. logistics and ISR capabilities, and increase the lines of communication in theater. In particular, this request will fund: infrastructure projects in Regional Commands – East and South to provide strategic and operational flexibility.

RECONSTITUTING THE FORCE

(\$23.2B: \$11.6B Bridge Enacted + \$11.6B Remaining Request)

The Reconstitution request funds the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment in the U.S. inventory. Funding maintains readiness by replenishing consumables, replacing and repairing weapon systems damaged or destroyed in battle, and upgrading equipment to better address current threats. Without continued investment in Reconstitution, the dynamic pace and extreme environments presented by OEF and OIF would have a significant, detrimental effect on equipment reliability and warfighting capability.

The Department's \$11.6 billion remaining request will fund the continued replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment used in Overseas Contingency Operations. Specifically, this

request includes funding to replenish conventional and guided ammunition items, as well as tactical missiles; replace day-to-day use items and a wide variety of combat support vehicles and aircraft; and provide the necessary depot and intermediate maintenance on equipment returning from Afghanistan and Irag.


ADDITIONAL REQUESTS

The Department proposes cancelling \$3.4 billion in base funds (fuel savings and Army procurement items) to partially offset the cost of Additional Requests included in the Overseas Contingency Operations estimate.

Accelerate Grow the Force

(\$2.3B: \$0.1B Bridge Enacted + \$2.2B Remaining Request)

The Accelerate Grow the Force request funds the continued effort within the Department to grow the size of U.S. ground forces. Growing the Army by 65,000 Soldiers and the Marine Corps by an additional 27,000 Marines will significantly reduce stress on existing forces and enable the Department to increase a service member's time at home station between deployments.



B04-09-100(III)

The Department received \$0.1 billion in Bridge funding to support this initiative. Given higher than anticipated recruiting and retention, the Army and Marine Corps are postured to meet their end strength goals well before their original timeframes. The Department requests \$2.2 billion in additional appropriations to reach the President's targets of 547,400 active Soldiers and 202,000 Marines by the end of FY 2009. This is 3 years ahead of schedule for the Army and 2 years ahead of schedule for the Marine Corps.

Wounded Warrior and Family Support

(\$2.5B: \$0.8B Bridge Enacted + \$1.6B Remaining Request)

The Wounded Warrior and Family Support request will fund two different initiatives to provide the best possible care to U.S. wounded, ill, and injured forces and to comprehensively support U.S. military families.

The Department's \$1.6 billion remaining request includes \$1.2 billion to enhance case management and data sharing and to streamline disability and compensation systems. Additionally, this funding will pay for accelerated opening and enhancement of Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) in Maryland and the Fort Belvoir Army Community Hospital (ACH) in Virginia.

The rest of the Department's remaining request – \$0.4 billion – will fund new Family Support Initiatives, increase benefits and opportunities for military spouses, and improve access to childcare. Two-thirds of service members stationed in the United States live off base and families consistently report difficulty finding affordable, high quality childcare. The request will also provide tuition assistance to the spouses of service members seeking education and vocational training, along with authority for DoD to reimburse federal agencies for the first year's costs associated with placing military spouses in internship positions.

Border Security

(\$0.4B: No Bridge Funding + \$0.4B Remaining Request)

The Border Security request will fund counternarcotics and other related activities along the United States-Mexico border.

Border Security funding is in response to escalating problems of violence on the border. In order to address this emerging security situation, this request provides for \$350 million for counternarcotics and other related activities along the United States-Mexico border. Up to \$100 million of this request would be available for transfer to other Federal agencies for southwest border-related activities.

Military Personnel

(\$0.5B: No Bridge Funding + \$0.5B Remaining Request)

The Military personnel request will fund significant FY 2009 base budget challenges within the Army military personnel accounts. To help alleviate these shortfalls and reduce future reprogramming requests, the Army has identified \$0.5 billion in FY 2008 and FY 2009 Procurement items for cancellation and reappropriation to these higher priority Military Personnel requirements.

Non-DoD Classified

(\$6.1B: \$2.9B Bridge Enacted + \$3.1B Remaining Request)

Congress appropriated \$2.9 billion for non-DoD classified activities in June for the FY 2009 Bridge funding. The Department now requests \$3.1 billion in additional funds. Details on this non-DoD classified request will be provided to Congress in a classified annex.

Operations

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure the men and women of the all-volunteer military engaged in the Overseas Contingency Operations are appropriately compensated and have the funds, supplies, and logistical support they need to conduct military operations.


Bridge Enacted: \$38.2B


- Supports military operations to include pre-deployment training, inter- and intra-theater transportation, aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, vehicle and ground miles
- Subsistence (food and water) and logistics support

Remaining Request: \$38.0B

- Supports the President's decisions to both increase forces in Afghanistan and redeploy forces from Iraq for a combined average force level in these two countries of approximately 185,000 in FY 2009
- Funds incremental pay, benefits and support for military personnel

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding





Operations	FY 2007	FY 2008 Enacted	FY 2009 Supplemental			
\$ in Billions	Enacted		Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	
Pay and Benefits	16.9	17.9	1.2	14.5	15.7	
Military Operations	52.2	52.4	33.6	18.5	52.1	
Subsistence and Logistics Support	6.2	6.4	3.4	4.2	7.6	
Operating and Restocking Supply Depots	1.3	0.8	_	0.8	0.8	
Total Operations	76.6	77.5	38.2	38.0	76.2	

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$76.2 billion for military operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in FY 2009. To date, Congress has appropriated \$38.2 billion in Bridge funding for operations. The Department now requests the remaining \$38.0 billion to fund OEF and OIF operations for the rest of FY 2009.

Operations costs are directly linked to the operating tempo of frontline combat and support forces in the theater. This request estimates the FY 2009 combined force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan will average approximately 185,000 troops. This is a slight decrease from the FY 2008 average of 188,500 troops. However, conditions on the ground and the commander's assessment could drive the requirement for significant changes in force structures that would compel the Department to request an amendment to this budget.

FUNDING REQUEST

The Operations category supports the full spectrum of military personnel, operation and maintenance, supply, and fuel requirements applicable to Reserve Component mobilization, predeployment training, deployment and redeployment of all forces,



as well as theater operations and sustainment.

The request sustains daily operations of the estimated FY 2009 average combined force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan of 185,000.

Pay and Benefits

This portion of the Operations request funds:

- Incremental pay and allowances for all deployed military personnel (special pays);
- Subsistence for military personnel;
- Permanent-change-of-station travel;
- Other military personnel costs for mobilizing Reserve component personnel, Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) uniformed personnel deployed in support of Contingency Operations; and
- Recruiting and retention bonuses and incentives.

Major requirements are as follows:

Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty: The force mix needed to support combat operations includes a combination of Active Component units and Reserve Component personnel serving on active duty (mobilized under presidential call-up authority or serving in ADOS status). All basic military pay and entitlements – basic pay, basic allowance for housing and subsistence, retired pay accrual, Social Security contributions, and incentive pay – are incremental to the base budget and are supported with supplemental appropriations.

Subsistence: Requested funds provide Subsistence-in-Kind – subsistence for dining facilities, operational rations, and augmentation rations – for all U.S. military forces deployed in support of the Overseas Contingency Operations.

Reserve and National Guard: Funds requested in the military pay appropriations of the Reserve Component are primarily requested for pre-mobilization training and support, recruiting and retention, and family support programs for the deployed forces.

Active Navy Individual Augmentees: Requested funds provide pay and allowances for 7,100 Active Navy Individual Augmentees who are performing Contingency missions. These Navy personnel are being retained above the baseline strength profile to provide augmentation support in capabilities such as Detainee Operations, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Intelligence, Medical Support, and Combat Air Support.

Military Operations

Operation and Maintenance funding for Active and Reserve forces are required to finance the costs of military operations including transportation, supplies, communications, and fuel consumed in pre-deployment training and in operations intheater. The FY 2009 OEF and OIF missions will require approximately 20 million barrels of fuel. Operations funding includes requirements for incremental pre-deployment training and support, transportation to and from theater, operating tempo in-theater, sustainment of equipment, and the full range of logistics and communications. The Reserve Forces' Operation and Maintenance appropriations fund incremental training and support costs prior to mobilization, recruiting and retention, and support programs for deployed Reserve forces and their families. Major subcategories of Operation and Maintenance include the following:

Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO): Provides fuel, supplies, repair parts, etc., for combat and supporting forces operating continuously in harsh conditions. The request provides funds for:

 Army OPTEMPO to fund the sustainment of light, mixed, and heavy unit equipment in the full range of combat, combat support, and combat service support units conducting day-today operations in support of OEF and OIF. Sustainment includes forward deployment training, air and ground OPTEMPO facility support, and organizational maintenance. The Army incurs both direct and indirect OPTEMPO costs. Direct OPTEMPO costs include fuel, oil, repair parts, etc. Indirect OPTEMPO costs generally include combat training center support, soldier support, training aids, devices, simulations and simulators and selected contracted logistics support, facilities, and base support;

- Naval Forces to finance the incremental costs of Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, aviation support (Carrier Air Wings and land-based Maritime Patrol and support aircraft) conducting Maritime Security Operations; Marines conducting the full range of Combat and COIN operations; and Sailors on the ground providing combat support operations. This includes funding for materials/supplies, training, OPTEMPO (flying, steaming, and operation of ground vehicles), and support to Coalition Forces;
- Air Force expeditionary operations support the projection of combat air power in support of OEF and OIF. Flying missions include close air support; air interdiction; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and both inter- and intratheater airlift. The expeditionary combat support functions provide mission readiness at forward installations where the Air Force is the lead component. Major mission support programs include airfield and air operations support and security forces, as well as the full range of critical base services including emergency and food services.
- U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) command operations are executed in EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM areas of responsibility (AOR). Funds also support U.S. SOCOM headquarters' role as the DoD lead command for synchronizing the Department's SOF actions in the Overseas Contingency Operations. The SOF funding is also executed to help establish the conditions to counter and defeat terrorism through Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Special Reconnaissance, and Civil Affairs.

In-Theater Communications and Base Support: Funds critical strategic and tactical, in-theater communications infrastructure. Provides base operations services, supplies and equipment, maintenance and storage facilities, pre-deployment training support and the full range of activities at DoD bases supporting mobilization and deployment missions.

In-Theater Maintenance: Provides for contract labor and repair parts for forward activities that perform maintenance and repair of key systems such as unmanned aircraft, Light Utility Helicopters, missiles and radar, Stryker combat vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and tank engines, Armored Security Vehicles, and C-130 aircraft.

Transportation: Supports the deployment, sustainment, redeployment, and reset of forces. Includes strategic lift by air and sea, port handling operations, second destination transportation, and transportation of fallen heroes.

Personnel Support Costs: Provides service members with family counseling and support services, such as extended childcare, Military Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services in-theater; Rest and Recuperation (R&R) travel; and civilian special pays.

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Programs: This program provides Reserve Component members and families with information, services, referral, and proactive outreach opportunities throughout the entire deployment cycle.

Guantanamo Bay Detainee Relocation: An executive order signed by the President on January 22, 2009, directs the closure of the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base no later than one year from the date of the order. This request will provide the Secretary with the funding required to support the relocation and disposition of individuals detained at the base, the relocation of military and support forces associated with detainee operations, and the closure of detainee facilities.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Security Investment Program (NSIP): Due to the relative decline in value of the dollar as compared to the euro, the NSIP suffered significant currency losses during FY 2008. As a result, the total NSIP funding available in FY 2009 is insufficient to liquidate currency exchange losses and to meet U.S. obligations for new and continuing NSIP projects. This request will cover those losses, allowing the Department to sustain NSIP, which includes several large communications and infrastructure projects supporting U.S. and Allied forces in Afghanistan. This request will require authorization language to support the obligation of these funds.

Services and Related Support: Provides for the Defense Agencies to support Contingency Operations activities such as contract management and in-theater audit services; secure credentials; personnel and support costs for military trials; and rewards for information provided by local nationals.

Subsistence and Logistics Support

These funds finance the cost of in-theater logistics support (e.g., operations of the forward operating bases for deployed troops) and subsistence and associated transportation costs for authorized civilians and contractors.

Theater Base Camp and Logistics Support: Includes Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) base camp and life support services – power generation, facilities management, billeting, dining services, latrines and waste management – at sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. The FY 2009 request reflects ongoing transition to Phase IV of the LOGCAP contract that moves from a single to multiple vendors.

Operating and Restocking Supply Depots

Funds are required to re-establish stocks of spare parts, including war reserves that have been released in support of the Overseas Contingency Operations.

- Army Working Capital Fund Supply: Funds re-stocking of spares and repair parts essential to the operational readiness of combat vehicles and equipment. Also included are medical supplies for combat support hospitals and surgical teams.
- Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund Supply and Information System: Funds Kuwait in-theater consolidated shipping point and distribution function and demilitarization operating costs within the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Funds intheater fuel losses experienced at tactical fuel sites and along fuel delivery routes due to combat losses. Funds transportation and delivery of fuel within the AOR. Funds increased bandwidth costs in theatre.

SUMMARY

The remaining request for FY 2009 is required to support the President's plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan and redeploy forces from Iraq. Without these funds, the Military Services will have to reduce the level of military operations, which would prevent success by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, weaken future warfighting capabilities, and ultimately undermine U.S. security.





Force Protection

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide U.S. Armed Forces with the best protection and the most effective technology against all forms of hostile action.


Bridge Enacted: \$4.5B

- Body armor and other personal protection items
- Equipment
 - Aircraft survivability components
 - Command and Control equipment
 - Radios
 - Night vision equipment
- Armored vehicles and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Fragmentation Kits

Remaining Request: \$9.8B


- Continued support for body armor, protection equipment, and armored vehicles
- Lighter Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles for OEF missions
- Labor costs for mechanics and logisticians supporting OEF missions

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



* Includes \$16.8B MRAP appropriation

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Force Protection	FY 2007	FY 2008 Enacted	FY 2009 Supplemental			
\$ in Billions	Enacted		Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	
Body Armor and Protective Gear	2.5	2.2	1.1	0.9	2.0	
Protection Equipment	3.1	4.9	1.5	4.5	6.0	
Armored Vehicles (includes MRAP)	6.8	16.8	1.9	4.4	6.3	
Total Force Protection	12.4	23.9	4.5	9.8	14.3	
Numbers may not add due to rounding	ı	ı	'			

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$14.3 billion for force protection efforts in FY 2009. This represents an approximate 40 percent decrease from the amount appropriated for FY 2008. Congress appropriated \$4.5 billion in Bridge funding for force protection in June 2008. The Department now requests the remaining \$9.8 billion to fund force protection efforts for the remainder of FY 2009.

The Department's FY 2009 total request of \$14.3 billion includes \$4.4 billion for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, a significant reduction from the \$16.8 billion in FY 2008, which procured 9,358 vehicles. This request supports an additional 1,000 lighter All-Terrain MRAP vehicles, logistics support for increased OEF missions, labor costs for mechanics and logisticians supporting increased OEF missions, procurement of test articles to perform ballistics and automotive testing and sustainment, and maintenance vehicles in theater.

The Department is committed to ensuring that U.S. forces are provided with the best force protection equipment possible to deter and defend against asymmetric threats. The most direct and visible method to increase force protection is to enhance personnel protective armor, provide the most effective force protection equipment, and improve the armoring on vehicles. Funds utilized for force protection directly impact the Department's



ability to save lives and increase the operational effectiveness of U.S. troops on the ground and others involved in combat.

FUNDING REQUEST

The \$9.8 billion remaining request supports the procurement of protective measures against attacks on U.S. troops and DoD civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq. These measures include an array of specialized equipment intended to protect forces while maintaining a high level of force mobility and lethality.

Body Armor

Individual Body Armor (IBA): The IBA provides an increased level of protection for forces on the ground and in the air. The Department is purchasing next generation body armor systems to take advantage of the most effective technology.

Body armor is purchased in both individual sets and replacement parts and components (Figure 3). Body armor requirements have evolved from an initial basic vest with chest and back protection in FY 2004 (Outer Tactical Vest) combined with two rifle plates called Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). These were improved with Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI). Also added were side, leg, and neck protection (Deltoid Auxiliary Protection System), which provides additional

shoulder protection and protection against armor-piercing rounds. This level of body armor protection is the minimum protective level for combat operations. It is worn to stop small arms and shrapnel.

Through FY 2008, the Department procured 100 percent of its requirements for Active, Reserve and National Guard units. Since that time, additional quantities have been procured as whole set and component replacements with enhanced body armor and components. In FY 2009, the next generation Small Arms Protective Inserts (X-SAPI) will be ready for procurement. This improvement includes protection against armor piercing ammunition.

In addition, there are other personal protection items not specifically labeled as body armor such as helmets (including the new Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH)), earplugs, gloves, boots, and other items. This makes it difficult to make year-to-year comparisons on how many "sets" of body armor are procured each year. Figure 4 reflects the total whole sets of individual body armor, additional items and replacement parts.

Figure 3. Body Armor – SAPI / E-SAPI Equivalent Sets, Quantities							
	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force	SOCOM	Total	
FY 2004 through FY 2007 Purchases	1,104,097	18,275	102,306	156,523	43,532	1,424,733	
FY 2008 Baseline	_	_	_		9,875	9,875	
FY 2008 Contingency Bridge	200,000	5,700	800	45,000	_	251,500	
FY 2008 Contingency Remaining Supplemental	70,000	_	_	_	3,200	73,200	
Cumulative Totals FY 2004 - 2008	1,374,097	23,975	103,106	201,523	56,607	1,759,308	
FY 2009 Baseline	_	_	5,210		4,353	9,563	
FY 2009 Contingency Bridge Enacted	120,000	6,178	14,317		_	140,495	
FY 2009 Contingency Remaining Request	_	2,251	29,713	19,200	_	51,164	
Grand Totals FY 2004 - 2009	1,494,097	32,404	152,346	220,723	60,960	1,960,530	

Advanced Combat Helmets (ACH) to Aircrew and Ground support personnel: The ACH outperforms the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT) Kevlar helmet in survivability and injury avoidance. The ACH has better ballistic and impact protection, increased 9mm and 7.62mm bullet protection, and improved field of vision and localization.

Protection Equipment and Activities

Fire-resistant combat uniforms for protection against fuel-enhanced Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): Fire-retardant "Nomex" uniforms are designed to protect soldiers from fuel-based accelerants used in conjunction with IEDs. The fuel-based IEDs are inflicting serious burns to gunners and operators of tactical vehicles. The Nomex fabric provides protection up to 700 degrees Fahrenheit. Nomex adds an additional two to four seconds of fire protection for vehicle egress. The remaining request will enable the Army to continue to provide gunners with two sets of uniforms, gloves, and a balaclava-type hood. The complete uniform ensemble will include Combat Vehicle Crewmember Coveralls, Gloves, and Balaclava Hoods.

Newly fielded combat uniforms for desert warfare operations: The remaining request provides Army Combat Uniforms (ACU) for deployers in support of OIF and OEF. Improved uniform capabilities include better camouflage and improved performance for desert warfare operations.

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG): The Army's AWG mission is to study and provide recommendations to commanders on the ground for the neutralization and defeat of IEDs and other insurgent tactics that harm U.S. and Coalition forces. The organization is actively engaged in real-time assessment and quick response solutions, and coordinates closely with the IED Defeat Organization.



Rapid Equipping Force (REF): The REF bridges the gap between the lengthy acquisition process and immediate warfighter needs. Specifically, the REF mission is to:

- Equip operational commanders with off-the-shelf (government or commercial) solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed, and acquired quickly – ideally, within 90 days;
- Insert future force technology solutions that engaged and deploying forces require by developing, testing and evaluating key technologies and systems under operational conditions;

 Assess capabilities and advise Army stakeholders of findings that will enable forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy.

Communication and Electronic Equipment: The request for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) technology will enable information dominance and decisive lethality for the networked warfighter.

- Communications: Funding would provide for Command and Control systems such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) to increase situational awareness at the lowest tactical level. Knight Command and Control provides precision strike capability by accurately locating and designating targets for both ground and airdelivered laser-guided ordnance and conventional munitions. Funds also provide information systems, tactical operations centers, and vehicle tracking systems.
- Electronic equipment: Funding would provide for electronic equipment such as Warlock and CREW II, which are IED jamming devices that attempt to intercept or block a signal before it reaches its intended target, preventing detonation. Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar tracks and detects enemy mortar fire, and the Sequoyah language translator for one or two-way speech translation. Funding for night vision devices would improve situational awareness by providing the capability to rapidly detect and recognize targets, while simultaneously maintaining the ability to see detail and to use rifle mounted aiming lights. Night vision provides soldiers the ability to engage and execute close combat operations and can perform in all levels of light, environments, and weather conditions.

Biometrics: Funds for biometrics would enable verification of an individual's identity. Biometrics can deny an adversary the ability to hide his true identity by stripping away anonymity with swift, accurate, and definitive identity verification.

Aircraft Survivability Equipment: The request funds investments in equipment to increase the survival of personnel and equipment to include missile warning systems, aircraft countermeasure systems, and infrared suppression systems.

Mine-Clearance Equipment: The request funds the procurement of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) equipment, the Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit (SPARK) mine roller kit which will be fitted to tactical vehicles such as the MRAP and HMMWV to counter explosive threats.

Sniper Defeat: Funding would address operational needs to counter enemy direct fire/sniper systems with a variety of active/passive systems for both fixed and mobile operations.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): The request funds the procurement of UAS, which support night operations, counter-IED operations, convoy protection, and border surveillance. Funding will procure Raven B systems for support to Army's Brigade Combat Team operations in OEF/OIF and the Warrior UAS for persistent intelligence gathering. Navy UAS funding will procure small, long-endurance UAS, providing real-time intelligence and situational awareness capabilities, including the ability to remotely track objects of interest for extended periods of time.

Weapon Systems: Funds will continue procurement of counter-rocket/mortar radars, which are critical to protecting Soldiers from cannon, rocket and mortar fire. The funding will also continue to be used to purchase vehicle mounted weapons stations that can be remotely operated within vehicles such as HMMWVs.

 Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM): Funding would procure the C-RAM air defense weapon system. The request enables the Army to detect rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) threats; warn the defended area; and intercept rounds in flight preventing damage to ground forces or facilities.

- Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS):
 Funding would procure CROWS which is a vehicle mounted
 weapons station that enables soldiers to remotely operate
 various types of automatic weapons and machine guns while
 under armor protection from within their vehicle.
- Small Arms: Funds will continue procurement and modification of various individual and crew-served weapons such as the M240 Medium Machine Gun, and .50 caliber machine guns to enable soldiers and marines to conduct combat operations and engage targets with lethal fire.
- Non-Lethal Weapons: Funding for non-lethal weapons include the Green Beam Designator and the Active Denial System (ADS). The Green Beam Designator IIIC is a laser that alerts drivers who fail to slow down at military checkpoints. The ADS uses millimeter-wave electromagnetic energy to stop, deter and turn back an advancing adversary from relatively long range.

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWVs): Funds would provide for the procurement of HMMWVs destroyed, damaged, or worn out due to combat operations. The HMMWV has several configurations such as cargo carrier, troop carrier, armament carrier, ambulance, shelter carrier, and Tubelaunched Optically-tracked Wire-to-command-Link (TOW) and Stinger Missile weapons carrier.

"TIPS" hotline program: The request funds a "TIPS" hotline program for reporting insurgent activities and providing theaterwide intelligence operations to prevent and reduce insurgent activities within OIF. The TIPS hotline enables Iraqis to inform DoD personnel of insurgent activities in the local communities.

Armored Vehicles

The request funds the procurement of armored vehicles. Armored vehicles procurement includes MRAP vehicles; Mine

Detection Vehicles that enable detection, protection, and early reaction to explosive hazards while on the move assuring mobility of the force; armored security vehicles and upgrades for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M1 Abrams Tank.

- MRAP Vehicles: Procure an additional 1,000 MRAP light all-terrain vehicles to fill an urgent in-theater need for OEF operations and continue production of selected MRAP vehicles at minimum levels. This request also includes funding to provide logistics support such as repair parts; procurement for increased OEF missions; labor associated with vehicle and component repair in Kuwait, OEF, and OIF; and support of increased air transportation of vehicles. Sustainment costs include maintenance personnel, in-theater facilities, training, repairable and consumable parts. Sustainment costs are driven mostly by an estimated 7,000 miles per year per vehicle OPTEMPO and a more distributed in-theater maintenance and support strategy.
- Stryker Vehicle Survivability Enhancements: Procure Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles (SRAT), slat armor, hull protection kits, and other vehicle kits required to increase survivability and protection of the Stryker crew.

Funds would provide for Mine Detection Vehicles that will be fielded to Explosive Ordnance Disposal and route clearance units. These vehicles are not characterized as MRAP vehicles.

- Mine Protection Clearance Vehicles (MPCV): Also known as the buffalo, the MPCV is capable of interrogating and classifying suspected explosive hazards including IEDs. It has an articulating arm with a digging and lifting attachment to remotely interrogate a suspected explosive hazard and allow the crew to neutralize the hazard.
- Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (VMMD): The VMMD is capable of finding and marking metallic explosive hazards.
 The VMMD consists of two mine detection vehicles and

three detonation trailers.

 Medium Mine Protected Vehicle (MMPV): The MMPV is used for Command and Control of route clearance missions and force protection. The MMPV also includes a series of mechanical flails for area clearance of anti-tank and antipersonnel landmine for safe mobility during military operations.

Funds would provide for Armored Security Vehicles (ASV). The ASV is an all-wheel drive armored vehicle that provides 360 degree ballistic protection against landmines, IEDs and small arms fire. The ASV is designed to configure a series of automatic weapons and is used primarily by the Military Police to perform missions of area security, police intelligence operations, and law and order on the battlefield. The ASV can also be used as a convoy protection platform for combat support and combat service support units.

SUMMARY

Force Protection is essential for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. troops. Without these funds – and the most effective body armor and protective equipment available – U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen will be placed unnecessarily in harm's way.



U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Armored Assault Team One 1, Weapons Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2-7 Marines), sit inside an Uparmored Humvee at an observation post in the Farah province, Afghanistan. The 2-7 Marines, based out of Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif., are a reinforced light infantry battalion deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

U.S. Marine Corps photo By Lance Cpl. Gene Allen Ainsworth III - June 2008



Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to defeat IEDs as the enemy's weapon of choice by attacking the IED network, defeating the device, and training our forces to defeat and disarm these weapons.


Bridge Enacted: \$2.0B

- Attack the Network
- -Counter Bomber
- -Counter Infrastructure
- Defeat the Device
 - -Jammers
- -Detection Systems
- -Robots, Defusing Systems
- Train the Force
- -Personnel Training

Remaining Request: \$1.5B


 Funds actions against all components of the IED system – the IED makers, the trainers, and supporting infrastructures

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Numbers may not add due to rounding

IED Defeat	FY 2007	FY 2008	F	Y 2009 Supplement	tal
\$ in Billions	Enacted	Enacted Enacted E	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total
Attack the Network	1.4	1.3	0.7	0.5	1.2
Defeat the Device	2.5	2.3	1.0	0.6	1.6
Train the Force	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6
Staff and Infrastructure	0.1	0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.1
Total IED Defeat	4.4	4.2	2.0	1.5	3.5

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$3.5 billion for defeating the IED threat to U.S. forces for FY 2009, a 17 percent decrease from the FY 2008 total. Congress appropriated \$2.0 billion in Bridge funding to support IED Defeat efforts in FY 2009. The Department now requests the remaining \$1.5 billion to fund IED Defeat activities.

The IEDs remain a grave threat to U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The enemy continues to use and adapt IEDs as a principal, effective weapon to attack U.S. and Coalition personnel.

To address comprehensively this enduring threat, the Department established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in February 2006 to develop, procure, and field Counter-IED (C-IED) technology as quickly as possible to protect U.S. forces. The organization has produced significant success thus far and continued congressional support will ensure deployed U.S. forces have the best protection against the deadly IED threat.

The funding requested for IED Defeat supports the following Lines of Operation:

Attack the Network;



- Defeat the Device;
- Train the Force; and
- Staff and Infrastructure.

FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2009 remaining request would fund actions against all components of the IED system – the IED makers, the trainers, and supporting infrastructures. The request will help to counter the effects of all forms of IEDs used against the U.S. forces.

Attack the Network

The Department requests an additional \$0.5 billion in FY 2009 supplemental funding to enhance the warfighter's capabilities to attack and disrupt the enemy's IED networks. The JIEDDO supports this effort by fusing information, integrating new capabilities, and developing new tools for modeling and simulation. The JIEDDO pushes or posts operationally integrated products to the warfighter at the appropriate tactical levels. The JIEDDO also provides critical personnel support to theater to augment current forces' capabilities in providing training and defeating IEDs and their supporting networks. Critical items include the following:

- Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS)
 Response: Addresses emerging, immediate needs identified
 by Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task
 Forces. The budget estimate for FY 2009 JUONS derives
 from historical experience as well as current trends and
 anticipated needs.
- Science and Technology for attacking IED Networks: Connects various sensor systems and integrates them with command and control systems enabling the warfighter to conduct operations against IED networks.
- Operations and Information Fusion Support: Harnesses and amasses information, analysis, technology and collaboration to enable more precise attacks against IED networks.

Defeat the Device

The Department requests an additional \$0.6 billion in FY 2009 supplemental funding for initiatives designed to thwart the impact of IEDs after they are emplaced. This includes technologies that assist in detecting IEDs from greater distances, mitigating blast effects, protecting against blast injuries, and tools to enable troops to safely disarm or detonate IEDs before they can be activated by the enemy. The JIEDDO identifies, develops, acquires, and fields technology to Combatant Commanders to find IEDs and defeat them at the point of attack, thereby lowering casualties and enhancing commanders' freedom of action.

- Initiative Development: Supports fundamental research and development efforts focused on technologies aimed at both preventing detonation and mitigating the blast.
- JIEDD Test Board: Coordinates and synchronizes test and evaluation resources with C-IED requirements to ensure that all systems are adequately tested and evaluated in an environment that mirrors that in which they will be operated.
- JUONS Response: Addresses emerging, immediate needs identified by Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces. The budget estimate for FY 2009 JUONS derives from historical experience as well as current trends and anticipated needs.
- Non-JUON Initiatives: Provides resources for the procurement and sustainment of non-JUON initiatives that have proven successful in development and warrant continued support. These programs include efforts to defeat command-wire-triggered IEDs, JIEDDO spiral efforts, vehicle detection systems, and blasting cap defeat systems.

Train the Force

The Department requests an additional \$0.3 billion in FY 2009 supplemental funding for C-IED training support at all service collective training venues. Funding will also provide for critical C-IED surrogate equipment necessary to both ensure service members receive realistic C-IED training prior to deployment, and fuse IED Defeat training efforts across the Services in an integrated approach that supports a joint operating environment.


 Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE): Provides a venue for C-IED training and the development of new operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that reduce the effects of IEDs. The JCOE training initiatives include Route Reconnaissance and Clearance, C-IED Robotics, Predictive Analysis Tools, Weapons Intelligence Teams, Biometrics, and Tactical Site Exploitation.

Staff and Infrastructure

The Department requests an additional \$26.0 million in FY 2009 supplemental funding to finance the critical support structure in terms of civilian personnel, facilities and personnel contracts, professional training and information contracts, travel, and supplies that enable the success of Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force lines of operation.

SUMMARY

The Overseas Contingency Operations request covers planned FY 2009 initiatives and emerging Joint Urgent Operating Needs identified by Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces, who are required to defeat IEDs and protect U.S. troops against the quickly evolving, asymmetrical threats that have proven to be the single most effective weapon against deployed forces.



Military Intelligence

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to support warfighting units with timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence.


Bridge Enacted: \$1.4B

- Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
- All-Source Intelligence
- Counterintelligence (CI)
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
- Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence
- Operational Support
- Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) & Related Communications
- Space ISR
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- Training

Remaining Request: \$3.8B


• Continues support to U.S. military intelligence programs and initiatives in support of the Overseas Contingency Operations

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding





\$ in Billions



Military Intelligence	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009 Supplemental		tal
\$ in Billions	Enacted Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	
Military Intelligence Program	3.4	4.9	1.4	3.8	5.1

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$5.1 billion for Military Intelligence Programs (MIP) vital to the conduct of operations in the Overseas Contingency Operations. Congress appropriated \$1.4 billion in Bridge funding for MIP in June 2008. The Department now requests the remaining \$3.8 billion to fund military intelligence initiatives for the remainder of FY 2009.


FUNDING REQUEST

The Department's remaining request is critical to providing deployed units and next-to-deploy units with access to real-time, operationally focused intelligence. The MIP request is presented according to the following intelligence disciplines:

- Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR);
- All-Source Intelligence;
- Counterintelligence (CI);
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT);
- Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT);
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT);
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence;
- Operational Support;
- SCI & Related Communications;
- Space ISR;
- · Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); and
- Training

Airborne ISR

The Airborne ISR discipline includes activities that synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of airborne sensors, assets and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. The ISR provides a diverse set of "multi-INT" capabilities and reachback support for Combatant Commands (COCOMs) engaged in the Overseas Contingency Operations, particularly U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Airborne ISR is an integrated intelligence and operations function. The MIP request would



fund procurement of and modifications to platforms such as the Warrior (MQ-1C aircraft and ground stations), Constant Hawk, Aerial Reconnaissance Multi-Sensor (ARMS), Marine Corps Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (MCTUAS), F/A-18 Shared Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP), and SENIOR SCOUT to provide critical capabilities to the forces engaged in OEF and OIF.

Additionally, this request would add Predator data link upgrades to mitigate in-theater C-band congestion, increase video quality, and improve interoperability. In addition, the Air Force MIP request includes Global Hawk transportable aircraft shelters to accommodate the deployment of Block 20/30/40 aircraft that are larger than the current shelters.

The Navy request would upgrade 12 MCTUAS to Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) configuration and Laser Designation capability. In addition, these funds would provide critical operations and maintenance support to three Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron systems deployed to Iraq in support of OIF. The Air Force request includes funding to procure additional Wide Area Airborne Surveillance (WAAS) sensors that provide persistent, broad area motion imagery to combat IEDs and insurgent activities. It also would sustain ISR operations through contractor logistics support and Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) ISR Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination (PED) functions. The ISR assets, including U-2 aircraft, Global Hawk, Predator, RJ-135, and DCGS, provide critical intelligence collection and PED for combat operations in both operation OEF and OIF. For example, DCGS provided multi-INT tasking. collection. processing. exploitation. dissemination, and correlation operations support for over 3,800 U-2 aircraft, Global Hawk, and Predator sorties in recent missions. These Air Force MIP ISR capabilities ensure warfighters have the real-time (or near-real-time) time-sensitive targeting, force protection (to include counter-IED), threat warning, and overall situational awareness they need, and

directly improve joint warfighters' and operational commanders' combat effectiveness.

All-Source Intelligence

The All-Source Intelligence discipline funds activities that support the production of finished intelligence products by incorporating all sources of intelligence, to include human, signals, and imagery. The MIP request would fund efforts across the Services and Agencies, but particularly at the Combatant Commands (part of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) request). These funds primarily support contracted analytic efforts and related OPTEMPO to enable 24/7 support of operations around the world.

Counterintelligence (CI)

The CI discipline covers information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

In particular, the request would fund force protection efforts in the Services and DIA, in-theater CI analysis and operations, as well as CI training for deploying forces. The request would fund a broad array of CI capabilities and projects in direct support of deployed forces, like CI Support to Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies (CICODA), to provide direct CI analysis and production support to the Combatant Commands, Military Services, and Defense Agencies worldwide. It would provide near-real-time intelligence and analytic support to protect DoD and other U.S. Government personnel, dependents, and assets against terrorist attacks and exploitation by foreign intelligence services. The CI support to critical information infrastructure provides hardware and software upgrades and the contractors to conduct cyber CI activities targeting foreign terrorists, organization and insurgents that represent a threat to DoD and

other U.S. Government interests. The CI support to technical services responds to Contingency Operations requirements for CI technical services and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capabilities. These funds would support contracted efforts to sustain CI operations and training, as well as some equipment purchases to enable information sharing across components engaged in CI activities.


Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT)

The HUMINT discipline includes intelligence information collected from and provided by human sources. The MIP request supports the evolution of the CI and HUMINT architectures (hardware, communications, training, and software), integrates standardized operational systems, identifies technical requirements for the future force, and bolsters cover and cover mechanisms. These efforts are underway in the Army and DIA. For the Army, this request would sustain contract support to develop and revise CI/HUMINT doctrine for CI source operations, TSCM, polygraph support, biometrics, Offensive Foreign Counter-intelligence Operations, and the management and operation of the Army CI Case Control Office and the Theater Sub-Case Control Offices.

Additionally, the request would continue to support HUMINT training, contract instructors and support personnel to produce 35M HUMINT Collectors and 35LCI Agents at the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC), as well as automated classroom support to produce functional and leader development training as well as capabilities development.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

The GEOINT discipline refers to the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced



activities on earth. The GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. The MIP funds GEOINT efforts primarily through National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), which allow warfighters to "see" the battlefield, an essential capability for combating terrorism and providing quality mission planning information in the theater. The NGA MIP request would support the procurement and operation of mobile, deployable exploitation tools as well as contracted support to enable effective and timely access of GEOINT by the forces on the ground. In particular, the request would support imagery exploitation workstations, Full Motion Video (FMV) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and training for FMV intelligence exploitation units.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)

The MASINT discipline is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. The MASINT capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. The MASINT provides insights into the areas of operation in Afghanistan and Iraq that other intelligence sensors cannot. The Department's request would protection, counter-targeting, support force persistent surveillance, and the reduction of combat risk by funding sensors, sustaining their operation, and providing warfighters the tools to access and utilize the sensor data collected in the field. The request would also support maintenance, spare parts. repairs, and sustainment of older systems, critical for maintaining continuity for the war effort and ensuring no production breaks for critical equipping of sensor systems.

Multidisciplinary Intelligence

The Multidisciplinary Intelligence discipline refers to the collection and processing of information by two or more disciplines. The MIP request would fund the procurement and sustainment of platforms and systems such as the Shadow UAV in the Army, several direction-finding and communications-interception efforts in the Navy and Information Operations within the Department.

Operational Support

The Operational Support discipline funds those activities that provide general, financial, and administrative functions, including logistics, comptroller, legal and audit functions, personnel management, facilities costs, development activities, public

information, medical services, supply operations, base services, and property disposal. This request would sustain 24/7 intelligence staff support at critical operational locations, IT infrastructure support, and some training infrastructure, particularly for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.



Iraqi airmen move an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) caravan aircraft into position for a static display on New al-Muthana Air Base, Iraq. Iraqi Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Kamal al-Barzanji and U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Brooks Bash, commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition Team-Iraq, spoke to Iraqi media personnel about the impact the caravans will have on the Iraqi military.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Paul Villanueva II - July 2008

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

The SIGINT discipline is comprised of communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. The SIGINT provides force protection and indications and warning products in support of deployed forces in the theater, followed by target development, analysis and reporting of logistics, support, and recruitment networks. The MIP request would fund equipment and operations, primarily in the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and National Security Agency (NSA), to equip forces with systems such as TROJAN and Prophet, and to allow them to apply the collected information to ongoing operations. The TROJAN Data Network facilitates all-source analysis and SCI reach back for warfighters in support of OEF/OIF. The TROJAN Classic XXI capability provides unmanned SIGINT systems in forward deployed locations, providing actionable intelligence to Combatant Commanders in particular. The MIP request would provide IT personnel support to users worldwide at the TROJAN Network Control centers, supporting approximately 400 sites worldwide. The request would also provide operational management and oversight of TROJAN systems, to include firewalls, router password management, internet protocol address space, network scanning and patching, and TROJAN Bandwidth Available Upon Demand assignments. The request would also fund training and target familiarization to forces deploying to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

Training

The Training discipline covers efforts throughout all Components to provide deploying forces, as well as deployed forces, with training in intelligence collection, exploitation and analysis, as well as utilization of equipment in the field. The MIP request would fund contracted support and personnel-related costs to ensure U.S. forces train in the latest equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures. In addition, the request would support Army Red Team training to teach U.S. forces to think like the opponents they will face in-theater.

SUMMARY

Without these funds, the Department will be unable to conduct essential surveillance against high value and high interest targets in Afghanistan and Iraq with the frequency and effectiveness required by U.S. warfighters. For example, intelligence collection on – and therefore detection of – IEDs will be reduced, leading to more deaths of and injuries to U.S. forces in-theater. Similarly, curtailed maintenance or sustainment of critical theater-level collection systems, such as UAVs, will threaten the safety and effectiveness of U.S. forces. The MIP capabilities supported in this request are essential to the timely, effective, and targeted operations U.S. and Coalition forces conduct every day.

Iraq Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the United States to support the increasingly capable Iraq Security Forces as they expand operational independence and develop critical enabling capabilities, reducing their reliance on U.S. forces.


Bridge Enacted: \$1.0B

- Enhances logistics capability, equipment, and sustainment of ground forces
- Enhances Iraq Security Forces capabilities
- Provides training in logistics and maintenance
- Continues enhancing the objective Civil Security Force
- Continues development of ministerial functions

Remaining Request: None


Need legislation to extend the availability of the \$1.0B
 Bridge funding through September 30, 2010

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions




Numbers may not add due to rounding

Iraq Security Forces	FY 2007	FY 2008	F	Y 2009 Supplemen	tal
\$ in Billions	Enacted	Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total
Total Iraq Security Forces	5.5	3.0	1.0	*	1.0
* Request includes legislation to cancel and reappropri	ate \$1.0B of Bridge fundir	ng and make it availab	le until September 30, 20	10 Numbers may	not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The \$1.0 billion enacted in FY 2009 to support Iraq security forces (ISF) is a 67 percent decrease from FY 2008. The Department requests that this funding be made available for new obligations through September 30, 2010.

By building on Government of Iraq (GoI) success in assuming primary financial responsibility for security infrastructure, sustaining the ISF, and in bearing a greater share of responsibility for equipment, the Department requires no additional funding for FY 2009 but needs the flexibility to execute these funds through FY 2010.



The ISF continues to demonstrate a growing capability and confidence in providing for security and leading operations in their country. To date, Contingency Operations funding has helped to train 604,369 Iraqi Soldiers and Police (Figure 4), enabling the transfer of 13 provinces to provincial Iraqi control (Figure 5). The FY 2009 funding will consolidate ISF gains as an effective counterinsurgency force, emphasize enabler capabilities, and invest in modest force modernization required for ISF operational

Figure 4. Iraq Security Forces

	Trained*
Ministry of Defense Force	
Iraqi Army	241,444
Support Forces	22,930
Iraqi Air Force	4,827
Iraqi Navy	1,494
Total MoD Forces	270,695

Ministry of Interior Force					
Police	230,103				
Border Enforcement	40,633				
National Police	58,374				
Total Mol Forces	329,110				
Counter Terrorism Bureau					

Counter Terrorism Bureau	
Special Operations	4,564
Total Iraq Security Forces	604,369

^{*604,369} trained of 607,241 assigned as of January 31, 2009 Numbers may not add due to rounding

independence. The FY 2009 budget of \$1.0 billion represents a fraction of the overall investment in ISF, with the GoI providing \$10.0 billion in funding toward its security ministries in calendar year (CY) 2009. However, the U.S. contribution remains essential to expedite the formation of security forces capable of assuming full responsibility for Iraq's security.


The Security Forces funds are routinely two-year appropriations in recognition of the lead times required for many of the purchases and to provide maximum flexibility and allow for adaptation to evolving security environments. Approval of a two-year obligation cycle will streamline the FY 2009 security forces funds and allow for more efficient management.

SUMMARY

The GoI is increasingly assuming financial responsibility for the ISF, allowing the Department to reduce its request from the \$3.0 billion enacted in FY 2008 to the \$1.0 billion enacted amount that will support the current requirement. Although the ISFF investment is decreasing, this funding is instrumental in expediting Iraq's ability to assume full responsibility for its own security. The United States will continue to work with the Iraqis to identify further areas of financial responsibility to transfer to the GoI during FY 2009.

However, tenuous security gains and remaining constraints on the capacity of the Iraqi security ministries mean that the need still exists to act nimbly to events on the ground and changing security force requirements. This FY 2009 funding will allow the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior to increasingly assume operational and strategic control from U.S. and Coalition forces. Further, approval of the Department's legislative request to cancel the \$1.0 billion FY 2009 one-year appropriation and reappropriate it for obligations in FY 2009 & FY 2010 will significantly enhance U.S. flexibility and planning.

Figure 5. Security Self-Reliance



Completed Transitions							
Muthanna	07/12/06	Karbala	10/29/07				
Dhi Qar	09/21/06	Basra	12/16/07				
Najaf	12/20/06	Qadisiyah	07/16/08				
Maysan	04/18/07	Anbar	09/01/08				
Dahuk	05/30/07	Babil	10/23/08				
Ibril	05/30/07	Wasit	10/29/08				
Sulaymaniyah	05/30/07						

100-4



Afghan National Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the United States to develop the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations (COIN) and establish security throughout Afghanistan.


Bridge Enacted: \$2.0B

- Continues building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
- Develops a Counter Narcotic Police capability

Remaining Request: \$3.6B


- Funds the accelerated growth of the Afghan National Army to an end strength of 122,000 Soldiers in 2011
- Continues support to man, train, and equip 82,000 Afghan National Police
- Need legislation to extend the availability of \$0.1B of Bridge funding through September 30, 2010

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Numbers may not add due to rounding

Afghan National Security Forces	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009 Supplemental		
\$ in Billions	Enacted Enacted Bridge E	Bridge Enacted*	Request**	Total	
Ministry of Defense					
Infrastructure	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.8
Equipment and Transportation	3.1	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.7
Training and Operations	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Sustainment	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.3
Total Ministry of Defense	4.9	1.7	1.5	2.6	4.0
Ministry of Interior					
Infrastructure	0.8	0.3	<0.1	0.3	0.3
Equipment and Transportation	0.7	0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Training and Operations	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5
Sustainment	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.6
Total Ministry of Interior	2.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.5
Related Activities				<0.1	<0.1
Total Afghan National Security Forces	7.4	2.7	2.0	3.6	5.6
* Bridge Enacted reflects approved spend plan. Numbers may	not add due to round	lina			

^{*} Bridge Enacted reflects approved spend plan. Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$5.6 billion to support Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for FY 2009. Congress appropriated \$2.0 billion in Bridge funding for ANSF. The Department now requests the remaining \$3.6 billion to support the growth, training, and equipping of the ANA and the ANP. The Department also requests Congress enhance the flexibility and planning of ANSF funds by enacting legislation to extend the availability of \$0.1 billion of Bridge funding through September 30, 2010.

The FY 2009 budget builds on the FY 2008 funding priorities while also funding the training, equipping, facilities construction



^{**} Request includes legislation to cancel and reappropriate \$0.1B of the \$2.0B Bridge funding and make it available until September 30, 2010

and sustainment of the increased ANA end strength of 122,000 (not including a training/transient pool of 12,000). The ultimate goal for the expanded ANSF is to reduce and eventually eliminate its dependence on Coalition forces.

FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations remaining request supports the expanded ANSF with independent capabilities to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements. After thoroughly analyzing the ANSF program in 2006, the Commanding General for the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) determined that the existing program failed to develop an ANSF of sufficient capability to address the increased insurgent threats facing Afghanistan. The ANSF required expanded basic combat enablers (highly-trained and equipped counter-insurgent forces, Close Air Support, Casualty Evacuation, Transport Aviation, Military Intelligence, Logistics, etc.) for the long term. The remaining FY 2009 request funds an expansion of the ANA end strength by 10,000 (to 80,000) and accelerates the further expansion to the newly approved end strength of 122,000 (plus a training/transient pool of 12,000).

The ANSF are steadily growing in strength and capability. By February 2009, there were approximately 83,000 ANA Soldiers and over 80,000 ANP trained and equipped (Figure 6). Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of OEF and the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Despite the progress made to date, much remains to be done. In February 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase in the ANA end strength from 70,000 to 80,000, and in September 2008, they approved an increase to 122,000 (not including a training/transient pool of 12,000).

Increases in violence and narcotics production have complicated the strategic environment and fueled the insurgency. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially the south. This increased strength, combined with the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan Government, enables insurgents to operate more freely in areas that do not have a strong military or government presence.

In response to the changing security environment, the Department requested additional funding in FY 2007 in order to

Figure 6. Afghan National Security Forces

	Trained/Equipped
Ministry of Defense Force	
Ministry of Defense/GS	2,621
Sustaining Institutions	1,237
Intermediate Commands	15,842
ANA Combat Forces	46,522
Afghan Air Corps	2,347
Detainee Operations & Counter-Narcotics Infantry Kandak	1,425
Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS)	12,787
Total MoD Forces	82,781
Ministry of Interior Force	
Ministry of Interior	6,311
Uniformed Police/ANAP	52,088
ANCOP	2,435
Border Police	12,464
Counter Narcotics Police	3,054
CID, Customs, Counter-Terrorism	4,004
Total Mol Forces	80,356
Total Afghan National Security Forces*	163,137

^{*} As of February 28, 2009

Numbers may not add due to rounding 100-17


accelerate and expand the capabilities of the Afghan forces. The FY 2008 Supplemental continued funding for the expanded response. The FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations request will enable the Department to accelerate the training and equipping of the additional ANSF with more independent capabilities. Providing additional funding is a fundamental and necessary step toward securing Afghanistan and preventing it from again becoming a safe haven for extremists.

Afghan National Army

Building on FY 2007 and FY 2008 supplemental funding for the ANA, the FY 2009 remaining request will provide the expanded ANA with the capacity and capabilities that will allow it to assume the lead for counterinsurgency and internal operations. Due to the changing security environment and a resurgent Taliban, the pre-2007 plan for the ANA would have created a basic infantry force that would not have been capable of conducting counterinsurgency missions without significant assistance from international forces. The FY 2009 request, which supports the larger, more comprehensive and more capable force, builds on the current success made by the ANA. These soldiers have fought bravely along side U.S. and Coalition forces and have earned the respect of the Afghan people. In August 2008, the ANA assumed responsibility for security of the capital, (RC-Capital) meeting an important capability milestone.

This remaining request will finish the build-out of the Army's intermediate commands and sustaining institutions as originally designed for the 70,000 ANA force and provide the resources needed to begin growing the ANA to the new 122,000 end strength objective (not including a training/transient pool of 12,000).

Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission, are now part of the Afghanistan planned force. The Army will now also include combat support units, including



engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police. The FY 2009 remaining request includes funds to increase and sustain these units as well.

Afghan National Police

The revised ANSF program recognized that a more robust police force is required to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, particularly in areas from which the ANA and international forces have cleared Taliban fighters. The original ANP program focused on a more narrow law enforcement mission, leaving the ANP less capable of addressing a security environment complicated by Taliban, narco-traffickers, and other illegal elements.

The ANP received additional resources under the FY 2007 and FY 2008 Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations, including an increase in end strength from 62,000 to 82,000,

supported in the FY 2007 budget request. In comparison with the ANA, the ANP lagged in progress, due in part to institutional corruption, low literacy rates among recruits, and a history of low pay. The FY 2009 request continues to equip and train the 82,000 person ANP and provides funds for the continued build out of the ANP training and sustaining institutions. Of the total FY 2009 Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) request, approximately 27 percent is for the ANP.

To address one of Afghanistan's key police issues, CSTC-A introduced the Focused District Development (FDD) Program, a pilot initiative designed for the critical development requirements of the ANP in each district. The FDD provides a strong reform program that focuses resources on the district level Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) by providing district police training for an entire unit. The FDD takes into account the need to professionalize the police and eliminate corruption in order to ensure that systems of justice, governance, development, and outreach are in place, contribute to local security, and support a stable, well-respected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The FDD initiative is complementary to ongoing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations and will center on the Eastern and Southern regions. with eventual expansion throughout the country. The CSTC-A also placed increased emphasis on the training and mentoring of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) through the Focused Border Development (FBD), which began in October 2008 and is similar to FDD. The FY 2009 request includes funding for training and mentoring of the ABP, as well as construction of ABP facilities.

Additionally, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized unit with tactical gear, improved force protection, and specialized equipment, presently has 26 of the 52 companies fielded. The ANCOP's primary role is that of a national quick reaction force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots. The ANCOP also relieve district AUP forces while those forces receive training and reform through the FDD process.



Detainee Operations

Funding for Detainee Operations provides mentors and organizes, trains, and equips a self-sustaining detainee guard program within the MoD for the detention of Afghan enemy combatants. The FY 2009 funds will be spent on sustainment and training of the guard force.

Counterinsurgency Operations

The FY 2009 budget request also includes funding for additional counterinsurgency activities that focus on training members of both the ANA and the ANP together to build cooperation and

cross-pollination of ideas and strengths. The COIN activities funding will expand training at the Afghan Defense University, and the COIN Academy, in addition to construction of an Engineering School and COIN training ranges. The training will include both ANA and ANP members.

The Way Ahead

The United States cannot achieve nor sustain these ANSF objectives alone. The GIRoA has committed to providing the manpower to meet these objectives. Equally important, Afghan leadership is committed to making the necessary security sector reforms that will ensure the ANSF are responsible and enduring institutions. Through ventures like the Border Management Initiative, the United States is helping the GIRoA increase revenues, which will provide a source of income to support and sustain the forces. The international community also has a role in building the ANSF. Various countries have donated millions of dollars of equipment for both the ANA and the ANP. Germany, Canada, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have played key roles with their police-training programs, and ISAF countries contribute Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) that embed with trained ANA units to provide in-thefield mentoring. NATO is also exploring additional near- and long-term ways to assist with equipping and training the ANSF.

For the security sector in particular, the United States recognizes that more needs to be done in response to the resurgent Taliban and other insurgent groups. Both the United States and international forces have faced the enemy in larger-scale operations and more intense fighting. The ANSF played an increasingly important role as COIN operations progressed.

The shift in the strategic environment also highlighted the need to revise and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. In order to enable the ANSF to respond to the resurgent Taliban and other insurgency groups, the United States needs to continue to accelerate the pace of the ANSF

program for the expanded force and to provide enhanced capabilities. The desired goal for the ANSF remains a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable force, less reliant on international assistance and more capable of taking the fight to the Taliban.

SUMMARY

The GIRoA does not have the budget, the experienced security forces, or the infrastructure required to equip, build, and sustain a reliable, effective security force alone. Without U.S. funding, the GIRoA will be unable to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia, Taliban, AI Qaeda, narcoterrorists, and other anti-government elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. This is a critical capability to prevent reemergence of safe havens when the Afghans eventually take full responsibility for security in their country. Further, approval of the Department's legislative request to cancel the FY 2009 appropriation and reappropriate it for obligations in FY 2009 & FY 2010 will significantly enhance U.S. flexibility and planning.



AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy


It is the policy of the United States to support the Government of Pakistan in building the capability of its security forces.

Bridge Enacted: None

Remaining Request: \$0.4B


- Builds the capabilities of the Pakistan Security Forces to secure their borders, fight insurgents, and prevent their territory from becoming a safe haven for extremists
- Funds the Security Development Plan and training and equipment to develop the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistan Security Forces

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Numbers may not add due to rounding

Pakistan Counterinsurgency	FY 2007 FY 2008		FY 2009 Supplemental			
Capability Fund \$ in Billions	Enacted Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total		
Infrastructure	_	_	_	<0.1	<0.1	
Equipment and Transportation		_	_	0.4	0.4	
Humanitarian Relief	_	_	_	<0.1	<0.1	
Training and Operations	_	_	_	<0.1	<0.1	
Total Pakistan COIN Capability Fund			_	0.4	0.4	

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$0.4 billion to accelerate the development of Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities and operations in support of U.S. efforts in OEF.

The purpose of the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is to improve Pakistan's ability to secure its borders, deny safe haven to extremists, fight insurgents, and provide security for the indigenous population in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. This Fund will help Pakistan, a critical ally in OEF, to develop expanded counterinsurgency capabilities to improve success in overcoming extremists on the Pakistan side of the border with Afghanistan, thus increasing the opportunity for victory in Afghanistan. Support for Pakistan's security forces fighting in the western frontier region will help ensure a more successful outcome for OEF.

The goal is to: 1) fund the Security Development Plan (SDP); 2) assist Pakistan Security Forces to organize, train, equip, and operate as a counterinsurgency-capable force; and 3) provide humanitarian relief in post-combat/conflict areas. By providing increased resources the PCCF will support a program to help the Government of Pakistan build the counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan Security Forces.




Lack of funding could reduce the capability of Pakistan's security forces to pursue terrorists that threaten the U.S. and its allies and could impede success in OEF.

FUNDING REQUEST

The PCCF will be used to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan's defense and border security forces by continuing the SDP. The SDP is a multiyear program designed to enhance Pakistan's capability to secure the border with Afghanistan, deny safe haven for terrorists, and provide security for the indigenous population in Pakistan's border regions. The SDP is a critical program to help build counterinsurgency capabilities in Pakistan and to date has been funded using a number of authorities, such as Counternarcotics and DoD Section 1206; Security Assistance Program. The PCCF will provide a single authority and the requisite funding to help achieve success on the ground in Afghanistan.

In addition to funding the SDP, the PCCF will support the replacement of equipment necessary for the Pakistan Security Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations against enemy militants. Replacing Pakistan Army assets destroyed or expended in seven years of operations in the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will give new life to units fighting a war with dated and depleted equipment. This includes requirements for: tactical wheeled vehicles, utility helicopters, armored personnel carriers, tactical radio equipment, and specialized ammunition.

To perform more effectively in its counterinsurgency role, the Pakistan military also requires training and several specific combat multipliers including: Army aviation helicopters; close air support capability; night fighting capability; training and a civil affairs/humanitarian relief capability.



SUMMARY

Success in Afghanistan lies in part in Pakistan's ability to deny safe haven for terrorists. Funding a robust counterinsurgency capability for Pakistan will serve as a combat multiplier and increase success in OEF. Lack of funding could result in a Pakistan less capable of defeating extremists that threaten the democratic government in Pakistan, our regional partners, and the U.S. homeland.



Coalition Support

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the United States to support Coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations to counter terrorism, and may not otherwise have the financial or logistical means to do so.


Bridge Enacted: \$0.3B

- Reimburses Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations supporting U.S. military operations
- Funds airlift and sustainment for partner nations

Remaining Request: \$1.4B


- Continues reimbursements to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations for their support to U.S. military operations
- Funds airlift and sustainment for partner nations in Iraq, Afghanistan
- Funds an air traffic control and safety system for the Kyrgyz Republic, whose Manas Air Base provides a key transit for U.S. and Coalition aircraft

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Numbers may not add due to rounding

Coalition Support	FY 2007	FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 Supplement		tal	
\$ in Billions	Enacted	Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total
Coalition Support Funds	1.1	1.1	0.2	1.0	1.2
Lift and Sustain	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.5
Kyrgyz Republic Air Traffic Control & Safety System			_	<0.1	<0.1
Total Coalition Support	1.4	1.4	0.3	1.4	1.7

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$1.7 billion to continue support Coalition partners for FY 2009, an increase of \$0.3 billion over the FY 2008 enacted level of \$1.4 billion. To date, Congress has appropriated \$0.3 billion in FY 2009 Bridge funding for Coalition Support. The Department now requests an additional \$1.4 billion to fund support to Coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations in the Overseas Contingency Operations for the remainder of FY 2009.

These funds will enable the Department of Defense to leverage the support of coalition partners by reimbursing them for expenses incurred in support of U.S. military operations (Coalition Support Funds) and providing logistical support (Lift and Sustain) to countries that are participating in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, these funds will support a needed safety enhancement to improve the Kyrgyz Republic's control of its airspace, creating a safer environment for U.S. military and coalition aircraft transiting the Kyrgyz Republic in support of OEF. Funding to support these efforts is more critical to current operations than ever before.



The composition of the Coalition is more diverse than in the past and the conflict in Afghanistan more intense. The Coalition countries who receive support are able to participate in U.S. military operations only because of the provision of financial support, in the form of reimbursements for expenses incurred (or to be incurred) or provision of transportation, sustainment, and subsistence when the forces are down-range.

The remaining funding request for FY 2009 will:

- Ensure Pakistan, Jordan, and key cooperating nations are reimbursed for support to U.S. operations (\$1.0 billion);
- Provide funding to pay for Lift and Sustainment support to Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (\$0.4 billion);



 Provide authority for the Department to transfer to the Department of State to provide an air traffic control and safety system for the Kyrgyz Republic (\$0.03 billion)

These programs support U.S. military operations and reduce the stress on U.S. forces. Failure to fully fund these programs would jeopardize the continued support of important partners like Pakistan and Jordan who conduct key border operations. Lack of requested funds could also minimize participation of Coalition partners like Poland and Romania, who plan to deploy thousands of troops to Afghanistan. All of these funding requirements serve as force multipliers providing increased troop strength and enhanced safety for U.S. military operations.

FUNDING REQUEST

Coalition Support

Continued support from Congress for Coalition Support Funds is critical to maintaining the viability of the Coalition and supporting countries that are able to make a military contribution to the Contingency Operations but do not have the means to finance their participation. The Department's remaining request for FY 2009 is \$1.0 billion.

Specific examples of the results of DoD Coalition Support include:

- Pakistan
 - Since October 2001, the United States has reimbursed Pakistan approximately \$6.4 billion for operations in support of OEF.
 - Pakistan, a key ally in the Contingency Operations, regularly engages enemy forces, arrests and kills Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, and renders significant support to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.

- Pakistan has increased its forces to more than 110,000 troops in the border region with Afghanistan and has suffered over 1,400 deaths of military and security forces personnel since September 11, 2001.
- The United States reimburses Pakistan for military support to OEF. The expenses Pakistan incurs to conduct joint operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces include providing logistical support for its forces, manning observation posts along the Afghanistan border, conducting maritime interdiction operations and facilitating resupply efforts for OEF.

Jordan

- Since October 2001, the United States has reimbursed Jordan close to \$0.5 billion for operations Jordan is conducting in support of OEF and OIF.
- Despite limited economic means, Jordan conducts border operations along the Jordan-Iraq border. These operations are having a major impact in curbing undesirables transiting across the border.
- Jordan also operates two field hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing medical treatment to thousands of injured Coalition forces and civilians.

Key Cooperating Nations

- Kyrgyz Republic: The United States has reimbursed the Kyrgyz Republic approximately \$0.04 billion for support it provides to U.S. military operations in support of OEF. Continued unhindered access to Kyrgyz facilities at Manas Air Base is vital to OEF logistical operations.
- Other partners including Georgia, Uzbekistan, Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Tonga, and Mongolia have received reimbursements with Coalition



Support Funds. These countries have supported the Coalition and reduced requirements for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lift and Sustain

Lift and Sustain funds are essential to enable the Department to support Coalition forces with vital logistical support in the form of transportation to and from Iraq and Afghanistan and sustainment and subsistence while serving with U.S. forces in both countries. Coalition forces who receive this support would not be able to participate without these provisions. The Department's remaining request for FY 2009 is \$0.4 billion.

Since FY 2005, the Department has provided approximately \$1.3 billion in logistical support to Coalition partners with a lesser capacity to pay. The Department requests a slight increase in Lift and Sustain funding for FY 2009, to meet higher charges associated with transportation, food, and other sustainment.

Without these funds, smaller Coalition countries that lack the financial means to transport their forces to and from Iraq and Afghanistan or to sustain their forces for extended deployments would not be able to participate. Support from the United States allows these forces to remain in-theater and to contribute to Coalition operations. Without this vital support, the Coalition forces may have to return home, increasing the burden on U.S. forces.

Kyrgyz Republic Air Traffic Control System

The Department of Defense would transfer these fund to the Department of State to facilitate the acquisition of a long-range air traffic control and safety system for the Kyrgyz Republic. Today Manas Air Base provides a vital transit point for U.S. and Coalition military aircraft in support of air refueling operations, resupply operations, and aero-medical missions. Should the U.S. remain at Manas, this system would provide a much needed air safety enhancement to Kyrgyz Republic airspace, thereby providing greater protection for U.S. and Coalition aircraft.

SUMMARY

It is clear the United States cannot succeed in the Overseas Contingency Operations alone. The support of U.S. Coalition partners is fundamental to operational success, and U.S. financial and logistical support is necessary to ensure their continued participation.

Coalition Support Funds are vital. They enable Coalition partners to support U.S. military operations. Without this program, the U.S. will not be able to reimburse Pakistan and Jordan for critical border operations or support countries like Poland, Romania, and others who are willing to serve in key roles in U.S. military operations but lack the needed training and equipment to ensure safety of U.S. and Coalition forces. Without support from Coalition forces, the U.S. military may be required to take on operations better covered by Coalition partners. In the case of Pakistan and Jordan border operations, the United States would likely not be able to conduct these operations as capably as the indigenous forces.

Without Lift and Sustain funding, many Coalition countries would not be able to maintain their forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would adversely affect U.S. operations by placing an additional burden on U.S. forces. Without support in Afghanistan, NATO members with limited economies, such as Poland and Romania, may not be able to participate thus hindering the ability of NATO and the United States to succeed in Afghanistan.

Without funding for the Kyrgyz Republic Air Traffic Control and Safety System, an important safety enhancement would be neglected, potentially hindering Coalition operations in the region and endangering U.S. and Coalition forces.



Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide commanders in the field with a flexible source of funds to assist local populations with urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction.


Bridge Enacted*: \$1.0B

- Funds a variety of critical, small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects as identified by commanders in the field, such as:
 - Protective measures
 - Transportation and roads
 - Health and education needs
 - Power lines and generators

Remaining Request: \$0.5B


- Supports additional requirements for operations in Afghanistan
- Incorporates reduced requirements for CERP funding to Iraq, given changing conditions on the ground and increased Government of Iraq capacity

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



^{*} FY 2009 Bridge Enacted funds were allocated for CERP

Commander's Emergency	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009 Supplemental		tal
Response Program \$ in Billions	Enacted	Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total
Commander's Emergency Response Fund	1.0	1.7	1.0	0.5	1.4

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$1.4 billion to continue support of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) for FY 2009. This is a reduction of \$0.3 billion from FY 2008 enacted level, the result of continuing Departmental efforts to transfer financial responsibility to the Government of Iraq (GoI) and redistributing funds between the Afghan and Iraqi theaters of operations. The Department now requests the remaining \$0.5 billion to fund CERP for the rest of FY 2009.

FUNDING REQUEST

The CERP enables commanders in the field to respond quickly to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by executing programs that will assist the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. As such, CERP is a dynamic, flexible program that provides commanders with the tools to address local concerns, bolster support for local governments, and undermine insurgents. The CERP's demonstrated multiplier effect continues to help U.S. forces hold recent security gains and counter insurgent influence. The remaining FY 2009 request is required to continue to support the ground commander's ability to respond to local humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.

The FY 2009 funding request is a reduction from the FY 2008 enacted level and reflects successes achieved on the ground in Iraq, an increased level of investment by the Gol, and evolving conditions in Afghanistan. Although recent security gains in Iraq and improvements in Gol capacity have allowed the Department to transfer programs and associated costs, the CERP remains



indispensable to the U.S. Government's counterinsurgency strategy in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Insurgent activities continue to destabilize neighborhoods and degrade infrastructure, health, education, and economic life in both countries. Military commanders consider CERP a key tool to maintain and expand stability gains. Commanders apply funds to assist in alleviating the hardships inflicted on the civilian population of Afghanistan and Iraq and providing needed relief and reconstruction. The remaining request for FY 2009 is critical to achieving additional security and development gains in Afghanistan and sustaining security gains in Iraq.

CERP funds Military Commanders' projects related to water and sanitation; food production and distribution; agriculture; electricity production and distribution; healthcare; education; telecommunications; transportation; irrigation; civic cleanup; repair of civic and cultural facilities; economic, financial and management improvements; efforts to improve rule of law and governance; condolence payments and former detainee payments; reimbursement for losses incurred as a result of U.S., Coalition or supporting military operations; protective measures to ensure the viability and survivability of critical infrastructure sites; and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects.

Increasing Government of Iraq Participation

The Gol has assumed responsibility for substantial reconstruction costs. In October 2008, the Gol began to assume responsibility for payments to the 51,000 Sons of Iraq (Sol) in the Baghdad area, thereby covering \$15.5 million in monthly payments previously funded through CERP. The gradual transition has been positive with both government and Sol leaders supporting the process. Similarly, Iraq provided a total of \$550.0 million for post-kinetic reconstruction in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and other cities. In the past, these efforts to enhance stability and cement hard-won security gains could have fallen to U.S. commanders with CERP funding.

Iraq-CERP (I-CERP)

With the success of the U.S. appropriated CERP funds in Iraq, in April 2008 the GoI provided \$270.0 million of Iraqi funds to be executed through the established CERP processes in Iraq. Although the U.S. military is the I-CERP executor, these funds are restricted by Iraqi requirements and priorities; they cannot substitute for the U.S. CERP funds and are kept separate. The GoI has designated their use for urgent reconstruction projects benefiting the Iraqi people in the 15 non-Kurdish provinces at specific proportions.

CERP Categories

Types of Payments/Projects Funded by CERP – FY 2007/2008

Water/Sanitation – Repair or reconstruction of water treatment plants, sanitation facilities, pump stations, pipelines, wells, sewers

Education – School repair/furnishings; education supplies, student backpacks, sport areas

Electricity – Repair or reconstruction of electricity stations, power lines, generators, street lights

Food Production & Distribution – Humanitarian food deliveries, livestock, animal feed, slaughterhouse repair, fish farms

Healthcare – Hospital and health care center repair, medical equipment, wheelchairs, ambulances

Agriculture/Irrigation – Irrigation stations and canals, increase agriculture production

Protective Measures – Contracts for security at reconstruction projects, oil refinery and pipeline facilities

Civic/Cultural Repair – Repair to religious buildings, museums, libraries, cultural centers, city halls, fire stations

Telecommunications – Repair or reconstruction of telecommunication systems infrastructure.

Transportation – Road repair, paving, highway guard rails and lights

Condolence Payments – Payment to individual civilians for death or injury

Battle Damage/Repair – Payments for property damage, economic and financial improvement

100-5

SUMMARY

Without the funds in the remaining CERP request, commanders in the field would lose a proven, effective, and flexible tool in the counterinsurgency fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. Commanders would be less able to rapidly respond to immediate needs of the Afghan and Iraqi people or to apply resources to activities that build trust, provide stability and security, and ultimately result in the increased safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel.



Military Construction

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy


It is the policy of the Department of Defense to employ limited construction projects to support wartime operations and enhance force protection.

Bridge Enacted: None

Remaining Request: \$0.9B


 Infrastructure projects in Regional Commands – East and South – to support the realignment of U.S. forces into and within Afghanistan

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Numbers may not add due to rounding

Military Construction \$ in Billions	FY 2007	FY 2008 Enacted	FY 2009 Supplemental		
	Enacted		Bridge Enacted	Request*	Total
Operational Facilities	0.2	0.1	_	0.5	0.5
Roads and Bridges	0.4	0.2	_	0.1	0.1
Basic Infrastructure	0.1	0.5	_	0.1	0.1
Force Protection	<0.1	0.1		_	
Camp Lemonier, Djibouti	0.1	<0.1		_	
Support Facilities	0.2	0.2	_	0.2	0.2
Landfills	_	0.1	_	_	
Total Military Construction	0.9	1.3		0.9	0.9

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$0.9 billion for critical military construction projects in FY 2009. The Department did not request any funding for Military Construction in the FY 2009 Bridge Request.

Most of these projects support the realignment of forces into and within Afghanistan, both enabling strategic and operational flexibility and increasing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Military construction is a key enabler in the Overseas Contingency Operations, directly supporting wartime operations by providing operational and support facilities at key locations in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility.

FUNDING REQUEST

The requested funds primarily support the increase in forces in Afghanistan. In Regional Command (RC) – East, military construction projects will support ongoing operations, as well as



U.S. Navy Seabee, Builder 3rd Class Chad Smith, Steel Worker 3rd Class William S. Sholey and Builder 3rd Class Merlyna Crank, assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 3, Detachment 4, in support of International Security Assistance Force, smooth out freshly laid concrete on the Camp Heselton compound at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eli J. Medellin – July 2008

increased presence at several contingency operating bases. The Department's request also provides infrastructure projects that increase its ability to enable both strategic and operational flexibility to support the President's decision to increase U.S.

^{*} In addition, legislation is proposed to cancel and reappropriate \$100 million of Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide funding for the National Security Agency to Military Construction, Defense-wide appropriation for a classified project

force levels in Afghanistan, particularly in RC-South. Such projects will increase the capacity of U.S. air-lines of communication in theater, broaden U.S. logistics and ISR capabilities throughout the theater, and provide the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, with the ability to reposition forces as necessary to counter emerging threats or reinforce successful operations.

Operational Facilities

The request includes \$0.5 billion for operational facilities, primarily focused on increased aviation support throughout Afghanistan. Rotary wing ramps and taxiways at Sharana, Shank, Tarin Kowt, Maywand and Kandahar in Afghanistan are crucial to support airlift capabilities. Combat Aviation Support aprons and runways at Bagram and Tombstone/Bastion also support planned operations. Other projects, such as fuel operations and storage and munitions storage, support the Department's readiness by increasing supplies at key locations.

Roads and Bridges

The request includes \$0.1 billion for construction of one Counter-IED road in RC-East, in Afghanistan, in order to help protect the movement of U.S. supplies and troops.

Basic Infrastructure

Bagram and Kandahar Air Bases remain critical to the Commanders' ability to increase and reposition forces in

Afghanistan. Critical infrastructure projects such as drainage systems, utilities and power plant expansions are included in this request, reflecting the high demand at those bases. The amount requested for these basic infrastructure projects is \$0.1 billion.


Support Facilities

The request also includes \$0.2 billion for aviation maintenance facilities and fuel distribution projects, which are required at several Afghanistan locations in RC-East and RC-South to support increased operations by both fixed and rotary wing aviation assets. Additionally, in order to support additional forces and enhance operational flexibility, temporary housing (e.g., relocatable buildings) and other support projects (e.g., brigade command and control facilities) are required at several locations throughout RC-East and RC-South, including Shank, Altimur, Airborne, Joyce, Maywand and Tarin Kowt.

SUMMARY

These military construction projects (Figure 7) have been requested by the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and are critical because of the immediacy of the troop movements and the scarcity of supporting infrastructure.

Figure 7. Military Construction Projects \$946.8M*



^{*} Excludes Military Construction funding for Child Care Centers (\$289.4M), Wounded, III, and Injured (\$513.5M) NATO Security Investment Program (\$100.0M), and BRAC (\$263.3M) addressed in other categories

Reconstitution

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure force readiness by quickly repairing or replacing equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out in Overseas Contingency Operations, and by providing critical equipment and technology for future deploying forces.


Bridge Enacted: \$11.6B

- Replenishment of munitions and equipment
- Replacement of equipment and combat losses, including wear-and-tear
- Repair of tanks, vehicles, aircraft and communication systems, as well as the repair and/or upgrade of other equipment

Remaining Request: \$11.6B


 Continued replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment utilized in Overseas Contingency Operations worldwide

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Reconstitution	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY	2009 Supplemental	
\$ in Billions	Enacted	Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total
Replenishment					
Army	1.0	1.1	0.1	1.0	1.1
Navy	0.5	0.4	_	0.1	0.1
Marine Corps	0.4	0.4	_	0.3	0.3
Air Force	0.1	0.3	_	0.2	0.2
Total Replenishment	2.0	2.2	0.1	1.6	1.7
Replacement					
Army	15.0	19.4	1.6	5.8	7.4
Navy	1.1	5.7	_	0.5	0.5
Marine Corps	5.9	2.9	0.2	1.0	1.2
Air Force	1.4	7.6	0.2	1.1	1.3
Defense-wide	0.6	1.5	_	0.4	0.4
Total Replacement	24.0	37.1	2.0	8.8	10.8
Repair					
Army	8.5	8.5	7.9		7.9
Navy	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.6
Marine Corps	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.7
Air Force	0.6	1.4	0.7	0.7	1.4
Total Repair	10.3	11.2	9.5	1.1	10.6
Total Reconstitution	36.3	50.5	11.6	11.6	23.2

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$23.2 billion for the timely reconstitution of equipment used during Contingency Operations. Congress appropriated \$11.6 billion in Bridge funding to reconstitute equipment. To fund reconstitution for the rest of FY 2009, the Department now requests an additional \$11.6 billion in supplemental funding.

Reconstitution encompasses maintenance and procurement activities to restore and enhance combat capability to units and pre-positioned equipment that were destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn beyond economic repair due to combat operations. Reconstitution is funded through a variety of appropriations, and includes the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment.

FUNDING REQUEST

Combat operations put considerable stress on U.S. military equipment beyond that incurred during peacetime operations. Overseas Contingency Operations require the military to use its equipment at much higher rates than in routine peacetime missions. In Afghanistan and Iraq, usage rates have run two to eight times higher than comparable peacetime rates.

In addition to higher rates of use, the very nature of warfare places additional stress on equipment. Whether evading enemy fire, surviving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or engaging enemy forces in direct combat, equipment is used under extreme conditions. The damage resulting from combat operations, coupled with the reduced time available for detailed maintenance, leads to an accumulation of wear and tear on equipment.

The harsh physical environment, both terrain and climate, in Afghanistan and Iraq causes equipment damage, further increasing maintenance requirements. Parts such as turbine engines for aircraft and tanks tend to fail more often when operating under harsh conditions. Moreover, the wear on these subsystems steadily diminishes their ability to be rebuilt or reused, ultimately increasing replacement and maintenance costs. Another contributor to equipment stress is the practice of adding armor to unarmored trucks. The extra weight combined with the occasional need to shift loads in ways for which the vehicles were not designed, places greater stress on the tires, suspensions, frames, and power trains of these systems. During reconstitution, older systems are replaced with new models designed to accept and carry armor.

Replenishment

Timely replenishment of equipment is critical to ensuring the deploying units have the equipment needed to achieve the mission.



This category provides for replenishment of ammunition and missile stocks consumed in pre-deployment training of accelerated BCTs and forces in the fight. The BCTs are equipped with significantly more weapons and require individual and crew training to reach proficiency prior to deployment.

Replenishment includes conventional ammunition items for all services, such as bombs, artillery rounds, small and medium caliber mortars, shoulder-launched rockets, aircraft launched rockets and flares, demolition materials, grenades, propellant charges, simulators, cartridges and non-lethal munitions. The request also funds precision guided ammunition items such as the Army's Excalibur artillery round and the Air Force's Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

The request also funds tactical missiles to replace those expended in combat, such as Hellfire, Javelin, Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided (TOW), and Guided Multiple Launched Rockets.

Replacement

Reconstitution funding provides for the replacement of equipment lost in battle or stressed beyond economic repair. This ranges from major platforms such as four F-22A Air Force aircraft and various Army helicopters (e.g., 12 AH-64 and 4 CH-47) to support equipment such as radios, power equipment, and construction equipment.

Funds are also requested for aircraft modifications designed to replace or upgrade capabilities required to support Overseas Contingency Operations. Examples of major aircraft modifications include:

- Various Air Force Aircraft Targeting Pods
- Predator/Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Data Link Retrofits

The request includes funding for the replacement of combat and logistics support equipment needed to maintain and sustain operations in the theater, such as secure radios, communications network switches, terrestrial and satellite receivers, and small arms and surveillance equipment, which are needed to allow U.S. forces to maintain a tactical advantage. The request also includes funding for a myriad of day-to-day use items such as generators, tools, power equipment and construction equipment.

The request also funds the replacement and modification of a wide variety of support vehicles lost in battle or stressed beyond economic repair. Examples of vehicle replacements and modifications include the following:

- High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Lightweight high performance four wheel drive air transportable and air droppable family of tactical vehicles, some equipped with TOW missile firing capability
- Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles A combination of heavy tanker, wrecker, cargo, and tractor trucks used in line haul,

local haul, unit resupply and other missions throughout the tactical environment to support modern combat vehicles

In addition to major platforms such as aircraft and vehicles, it is important to emphasize that reconstitution funding provides for the replacement of day-to-day support equipment necessary to keep the platforms operating at peak combat readiness. This support equipment includes aircraft and vehicle spare parts, radios and other command and communications equipment, bridges, containers, medical equipment, power equipment, tools and other construction equipment, water purification and fuel distribution systems, air traffic control equipment, small boats, salvage equipment, explosive ordinance disposal equipment, night vision equipment, firefighting equipment, and portable shelters. Replacing these items as they wear out is critical not only to the operation of the platforms, but also to the subsistence of the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen.

Repair

Repair activities involve the necessary depot and intermediate level maintenance required to restore equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan to pre-deployment conditions.

For the Army, the request funds depot and intermediate repair of a wide variety of platforms such as helicopters, trucks, HMMWVs, Bradley, Stryker, and other tactical vehicles. It also funds repair of support equipment such as radios, power equipment, physical security equipment, and construction equipment.

For the Department of the Navy, this request funds the repair of aircraft, ships and support equipment. This also includes the cost to overhaul, clean, inspect, and maintain equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of an operation. Major components include:

- Airframe rework
- Engine rework

- Aeronautical components
- Ship operating systems

The request funds Air Force Depot Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). Aircraft continuously deployed in support of OEF and OIF experience extreme operational demands in harsh environments, thus accelerating the need for repairs to maintain operational capability. Funding will support bomber and fighter weapon systems used in support of operations including the B-1, F-15, F-16, and ground stations for Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and Global Broadcast Service (GBS). Also included is CLS funding that addresses the wear and tear resulting from the flying hours associated with KC-10, C-21, C-37, C-40, U-2, and Global Hawk in support of Overseas Contingency Operations. Increased flying hours have driven increased costs for spares, repairs, and replenishment, as well as additional contract Field Team Support at deployed locations.

Air Force operational requirements, as a direct result of contingency's operation, have raised the demand for depot level repairs, and the funding in the remaining Overseas Contingency Operations request provides fleet-wide refurbishment for Active Duty Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. Funding will support depot maintenance overhauls for multiple aircraft (e.g., A-10, B-52, C-5, C-130, F-16 and KC-135). Additionally, funds will allow for depot maintenance and depot software maintenance for missiles.

SUMMARY

Replacing, repairing, and replenishing the complex equipment in the U.S. inventory is critical to continuing the Overseas Contingency Operations. Given the harsh conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, application of Reconstitution funding has been central to military readiness.



Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are placing demands on equipment far beyond what is typically experienced during training or home-station operations. These higher demands increase reconstitution requirements for equipment employed in the theater, and they do not end when units and equipment redeploy to the home station. The Department's ability to sustain itself through reconstitution efforts is essential to ensuring that the nation has a ready and reliable military force. Reconstitution is a cost of war and one of several components affecting readiness.

Without the requested funds, overall U.S. military ability to support deploying units will suffer. Critical military capabilities will be deficient and combat air, mobility, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support pledged to Combatant Commanders will not meet mission requirements. In sum, without the requested funding the Department will not be able to support and train the next deploying forces.



Accelerate Grow the Force

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps to ensure the supply of forces is sufficient to meet strategic demands, while reducing the deployment stress on our Soldiers and Marines.


Bridge Enacted: \$0.1B


 Installation support and training costs for the increased force structure

Remaining Request: \$2.2B*

 Pay and allowances, installation support, and training costs for the increased force structure

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding





^{*} A cancellation of \$3.4B in the base budget, to reflect savings in the price of fuel and a reduction to Army procurement items, offsets the cost of Family Support, NCR Acceleration, and Military Personnel requirements

Accelerate Grow the Force	FY 2007 Enacted	FY 2008	FY 2009 Supplemental					
\$ in Billions		Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total			
Army	_	0.4	0.1	1.8	1.8			
USMC	_	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.5			
Accelerate Grow the Force	_	0.5	0.1	2.2	2.3			

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$2.3 billion for accelerating growth of the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Active Marine Corps above the levels funded in the FY 2009 baseline President's Budget request. In June 2008, Congress appropriated \$0.1 billion in Bridge funding for this effort. The Department now requests the remaining \$2.2 billion to fund the growth of the Army and Marine Corps for the rest of FY 2009.

FUNDING REQUEST

The Department has been increasing overall end strength. The plan called for the increase of 92,000 Soldiers and Marines over 5 years – 65,000 Active Army and 27,000 Marines. These forces will enhance the combat capability of U.S. ground forces and improve the deployment-dwell ratio to reduce stress on deployable personnel and their families.

Army

The original Grow the Force plan called for growth of the Active, National Guard and Reserve Army by 74,200 by 2013, as follows:

- The Active Army will increase by 65,000 to 547,400
- The Army National Guard will increase by 8,200 to 358,200
- The Army Reserve will increase by 1,000 to 206,000

The FY 2009 President's Budget moved the funding for 43,000



active duty Soldiers and 2,600 Army National Guard Soldiers from the supplemental into the base budget.

Capitalizing on unprecedented success in recruiting and retention, the Army ended FY 2008 with an Active Component end strength of 543,645 and a National Guard end strength of 360,351, well above previously projected levels. The Army now expects to be able to meet the approved active end strength target of 547,400 by the end of FY 2009 instead of FY 2012 as previously planned. This will put the Army 15,000 above the 532,400 level funded in the FY 2009 base budget.

Similarly, the Army National Guard exceeded its FY 2013 end strength goal of 358,200 by 2,151 in FY 2008. Returning to the 358,200 end state level in FY 2009 will put the Guard 5,600 above the 352,600 end strength level funded in the base budget request.

Marine Corps

In addition to the Army, the Department planned to grow the Active Marine Corps by 27,000 for an end strength of 202,000 by FY 2011. Acceleration of this planned growth expedites increasing force structure to build three balanced globally sourced Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). The Marine Corps Active Component end strength was 198,505 at the end of FY 2008.

Like the Army, the Marine Corps has had impressive success in recruiting and retention. With accelerated growth, the Marine Corps expects to achieve 202,000 end strength by the end of FY 2009 rather than FY 2011 as originally planned. This puts the Marine Corps 8,000 personnel above the FY 2009 base budget level of 194,000 end strength. The FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations request includes funding for the Marine Corps to achieve its planned growth in an expedited manner.



U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Jeremy Clower, chief of Human Intelligence Exploitation Team 7, Regimental Combat Team 1, was sworn in by Chief Warrant Officer Derrick Freeman during his reenlistment ceremony on Camp Baharia, Iraq.

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Geoffrey T. Campbell - October 2008

SUMMARY

Accelerating Army and Marine Corps end strength growth will increase capabilities to meet global force demand. The growth will maximize the amount of time between deployments, reducing stress on forces and allow for more time for reconstitution and training – all of which are crucial to retaining the best Soldiers and Marines. Without these funds, the Military Departments will have difficulty meeting the deployment timelines, which will place a greater burden on troops currently in theater.



Wounded Warrior and Family Support

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide the highest quality support to our wounded warriors, as well as comprehensive support to all of our military families.


Bridge Enacted: \$0.8B

- Establishes clinical treatment programs for Traumatic Brain Injury and Psychological Health
- Modernizes medical treatment facilities that provide care to returning wounded warriors
- Increases clinical case managers to assist in healthcare delivery
- Establishes pre-deployment cognitive testing for deploying members


Remaining Request: \$1.6B*

- Improves healthcare services for our wounded warriors
- Streamlines disability and compensation systems
- Accelerates the opening of the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and the Fort Belvoir Army Community Hospital, while enhancing the facilities
- Expands the availability of child care and education for our military families

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding



Wounded Warrior and Family Support \$2.5B



^{*} A cancellation of \$3.4B in the base budget, to reflect savings in the price of fuel and a reduction to Army procurement items, offsets the cost of Family Support, NCR Acceleration, and Military Personnel requirements

Wounded Warrior and Family	FY 2007 FY 2008		FY 2009 Supplemental				
Support \$ in Billions	Enacted	Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total		
Wounded Warrior							
Wounded, III, and Injured	0.9*	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.8		
NCR Acceleration and Enhancement	<0.1	0.4	_	0.3	0.3		
Total Wounded Warrior	0.9	1.6	0.8	1.2	2.0		
Family Support							
Access to Child Care		0.3		0.4	0.4		
Military Spouse Careers			<0.1	<0.1	0.1		
Total Family Support	_	0.3	<0.1	0.4	0.5		
Total Wounded Warrior & Family Support	0.9	1.9	0.8	1.6	2.5		

^{* \$0.9}B enacted in FY 2007 for Traumatic Brain Injury/Psychological Health (TBI/PH) was previously included in the operations category. Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

Apart from the war itself, the Department has no greater priority than providing the highest quality support to wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. The Department requests \$2.0 billion to continue the investment in infrastructure, care and treatment, rehabilitation, and research and development for wounded, ill and injured soldiers. In June 2008, Congress appropriated \$0.8 billion to ensure that returning wounded, ill and injured members and their families have access to the full complement of services and benefits as their recovery leads to reintegration back into the Services or transition to the Department of Veterans Affairs. The Department now requests the remaining \$1.2 billion to continue to fund these programs.

The Department of Defense also requests \$0.4 billion to expand access to child care and provide career development opportunities for military spouses.



FUNDING REQUEST

Wounded Warrior

Wounded, III, and Injured (WII): To ensure the Department's efforts in this area are integrated, implemented, coordinated, and resourced, the Wounded, III and Injured Senior Oversight Committee (WII SOC) was established. The WII SOC streamlines, de-conflicts, and expedites the Department's efforts to improve the provision of medical care, disability processing, and transition activities to the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) for all military personnel. The committee is chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs and includes senior civilian and military leadership from both Departments (\$0.9 billion).

The Department of Defense is taking actions to:

- Improve the provision of healthcare services for wounded warriors and their families. Wounded warriors often present more complex, long-term injuries and therefore require greater resources for effective treatment and recovery. Funds ensure that medical operations, staffing, and equipment are available to the Services' specific programs and the Department-level initiatives. (\$0.1 billion)
- Enhance case management to include world-class quality care and service delivery for WII service members and their families from recovery and rehabilitation to reintegration into society. (<\$0.01 billion)
- Improve and streamline the disability and compensation systems by instituting a single, comprehensive medical exam for each wounded service member. The Department has completed the National Capitol Region (NCR) pilot program, and based on the lessons learned, the DoD and DVA will deploy the program across both agencies. (\$0.1 billion)
- Improve DoD/DVA data sharing by developing a userfriendly exchange of patient medical and personnel



information with the ultimate goal of full bi-directional data sharing capability as an end state. (\$0.1 billion)

- Ensure that incremental medical supplies and equipment are readily available, to include wheel-chair-accessible van to transport patients and information technology systems integral to the treatment of WII service members. (\$0.1 billion)
- Ensure that critical wartime medical and health professionals are available to provide needed healthcare services by improving hiring and retention bonuses and offering targeted special pays. (\$0.1 billion)
- Continue the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) Warrior in Transition (WIT) initiative by providing WIT facilities at key locations where the largest wounded, ill and injured populations exist. Funds will construct handicap-accessible barracks, soldier and family support centers and administrative facilities for Active, Reserve, and National Guard wounded, ill and injured members. (\$0.4 billion)
- Construct Wounded Warrior Battalion Headquarters and Marine Recovery and Resource Centers at Camp Lejeune

and Camp Pendleton to provide administrative support space, medical records file storage for the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior program, and family support services. (<\$0.1 billion)

National Capital Region (NCR) Acceleration and Enhancement: To provide the best possible medical facilities for the care and recovery of wounded servicemen and women in the NCR, the Department is accelerating the closing of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C. and the opening of both the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), Maryland, and the new Fort Belvoir Army Community Hospital (ACH), Virginia. (\$0.3 billion)

The Department is taking action to:

- Enhance and accelerate the Fort Belvoir ACH by 9 months from May 2011 to August 2010 and the new construction at WRNMMC by 8 months from May 2011 to October 2010, including Intensive Care Units, Operating Rooms, and key parts of the Warrior Care Center;
- · Consolidate various outlying clinics at Fort Belvoir; and
- Construct a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) clinic addition and other WTU facilities at WRNMMC.

Family Support

Child Care: The FY 2009 remaining request will accelerate the construction of childcare projects for each of the Military Services in order to expand access to childcare. Two-thirds of U.S. military personnel stationed in the United States live off base, often in remote areas. There is a shortage of childcare nationwide and military families consistently report difficulty in locating quality, affordable childcare, especially for infants. Accessibility of care is a top issue for deploying troops and

currently there are approximately 58,000 spaces needed for children of military families.

Included in this request is \$0.2 billion for the Navy and Marine Corps to fund construction of child development centers at ten locations in the United States. The Air Force has requested <\$0.1 billion for a Child Care facility in Spangdalem, Germany. The Army has requested \$0.1 billion for child development centers at 11 locations.

Additionally, \$0.1 billion is being requested to fund childcare private-public partnerships to further increase access for military families.

Military Spouses: This request supports tuition assistance for service members' spouses pursuing education, training or certification toward their career advancement. Additionally, this request would allow DoD to fund the first year of costs for military spouses selected for positions under existing Federal Agency career intern programs to provide military spouses with career development opportunities. (<\$0.1 billion)

SUMMARY

The Department takes its commitment to Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard Component members and their families very seriously. By ensuring access to world-class healthcare and state of the art living and support facilities, the Department backs up this commitment. Access to childcare and professional development opportunities also weigh heavily on the minds and hearts of service members and their families. The Department is committed to lessening these concerns by placing the resources well within reach of our beneficiaries. Failure to provide funding for any of the initiatives outlined above may place undue strain on U.S. troops and their families.

Border Security


HIGHLIGHTS


Bridge Enacted: None

Remaining Request: \$0.4B

- Conducts counternarcotics and other related activities along the United States-Mexico border
- Addresses services to be provided by other Federal agencies for southwest border-related activities

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding






Border Security \$ in Billions	FY 2007	FY 2008 Enacted	FY 2009 Supplemental				
	Enacted		Bridge Enacted	Request	Total		
Border Security	_	_	_	0.4	0.4		
Total Border Security	_		_	0.4	0.4		

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$0.4 billion for counternarcotics and other related activities along the United States-Mexico border.

FUNDING REQUEST

Border Security funding is in response to escalating problems of violence on the border. In order to address this emerging security situation, this request provides for \$350 million for counternarcotics and other related activities along the United States-Mexico border. Up to \$100 million of this request would be available for transfer to other Federal agencies for southwest border-related activities.



Military Personnel


HIGHLIGHTS


Bridge Enacted: None

Remaining Request: \$0.5B*

- Provides for additional Army Military Personnel emergent requirements
- Provides funding to compensate for shortfalls in Overseas
 Housing Allowances and Cost of Living Allowances associated
 with troops who were scheduled to move to the United States
 but are remaining overseas
- Funds National Guard support of the Presidential Inauguration
- Funds increased drill participation for the Army Reserve

FY 2009 Supplemental Funding





^{*} A cancellation of \$3.4B in the base budget, to reflect savings in the price of fuel and a reduction to Army procurement items, offsets the cost of Family Support, NCR Acceleration, and Military Personnel requirements

Military Personnel \$ in Billions	FY 2007	FY 2008 Enacted	FY 2009 Supplemental					
	Enacted		Bridge Enacted	Request	Total			
Military Personnel	_	_	_	0.5	0.5			
Total Military Personnel	_		_	0.5	0.5			

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$0.5 billion for significant FY 2009 base budget challenges within the Army military personnel accounts. To help alleviate these shortfalls and reduce future reprogramming requests, the Army has identified \$0.5 billion in FY 2008 and FY 2009 Procurement items for cancellation and reappropriation to these higher priority Military Personnel requirements.

FUNDING REQUEST

The request includes a provision to cancel and reappropriate \$0.5 billion in Army procurement items to fund higher priority emergent requirements in the base budget military personnel accounts.

Funding will support shortfalls in Overseas Housing Allowances and Cost of Living Allowances associated with the decision to delay redeployment of soldiers from Europe to the United States, emergent requirements such as National Guard support of the Presidential Inauguration, and increased drill attendance for the Army Reserve.



Table 1. Funding by Military Operation¹

\$ in Billions	EV 2007 Exected	FY 2008 Enacted		Percent Change		
	FY 2007 Enacted	F f 2008 Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Supplemental	Total	'08-'09
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)	122.7	135.1	46.2	40.4	86.6	-35.9%
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)	32.6	35.9	15.8	31.1	46.9	30.6%
Additional Requests ²	8.4	9.5	1.0	4.7	5.6	-41.1%
Non-DoD Classified	5.9	6.6	2.9	3.1	6.1	-7.4%
Total	169.5	187.1	65.9	79.2	145.1	-22.4%
Cancellation of Base Funding ² (Fuel Savings)	_	_	_	-2.9	-2.9	_
Cancellation of Base Funding ² (Procurement)	_	_	_	-0.5	-0.5	_
Cancellation of Base Funding ³ (O&M, DW)	_	_	_	-0.2	-0.2	_
Reappropriation of Base Funding ³ (Milcon, DW)	_	_	_	+0.2	+0.2	_
Cancellation of ASFF Funding ⁴ (One Year)	_	_	_	-0.1	-0.1	_
Reappropriation of ASFF Funding ⁴ (Two Year)	_	_	_	+0.1	+0.1	_
Cancellation of ISFF Funding ⁵ (One Year)	_	_	_	-1.0	-1.0	_
Reappropriation of ISFF Funding ⁵ (Two Year)	_	_	_	+1.0	+1.0	_
Total	169.5	187.1	65.9	75.8	141.7	-24.3%

Numbers may not add due to rounding

¹ Congress does not appropriate Supplemental funds by military operation. This estimate is subject to change depending on the needs of commanders in the field.

² Additional Requests amounts include \$3.4 billion of funds to be cancelled from the Base budget to offset the cost of Additional Requests in the FY 2009 Supplemental Request (\$2.2B for Accelerate/Grow the Force; \$0.4B for Family Support; \$0.3B for NCR Acceleration; \$0.5 for Military Personnel).

The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation within the Base budget: \$0.2B from O&M, Defense-Wide to Military Construction, Defense-Wide.

⁴ The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation of \$0.1B of \$2.0B ASFF funding provided in the FY09 Bridge to make it available until September 30, 2010

⁵ The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation of \$1.0B ISFF funding provided in the FY09 Bridge to make it available until September 30, 2010.

Table 2. Funding by Functional Category

\$ in Billions	EV 0007 E	EV 2000 E		FY 2009 Request		Percent Change	
Continuing the Fight	FY 2007 Enacted	FY 2008 Enacted	Bridge Enacted	Supplemental	Total	FY08 - FY09	
Operations	76.6	77.5	38.2	38.0	76.2	-1.7%	
Force Protection	12.4	23.9	4.5	9.8	14.3	-40.0%	
IED Defeat	4.4	4.2	2.0	1.5	3.5	-17.5%	
Military Intelligence Program	3.4	4.9	1.4	3.8	5.1	4.1%	
Iraq Security Forces	5.5	3.0	1.0	_	1.0	-66.7%	
Afghan National Security Forces	7.4	2.7	2.0	3.6	5.6	107.7%	
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability	_	_	_	0.4	0.4	_	
Coalition Support	1.4	1.4	0.3	1.4	1.7	23.6%	
CERP	1.0	1.7	1.0	0.5	1.4	-17.6%	
Military Construction	0.9	1.3	_	0.9	0.9	-30.8%	
Subtotal Continuing the Fight	113.0	120.5	50.4	59.9	110.2	-8.5%	
Reconstitution	36.3	50.5	11.6	11.6	23.2	-54.1%	
Additional Requests ¹							
BCTs / RCTs	3.6	_	_	_	_		
Grow the Force / Accelerate Grow the Force ²	1.5	0.5	0.1	2.2	2.3	360.0%	
Wounded Warrior / Family Support / NCR ³	0.9	1.9	0.8	1.6	2.5	31.6%	
Border Security with Mexico	_	_	_	0.4	0.4	_	
Military Personnel	_	_	_	0.5	0.5	_	
Other Requests and Non-DoD Classified ⁴	14.2	13.7	2.9	3.1	6.1	-55.5%	
Subtotal Additional Requests	20.2	16.1	3.9	7.8	10.9	-32.3%	
Total	169.5	187.1	65.9	79.2	145.1	-22.4%	
Cancellation of Base Funding ¹ (Fuel Savings)	_	_	_	-2.9	-2.9	_	
Cancellation of Base Funding ¹ (Procurement)	_		_	-0.5	-0.5		
Cancellation of Base Funding ⁵ (O&M, DW)	_		_	-0.2	-0.2	_	
Reappropriation of Base Funding ⁵ (Milcon, DW)	_		_	+0.2	+0.2	_	
Cancellation of ASFF Funding ⁶ (One Year)	_	_	_	-0.1	-0.1	_	
Reappropriation of ASFF Funding ⁶ (Two Year)	_	_	_	+0.1	+0.1	_	
Cancellation of ISFF Funding ⁷ (One Year)	_	_	_	-1.0	-1.0	_	
Reappropriation of ISFF Funding ⁷ (Two Year)	_	_	_	+1.0	+1.0	_	
Total	169.5	187.1	65.9	75.8	141.7	-24.3%	

¹ Additional Requests include \$3.4 billion to be cancelled from the Base budget to offset the costs in the FY 2009 Supplemental Request (\$2.2B for Accelerate/Grow the Force; \$0.4B for Family Support; \$0.3B for NCR Acceleration; \$0.5 for Military Personnel). ² Congress appropriated funding for Grow the Force in FY 2007 and Accelerate Grow the Force in FY 2008. In FY 2009, Congress appropriated \$0.1B in Bridge funding and the Department is requesting an additional \$2.2B to fund Army and Marine Corps Accelerate Grow the Force. ³ FY 2007, FY 2008 and FY 2009 columns include amounts for Wounded Warrior and Family Support programs. \$0.3B is included in FY 2009 for National Capital Region Acceleration. ⁴ FY 2007, FY 2008 and FY 2009 columns include amounts for Non-DoD Clasified programs. FY 2007 / FY 2008 columns include amounts for other requests, e.g., baseline fuel. ⁵ The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation within the Base budget: \$0.2B from O&M, Defense-Wide to Military Construction, Defense-Wide. ⁶ The FY09

Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation of \$0.1B of \$2.0B ASFF funding provided in the FY09 Bridge to make it available until September 30, 2010. The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation of \$1.0B ISFF funding provided in the FY09 Bridge to make it available until September 30, 2010.

Table 3. Funding by Appropriation Title

\$ in Billions		FY 2007 Enacted	nacted FY 2008 Enacted F			FY 2009 Reques	st	Percent Change		
	Title IX	Supplemental	Total	Bridge	Supplemental	Total	Bridge	Supplemental ²	Total	FY08 - FY09
Military Personnel	5.4	12.4	17.7	1.1	18.1	19.1	1.2	16.7	17.9	-6.5%
Operation and Maintenance	40.8	46.5	87.3	54.3	34.9	89.3	55.2	34.2	89.4	0.1%
Procurement	18.5	28.2	46.7	27.1	37.1	64.2	6.6	21.8	28.4	-55.8%
RDT&E	0.1	0.5	0.6	_	0.9	0.9	<0.1	0.4	0.4	-56.8%
Military Construction		1.7	1.7	_	4.2	4.2	_	2.1	2.1	-50.5%
Revolving and Management Funds		1.1	1.1	1.0	1.7	2.7		0.8	0.8	-68.6%
Subtotal	64.9	90.4	155.3	83.5	97.0	180.5	63.0	76.0	139.0	-23.0%
Additional Request and Non-DoD Classified ¹	5.1	9.1	14.2	3.3	3.3	6.6	2.9	3.1	6.1	-7.4%
Total	70.0	99.5	169.5	86.8	100.3	187.1	65.9	79.2	145.1	-22.4%
Cancellation of Base Funding ² (Fuel Savings)	_	_	_		_			-2.9	-2.9	
Cancellation of Base Funding ² (Procurement)	_	_			_			-0.5	-0.5	
Cancellation of Base Funding ³ (O&M, DW)	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-0.2	-0.2	_
Reappropriation of Base Funding ³ (Milcon, DW)	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	+0.2	+0.2	_
Cancellation of ASFF Funding ⁴ (One Year)			_	_	_	_	_	-0.1	-0.1	_
Reappropriation of ASFF Funding ⁴ (Two Year)	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	+0.1	+0.1	_
Cancellation of ISFF Funding ⁵ (One Year)			_	_	_	_	_	-1.0	-1.0	_
Reappropriation of ISFF Funding ⁵ (Two Year)		_	_	_	_	_	_	+1.0	+1.0	_
Total	70.0	99.5	169.5	86.8	100.3	187.1	65.9	75.8	141.7	-24.3%

¹ FY 2007 enacted total includes \$5.9B of Non-DoD Classified appropriations and \$8.4B of Additional Request (e.g., BCTs/RCTs, Grow the Force, Wounded Warrior); FY 2008 and FY 2009 columns include Non-DoD classified funding only.

Additional Requests amounts include \$3.4 billion of funds to be cancelled from the base budget to offset the FY 2009 supplemental cost of Accelerate/Grow the Force (\$2.2B); Family Support (\$0.4B); NCR Acceleration (\$0.3B); Military Personnel (\$0.5B).

³ The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation within the Base budget: \$0.2B from Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide to Military Construction, Defense-Wide.

⁴ The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation of \$0.1B of \$2.0B ASFF funding provided in the FY09 Bridge to make it available until September 30, 2010.

⁵ The FY09 Supplemental Request includes a request for a cancellation/reappropriation of \$1.0B ISFF funding provided in the FY09 Bridge to make it available until September 30, 2010.